

## **Indonesia's Deterrence Strategy from the Perspective of the Total People's Defense and Security System (Sishankamrata)**

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### **Abstract**

Indonesia faces a clear gap between its deterrence doctrine and the institutional capacity required to execute it within the Total People's Defense and Security System known as Sishankamrata. The doctrine is comprehensive, yet systematic evaluation of how its core elements operate as an integrated deterrence system remains limited. These elements include ideological, political, economic, socio cultural, and defense security dimensions. This study examines Indonesia's deterrence strategy through the Sishankamrata framework and assesses how it shapes national deterrence capacity against complex and evolving threats. The study applies a qualitative descriptive approach. Data collection took place from January to October 2025. Primary data consist of official doctrinal documents from the Ministry of Defense, national defense white papers, and strategic policy statements. Secondary data include peer reviewed journals and comparative studies of total defense systems implemented in Nordic states. Data analysis uses thematic mapping and interpretive document review. Validity is maintained through document triangulation and cross checking between official and academic sources. The findings show that Sishankamrata provides a coherent deterrence structure that integrates physical strength, moral resilience, and non conventional capabilities. However, several constraints remain. Coordination across sectors is not yet optimal. Institutional readiness varies. Public understanding of defense is still limited. Strategic communication lacks consistency and impact. The study concludes that Indonesia's deterrence effectiveness depends not only on doctrine but on consistent institutional reform, active public participation, and credible strategic signaling across all sectors of national life.

Keywords: Deterrence Strategy, Sishankamrata, National Security, Total Defense, Indonesia

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Deterrence is a strategic concept based on the assumption that an adversary can be prevented from initiating hostile action when the expected costs exceed the anticipated gains (Schelling, 1966). This logic developed during the Cold War and has expanded to cover

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conventional, cyber, and hybrid threats. Contemporary deterrence theory identifies two main approaches. Deterrence by denial aims to ensure that an attack fails to achieve its objectives. Deterrence by punishment seeks to impose costs that make aggression irrational (Morgan, 2003). Both approaches depend on three key conditions. These are credible capability, firm resolve, and effective strategic communication (Haffa Jr, 2018; Huth, 1999).

Indonesia holds a strategic position as the largest archipelagic state in the world, with more than 17,000 islands located along critical maritime routes. This condition creates a complex security environment. Threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity are not limited to conventional military action. They include ideological influence, cyber attacks, disinformation, separatist movements, and economic pressure. To address these challenges, Indonesia applies the Total People's Defense and Security System known as Sishankamrata. This system serves as the main national defense framework. It integrates the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the National Police (Polri), government institutions, and the population into a unified structure. Its implementation is guided by the principles of universality, territoriality, and democratic participation.

Existing studies on Indonesia's defense policy examine parts of the system separately. Research on TNI modernization (Kementerian Pertahanan RI, 2015), strategic partnerships (Rachman, 2025), and socio cultural resilience (Habibi, 2024) explains specific elements of deterrence. However, no study provides a comprehensive analysis that positions Sishankamrata as a unified deterrence framework in line with established theory. There is no clear assessment of how its components meet the requirements of capability, credibility, and communication. This gap has direct implications. Without a structured analysis of Sishankamrata as a deterrence system, policymakers and planners lack a solid basis to identify implementation weaknesses and set priorities for institutional reform.

This study addresses that gap by analyzing Indonesia's deterrence strategy through the theoretical lens of Sishankamrata. Specifically, it examines how ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and defense-security variables interact within the Sishankamrata framework to shape deterrence effectiveness. The study further draws on comparative insights from Nordic total defense models to identify transferable lessons and contextual limitations. By foregrounding both the structural strengths and the institutional constraints of the Indonesian

deterrence posture, this article contributes to both the academic literature on developing-state deterrence and the policy conversation on defense sector reform in Indonesia.

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

This study uses a qualitative document-based policy analysis, more specifically a doctrinal analysis, suited for the systematic interpretation of official defense documents, policy frameworks, and strategic literature. This design is selected because the study does not employ interviews, participant observation, or other forms of primary field-based data collection. Instead, the analytical object the deterrence architecture embedded within Sishankamrata is examined through official doctrine, policy statements, and academic literature. This approach is appropriate when the goal is to interpret the logic, structure, and implications of institutionally produced texts rather than to gather original empirical data from actors in the field.

The data corpus is organized into two categories. The first category consists of primary policy documents, that is, authoritative texts that carry direct institutional or legal weight in defining Indonesia's defense posture. It is important to note that these documents are primary sources in the documentary sense they are not primary empirical data collected from participants in the field. This distinction is acknowledged as a methodological boundary of the study. The primary policy documents reviewed include the Doktrin Pertahanan Negara Indonesia (Indonesian Ministry of Defense Regulation No. 38 of 2015), national defense white papers, and strategic policy statements related to Indonesia's defense posture and the implementation of Sishankamrata. The documents are selected based on institutional authority, policy relevance, and direct linkage to deterrence doctrine. The second category consists of peer reviewed journals, institutional reports, and comparative studies on integrated defense systems, with emphasis on Nordic countries. Foundational and contemporary works on deterrence theory are also included. All sources were collected from January to October 2025 to ensure alignment with current strategic developments in Indonesia's defense environment.

Source credibility is maintained through a strict inclusion and exclusion process. Documents are included when they meet three criteria. First, they originate from recognized government or academic institutions. Second, they have direct relevance to the variables

under study, namely deterrence mechanisms within Sishankamrata. Third, they provide clear and verifiable publication or issuance dates. Sources with unclear origin, including grey literature without identifiable authorship or institutional affiliation, are excluded. To strengthen methodological rigor, data triangulation is applied by cross checking primary doctrinal documents, academic analysis, and comparative international cases. Converging findings are treated as supporting evidence. Diverging findings are recorded and interpreted as indicators of implementation gaps or doctrinal ambiguity. It is important to acknowledge a limitation arising from the absence of primary field data. Several findings discussed in this article including weak interagency coordination, uneven public understanding of defense, inconsistent strategic communication, and partial operational readiness are derived from official reports, academic literature, and doctrinal documents rather than from direct interviews with defense officials, TNI representatives, policymakers, or security analysts. These claims are therefore interpretive and analytical in nature. They reflect patterns identifiable in the documentary record but are not corroborated by field-level testimony. Future research should address this gap by incorporating structured interviews with relevant institutional actors, which would allow claims about implementation to be grounded in empirical evidence from practitioners.

Data analysis is conducted in three stages. The first stage uses thematic mapping to identify and organize the Sishankamrata framework's principal deterrence components. The five thematic dimensions ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and defense-security were identified deductively from the doctrinal structure of Sishankamrata as articulated in Kementerian Pertahanan RI (2015). Each dimension was then coded according to its correspondence with the three theoretical conditions of deterrence identified in the literature: capability, credibility, and communication. For example, the defense-security dimension was coded primarily as a capability indicator, the ideological and socio-cultural dimensions were coded as credibility indicators due to their role in signaling national resolve, and the political and non-conventional dimensions were coded as communication indicators given their function in shaping adversary perception. This coding structure allowed for systematic linkage between doctrinal content and theoretical categories. The second stage applies doctrinal interpretation by comparing each thematic component with these key conditions in deterrence theory, namely capability, credibility, and communication, as outlined in major

works (Huth, 1999; Morgan, 2003; Schelling, 1966) The third stage applies cross national comparison using Nordic total defense models (Wither, 2020) to assess the relevance and limits of adopting external best practices in the Indonesian strategic setting. Finland, Sweden, and Norway were selected for this comparative stage based on three criteria. First, all three states have developed formally institutionalized total defense systems that combine military readiness with civilian preparedness under a unified national security framework—a structural parallel to the Sishankamrata architecture. Second, their total defense frameworks have been systematically documented in peer-reviewed academic literature, enabling rigorous cross-case comparison (Wither, 2020). Third, while their geopolitical, demographic, and economic contexts differ substantially from Indonesia particularly in terms of NATO membership, geographic scale, and per-capita defense expenditure these contrasts are analytically productive. They clarify which dimensions of total defense are highly context-specific and which institutional mechanisms may be selectively adapted to an archipelagic developing state. The comparison is therefore applied heuristically, not prescriptively: its purpose is to identify structural features and institutional designs that carry conditional relevance for the Indonesian case, rather than to advocate direct policy transfer. Throughout the analysis, the framework remains grounded in theory to ensure that policy description is directly linked to broader arguments on deterrence effectiveness.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Analytical Note on Findings: The discussion that follows draws on three distinct types of analytical content, which the reader should interpret accordingly. First, findings derived from doctrinal interpretation reflect the author's reading of official policy documents and formal defense doctrine. These findings describe what the doctrine prescribes or intends. Second, findings described as empirically supported are based on published academic studies, official reports, or institutional data that provide observable evidence of real-world implementation outcomes—such as naval patrol operations in the North Natuna Sea or documented airspace violations. Third, findings characterized as analytical interpretations reflect the author's evaluative judgment, connecting doctrinal content with theoretical frameworks and comparative evidence. Where the evidence base is limited or indirect, findings are stated cautiously using hedged language such as “appears to,” “suggests,” or “may indicate.”

### **Deterrence as a Strategic Architecture**

Deterrence theory in its classical form states that a state prevents aggression not by defeating an opponent in war, but by making war an unattractive choice for a potential adversary (Brodie, 1959; Schelling, 1966). This logic operates through two main mechanisms. Deterrence by punishment imposes the threat of retaliation with costs high enough to outweigh any expected gains. Deterrence by denial seeks to ensure that an adversary cannot achieve its objectives through force, thereby reducing the utility of aggression (Jervis, 1979; Morgan, 2003). Huth (1999) shows that deterrence success is not determined solely by military capability. It also depends on how that capability is perceived, the consistency of demonstrated resolve, and the clarity of strategic signaling. These elements, capability, credibility, and communication, form the main analytical basis for assessing the Sishankamrata framework.

Indonesia's national defense doctrine places deterrence as the first layer in a three tier defense structure consisting of deterrence or pencegahan, repression or penindakan, and recovery or pemulihan (Kementerian Pertahanan RI, 2015). This structure reflects a clear strategic sequence. Prevention is prioritized over response, and effective prevention requires that potential adversaries assess the cost of aggression as unacceptable before escalation occurs. The doctrine adopts an active defensive posture. It does not pursue expansion, yet it avoids signaling weakness. This approach aligns with what deterrence theory defines as a status quo orientation (Gray, 2000). The main issue lies in implementation. The extent to which doctrine translates into effective deterrence remains uneven, and analysis of Sishankamrata shows both structural strengths and ongoing limitations.

### **Integration of Deterrence within Sishankamrata**


Sishankamrata is built on the integration of all national resources, both military and non military, into a unified defense posture. Its structure is defined by three main principles that are directly linked to deterrence. The principle of universality or semesta requires that all elements of national power contribute to defense. These include ideological, political, economic, socio cultural, and military components. This approach expands deterrence beyond a purely military domain. The principle of territoriality or kewilayahan treats the entire national territory as a strategic asset. This increases the difficulty for any adversary to calculate gains from aggression.

The principle of democratic participation or *kerakyatan* places the population at the center of defense efforts. This reflects societal resilience, which Wither (2020) identifies as the human dimension of total defense.

This structure shows similarities with total defense models in Nordic countries, yet key differences remain. Finland, Sweden, and Norway have established highly institutionalized systems that integrate military readiness with civilian preparedness, infrastructure resilience, and interagency coordination. These systems are supported by clear legal frameworks and consistent funding (Wither, 2020). In Sweden, the *totalförsvar* model assigns defined responsibilities to private sector actors, local governments, and citizens through binding regulations. Its credibility is strengthened by sustained defense investment and NATO membership. Norway applies a similar approach through formal coordination between defense and civilian institutions, supported by strong public communication that maintains national readiness.

In comparison, Sishankamrata still faces structural constraints that affect its deterrence performance. First, although the doctrine has a strong legal basis, implementation appears to be constrained by incomplete interagency coordination. The integration of ministries, regional governments, private sector actors, and civil society has not yet reached an operational level. Second, public understanding of defense appears to remain uneven across the population, a pattern consistent with findings documented in the academic literature (Sekarsari et al., 2024). Awareness and preparedness are concentrated in urban communities and within formal defense institutions. This condition may reduce the effectiveness of the societal dimension of deterrence. Third, Indonesia's archipelagic geography creates logistical challenges. Distance and dispersion limit rapid force deployment and complicate territorial control. These factors require sustained institutional development. They do not weaken the concept of Sishankamrata, but indicate the level of capacity needed to make deterrence effective.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship among four main elements that support deterrence within Sishankamrata. These elements include ideological and political coherence, defense and security capacity, socio cultural resilience, and economic strength. Each element operates in relation to the others. Deterrence does not depend on a single factor. It is formed through the combined strength of all components. Weakness in one element will reduce the overall effectiveness of national deterrence.



**Figure 1. The Relationship Between Elements in Strengthening National Deterrence Capacity**

Note: Figure adapted from the conceptual framework of Sishankamrata as articulated in Kementerian Pertahanan RI (2015) and interpreted by the author.

### **The Three Pillars of Indonesian Deterrence**

Based on Haffa Jr. (2018), effective deterrence rests on three core elements. These are capability, credibility, and communication. Capability refers to the actual capacity to act. Credibility reflects the opponent's belief that such capacity will be used when required. Communication ensures that both capability and intent are clearly understood by the adversary. Without the integration of these three elements, deterrence will not function as intended.

Within the Sishankamrata framework, Indonesia's deterrence strategy can be structured into three main pillars. These are physical deterrence, moral deterrence, and non conventional deterrence. This structure reflects an effort to align national defense with a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of national power.

Physical deterrence forms the foundation. It represents the state's tangible military strength, including force readiness, defense equipment, and territorial deployment. This pillar supports capability. However, capability alone is not sufficient. It must be visible and sustainable to build credibility. Limitations in budget, technology, and industrial capacity remain key constraints that affect this pillar.

Moral deterrence strengthens the psychological dimension of defense. It is reflected in national identity, ideological cohesion, and public readiness to defend the state. This pillar reinforces credibility. A society with strong unity and defense awareness signals determination. In contrast, internal division reduces deterrent value. Current challenges include uneven defense literacy and weakening ideological alignment among parts of the population.

Non conventional deterrence expands the scope beyond military means. It includes diplomacy, economic resilience, and cyber capability. This pillar plays a central role in communication. It shapes how Indonesia signals its intentions, builds partnerships, and manages influence in the information domain. Weak integration across these sectors reduces the clarity and impact of deterrence signals.

All three pillars are interdependent. Physical strength without moral support will lack resolve. Moral strength without capability will lack impact. Non conventional instruments without coordination will fail to deliver clear signals. Each pillar contributes to the overall structure, yet each also presents institutional challenges. These challenges must be addressed in a systematic manner to ensure that Indonesia's deterrence posture is not only conceptually sound but also operationally credible.

### **Physical Deterrence: Military Capability and Force Readiness**

Physical deterrence represents the visible military dimension of Indonesia's defense posture. It includes the size, capability, and readiness of the TNI, the modernization of primary defense equipment or *alutsista*, and the deployment of territorial command structures. Doctrinally, the *Doktrin Pertahanan Negara Indonesia* (Kementerian Pertahanan RI, 2015) places physical capability as the primary foundation of deterrence by denial the state's ability to impose sufficient costs to render aggression futile. Huth (1999) shows that perceived military balance is a key factor in deterrence success. When a state's military capability is seen as weaker, deterrence credibility declines regardless of doctrine.

Indonesia has made progress in strengthening physical deterrence through ongoing modernization. This includes the development of naval forces to secure the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes or ALKI, and the expansion of air defense systems to monitor and control strategic airspace. The territorial command system or Komando Teritorial extends military presence across the archipelago. This supports deterrence by denial through wide geographic coverage.

However, several constraints remain. Defense modernization is limited by budget conditions and the legacy of a fragmented defense industry. Indonesia's defense spending as a share of GDP remains lower than several regional peers. This affects the speed of capability development and reduces the visibility of credible force. The domestic defense industry is still in an early stage of development. Dependence on imported systems continues, which creates vulnerabilities in supply chains and long term readiness. These conditions indicate that physical deterrence is the most visible element of Indonesia's defense posture, but its credibility is still partial and depends on sustained investment and industrial reform. The analytical implication for deterrence theory is significant: capability without credibility cannot deter. Until Indonesia's physical deterrence posture is perceived as both capable and sustainable by potential adversaries, the first pillar of its deterrence architecture will remain structurally incomplete.

### **Empirical Evidence of Physical Deterrence in Indonesia**

Empirical observation in the North Natuna Sea provides a clear test of Indonesia's physical deterrence performance. The presence of Indonesian Navy vessels shows a consistent effort to enforce maritime control. Routine patrols, deployment of KRI, and integration with maritime agencies reflect an approach based on sea control and sea denial. However, research indicates that deterrence implementation in this area has not reached optimal effectiveness. Operational patterns and readiness still require improvement to produce a stronger deterrent effect (Wibowo et al., 2024).

In practice, violations in the North Natuna Sea continue to occur despite increased naval presence. This indicates that current measures function more as persistent presence rather than full deterrence by denial. The presence of naval forces raises the cost of intrusion but has not fully prevented repeated incursions. This condition highlights a gap between capability

and actual deterrence outcome. Maritime defense operations rely on patrol intensity and surveillance systems, yet these measures have not consistently altered adversary behavior (Sochfan et al., 2025).

A similar pattern is observed in airspace security. The Indonesian Air Force conducts interception and scramble operations in response to airspace violations. These actions demonstrate readiness and capability. However, the frequency of such responses does not always produce a sustained deterrent effect. Violations still occur, indicating that response alone is insufficient without stronger signaling and follow up measures. This reflects a condition where capability exists but credibility and communication remain limited.

Security of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes also shows mixed results. Increased patrols and monitoring have improved administrative control and surveillance coverage. Coordination between agencies has strengthened maritime governance. However, control remains uneven across regions due to geographic complexity and resource constraints. In several cases, enforcement functions are still reactive rather than preventive. This limits the effectiveness of deterrence by denial and reinforces the perception of partial control.

Overall, empirical evidence shows that Indonesia possesses growing physical capability, but its deterrence effect remains conditional. Military presence, patrol operations, and interception actions demonstrate capacity. However, the persistence of violations indicates that deterrence has not fully shifted adversary calculations. This confirms the existence of a gap between capability and operational deterrence effectiveness.

### **Moral Deterrence: Ideological Resilience and Civic Preparedness**

Moral deterrence operates through ideological and psychological dimensions of national defense. It includes civic education, defense literacy, internalization of Pancasila values, and the development of societal resolve. Doctrinally, Sishankamrata identifies the population as a central pillar of the defense system through the principle of kerakyatan (democratic participation), which requires that citizens not only accept but actively support and participate in national defense. This doctrinal expectation is therefore a direct contributor to deterrence credibility: when an adversary perceives a unified, resolute population, it raises the perceived cost of aggression. This element is critical. Morgan (2003) states that deterrence depends on the adversary's assessment of the defender's will to resist, not only on material

strength. A society that shows fragmentation or weak defense awareness signals vulnerability. This condition can invite aggression or subversive influence.

Indonesia's moral deterrence faces structural challenges. Sekarsari et al. (2024) note that cultural globalization has reduced the internalization of Pancasila values, especially among younger urban groups exposed to global digital media. This trend affects deterrence. A population without a shared national identity and clear awareness of what must be defended cannot support total defense (Sekarsari et al., 2024). Programs such as Bela Negara have been introduced to address this issue. However, coverage remains uneven and the depth of instruction is limited. As a result, psychological preparedness has not reached the level required for credible deterrence.

Strengthening moral deterrence requires a shift in approach. Civic education must move from short term programs to a structured and continuous system. This system should be integrated into formal education, professional development, and community activities. Experience from Nordic countries shows that societal resilience can be built through sustained policy. Finland applies national defense courses within civilian education and supports a reserve officer system to maintain readiness. This model shows that societal resolve can be developed through planned investment. Indonesia has a large and connected youth population. This demographic can become a strategic asset for moral deterrence if supported by relevant and consistent defense education programs. The analytical implication for deterrence effectiveness is that without consistent investment in this dimension, Indonesia's moral deterrence will remain a doctrinal aspiration rather than an operational reality. The credibility of total defense cannot exceed the level of genuine societal commitment that sustains it.

### **Non Conventional Deterrence: Diplomacy, Economy, and Cyber Resilience**

The third pillar of Indonesia's deterrence posture covers non conventional mechanisms. These include diplomatic deterrence through strategic partnerships and regional security arrangements, economic deterrence through industrial resilience and reduced dependence, and cyber deterrence through protection of digital infrastructure and control of the information space. This pillar is critical. Current threats often operate in the gray zone, below the level of

open conflict, and cannot be addressed by military force alone (Gray, 2000; Nisar & Rahim, 2024).

Indonesia's free active foreign policy provides a foundation for diplomatic deterrence. This approach maintains strategic flexibility while building relations with multiple major powers. It reduces the risk of Indonesia being treated as a proxy target and preserves room for selective alignment when required. Rachman (2025) states that strong rule of law, government transparency, and public participation are key conditions for political resilience (Rachman, 2025). These factors strengthen resistance to external interference and support deterrence against political destabilization.

Economic deterrence within Sishankamrata remains underdeveloped. The doctrine emphasizes domestic industry and economic diversification, yet implementation is still limited. Indonesia's defense industry continues to grow but lacks full integration with national industrial policy. Savilia et al. (2025) argue that diversification and strengthening of domestic sectors are essential for resilience in an environment marked by economic interdependence and coercion (Savilia et al., 2025). Without sufficient self reliance in strategic sectors, Indonesia remains exposed to external pressure. Integration between defense technology development and civilian industry is therefore a priority.

Cyber deterrence is the least developed element of this pillar. Nisar and Rahim (2024) show that digital platforms now play a central role in deterrence. They allow states to project capability, shape information, and signal intent with speed and scale (Nisar & Rahim, 2024). Indonesia's digital infrastructure and use of social media for strategic communication are not yet optimized. Adversaries have moved faster in using the information domain as a field of competition. Fakhreja et al. (2025) emphasize that effective national cyber defense requires the ability to identify and prioritize incident severity through structured analytical models (Fakhreja et al., 2025). Their study using decision tree methods shows that accurate classification of cyber incidents improves response speed and resource allocation. This finding is relevant for Indonesia. Without a clear system to assess threat levels, cyber responses risk being delayed or misdirected, which weakens deterrence signaling. Strengthening cyber deterrence therefore requires not only investment in secure systems but also the development of analytical capability to assess threats in real time. It also requires a clear communication doctrine. This doctrine must ensure that national capability is translated into credible signals

within the information space. The implication for Indonesia's deterrence posture is that the non-conventional pillar currently represents the weakest communication link in the Sishankamrata framework. Since contemporary deterrence increasingly operates through perception management, information shaping, and signaling in gray-zone environments (Gray, 2000; Nisar & Rahim, 2024), the underdevelopment of this pillar creates a structural vulnerability that adversaries may exploit without triggering a conventional military response. Addressing this gap requires the elevation of cyber and information deterrence from a peripheral technical concern to a central component of national strategic planning.

## **CONCLUSION**

This research demonstrates that Indonesia's deterrence strategy, within the Sishankamrata (Indonesian Defense and Security System) framework, has a strong doctrinal foundation, integrating physical, moral, and non-conventional pillars into a comprehensive defense structure. Sishankamrata not only positions military power as the primary instrument but also incorporates ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, diplomatic, and technological dimensions as part of national strength. However, the research findings confirm that doctrinal comprehensiveness is not yet fully aligned with operational effectiveness. In the physical pillar, military presence in strategic areas such as the North Natuna Sea has not yet fully transformed the behavior of adversaries. In the moral pillar, the weakening of the internalization of national values and defense literacy, especially among the younger generation, has contributed to diminishing social resilience as the foundation of overall defense. Meanwhile, in the non-conventional pillar, diplomacy, economics, cyberspace, and strategic communications continue to operate separately, thus lacking a unified deterrence system.

Thus, Indonesia's deterrence posture can be considered conceptually strong, but still faces limitations in implementation. The gap between doctrinal ambitions and operational realities is evident in the limited defense budget, the suboptimal national defense industry, weak inter-agency coordination, limited national defense education, and the immaturity of strategic communication and cyber defense systems. Therefore, strengthening Sishankamrata requires ongoing institutional reform through the establishment of cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms, the integration of defense education into formal and community programs, the

development of domestic defense technology, and the formulation of a national strategic communication doctrine. This research also has limitations because it is based on document analysis, does not directly measure the perceptions of adversaries, and still requires further study of the regional context and the cyber dimension as a crucial element in addressing contemporary threats.

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