

Persaingan dan Pengaruh Strategis Rusia-NATO di Eropa Timur dalam Keamanan dan Ekonomi

Russia-NATO Strategic Rivalry and Influence Struggle In Eastern Europe In Security and Economy

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ABSTRAK

Kekuatan global yang semakin berkembang seperti NATO, Uni Eropa, China dan Rusia memiliki karakteristik dan kepentingan berbeda dalam politik dunia. Rusia setelah runtuhnya Uni Soviet cenderung berada dalam posisi yang relatif lemah secara pengaruh, keamanan dan ekonomi. Sekarang ini hubungan Rusia dengan Uni Eropa dan Amerika Serikat telah membaik setelah Perang Dingin. Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, Rusia dan NATO tidak hanya memperkuat ekonomi dan keamanan yang terkait dengan militer, tetapi telah melangkah lebih jauh untuk memperkuat pengaruh utamanya di Eropa Timur. Studi ini akan mengkaji kebijakan politik Rusia terhadap NATO dan Eropa Timur dari perspektif keamanan dan kepentingan ekonomi. Metode yang digunakan adalah kualitatif dengan melakukan studi mendalam terhadap data yang diperoleh dari hasil penelitian sebelumnya. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Rusia dan NATO terlibat persaingan dalam memperebutkan Pengaruh Strategis di Eropa Timur khususnya Ukraina dan bekas Uni Soviet. Rusia dan NATO yang disponsori Amerika Serikat, berusaha untuk mencapai kepentingannya masing-masing dengan melakukan upaya peningkatan kekuatan yang meliputi kekuatan politik, keamanan dan ekonomi.

Kata Kunci: Rusia vs NATO, persaingan strategis, kepentingan ekonomi dan keamanan

ABSTRACT

Global powers such as NATO, European Union, China and Russia have different characteristics and interests in world politics. Russia after Soviet Union tends to be in a relatively weak position in terms of influence, security and economy. Today Russia's relations with the European Union and the United States have improved after the Cold War. In recent years, Russia and NATO have not only

strengthened the economy and security related to the military, but have gone so far as to strengthen the influence of its main State in Eastern Europe. This study will analyze Russia's political policies towards NATO and Eastern Europe from the perspective of security and economic interests. The method used is qualitative by conducting an in-depth study of the data obtained from the results of previous research. The results of this study indicate that Russia and NATO are involved in competing for strategic influence in Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine and the former Soviet Union. Russia and NATO, which is sponsored by the United States, are trying to achieve their respective interests by making efforts to increase strength which includes political, security and economic.

Keywords: *Russia vs NATO, strategic rivalry, security and economic interests*

INTRODUCTION

Russia and NATO's rivalry for influence in Eastern Europe began since the end of the cold war. Russia, which wants to regain hegemony in the Eastern European region, is constrained by the intervention of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) which is dominated by the United States, in influencing countries in Eastern Europe (Wolff, 2015). The formation of NATO as a defense agency for European countries cannot be separated from the history of the cold war, when the world was divided into two main poles, namely the United States and the Soviet Union which were the Super Powers at that time (Richterova, 2014). The ideological war which became one of the main forms of war made Europe geographically divided into two camps at that time, namely Western Europe with NATO and Eastern Europe with the Warsaw Pact. When the cold war ended, NATO did not immediately end its existence, but until now NATO continues to exist and expand its membership to the territory of the former Soviet Union satellite countries in Eastern Europe, which of course will be perceived as a potential threat to Russian sovereignty (Kropatcheva, 2012). NATO's expansion in recent years has drawn closer to Russian borders and poses an "external threat" to Russian security.

Security is the most critical aspect in a country's sovereignty so that the state must keep its security from any threat and any country (Yakovlev, 2016). The state has to be able to show its strength and power if the country wants to become a superpower or a resilient nation that leads the world power. In line

with opinions (Sulastri, 2013) that territorial ownership is an essential aspect that must be owned by the state to increase power. Besides, an increase in term of the military as a strong defence and security for the country is needed to show its power to other countries (Nuttalla, Samaras, & Bazilian, 2019). A country can ally with another country when it feels threatened through cooperation with major countries or world security organizations (Kouldunova, 2016), even forming their defences with economic and military power they have.

The superpower occupies a strong position that can influence agreements and enter the national interests of the country. Each country is trying to achieve their respective interests by making efforts to increase national power. National power includes various elements, one of which is military power. The popular perception of Russia as a "centre of gravity" is not only the extent of the territory and the size of Russia's natural resources. Russian characters also make ethnographic entities unique to the concepts of ideology, politics, history and culture (Dragneva, Rilka, & Wolczuk, 2013). The concept of the character referred to the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century when the Russians began to identify themselves as defenders of Orthodoxy and heirs of Byzantine Culture which later developed into philosophical and historical thinking which contributed to the formation of Eurasianist geopolitical views (Dimitri, 1999).

Russia's perception of Eurasian integration is apparent when Ukraine participates in the formation of the Common Economic Space (CES) with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, when the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) has also been operating (Kazantsev, 2015). Meanwhile, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia prefer to be observer status in the Eurasian Economic Community. However, the drive for integration in the early 2000s was set back by the ultra-liberal influence in the Russian government, which held that post-Soviet forms of integration were economically inefficient (Kouldunova, (2016). The idea of reuniting the CES economy as a common market and

integration initiatives of President Vladimir Putin did not get support in Russia. At the same time, it is not possible to simultaneously form Customs Union and Common Economic Space when seeking membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which is considered a priority in that period (Hutabarat, 2017). At least it caused the integration process to stall for several years.

Post-Soviet Russia is indeed in a relatively weak position in economic terms (Kanet, 2010). Although Russia's relations with the European Union and the United States had improved after the Cold War, it did not have a significant impact on Russia's economic growth (Dragneva, Rilka, & Wolczuk, 2013). In recent years Russia and other major powers have not only strengthened the economy and security related to the military. However, they have gone far beyond that to strengthen the country's influence (Kanet, 2010). It is what makes the superpower countries compete in making policies that ultimately affect the world political and economic situation.

Research by Leonard F. Hutabarat (2017) reveals that Russia, when viewed from its historical background, cultural traditions and geopolitical interests, still places Russia as a "natural center" of the integration process of the Eurasian Economic Union in developing security and economy. In terms of security and economy, Elena Kropatcheva (2012) revealed that Russia's foreign policy is often seen as contradicting the West, this is indicated by the expansion of NATO which is considered a risk to Russia's security. Meanwhile, according to Alexander Lukin and Vladimir Yakunin (2018), Russia views Eastern Europe as one of the supports for economic strength and a link between Russia and Western Europe.

This paper will look at how the relationship between Russia and countries in the Eastern European region, the relationship formed between the two parties is caused by the international system. Western powers, the United States and the European Union, have been the triggering factors for Russian activity in the region. After the Soviet Union, it was as if Western countries cut

ties with post-Soviet countries. Therefore, Russia is marginalized by the presence of NATO and the European Union which are trying to expand their influence to the former Soviet Union, which became a Russian tribe.

RESEARCH METHOD

The author uses a qualitative approach in this research with data from reliable sources, including international and national journals, proceedings, and information from websites. Qualitative research methods that emphasize understanding of problems in state life based on realistic, complex, and holistic realities or natural settings. Descriptive-analytical type with a qualitative approach is expected to be able to provide descriptive notes from previous research and other data sources observed by researchers to be able to describe and explain comprehensively the interests of Russia in Eastern Europe .

In short, Russian foreign policy in Eastern European regions such as Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine is based on the interest to maintain the dominance of Russian influence. With the provision of arms assistance and economic improvement, coupled with the dependence of countries on Russian natural gas for its energy needs, Russia is trying to maintain the existence of its power in the region. This paper will explain the extent to which Russia's policy towards Eastern Europe maintains its influence, especially in the security and economic.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Russia And Nato Rivalry

Since the beginning of the process of expanding NATO into Eastern Europe after the Cold War, the main concern of NATO, led by the United States, has been how to reconcile this process with Russian interests. Therefore, NATO strives from the very beginning to create a cooperative environment conducive to member expansion, at the same time establishing a special relationship with Russia. When the debate about NATO expansion started in earnest around 1993, due to increasing pressure from countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it happened with considerable controversy. Some academic

observers are particularly opposed to admitting new members into NATO, as this would inevitably become hostile to Russia and risk undermining any positive achievements since the end of the Cold War.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a regional security organization for countries in the northern Atlantic Ocean region formed on April 4, 1949. NATO is an intra-governmental organization, where allied countries agreed to create a joint defence and security body during the Cold War (Rahyuni, 2012). NATO members include the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark and Norway. They first signed the agreement and became the first member of the NATO security organization (Richterova, 2014). Based on the official website of NATO, it states that NATO membership increased to the present number of 30 member countries located in the European and North American regions.

This defence organization aims to maintain security in Western Europe; it is also to maintain the freedom and security of its members, maintain security stability in the Euro-Atlantic area to prevent international crises (Rahyuni, 2012). To uphold the values of the United Nations (UN) and promote democracy, human rights and international law in 1955, to balance NATO's power a Defense Pact was formed by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the Warsaw Pact which established on May 14, 1955 (Clarasanti, 2019). During the Cold War, the two Defense Blocks continued to try to gain support from other countries and increase their military power (Richterova, 2014).

The competition between two military pacts ended at the end of the Cold War. It marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991 (Khanna, 2016). After that, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact signed the collapse of the superpower state. As a result, NATO became the only Military Pact in Europe and the North Atlantic (Wolff, 2015). This defence organization then gradually began to expand its membership and wanted to achieve its

interests, namely to stem the spread of Soviet communism in the European region. To achieve this goal, NATO then expanded its membership to the Eastern European region, which was once an area of influence and power of the Soviet Union (Hatzivassiliou, 2012).

The participation of former Soviet Union countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO shows as a form of betrayal in Russia's view. It will pose a threat to security stability in the Eastern European Region. This NATO expansion received a negative response and sharp criticism from Russia (Wolff, 2015). Russia considers that this expansion is one of the threats and efforts of NATO to narrow Russian hegemony, especially in the Eastern European Region. Therefore, Russia feels this is a threat to its existence and seeks to issue policies and strong statements on NATO's expansion and policies, which considered to be able to disrupt Russia's security stability.

As early as 1996, the Allies declared that in their current circumstances they "have no intention, no plans, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on new recruits' territory in Eastern Europe." These statements were incorporated into the NATO-Russia Establishment Act 1997, along with similar references to combat forces and substantial infrastructure. This "soft" military approach to the enlargement process should signal to Russia that the goal of NATO expansion is not Russia's military "encirclement", but the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Atlantic security space.

However, in the Kosovo crisis, for example, NATO military intervention was interpreted by Russia as a geopolitical coup by the West which tended to marginalize Russia's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Even though NATO's missile defense approach is directed at a third country, Russia considers it an attempt to undermine Russia's second nuclear strike capability. To make matters worse, the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine and the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia brought elites imagining the future of their respective countries in the European Union and NATO. This is what is considered to endanger Russian security.

The Influence Russia In Eastern Europe

The emergence of NATO in Eastern Europe made Russia feel that it had other competitors in spreading its influence and that meant the increasingly limited space for Russia in the Eastern European region, especially in the Soviet Union (Richterova, 2014). In 1999, the Czech Republic and Poland officially entered NATO. As is known, the Czech Republic and Poland are former member states of the Warsaw Pact. NATO's expansion of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact left Russia seriously threatened to lose the full influence of its power (Rahyuni, 2012). The expansion of NATO members moving towards Eastern Europe is quite threatening for Russia because Eastern Europe is Russia's lane with Western countries. If NATO continues to expand its power, that means it will make Russia more isolated from the outside world. Because, if NATO holds full geopolitical power in Eastern Europe, Russia will be even weaker. It is a strategy of the West (especially the United States) to stem Russian rule. By using NATO's name and appeal, the United States is trying to stem Russian power entirely so that no second, third and so-called superpower will be like the Soviet Union (Wolff, 2015).

The United States expressed the desire to relocate several military bases from Western Europe to several Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania and Poland (Rahyuni, 2012). In addition to expanding its territory, NATO has even built military bases in Western and Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. Relocating the base means moving the front lines of the NATO defence system to near Russian territory (Richterova, 2014). When viewed in terms of historical and cultural, it seems clear that relations between Russia and the Soviet Union were very close, so that Russia wants to maintain security and influence of its power over the region around Russia.

The expansion that happened has changed NATO's boundaries so that its territory is getting bigger. The existence of military bases shows the continuity to expand into Eastern Europe and Central Europe. The security of

NATO member states guaranteed by the military base (Pringgondani, 2016). Because, the principle of this defence pact is if there is a threat to one member, then it is a threat to all other members as well. Tensions between Russia and NATO resurfaced when the issue of nuclear weapons reappeared, making the relations between the two tense again. The tension was triggered by the development of the missile defence system, or NATO missile defence system spearheaded by the United States as the NATO leader in several countries in Eastern Europe, which was once an area of Russian influence and interests.

Russia views this as a threat to its territory (Sidiki, 2016). However, the United States continues to plan, even has negotiated and reached agreements with several Eastern European countries, to build a missile defence system, including with Poland and the Czech Republic. Responding to NATO's policy, Russia then enacted a policy by strengthening military security at each of its country's borders and carrying out various counter actions including directing its missiles to Ukraine which is a NATO ally (Clarasanti, 2019). Russia did it because of a sense of concern for Ukraine that was allegedly threatening Russian security.

Russian Interests In Eastern Europe In Terms Of Security

For Russia, Eastern Europe is undoubtedly a significant and strategic region in the history of the Russian nation (Clarasanti, 2019). There are at least two significant events in European history that emphasize the importance of the Eastern European region for this white bear country. First, France in the Napoleon Bonaparte era had tried to attack Moscow in 1812. Secondly, Germany in the era of Adolf Hitler had also tried to attack Russia in World War II in 1941, even though Russia repelled the German army (Hatzivassiliou, 2012). These two significant events show that, in terms of geopolitics and security, Russia is indeed vulnerable and has been the target of attacks from aggressive neighboring countries located in the West (Karsten, 2008). That is the historical and geopolitical reason for Russia of the need for the sphere of influence and buffer-zone in Eastern Europe to withstand the possibility of

various attacks from the western region.

During the Cold War, Russia in the Soviet Union era managed to get an adequate buffer-zone for the strategic interests of the countries that joined the Soviet Union (Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova). These countries are part of the Soviet Union located in Eastern Europe (Dragneva, Rilka, & Wolczuk , 2013). Buffer-zone for Russia also from satellite communist countries in Eastern Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany). To compensate for the military power of the West, the Warsaw Pact military alliance was established and based in the city of a satellite country in Eastern Europe, namely Warsaw, Poland. However, the geopolitical and geostrategic map has entirely changed since the Cold War ended (Karpova, Karpov, & Kruchkov, 2015).

Towards the end of the cold war, the communist countries in Eastern Europe fell one after another and turned towards democracy. Likewise, because economic bankruptcy and the failure of political institutions was inevitable, the Soviet Union finally dissolved (Hudson, 2014). As the sole "heir" state of the Soviet Union, Russia seeks to retain its remaining influence in the countries of the former Soviet Republic by forming a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Russia is slowly but surely increasingly abandoned by the countries of its former allies.

Russia's Interest in the Ukraine Conflict

The new round of outbreaks of tension between the West and Russia occurred when Russia surprised the annexation of Ukrainian territory, that is, the Crimean Peninsula (Sidiki, 2016). The incident occurred after the outbreak of the political crisis in Ukraine after President Viktor Yanukovich refuses to sign a trade agreement with the European Union. The policy sparked the anger of the pro-Western Ukrainian people so that they held large-scale popular demonstrations in the city of Kyiv (Hanifah, 2017). The peak of tension occurred when a bloody incident broke out in Kyiv which killed approximately 67 demonstrators; President Viktor Yanukovich finally stepped down in

February 2014, who then fled and requested protection to Russia (BBC, 2014).

Russia certainly has an interest in strictly following the development of the political crisis in Ukraine. For Russia, the tragic fall of President Yanukovich, who is pro against Russia, will undoubtedly cause Russia to lose soon another close friend, Ukraine (Svarin, 2016). Indeed, Ukraine, led by a new president who tends the West, will soon follow in the footsteps of other former communist countries that reoriented their foreign policy to the West and left Russia (Karsten, 2008). As popular domino theory during the Cold War, the theory also applies when one Russian ally fell into Western hands. The other Russian ally followed the measures and fell into the West align or the European Union (Kropatcheva, 2012). Russia lost in gaining influence and economically harmed. Several factors have become Russia's critical strategic toward Ukraine.

First, it is a factor in Russia's strategic importance. Russia has long had a naval military base in Sevastopol in Crimea. The strategic naval base was leased by Russia from Ukraine and extended until 2042 (Orttung & Overland, 2011). The extension of the naval base lease contract with Kyiv could occur only because of a quite tough diplomacy. This base is very strategic for Russia because it is at this Black Sea base that Russian warships remain free to operate in winter. After all, the sea is not frozen (Richterova, 2014). The Russian base lease contract in Ukraine might not be a problem as long as the government in Kyiv is on Moscow's side. However, with the fall of pro-Moscow President Yanukovich, the future of Russia's strategic naval base could become uncertain (Svarin, 2016). As a strategic point of military power in the Black Sea, Russia certainly will not give up the possibility of closing this naval base in the future. For Russia, annexation is a rational choice of action.

Second, psychological factors. After the Cold War broke out, Russia under Boris Yeltsin re-orientated its foreign policy slowly to approach the West (Andrei, 2010). However, Moscow was disappointed that the West still had a distrust of Russia. For years Russia tried but failed to achieve what it

wanted most: regular membership to the West and economic prosperity (Friedman, 2012). Russia has indeed become an exclusive member of the G8 group. However, Russia has never enjoyed the same status as the other seven member states, Russia still considered as "the other." Economically, the shock therapy proposed by the West and implemented sincerely by Boris Yeltsin did not bring the expected economic progress (Karsten, 2008). However, Russia's economy deteriorated, causing the average life of Russian society to decline from before. By carrying out the annexation of Crimea, Russia wants to prove to the West that Russia is a big country that does not receive underestimation and mock.

Third, President Vladimir Putin has ambitions to reawaken the glory of Soviet Russia (Dimitri, 1999). When the Russian economy is getting better, the West faces various problems. In 2008 the economic crisis shook the American economy and then followed the debt crisis in several EU member states. Oppositely, Russia began to rise as an economic force that could support the recovery of the crisis in the European Union (Mau, 2016). At this time, Britain, France, or even Germany are busy asking Russian oil entrepreneurs to buy and make more investments (Myers, 2015). President Putin, and his desire to restore the imperial domination of the Soviet Union's fraction states under the name New Russia, will pose geopolitical challenges. Not only for neighboring Russia but the US over Europe.

Russia's Economic Interests In Eastern Europe

Russia's relations with post-Soviet countries have changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, forming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). CIS was formed in December 1991 with membership from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (cis.minsk.by, 2021). The membership of these countries in the CIS results in the country cooperating on issues as diverse as economy, defense and foreign policy. This then becomes the basis

for the approval of member countries to cooperate in various fields of internal and external policies in security and economic (Putri, 2017).

The global economic and financial crisis has affected Russia's geopolitical views in post-Soviet integration. The process of globalization and global competition does not allow any country, including Russia, to act alone, it forces to seek allies in the new multi-polar world (Kanet, 2010). At least, Russia is trying to realize the potential of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, with the hope that Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and several other countries will join later (Federation, 2010). In this stage, the main focus is the maximization of free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. President Vladimir Putin stated that regional integration around the world follows this path of the most effective efforts to maximize domestic growth resources and strengthen competitiveness in global markets (Myers, 2015). Shared strengths will be more reliable and more comfortable to face global challenges together.

Based on the considerations above, the Eurasian Economic Union was a "community of equal partners". Eurasia is not synonymous with Russia, despite Russia's dominant role as the owner of the largest economy in the region, the Eurasian project, at least from a political point of view, cannot develop surrounding Russia itself (Dragneva, Rilka, & Wolczuk , 2013). However, the political aspects of Eurasian integration did not reduce its economic interests. Russia, with its economic strength, must offer incentives for cooperative projects in this "multi-polar club" (Aunders, 2008). It means that Russia has the basis of making administrative and ideological leadership claims in building this Eurasian Economic Union.

The development of Russia's position in cooperation in the East Asian region still has many serious challenges. Russia's domestic factors will be crucial in the efforts to improve Russia's economic relations to the east (Karsten, 2008). At least the focus of economic integration in the Siberian region and other Russian regions in the direction called "Far East" Russia still

needs to be developed to have the same level as other East Asian countries, especially China, Japan, South Korea (Malle, 2017). Russia must also solve other crucial problems to overcome the perception that Russia is geographically part of East Asia. However, economically and politically, it is still seen as an "external player" in the region (Nurhasanah, Napang, Rohman, 2020). For Russia, Eastern Europe is a critical region in the country's politics, economy and military. For example, Ukraine, which, to this day, is a connecting bridge that supplies gas from Russia to Europe (Kouldunova, 2016). Besides, the state of the Ukrainian economy that is dependent on exports of steel, coal, fuel and petroleum, chemicals and grains to Russia has its advantages for Russia.

In addition, Russia maximizes the CIS member countries that will buy natural gas and oil from Russia to meet their energy needs. This cooperation in the energy sector was manifested at the meeting of The CIS Council of Heads of State in Yalta, Crimea on 25 May 2007 to discuss energy issues where Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed an agreement to form a common energy market that has the intensity of expanding. Trading in electricity and increasing access to energy resources in CIS member countries. Meetings are held periodically by the CIS member countries at different places but in the capitals of the CIS member countries. The activities carried out by the CIS are actually based on a charter that upholds equality of sovereignty by member countries where the independence of member countries is highly respected. In this CIS, there is no supranational force or power over the country leading the highest position. There have been developments in the membership of the CIS countries, such as in November 2009 where the three main members of the CIS namely Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus agreed to form a custom union which opened the door to a single economy.

Based on the writings of James T. Quinlivan and Olga Oliker (2011), Russian foreign policy is actually rooted in the national goal of protecting the

life and dignity of Russian society and protecting the interests of its business community so that Russia will respond to all aggressive actions shown to its country. From this sentence, it can be seen that Russia will not remain silent in responding to threats posed by Western countries such as the European Union and the United States, especially those that have the potential to reduce Russia's influence in the Eastern European region in terms of security or economic.

Economic Sanctions on Russia

Russia's actions to annex Crimea and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine violated the norms of international law and international order (Sulastri, 2013). However, the problem is once again not a legal problem but a political and national security issue of Russia. Russia is a high power or even still a military superpower in the sense that its military capabilities are still among the strongest in the world (Kanet, 2010). Aside from Russia being the most significant nuclear nation, Russia is not an arbitrary country because its political position is powerful because it is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UN) (Aunders, 2008). For the United States and the European Union, it is precisely this kind of response that is fitting to punish Russia.

Efforts that have been made by the West are to carry out diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions against Russia, although both are not without problems (Hanifah, 2017). From the beginning, the United States and the European Union carried out an intensive diplomacy drive and agreed to condemn Russia for its actions. The West warns Russia that the West is ready to increase tougher economic sanctions if President Vladimir Putin intervenes more broadly in the territory of Eastern Ukraine (Keliat, 2006). In its implementation, the leaders of the Advanced Country Group (G8) agreed to dismiss Russia as a member until President Putin wanted to change his attitude. The G7 then holds a summer meeting in Brussels, symbolically meeting at the Headquarters of the European Union and NATO, two

organizations that are strengthening relations with Ukraine (Richterova, 2014).

On the other hand, Russia then supported the holding of a referendum in Crimea. It acknowledged that the referendum was legitimate in declaring Crimea an independent state incorporated in the Russian Federation (Andrei, 2010). It considered the annexation of territory and was illegal by the EU and Ukraine. On this basis, the EU provides sanctions against Russia in the form of economic sanctions namely the freezing of assets of several Russian companies and individuals and a ban on entry to the EU against high-ranking Russian officials (Fadli Adzani, 2015). The sanctions came into force on March 17, 2014 (Hanifah, 2017).

The policy of Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to come under pressure from Western economic sanctions (Karpova, Karpov, & Kruchkov, 2015). A series of sanctions imposed by the EU and the US, the first step of the US has announced the prohibition of visas and blocking of assets to Russian officials who are in the US and take precautions if there are US citizens who want to do business with Russians and Ukrainians (Wolff, 2015). The US will also prepare a legal basis to impose further sanctions on individuals.

This strong response from the US is not much different from the EU response. The EU Council said that they condemned all forms of violence that had befallen Ukraine (Pujayanti, 2014). Therefore, based on Decree 2014/119 / CFSP, the EU Council decided to freeze funds and assets of 18 people who have misused Ukraine's state funds and for violence and human rights violations that occurred during demonstrations against the government.

Despite the economic difficulties in Europe, the EU continued to move to put pressure on Russian natural gas imports in Europe began to be fruitful (Hanifah, 2017). Russia, which is a major supplier of European natural gas needs, with around 80 per cent of it channelled through the instability of Russian gas exports to Europe so that the Russian economy disrupted. On the other hand, Russia's efforts to find a new route in channelling its natural gas

through Bulgaria have stalled. Under EU pressure, Bulgaria terminated project agreement with Russia in the southern route natural gas, by suspending the 'South Stream' pipeline project on its territory (Myers, 2015). The termination of this project, when its exports in Ukraine had not yet recovered, it significantly disrupted the Russian economy that was on the verge of recession. In short, economic sanctions and EU political pressure have damaged the Russian economy that is on the verge of recession.

The EU then extended sanctions given to Russia because it never stopped interfering in Eastern Ukraine, namely the EU banned all member states from importing weapons from Russia (Wolff, 2015). The access of Russian government banks to capital also restricted. Large Russian oil and gas companies will no longer get credit from the EU. The gas companies that received sanctions were Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft. Whereas in military cooperation, the EU broke the cooperative relationship with the airline United Airport Corporation, as well as the arms company Kalashnikov (BBC, 2014). With these sanctions, Russia threatens back EU. Russia bans all flights from Europe to Russia. Russia also cut gas flows to Poland and Austria. Russia implemented a policy of cutting gas flow to Poland by 50%. Whereas in Austria a reduction of 15% of the amount that should be received (DWNNews, 2014)

Facing political and economic pressure on his country, Russian President Vladimir Putin began to be pragmatic by calling for improved relations between Russia and the US (Conley, Mina, & Nguyen, 2016). After that, President Putin puts Russia as an equal partner who must work together to take responsibility for maintaining global security (Sidiki, 2016). By these facts that the EU economic embargo against Russia is a strategy of EU in confronting with Russia. It shows that EU capabilities are higher from Russia. The proof is the EU cooperation with NATO in terms of the military to rival Russia and the EU cooperation with Turkmenistan and other oil-producing Central Asian countries to overcome its energy dependence on Russia (Federation, 2010). Besides, the enlargement of EU was a form of recognition

power of the EU over European areas. The participation of European countries to the EU has proved that.

CONCLUSION

The expansion of NATO's territory and influence into Eastern Europe has led to tensions between NATO and Russia. This tension occurred because several post-Soviet countries joined NATO, this was marked by the existence of military bases that continued to expand into Eastern Europe and Central Europe. This military base was created to maintain the security of members within NATO, but Russia feels the military base is an attempt to weaken Russia's influence in Eastern Europe. In addition, even though NATO's defense approach is directed at third countries, Moscow considers it a security threat to Russia. The tension was also exacerbated by the conflict that occurred in Ukraine, the domestic conflict in Ukraine which caused the European Union, NATO and Russia to become involved in this conflict, this is the fact that the conflict in Ukraine is a conflict between the European Union, NATO and Russia.

Apart from the perspective of influence and security, Russia also has an economic interest in eastern Europe. Russia, which received economic sanctions from the United Nation due to conflict intervention in Ukraine, caused Russia to maximize its Eastern European countries for economic sustainability. The energy trade between Russia and countries in Eastern Europe encourages the formation of cooperative relations in the economic sector due to the export and import trade. The cooperative relationship in the economic sector between Russia and countries in the Eastern European region has made them important trading partners to ensure the sustainability of the country's economy. Therefore, Russia and several post-Soviet Eastern European countries formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a forum for post-Soviet state cooperation. The membership of countries in the CIS causes the state to cooperate on issues as diverse as economy, defense and foreign policy. This is very beneficial for Russia both in terms of influence and economy.

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