The Construction of Habib Rizieq Shihab's Political Islamic Thought in the Post-Reform Indonesian Context

Dede Hidayat,[1*] Dody S. Truna,[2] Mohammad Taufiq Rahman,[3] Asep Muhyidin [4]

[1] Yayasan Arafah Cendekia Garut
[2] UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung
[3] UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung
[4] UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung

* Corresponding Author, Email: studiagamaagamars@gmail.com

Abstract: This article describes a religious movement figure in post-Reformation Indonesia (1998), namely Habib Rizieq Shihab, who had a mass organization considered radical, namely the Islamic Defenders Front. This article answers the accusation that Shihab was anti-state politics, anti-Pancasila, anti-the Republic of Indonesia, and was intolerant of anyone different from the movement he had led. This study uses the content analysis method, namely analyzing the ideas in Shihab's writings and lectures to reveal his Islamic political ideology. This study found that Shihab's theology was Ashary and Shafiy Sunni with Alawiy Tareqat order. The Muslim Brotherhood influenced Shihab's thoughts and Al-Maududi's ideas, namely, aspiring to an Islamic state or formalizing religious constitutional law into a condition known as Islamic law. At the local level, Shihab was influenced by the local scholar M. Natsir. However, Shihab's political Islamic thought results gave distinctive features and differed from the existing typology. Shihab accepted Pancasila as the basis of the state. However, the "Shari'ated Indonesia" concept was a theistic concept perceived as implementing the Islamic caliphate vision and mission and the reincarnation of the 1945 Jakarta Charter Pancasila.

Keywords: Political Islam; Islamic Defenders Front; divine statehood; Islamic Sharia; Indonesian Muslims

1.   Introduction

The phenomenon of religious radicalism in various parts of the world has encouraged intellectuals and policymakers to pay attention to religion's position in discussions on public space (Toepler et al., 2020). Faith in the context of the public space has begun to be projected to create an equal space for communication to find social morals in building a peaceful life (Kriyantono & McKenna, 2017). In Indonesia, where the majority of the population is Muslim, public discourse seems inseparable from the role of the Islamic scholars (*ulama*). Ulama have long proven to be essential actors who influence politically, sociologically, and culturally on Indonesian society's historical dynamics . One of them is to voice and interpret the relationship between religion and state. The relationship between religion and state, considered 'final' with the concept of the state Pancasila, began to be discussed. Its legitimacy was debated in open spaces in the reform era (Ichwan, 2011; Sayyid, 2017).

The demand for a return to the Jakarta Charter has strengthened militant Islamic groups that have shouted Sharia's application and staged radical actions in the public sphere (Hefner, n.d.). In Indonesia's context, the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. It accommodates a plurality of ethnic groups and religions firmly held by the state and legitimized by mainstream ulama. Therefore, the emergence of an alternative discourse on religious politics that legitimizes the caliphate system or the Indonesian idea of "having Islamic law" can be understood as an attempt to enter the center of discourse (Nurrohman Syarif, 2006).

There was a fragmentation of authority within the spectrum of old religious authority itself. It generally encourages moderate Islamic discourse and supports Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Syam et al., 2020). Meanwhile, the fragmentation is more extensive and unstable among the new religious authorities. The spectrum includes those who recognize the Republic of Indonesia but agree on implementing Islamic law (Shari'ated NKRI) to those who aspire to uphold an Islamic state or caliphate. Also, changes in the constellation and political configuration that occurred steadily in the era of electoral democracy led to increasingly vital struggles for and contested religious authority. The Regional Leader Election, Legislative Election, or Presidential Election moments are critical moments in which political actors compete to play religious symbols and issues for their electoral interests (Mohammad Taufiq Rahman & Setia, 2022).

For example, the 212 incident in the context of the Jakarta local election clearly shows how the accusation of blasphemy addressed to Basuki Tjahja Purnama or Ahok was able to mobilize thousands of masses. In this incident, there were also faint demands for applying Sharia and caliphate as an alternative to overcome various problems of the nation (Hatherell & Welsh, 2017).

Among the ulama who fought for political Islam in Indonesia was Habib Rizieq Shihab. He is known as a scholar from the Habibs in Indonesia with many followers and a preacher based on socio-religious organizations. He was often criticized and called a radical leader after declaring and leading the FPI religious organization in 1998. Because in actualizing, the movement is always associated with physical violence. Rizieq Shihab should be considered in religious and political thought because he has a formal and informal educational background. However, there are often contradictions with Indonesian leaders' ideas, especially figures supporting the government in power (the state) from religious and political thoughts. Some people understand Habib Rizieq Shihab's studies as an Islamic political sect and have fundamental views. It is named fundamental because Rizieq Shihab cannot be isolated from the text of the sacred book he believes in as he discusses his faith. It has also become the legality or symbol of its struggle, which is included in the FPI doctrine (Dwicahyo, 2017).

Habib Rizieq Shihab's thoughts on his relationship with state politics, Rizieq Shihab criticized the Indonesian state's basis, namely Pancasila, which Rizieq Shihab considered to have been influenced and many interpretations that were distorted by the ruling party and harmed Muslims (Maula, 2019).

This study focuses on Habib Rizieq Shihab's political Islamic thoughts. This discussion is essential based on several reasons. Habib Rizieq Shihab is one of the Ulama-Habaib members, a famous figure among the Indonesian people and known as a significant Habaib individual, particularly after the 212 Islamic defense action. *Second*, Shihab has a big impact on his members or congregation. Even the name of Shihab Rizieq is identified as one of the five ulama most affected by elections based on an Indonesian survey carried out by Denny JA Circle (Lubis, 2020). Rizieq Shihab's thoughts are always used as a reference by each member and his congregation in acting in every movement they carry out. Of course, this will affect the thought process of the political Islam movement in Indonesia (Thibburruhany, 2019). *Third*, Rizieq Shihab has always considered his thoughts controversial; even Rizieq Shihab was once jailed to account for his case. Rizieq Shihab is also considered to be against the current thought that has been considered established with Indonesia's current conditions, namely nationalist thinking, especially in interpreting Pancasila as the basis of a state that has been considered an agreement with Indonesian citizens. There is an assumption that Rizieq Shihab does not know the true history of Pancasila's meaning (Maula, 2019). *Fourth*, Rizieq Shihab's thoughts on religion and nationality are uniquely different from the Ulama, Habibs, and other Indonesian Muslim scholars, namely that Rizieq Shihab is clearly influenced by strong thoughts religious movements, colored by the influence of Islamic credo. Then Rizieq Shihab offered the idea of a sharia NKRI concept. This concept does not mean changing the state ideology of Pancasila or other pillars of the state. Still, Rizieq offers Pancasila's idea, the 1945 Constitution, which is interpreted by Islamic law, namely the concept of Pancasila tauhid (bin Husein, 2012).

Religion is the identity of universal human social life (Sterelny, 2018). All society components have a methodology of thinking, typology, and behavior patterns that qualify to be called "religion" (Stolz & Usunier, 2019). Dogmatic, orthodox, and obedient religion (which we might call holiness) significantly tolerates emotional disturbances (Elsässer, 2021). People generally trouble themselves with a deep belief in aesthetics, shoulds, and obligations (Fazi, 2021). Emotionally healthy people are soft, open, tolerant, and willing to change, while very religious people tend to be rigid, closed, intolerant, and unwilling to change; therefore, piety in many ways is the same as irrational thinking and emotional disturbance (Frank, 2019). Many so-called religions are included in the superstructure; religion consists of symbols, images, beliefs, and specific values by which human beings interpret their existence (MahdiNejad et al., 2020). Still, because religion also contains a ritual component, some religions are also classified as social structures (Sosis, 2019).

In Islam, there is no dichotomy between religion and politics (the state) (Montgomery & Heathershaw, 2016). Both are organically related, even integral to the economic structure of an Islamic state. According to Al-Ghazali, religion is the basis, and the state is the guardian (Kirabaev & Al-Janabi, 2019). In Islam, Muslims must simultaneously appoint leaders with high charisma and religious figures; thus, religion is protected from power. Even al-Gazali stated that politics occupies a significant and strategic position, only one level below prophecy. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that managing people's affairs is essential to religious obligations, but this does not mean religion cannot exist without a state (M Taufiq Rahman, 2010).

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, human welfare cannot be created except in one social order where everyone depends on each other (M Taufiq Rahman, 2010). For Iqbal, there is no separation between spiritual and material, religion, and state (Iqbal, 2013). Religion can likely develop if the political conditions allow for religious political maneuvers (Masroor et al., 2019). *Hijrah* of the prophet Muhammad is the first political maneuver he did and is the city that helps and has the potential to develop religion. Islam claims to be the last religion and contains all moral and religious truths needed by all humankind in the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Masud, 1990).

In Islam, the relationship between religion and the state does not matter. The issue that Muslims dispute is over who has the right to lead the ummah and the method of choosing them. Traditionalist Muslims claim that in Islam, religion and politics are inseparable (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2020; Ojewunmi, n.d.). Western attempts to privatize Islam are seen as attacks on Islam. The problem is whether the statement is true or just an argument to sustain the ulama and the Muslim community's status. Islam is a religion that is embraced by the majority of Indonesian people (Makin, 2018).

The nation-state was born out of a long period of torture among the nation's top officials. A nationality-oriented state is an ideal, enthusiastic, and unified state. No human variations depend on differences in religion, race, traditions, history, etc. The "Jakarta Charter" was born due to a meeting of minds of 9 (nine) national figures chaired by Soekarno, his deputy chairman Muhammad Hatta, and the like in Indonesia (Anshari, 1981). Pancasila is the philosophy and ideology of the Indonesian nation. It is a noble agreement for the nation's citizens who need appreciation as the nation's political ijtihad. As a state principle, the Pancasila agreement is simultaneously a source of law because all laws compiled must refer to it (Burhani, 2017). The 1945 Constitution provides accurate and systemic directions to achieve the Indonesian nation's ideals in Pancasila. The Indonesian nation chose the basis of the state in its historical journey, which is not new. Pancasila has always been only used as a political tool to benefit the ruling regime. In the Reformation, Pancasila was used as an umbrella guard for heretical sects, blasphemy of religion, and a driving force for neoliberal economic development. Secularists have been fanning as creators of Pancasilas (bin Husein, 2012).

This research takes the form of a qualitative literature study where the object of study is Habib Rizieq Shihab's political Islamic thought, both in written and oral form that has been archived in the form of books, articles, papers, lectures, etc. This type of research is considered appropriate because what is being studied is how people perceive and interpret life based on the perspective

of the person who is the research object by looking at some socio-cultural phenomena (Daher et al., 2017).

As library research, the research data is obtained from various literature, both from the work of Habib Rizieq Shihab as the figure under study and other research sources. The data sources are books, other writings, and transcribed lectures related to the discussed research topic. Primary data sources are collected by the figures' works concerned individually or simultaneously (analogy) on the topic being researched (as primary data). Then read and traced other works produced by that figure in other fields. A thinker has thoughts that have an organic relationship. Outlining speeches or lectures on religious themes, nationality including Islam, politics, pluralism, multiculturalism, and the nation-state. Among the primary data sources in this study are: (1) Habib Rizieq thesis*'s "The Effect of Pancasila on the Implementation of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia."* This thesis was written by Habib Rizieq Shihab when he finished his studies at the Fiqh and Ushul Department of the Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya Kuala Lumpur, in 2012 (Sugara, 2017). (2) Habib Rizieq Shihab "*National Insight Towards a Sharia Unitary Republic of Indonesia*." This book is a collection of dialogues and the Habib Rizieq Shihab movement doctrine, which has served as FPI guidelines in conducting *amar maruf nahyi munkar*, with a thickness of 718 pages, with Publisher Pustaka Ibnu Sidah, 2nd edition, 2008 (bin Husein, 2012). (3) Al-habib Muhammad Rizieq Bin Husen Shihab "*FPI Dialogue Amar Ma'ruf nahi Munkar*". This book is a collection of Habib Rizieq Shihab's thoughts on religion and nationality regarding Islam. Secondary sources of knowledge have been traced through other people's works regarding the figures or subjects under analysis.

2. Results and Discussion

2.1. Religion and Secularism

Rizieq Shihab understands that secularism is the separation of religion and state while. Liberalism is the freedom to think, say, do, and have religion. Pluralism is the uniformity of religion in that every religion is the same and true. Researchers analyzing this understanding have become debated Islamic groups into two camps. The first group strongly rejects the average that this group emerges from a religious group that provides a textual caption tied to religious texts (Squire, 2019). The second group that contextually accepts this group's understanding emerges from academic, religious thinkers who have been influenced and opened up to Western thoughts (Mukhammadolim, 2019). Their interpretation is the same as the first group taking from sacred texts. It's just that there are differences in the interpretation methodology of the two camps. Whereas in the researchers' opinion, the meaning of functionality is the same, namely for the common good, on the one hand, to maintain the purity of the doctrine. And the second group aims to foster a sense of tolerance and tolerance between fellow human beings who live full of differences, be it race, religion, ethnicity, and ethnicity. The second group considers pluralism not to equate a religion as an equally true belief. Still, the justification of truth is only implanted in the private area alone, not published significantly to people with other religious beliefs. Because if there is a claim to the truth itself, it will be forced into conflict and hostility between every religious person (Ratcliffe, 2020).

Pluralism construed the second group as plurality, or religious diversity, as necessary for universal history. In theology's language, a plurality of religious diversity is the *Sunnat al-Allah* (the certainty of God's law), which is eternal. The Qur'an repeatedly affirms the signs of the plurality of this religion, as contained in the letter al-Baqarah (2): 148: *"And for each umma, there is its qibla (wijhah) which he faces to him; then you are competing (in doing) goodness. Wherever you are, Allah will gather you all (on the Day of Resurrection). Verily Allah has power over all things "*. The word *wijha*h in tafsir scholars' terminology has many meanings, including the direction of qibla, goals, views, and orientation. It means that each umma or religious community (*ahl al-adyan / al-millat*) has a direction, qibla, goals, orientations, and different perspectives. The idea of plurality as the certainty of God's law, which is eternal (perennial), is also stated in the Al-Quran surah al-Maidah

(5): 48, which translates: "For every ummah among you, We give you the rules (*shir'a*) and the strictest way (*minhaj*), if Allah wills, He will make you one umma (only), but Allah wants to test you against His gift to you, then compete in making policies. " The words *Shir'at* and *minhaj*, usually translated as rules and clear paths, can also be interpreted as religious practices. It means that every umma or religious community (*ahl al-adyan / al-millat*) has different religious practices from one another (Kahmad, pp. 26-27). Meanwhile, historically it is empirical; according to Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, the diversity or plurality of religion is caused by differences in the level of historical development, civilization, and the location of the ummah who accept it. Furthermore, Ismail Raji al-Faruqi explained that religion's origin is one because it comes from one God, namely what he calls the Religion or religion of fitrah *(Din al-Fithrat)*, as Allah says. *"Then turn your face to Allah with straight, determine or fitrah Allah who has created humans on top of that nature. There is no change in the nature of Allah. That is the true religion, however, most people don't know. "*(QS.al-Rum: 30).

The authors see a shift in the meaning of language related to pluralism, liberalism, and secularism today, different from past and present pluralism, secularism, and liberalism. Researchers feel it is essential to discuss the dichotomy between the two poles of either conservative or modernist groups. Because if this continues to be sharpened, there will be a hazardous division within the Muslim group. In essence, the existence of pluralism, liberalism, and secularism is to eliminate conflict.

According to Rizieq Shihab, jihad is a way to enforce the sentence of Allah SWT physically or violently. There will be many understandings of takfirism in practice, which means kafir-kafir groups within the Muslims. When faced with a state currently considered legitimate, it will give birth to the legitimacy of a *thagut* state and a kafir state. However, the blood of innocent non-Muslims spilled a lot in the name of holy war. Shihab has his "interpretation of the deconstruction of Jihad and Syahid" in analyzing jihad.

Al-Banna (Al-Banna, 1978) urged Muslims not to be afraid to die honorably to defend their country and religion. Al-Maududi (Maududi, 1986) stated that Jihad "for the sake of Allah" does not allow forcing non-Muslims to convert to Islam. Jihad also calls for the expansion of politics and Islamic territory because it is only by being under one "Islamic State" in the world that humanity can benefit from Islamic ideology and welfare programs. Islam's goal has not changed to call on all humans to worship Allah Almighty; therefore, this movement must be encouraged to achieve it. This is the mission of the prophet Muhammad SAW.

Sayyid Qutb rejects the mission of Islamic hegemony must be vigorously fought to the death or submit. Jihad is a combative and offensive waged for the sake of human liberation. Jihad with discourse only occurs among people who live under a government that upholds God's law. Jihad can only be considered defensive as it defends human beings from all the factors that limit their independence. All these obstacles to freedom and progress must be removed by force (M Taufiq Rahman, 2010). Al-Banna and al-Maududi interpret the shared concepts of *jihad*.

2.2. Construction of Shihab's Thought for Politics in Indonesia

Researchers analyzed Rizieq Shihab to understand Islam as a religion of love, compassion, and peace. Islam highly values religious freedom; no one should be forced to convert to Islam. In Islamic teachings, everyone is free to believe in his religion's truth, just as he is also free to reject other religious facts he does not consider. Political Islam is Islam, which places politics as one of the fighting instruments to uphold Islam, protect its people's benefit, and maintain humankind's safety of humanity.

Shihab considers Pancasila following Sharia or *shar'i* because it does not contradict Islamic teachings. Rizieq Shihab connects religion and state strictly and cannot be separated or not partially practicing religion but must be practiced as a whole. Researchers analyzed statements using two approaches, namely the Hermeneutic approach and the historical approach. The researcher's analysis has to be final because it has been agreed upon because the substance related to the concept

of Pancasila and religion, in particular, is not contradictory and should not be contested. Both do not defeat each other and even support each other.

Indonesia was a monotheistic state based on the One God Almighty, Allah SWT. The word "divinity" has two meanings: textual and contextual. So, Rizieq Shihab's legitimacy for interpreting Almighty God's principle is one-sided for one group in the Muslim community. As for the historical approach, the researcher analyzes: *First*, religious practice is so strong, and rooted, and has colored the development of the Indonesian nation's life since the kingdom, the colonial period to independence. The divinity in this precept is not only a sociological phenomenon of the Indonesian nation, but also lays the foundation of religious, ethical morals taught by religions for the administration of the state so that every fulfillment of the ideals of independence is to create an independent, united, sovereign national life. Just and prosperous contains a moral obligation. Based on this First principle, Godhead in One God, divine values underlie the Indonesian nation's public-political life. There is a positive belief that although there are various kinds of religions, the prophetic mission of religion has good ethical-religious linkages. Ibn Amir Haj, stated "summarizing these universal goals or values (protecting religion, soul, or life, mind, and property), has been determined through research on the reality and the results of observations of traditions *of religious* and teachings" (Ibn Amir, Vol., P. 144).

Only three out of 27 members of the PPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) came from Islamic groups. In stipulating the Constitution, there was an incident where clauses accompanying the divine precepts were erased. Islamic terms included initially in the articles of the Constitution were also abolished. In the Qur'an's eyes, Muslims are strictly forbidden to force others to follow their beliefs (al-Baqarah: 256). The attributes of the One and Only God were crowned as a companion to the divine records in the Jakarta Charter. But this does not mean that followers of other religions do not have the freedom to interpret the first precepts according to their respective religions (Maarif, 1996).

In addition to the lack of representative seats from loyalist Islamic groups, it is also influenced by the weak political communication of Islamic groups, and the diplomacy carried out by Soekarno against Muhammad Hatta shows political resilience. Soekarno was an authoritative or charismatic leader, so diplomacy affected everyone at the PPKI session. Of course, this could not be called treason because Soekarno guaranteed Islamic groups by defending the word of the One and Only. It is wise so that Islamic groups accept Pancasila non-charter Jakarta with *tawakkal*.

The researcher analyzed the Republic of Indonesia's statement as a Shariah and Khilafah Islamiyyah, which Rizieq Shihab initiated as an idea towards a process of struggle to uphold Islamic law.

Rizieq Shihab explained the meaning of the Sharia NKRI in his lecture via Youtube Video (Front TV: 2018). Rizieq Shihab provides 17 definitions of the Sharia NKRI, including:

1) NKRI with Shariah is NKRI which has religions, not atheist nor communist without religion.
2) NKRI which is devoted to the One and Only.
3) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI which upholds the noble values of the One and Only Godhead.
4) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI, which submits and obeys God Almighty's law, namely Allah SWT's law.
5) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI which is just and civilized.
6) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI that maintains the unity of Indonesia.
7) NKRI with shari'a is the Republic of Indonesia that prioritizes deliberation in the nation's life and state, according to the mandate of society's principles, led by wisdom in representation.
8) The NKRI with Sharia is the Republic of Indonesia that rejects Socialist and capitalist Neolibs to realize social justice principles for all Indonesians.

9) The Shared NKRI is the Republic of Indonesia that guarantees every religious community to carry out their respective spiritual practices and Sharia.

10) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI, which protects the people from all immorality.

11) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI, which presents mandated officials and not betrayal.

12) The NKRI is the NKRI that protects the Muslim umma as the majority of the Indonesian people from consuming all haram products, food and beverages, clothing, cosmetics, and cleaning tools and medicines.

13) NKRI with shari'a, NKRI, which respects the ulama and the students, does not criminalize or terrorize.

14) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI, which is indigenous in its own country.

15) NKRI with shari'a is NKRI that respects and protects madrasas and pesantren, not marginalizing and suspecting them.

16) NKRI with shari'a is the NKRI, anti-corruption, anti-alcoholic, anti-drug, anti-gambling, anti-pornography, anti-porn action anti-prostitution, anti-LGBT, anti-terrorist, anti-separatist, anti-slander, anti-lies, anti-evil and anti-tyranny.

17) The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is NKRI, based on Pancasila, and the Constitution of 18 August 1945 was inspired by the Jakarta Charter on 22 June 1945. It is by the mandate of the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959.

Rizieq Shihab's statement does not contradict the values of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution that exists today. The word NKRI as Sharia is not to be applied as the Republic of Indonesia already practices Islamic principles. Still, only if anything needs to be combated with Islam can be achieved by battling the law with the people's representative media controlled by the state. The Sharia Republic of Indonesia, which Rizieq Shihab initiated, the researcher analyzed through the following approaches:

First, the historical approach, fighting for the form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, results from a tiring and exhausting struggle and the minds of the founders of the nation, including the scholars, facing various challenges and in its existence test. Indonesia is a pluralistic country and a very high plurality. The Indonesian nation consists of multiple religions, ethnicities, and cultures that inhabit 17,504 islands in Indonesia. To accommodate this plurality, a unitary state was established based on the unity of the elements that make it up: the people of various ethnic groups, groups, cultures, languages, religions, regions, and others. The unitary state becomes a container that protects all spills. Indonesian blood unites all aspects of national life, covering geography, demography, natural resources, ideology, politics, economy, social, and national defense and security. In Article 1 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, it is stated that "the State of Indonesia is a Unitary State in the form of a Republic" and in Article 37 paragraph (5) "Especially regarding the form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, changes cannot be made." The changes in the Constitution of 1945 strengthen the form of a unitary state. It is the final effort of the struggle of Indonesia's entire population, including Muslims, to establish a country.

Indonesia is a place to carry out the da'wah, which is accommodating, selective, and pious. The absorption of Islamic law into national law will benefit the Indonesian people, mostly Muslims. Three methods of absorbing Islamic Sharia can be done. The most important thing is that the state protects, guarantees, and regulates public worship freedom to practice their religion. The Shari'a does not need to be formalized, but the values and substance of Sharia must continue to fill and animate. This section is divided into three calcifications: first, Islamic law, which regulates private law, and civil law, which contains sharia rules regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. Second, public law or laws concerning the public interest is applied to all citizens. This public law requires legal unity among all citizens because distinguishing public law rules based on the people's religion will create chaos in the country. Third, Islamic law remains a source of national law that fills, animates, and contributes to national legal products' value.

In the context of its application, Islamic law has a theological and practical dimension. When it is related to the concept of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, Islamic laws have been applied in Indonesia except in the case of *hudud* and *qisas* crimes because these are adjusted to *wad'i* law (*sabab, sharat, man'i, legal, fasad*), which determines the direction of *taklifi*. But if the reality of *wad'i* law is fulfilled, the stipulation becomes mandatory. So, it is incorrect to claim or accuse that a country does not apply Islamic law without first ascertaining whether *wadl'i* law in the context of the country supports it. Even not using shari'a like *hudud* and *qisas* in the reality that *wad'i* law supports this expectation is part of implementing the Sharia itself. Then there is the theory of evolution in the theory of social change. In applying a law, it is necessary to pay attention to the gradual principle and consider the impact of mafsada. In this case, it is essential to evaluate the spiritual readiness of the community. Without this principle, imposing the application of Sharia to the reality of the society that rejects it makes them run away from religion.

The researcher analyzes that Islam as a comprehensive religion *(din Syamil Kamil) can* not overlook state and government issues from the discussion agenda, although not in a complete concept, but in the form of fundamental values and principles *(mabadi 'hamyah)*. Islam has provided *guidance* sufficient for its people. Nahdlatul Ulama mass organizations also view Islamic leadership as appointing a leader *(nashb al-imam) is* obligatory because human life will be chaotic without a leader. It is reinforced by leading scholars' statements, including Al-Ghazali (t.th: Juz 1:17). *"The power of the state and religion are twins. Religion is the foundation, while state power is the guardian. Something that has no bodyguard will be wasted. "* And Ibn Taimiyyah (t.th:217): *"Indeed, the task of regulating and managing the affairs of many people (in a government and state) is one of the greatest religious obligations. It is caused by the absence of a firm upholding religion without any government support."*

The researcher believes that Islam does not determine or even oblige a specific form of state and system of government for its adherents. The ummah is given the authority to regulate and design a government system following the demands of the times and places' progress. However, the most important thing is that a government must protect and guarantee its citizens to practice and apply their religious teachings and become a conducive place for prosperity, prosperity, and justice. As a government system, the Khilafah is a historical fact practiced by al-Khulafa al-Rashidun (The Righteous Caliph). The Righteous Caliph is a model that fits well with the era when human life is not yet under *nation-states'* auspices. At that time, Muslims could live in a system *Khilafah.* When humankind takes shelter under the *nation's States*, the system *caliphate* for Muslims worldwide loses relevance. Even reviving the idea of the caliphate in our day is utopia.

The Unitary State of the Republic (NKRI) results from a noble national agreement between the nation's founding sons. The NKRI was formed to accommodate all the nation's elements, which are diverse in ethnicity, language, culture, and religion. All nation elements must maintain and strengthen the Republic of Indonesia's integrity. Therefore, every way and attempt to emerge from movements that threaten the Republic of Indonesia's integrity must be resisted because it will cause great corruption *(mafsadah)* and division of the people.

Muslims should not be trapped in symbols and formality of names that appear to be Islamic but must commit to the substance in everything. In the adage popular among scholars, *"What holds the essence is the substance, not symbolic or external." The main holding is given a name (meaning), not the name itself* (Ali Al-Qari, The most significant, p. 122).

Although Indonesia is not an Islamic state, it is legal from an Islamic perspective. Likewise, Pancasila is the basis of the state; although it is not Sharia/religion, it is not contradictory, even in line with Islam. As a consequence of the Republic of Indonesia's legitimacy, all elements of the nation are obliged to defend and defend their sovereignty. The government and people have their respective rights and obligations. The government's primary duty is to create the prosperity and welfare of its people in a just and devout manner. Meanwhile, the people must obey the government, as long as it does not conflict with Islamic teachings.

Indonesia is an Islamic State as an area once controlled and inhabited by Muslims. As a nation-state, Indonesia's ideals pledged in the youth oath in 1928 did not contradict Islamic norms. Muslims

do not need to worry and bother to change the state's basis or even establish a "new state" based on Islamic law. It is because Indonesia has fulfilled the aspirations of the Muslim community. Even without the formal application of Islamic law and the state system (state religion), the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) remains a religious state. The former Chairman of the Nahdatul Ulama (PBNU) Executive Board, KH Hasyim Muzadi, once advised that it is sufficient to seriously acknowledge and obey a legitimate and sovereign government, even though it is not in the form of a religious state (*Khilafah*). Because following the government is one thing, which is obligatory while establishing a religious state is another, which is not mandatory.

The researchers analyze politics as a world affair (*al-umur al-dunyawiyyat*) placed and managed as the realm of ijtihad (Moten, 1996). It means that politics is part of *muʾamalah* affairs in the realm of "*al-ibahah*", namely the free choice of how to do it, so it does not have to be left behind (M Taufiq Rahman, 2016). When Muhammadiyah does not pursue a political-practical struggle and prefers the struggle for social *daʾwah*, this step is justified by religion as a way of ijtihad in its category "*al-ibahah*"or ability (Mulkhan, 1999). It is not prohibited in Islam Islam as "*Din wa Daulah*" is jargon and the result of *ijtihad* thinking, not a *qothiy* commandment of Islamic teachings. According to some views, the jargon known as the basis of Islamic politics is taken from the Persian political tradition that entered Islamic politics in the past (Amrizal, 2020). However, it is good when it becomes a political choice for Muslims; until now, the door to open ijtihad does not create a *daʾwah* and political-practical struggle (Brooke et al., 2022). The political struggle cannot be separated from the battle of Islam and part of *muʾamalah* affairs in Islamic teachings, but regarding the format and strategy for realizing it is entirely the choice of *ijtihad* (Butt, 2020).

3. Conclusion

The main background factor that gave birth to the idea of political Islam Rizieq Shihab was he was born into a strong Islamist family and had an educational background from LIPIA Jakarta and King Saud University of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Rizieq Shihab is nervous about the arrival of the concepts of democracy, liberalism, secularism, and pluralism that came from the West, and communism (atheism) which is considered increasingly ongoing to come to Indonesia, especially after the opening of the Reformation Order as an era of freedom of opinion. such as Ahmadiyah, Shiʾa, and the Christianization movement. It is antithetical to Rizieq Shihab's ideas until now; it is felt that Islam's assertiveness against communism, liberalism, and secularism is considered capable of countering this.

Rizieq Shihab provides a solution: state welfare and religious security must start from the bottom based on *tauhid* and *shura* with solid Islamic spirituality. Religion and state in Rizieq Shihab's thought construction have an integral formalistic character. Hence, the Unitary State of the Republic (NKRI) is Sharia, or reincarnating the Jakarta Charter Pancasila must be implemented through a system revolution. The system revolution that Rizieq Shihab initiated through three stages called Rizieq Shihab is a field of Islamic struggle, namely; *daʾwah* (dialogue), *hisbah* (*amar maʾruf nahyi munkar*), *jihad* (constitutional and physical struggle).

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