

## **Défense Strategy to Support Security, Order, and Resilience in Indonesian Tourism Destination Management**

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### **Abstract**

Indonesia's tourism sector faces multidimensional threats that have not been fully integrated into the national defense framework. This study aims to analyze how defense synergy strengthens security, order, and resilience across national tourism destinations. A qualitative descriptive approach is applied through the review of policy documents, defense and security regulations, and case studies in three super priority destinations which are Bali, Mandalika, and Labuan Bajo. Secondary data is drawn from official publications of the Ministry of Defense, the National Disaster Management Agency, the National Cyber and Crypto Agency, and the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, supported by academic literature on tourism resilience and non traditional security. The findings confirm that defense synergy operates through four strategic dimensions. First, threat detection based on intelligence systems that identify potential risks early. Second, protection of vital infrastructure to ensure continuity of tourism activities. Third, readiness and emergency response conducted by the Indonesian National Armed Forces to handle crises effectively. Fourth, international security diplomacy that supports stability and trust in Indonesia as a global tourism destination. The analysis identifies a major structural constraint. Coordination across sectors remains weak. The Indonesian National Armed Forces, the National Police, the National Disaster Management Agency, and tourism authorities operate with limited integration. This condition reduces operational effectiveness and delays response in critical situations. The study concludes that an integrated tourism resilience model provides the most relevant framework. This model aligns defense, security, and tourism governance into a unified system. Implementation of this model will strengthen national resilience, ensure safe tourism operations, and increase global competitiveness. It also supports the long term strategic objective of achieving a secure and resilient Indonesia by 2045.

Keywords: Strategy, Defense, Land, National Security, Order, Tourism, Indonesian Tourism.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state, consisting of more than 17,000 islands with diverse natural and cultural assets. This endowment positions Indonesia as a major global tourism destination. The sector contributes significantly to national output and employment. Data from the OECD records a contribution of 4.1 percent to Gross Domestic Product, equivalent to more than IDR 1,000 trillion, with a projection of IDR 1,270 trillion by 2025. The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy targets an increase to 4.5 percent of national GDP. Tourism also absorbs more than 12 million workers and supports the growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises across regions (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2024; OECD, 2024).

Despite this performance, tourism development faces persistent security and resilience challenges. The National Disaster Management Agency reports more than 3,000 disasters annually, many affecting key destinations such as Bali, Lombok, and Yogyakarta (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, 2024). The National Counterterrorism Agency highlights ongoing risks of radicalism in strategic tourism areas (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, 2023). The National Cyber and Crypto Agency reports a 32 percent increase in cyberattacks targeting digital tourism systems during 2023 (Badan Siber dan Sandi Nasional, 2024). These threats indicate that tourism destinations remain exposed to both physical and non physical risks.

Previous studies on tourism security have focused on crisis management, disaster mitigation, and destination recovery. Research in non traditional security also addresses cyber threats and social instability in tourism areas. However, limited attention has been given to the integration of defense functions within tourism governance. The role of defense institutions is often treated as supportive and temporary, not as a core element of destination resilience. This gap reduces the effectiveness of long term security planning.

Current practice shows weak coordination among the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the National Police, the National Disaster Management Agency, and tourism authorities. Response mechanisms tend to be reactive and fragmented. This condition contrasts with the Total People's Defense and Security System or SISHANKAMRATA, which requires unified action across state and societal components.

This study addresses the gap by examining defense synergy in tourism destination management. The focus is on how defense capabilities support security, order, and resilience.

The research also formulates a model of integrated tourism resilience to strengthen national capacity. The outcome supports the strategic objective of building a secure and competitive tourism sector in line with Indonesia's 2045 vision.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Defense Strategy as the Foundation of Tourism Destination Security**

National defense is the primary instrument through which a state sustains its sovereignty, internal stability, and long-term national development. In Indonesia, Law Number 3 of 2002 on National Defense establishes that the national defense system is comprehensive by nature, engaging all citizens, territories, and national resources as a unified whole. This principle is affirmed and operationalized in the National Defense White Paper, which identifies tourism areas as strategic assets requiring coordinated defense attention (Kementerian Pertahanan RI, 2015). This legal foundation affirms that defense is not an isolated military function but a systemic undertaking embedded across all sectors of national life, including tourism. The relevance of this principle to tourism governance lies in the argument that no destination can maintain long-term viability without the structural security conditions that only an integrated defense posture can provide.

Yusgiantoro (2020) argues that modern defense strategy has evolved well beyond conventional military deterrence into what he terms adaptive defense, which refers to the state's capacity to anticipate, prevent, and respond to diverse forms of threats, both traditional and non-traditional. This shift is analytically significant because it repositions defense institutions as active contributors to non-military domains (Yusgiantoro, 2014). In the case of tourism, the presence of defense elements the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), regional governments, and local contributes directly to creating the security conditions that determine whether a destination remains viable and competitive. This aligns with the principles of defense diplomacy, whereby a stable security environment strengthens a nation's international image and supports economic engagement through the tourism sector. Defense strategy and tourism governance are therefore not parallel tracks; they are mutually reinforcing systems whose integration determines whether national tourism can withstand internal and external disruptions over time.

### **Non-Traditional Threats and the Security Landscape of Tourism**

The transition toward adaptive defense is driven by the intensification of non-traditional security threats, which are threats that do not originate from state military aggression but from complex, cross-border, and multidimensional phenomena. Buzan (1991) and Caballero-Anthony (2005) identify this category as encompassing natural disasters, transnational crime, terrorism, cyberattacks, social conflict, and climate change. These threats are especially consequential for tourism because they directly erode destination stability and undermine tourist confidence in the safety of a given location, often with effects that extend well beyond the immediate crisis period (Buzan, 1991; Caballero-Anthony, 2005).

Nye (2011) reinforces this framework by positioning human security as the core of non-traditional security. Under this formulation, the individual rather than the territory becomes the primary object of protection, encompassing personal safety, social protection, and economic well-being (Nye, 2011). Applied to Indonesian tourism, this means that defense strategy must expand its protective scope to address natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis; social threats including identity-based conflict, radicalism, and crime; cyber threats targeting digital reservation and promotional systems; and environmental threats arising from ecosystem degradation caused by overexploitation. Recognizing these as defense-relevant concerns enables defense institutions to move beyond a purely reactive posture toward proactive roles in disaster mitigation, crisis management, and post-crisis recovery at tourist destinations. This is the point at which non-traditional security theory ceases to be a conceptual abstraction and becomes an operational foundation for how defense strategy should be designed and deployed in a tourism governance framework.

### **National Resilience as the Integrating Analytical Framework**

The concept of national resilience provides the integrating framework that links defense strategy to tourism performance in a manner that is both theoretically coherent and empirically measurable. Erman Anom (2008) defines national resilience as the capacity of a nation to develop and sustain its national strength in the face of threats, challenges, obstacles, and disruptions originating from within and outside the country (Anom, 2008). This capacity is assessed across eight dimensions known as Astagatra, comprising three natural elements,

namely geography, natural resources, and population, and four social elements, namely ideology, politics, economics, and socio-culture.

The analytical strength of this framework lies in its dynamic and adaptive character. National resilience is not a fixed condition but an ongoing systemic response to a continuously shifting environment. This understanding draws on the broader resilience tradition in social-ecological systems theory, which defines resilience as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, reorganize, and continue developing in the face of change (Walker & Hollin, 2004). Tourism resilience is therefore not a standalone policy objective; it is a direct expression of national resilience applied to the tourism sector. Hall, Prayag, & Amore (2017) defines tourism resilience as the capacity of a tourism system to anticipate, adapt to, and recover from shocks without losing its function as an economic and social driver (Hall et al., 2017). The stronger the resilience of the tourism sector, the greater its contribution to the reinforcement of national resilience as a whole, and the relationship holds in the opposite direction as well. At the organizational level, this connection is borne out empirically: tourism organizations with higher resilience capacity demonstrate measurably stronger financial performance during and after periods of disruption (Prayag et al., 2018).

To operationalize this relationship, the present study adopts a destination resilience measurement framework drawn from Anang Sutono (2025) and the OECD (2024). This framework identifies five interdependent dimensions of a resilient tourism destination. The economic dimension covers the stability of GDP contributions, community income, and tourism investment (OECD, 2024; Sutono, 2023). The social dimension addresses social cohesion, community security, and public participation. The cultural dimension concerns the preservation of local cultural values and national heritage. The environmental dimension involves natural resource management and disaster risk mitigation. The defense and security dimension encompasses preparedness against physical, digital, and social threats. These five dimensions do not function in isolation. Defense operates as what this study terms a systemic fence, a protective layer that guards all other dimensions against disruption, while destination management maintains the balance among security, well-being, and sustainability. National resilience theory, in this sense, is not merely background literature; it is the scaffolding on which the entire analytical structure of this study is built.

### **Tourism Destination Management and the Case for Defense Integration**

Ritchie and Crouch (2011) establish that a destination's success is not reducible to visitor numbers alone; it depends on the sustained capacity to balance economic, social, cultural, and environmental interests simultaneously (Ritchie & Crouch, 2011). This standard of destination management demands institutional coordination, structured risk planning, and meaningful community engagement, which are precisely the competencies that a well-integrated defense presence can reinforce when it is positioned as a governance partner rather than a peripheral security function.

The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 2017) recommends the Destination Management Organization model, referred to hereafter as DMO, as the coordinating architecture for this purpose. The DMO brings together government agencies, the tourism industry, local communities, and defense and security institutions under a unified management structure (World Tourism Organization, 2017). Effective destination management within this model requires coordination among all stakeholders, systematic risk and crisis management, sustained improvements in service quality and visitor safety, and the empowerment of local communities as primary actors in sustainable tourism development. Each of these requirements has a direct defense dimension, whether in the form of early warning systems, rapid response capabilities, or the institutional trust that a visible and community-oriented security presence can generate.

David & David (2017) strategic management framework, the risk management principles of ISO 31000:2018, and the public policy-making framework advanced by Anderson (2015) collectively extend this analysis by emphasizing the necessity of external environmental assessment, structured risk evaluation, and policy coordination in any serious planning process (Anderson, 2015; David & David, 2017; International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 2018). Applied to tourism governance, defense strategy becomes not an ancillary add-on but a core input into how destinations identify threats, assess vulnerabilities, and design proportionate and effective responses. This is the analytical foundation on which the present study constructs its argument for why defense strategy must be treated as an integral component of destination management, not as a separate policy domain that intersects with tourism only during times of crisis.

The four bodies of theory reviewed here do not represent independent intellectual traditions that happen to be relevant to this study. They represent four interlocking layers of a single analytical structure, each of which depends on the others to produce a complete account of the relationship between defense strategy and tourism resilience. Defense strategy defines the state's adaptive capacity to protect its citizens and national assets across all sectors, including tourism. Non-traditional security theory identifies the specific and evolving threat landscape that tourism destinations must be equipped to navigate. National resilience theory provides the integrating framework within which tourism resilience is understood as a measurable and policy-relevant outcome of effective defense governance. Destination management theory specifies the institutional and operational mechanisms through which resilience is built, sustained, and evaluated in practice.

The synergy between defense and tourism is therefore not a peripheral policy option or a circumstantial arrangement activated only during emergencies. It is a structural requirement for maintaining destination viability in an environment of complex, evolving, and increasingly interconnected threats. TNI, Polri, and allied defense institutions are not supplementary actors in tourism governance; they are integral components of an early warning, crisis mitigation, and recovery system whose performance directly determines whether Indonesian tourism destinations can sustain their economic, social, and cultural functions over the long term. This study uses the convergence of these four theoretical layers to construct an analytical framework for examining how defense strategy should be configured to support security, order, and resilience across Indonesian tourism destinations.

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

### **Research Design**

This study employs a document-based qualitative policy analysis to examine the integration of defense synergy in strengthening security, order, and resilience across Indonesian tourism destinations. This design was selected based on the need to understand a complex, cross-sectoral policy phenomenon that cannot be adequately captured through statistical quantification alone. The study does not employ field-based methods such as interviews or participant observation. All data are derived exclusively from documentary sources, including legislative instruments, institutional reports, statistical publications, and

peer-reviewed academic literature. This methodological choice is consistent with a document-based qualitative policy analysis framework, in which the primary unit of analysis is the policy document rather than the individual actor. This design is appropriate for examining the alignment between defense doctrine and tourism governance frameworks at the national level, but it necessarily limits the study's capacity to capture implementation dynamics, informal coordination practices, and actor-level perspectives that only primary fieldwork could reach. This limitation is acknowledged explicitly in the concluding section.

### **Data Sources and Selection**

This study does not collect primary data through interviews, focus groups, or field observations. No participants were recruited and no fieldwork was conducted. The data corpus consists entirely of documentary sources. The core documents drawn upon include national defense and security regulatory documents, including Law Number 3 of 2002 on National Defense, related Government Regulations, and the National Defense White Paper (Kemhan RI, 2024). Secondary data sources include annual reports from the National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB, 2024), cybersecurity reports from the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN, 2024), tourism governance documents from the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (BPS, 2024), and peer-reviewed academic publications in reputable international journals covering tourism resilience, crisis management, and non-traditional security. The absence of interview data and direct field observation constitutes a recognized methodological limitation of this study. Claims made in the discussion regarding inter-agency coordination problems, institutional capacity constraints, intelligence-sharing gaps, and community participation patterns are based on inferences drawn from the available documentary record and should be interpreted accordingly. To substantially strengthen the empirical basis of these arguments, future research should incorporate in-depth interviews with relevant institutional actors, including officials from TNI territorial commands, Polri, BNPB/BPBD, the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, local government, and tourism community representatives.

The selection of three case study destinations, namely Bali, Mandalika, and Labuan Bajo, was grounded in three scientifically justifiable criteria. First, all three are designated National Strategic Tourism Areas (KSPN) that the government has classified as super-priority

destinations, giving them high policy relevance. Second, each destination has experienced significant security events that required coordinated defense responses, specifically the Bali terrorist attacks, the organization of the MotoGP event in Mandalika, and the infrastructure development program in the remote region of Labuan Bajo. Third, the three destinations represent distinct geographic and socio-demographic characteristics, thereby providing sufficient analytical variation across cases. The three cases were analyzed using a common set of analytical indicators derived from the eight dimensions of the IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM framework, ensuring consistency and comparability across the case analyses. For each destination, the analysis examined the same indicators: (1) the nature and severity of security threats documented in official reports; (2) the institutional architecture of defense-tourism coordination, including the presence or absence of formal memoranda of understanding and coordination protocols; (3) the operational record of TNI-Polri-BNPB joint responses to specific security events; (4) evidence of early warning system integration; and (5) documented outcomes in terms of tourism activity continuity following security incidents. Similarities across cases were identified where documentary evidence showed comparable structural constraints, such as the absence of permanent coordination mechanisms. Differences were noted where destinations exhibited distinct threat profiles or response capacities, such as the contrast between Bali's established intelligence network and Labuan Bajo's limited security infrastructure. This approach enables systematic cross-case comparison while acknowledging that the depth of available documentation varies considerably across the three destinations.

### **Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria**

Sources included in the analysis met the following criteria: they were published by official government institutions or in internationally indexed journals within the period of 2017 to 2024, they substantively addressed the defense, security, or resilience dimensions of tourism or national development in Indonesia; and they were fully available for verification. Sources excluded from the analysis included reports from non-governmental organizations without verifiable data foundations, opinion articles lacking an empirical basis, and references more than a decade old with no direct conceptual relevance to the research questions.

### **Data Analysis Techniques**

Data collection was conducted through document analysis, thematic mapping, and structured extraction of policy content related to defense functions, tourism governance, and crisis response mechanisms. The collected material was processed through content categorization organized around the variables of ideology, politics, economics, socio-culture, environment, and defense-security, a framework referred to in Indonesian defense doctrine as IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM, each of which bears direct relevance to destination resilience. Each dimension of the IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM framework was operationalized through a set of specific indicators used to code and categorize documentary content. The Ideology dimension was operationalized through indicators of social cohesion, national identity narratives, and documented instances of radicalism or disinformation targeting tourism areas. The Politics dimension was assessed through indicators of legal certainty, the presence and stability of governance frameworks, and documented cases of political instability affecting tourism performance. The Economics dimension was operationalized through data on GDP contribution, community income levels, tourism investment figures, and indicators of economic diversification among tourism-dependent communities. The Socio-Culture dimension was assessed through indicators of community participation in tourism governance, the quality of tourist-resident relations, and documented instances of social conflict at tourism destinations. The Environment dimension was operationalized through indicators of natural disaster frequency and severity, the adequacy of disaster mitigation infrastructure, and the status of environmental management policies. The Defense and Security dimension was assessed through indicators including security incident response times, the coverage and integration of early warning systems, the frequency of crisis simulations, and the institutional architecture of TNI-Polri coordination. These indicators were applied consistently across all three case study destinations, enabling systematic cross-case comparison.

Data analysis followed an interpretive approach that combined policy comparison, doctrinal interpretation, and cross-sectoral analytical reasoning to establish connections between defense principles and tourism management frameworks. Data validation was conducted through source triangulation, whereby each finding was confirmed through a minimum of three sources of different types, specifically regulatory documents, institutional

reports, and academic literature. This process ensures that the interpretations produced are internally consistent and scientifically defensible. The analytical process proceeded in four sequential stages. In the first stage, all selected documents were read in full and annotated to identify passages relevant to any of the eight IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM dimensions. In the second stage, annotated passages were coded using thematic labels corresponding to the study's four strategic dimensions: threat detection and intelligence; infrastructure protection and law enforcement; emergency preparedness and crisis response; and security diplomacy. Each coded segment was tagged with its source type (regulatory document, institutional report, or academic publication) and the specific destination context where applicable. In the third stage, coded segments were grouped into thematic clusters, and patterns of recurrence, contradiction, and complementarity across sources were identified. In the fourth stage, cross-dimensional synthesis was conducted to assess how findings within each dimension related to the others, producing the integrated analysis presented in the Results and Discussion section. This four-stage procedure was applied consistently across all three case study destinations to ensure comparability of interpretation.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Defense Synergy in the Tourism Sector: An Analysis of Current Conditions**

Defense strategy in the tourism sector no longer operates within the narrow boundaries of military security alone. It now encompasses the protection of human resources, vital national assets, and the social stability that forms the foundation of destination sustainability. An analysis of current conditions, however, reveals a number of significant structural weaknesses that prevent this broader mandate from being realized in practice.

The first weakness is that inter-agency coordination appears to remain situational and has not been fully institutionalized. Based on the documentary record reviewed, TNI, Polri, BNPB, and the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy have not yet established a permanent coordination platform with mutually agreed protocols. Available evidence suggests that responses to crises at tourism destinations have been delayed and fragmented in a number of documented cases. The 2018 Lombok earthquake illustrated this problem clearly, as tourist evacuation was impeded by the absence of a clear command structure linking TNI, Polri, and regional governments. The second weakness is that the existing early warning

system does not appear to have been systematically integrated with TNI's territorial intelligence network. Available institutional documents do not identify a formal protocol through which threat data held by BNPT, BSSN, and BIN is transmitted to the territorial units responsible for tourism areas, suggesting that this integration gap remains unresolved at the policy level. The third weakness is that TNI's Territorial Development program, known as Bintel, has been implemented in tourism areas only to a very limited extent and has not been documented as part of any destination resilience strategy.

Within the SISHANKAMRATA framework, this situation reflects the failure to achieve comprehensive integration among the primary component (TNI), the reserve component (trained civilian apparatus), and the supporting component (communities and tourism business actors). These three components are theoretically designed to operate as a cohesive system, but the reality on the ground shows that each continues to operate within its own sectoral silo. This finding aligns with Maysarah et al. (2025), who demonstrate that the structural gap between policy design and operational readiness in total defense doctrine is most acute precisely when non-military threats require cross-sectoral coordination that existing institutional arrangements are not built to deliver (Maysarah et al., 2025).

#### **Four Strategic Dimensions of Defense-Tourism Synergy**

Based on an analysis of policy documents and case studies conducted across three super-priority destinations, this study identifies that effective defense synergy operates through four interrelated strategic dimensions.

##### ***First Dimension: Threat Detection and Tourism Intelligence***

Threat detection forms the foundation of the entire destination defense system. Tourism intelligence functions as a subsystem of the state intelligence apparatus, focused on the collection and analysis of strategic information for the early detection of potential disruptions to destination security. Through an integrated early warning system involving TNI, Polri, the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, BNPB, and regional governments, tourism intelligence can identify indications of criminal activity, radicalism, natural disasters, and cyberattacks that have the potential to disrupt tourism activity.

The Bali case study provides the most comprehensive illustration. Following the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the intelligence system in Bali underwent significant restructuring. Coordination among Densus 88 of Polri, the TNI Intelligence Unit, and the Regional Intelligence Agency (Binda) of BIN produced an early warning network that was considerably more responsive than what had existed before. This was demonstrated by the successful security operations for a succession of major international events, including the 2013 APEC Summit, the 2018 IMF-World Bank Annual Meeting, and the 2022 G20 Leaders Summit, all of which concluded without significant security incidents. These outcomes were not the product of an absence of threats but of an early detection system that succeeded in neutralizing threats before they materialized.

The existing tourism intelligence system, nevertheless, retains serious gaps. The use of digital technology, including big data analytics, social media monitoring for radicalism detection, and smart surveillance systems, remains very limited. BSSN (2024) recorded that 32 percent of the increase in cyberattacks targeting digital tourism systems went undetected by conventional defense mechanisms. This finding indicates that tourism intelligence must evolve from a human-centered approach toward a hybrid human-technology approach.

### ***Second Dimension: Protection of Vital Infrastructure and Law Enforcement***

Tourism infrastructure, encompassing airports, seaports, road networks leading to destinations, digital reservation systems, and international-standard accommodation facilities, constitutes vital national assets that are vulnerable to various forms of disruption. Protecting this infrastructure requires a level of TNI-Polri synergy that goes well beyond the traditional division of roles between the two institutions.

The Labuan Bajo case study illustrates this challenge in concrete terms. As a relatively remote destination with infrastructure that is still developing, Labuan Bajo faces a dual risk profile, namely physical vulnerability from natural hazards such as earthquakes and flooding, and security vulnerability arising from the minimal presence of security forces in its outlying areas. The infrastructure acceleration program for Labuan Bajo, which began in 2019, did deploy TNI through the local Kodim to support construction security, but coordination with tourism authorities continued to operate informally and without any systematic structure.

The most critical institutional obstacle is the absence of a formal coordination mechanism among TNI Territorial Units at the Kodam, Korem, and Kodim levels, the local Polres, and the regional Tourism Office for managing destination security on a day-to-day basis. The memoranda of understanding that do exist are generally broad in scope and non-operational in nature. Their implementation therefore depends on personal relationships among individual officials rather than on systems that function independently of personnel turnover.

### ***Third Dimension: Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Response***

Emergency preparedness for natural disasters and social crises is the dimension in which TNI possesses the greatest operational capacity and, simultaneously, the most underutilized potential within the tourism domain. Military Operations Other Than War, referred to as OMSP in Indonesian defense doctrine and encompassing disaster relief, evacuation, and humanitarian operations, constitute a TNI mandate that is directly relevant to the needs of tourism destinations.

The Mandalika case study offers important lessons. The 2022 MotoGP Mandalika event involved a multi-layered security scheme mobilizing approximately 6,000 combined TNI-Polri personnel. No significant security incidents occurred during the event, and a technical disruption involving road infrastructure in the days before the race was resolved swiftly through coordination among Korem 162/Wira Bhakti, the NTB Regional Police, and the NTB Provincial Government. The event demonstrated that the emergency response capacity of TNI-Polri can function very effectively when clear coordination leadership and mutually agreed operational protocols are established from the outset.

The success at Mandalika, however, also exposed a fundamental weakness. A large-scale security scheme of this nature is not sustainable as a model for day-to-day operations. No mechanism exists to translate the lessons learned from major events into permanent operational standards for routine destination security management. This means that every major event must rebuild its coordination system from the beginning, at high coordination costs and with recurring risks of failure. This pattern is consistent with what Novelli, Morgan, and Nibigira observed in post-conflict fragile tourism destinations, where the absence of

institutionalized coordination structures systematically undermines long-term recovery and resilience (Novelli et al., 2012).

#### ***Fourth Dimension: Security Diplomacy and International Image***


The fourth dimension is the one most frequently overlooked in academic discussions of tourism security, yet its impact on destination competitiveness is substantial. Successfully securing international events does not only generate direct economic benefits; it builds Indonesia's reputation as a country capable of guaranteeing the safety of foreign visitors.

The 2022 G20 Bali Summit is the most representative example. The security operation covering 29 heads of state and delegations from around the world was executed without incident, through a multi-layered security system coordinated by Paspampres, TNI Headquarters, Polri Headquarters, BIN, and BSSN. This outcome contributed directly to the recovery of Bali's tourism image in the post-pandemic period. The pattern aligns with Richter's finding that deliberate image-building efforts following political turmoil are among the most effective mechanisms for accelerating tourism recovery in Asian destinations (Richter, 1999). International tourist arrivals to Bali increased significantly in the second half of 2022 compared to the first half, driven in part by the positive international media coverage generated by the G20.

This dimension also encompasses defense diplomacy in a regional setting, including the sharing of transnational threat intelligence with ASEAN member states through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). The integration of tourism security information into these forums, however, remains very limited and requires systematic strengthening.

#### **A Destination Resilience Model: Analysis through the IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM Framework**

Tourism destination resilience can be measured through a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators that reflect three primary domains, namely People, Prosperity, and Planet. This study draws on the destination resilience measurement framework developed by Anang Sutono (2025) and OECD (2024), integrated with the IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM approach.



**Figure 1. The Indonesian Tourism Destination Resilience Measurement Framework**

Source: Adapted from Anang Sutono (2025) and OECD (2024)

As shown in Figure 1, the model is operationalized through eight resilience dimensions grouped under the IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAM approach. These dimensions should not be understood as separate or independent components, but as interconnected elements that interact with and influence one another within an integrated resilience system.

The Ideology dimension functions as the foundation of social cohesion within a destination. Strong national values and a robust sense of national identity serve as the binding force for tourism community solidarity when facing external pressures, including radicalism and disinformation campaigns. The Politics dimension ensures legal certainty and policy stability in tourism governance, which is a prerequisite for the confidence of investors and international visitors. Political instability and political violence have been shown empirically to have a direct negative effect on international tourism arrivals, with terrorism serving as a moderating factor that amplifies this dampening effect on destination development (Neumayer, 2004; Saha & Yap, 2014; Zhang et al., 2024).

The Economics dimension encompasses the tourism sector's contribution to GDP, destination affordability, and the degree of community dependence on the tourism industry.

Excessive economic dependence on tourism increases vulnerability rather than reducing it: communities that rely almost entirely on tourism income demonstrate lower adaptive capacity when a crisis strikes. Diversification of the local community economy, supported by TNI's Territorial Development program (Binter), represents one strategy for reducing this vulnerability. The Socio-Culture dimension addresses social cohesion, community participation, and the quality of relations between tourists and local residents. Social conflict at tourism destinations, such as what has occurred in several locations in Bali as a result of mass tourism pressure, represents a genuine threat to destination sustainability that is frequently overlooked in conventional security policy.

The Defense and Security dimension covers preparedness against physical, digital, and social threats. This is the dimension in which the role of TNI-Polri is most direct and measurable. Key indicators include the response time to security incidents, the ratio of security personnel to tourist capacity, the coverage of digital monitoring systems, and the frequency of crisis simulations. The Natural Resources dimension covers the environmentally sound management of energy, water, and waste. Environmental degradation, frequently triggered by mass tourism without adequate controls, represents a long-term threat to a destination's appeal. The Geography dimension addresses the spatial and strategic locational aspects that determine the vulnerability and accessibility of a destination, including evacuation routes and defense logistics networks. The Demography dimension covers population composition, migration rates, and the workforce dynamics that shape the socio-economic conditions of tourism areas.

A cross-dimensional analysis of these indicators reveals an important finding: defense exerts a cross-dimensional impact that extends well beyond its own designated dimension. A strong defense system reinforces political stability, strengthens economic confidence, protects natural resources, and sustains social cohesion. Conversely, a weakness in the defense dimension can trigger a domino effect across all other dimensions, as the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated by simultaneously destroying the economic, social, and cultural dimensions of tourism destinations.

### **Barriers to the Implementation of Defense Synergy**

Why has a conceptually mature model of defense synergy not yet been implemented systematically? This study identifies four primary structural barriers.

The first barrier is regulatory fragmentation. No legislation explicitly governs the coordination mechanism between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy within a destination defense framework. The Tourism Law (Law Number 10 of 2009) does not address the role of defense, while the Defense Law (Law Number 3 of 2002) does not specifically identify the tourism sector as an object of protection warranting dedicated policy. This regulatory gap produces jurisdictional ambiguity and an absence of clear accountability.

The second barrier is institutional capacity imbalance. The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy has no dedicated work unit for managing defense and security coordination at tourism destinations. Equally, TNI territorial units have no staff trained specifically in tourism security management. As a result, coordination depends on the personal initiative of individual officials rather than on systems that function at an institutional level.

The third barrier is budgetary constraint. The security of tourism areas has not been included as a priority budget item within the defense allocation. Programs such as joint patrols, crisis simulation exercises, and the development of tourism intelligence systems must therefore compete with defense priorities deemed more urgent. The fourth barrier is a knowledge gap. Among tourism officials, the perception persists that a military presence in tourism areas risks creating a negative impression of militarism that would be counterproductive to destination appeal. This perception must be addressed through education demonstrating that a professional and non-confrontational defense presence in fact enhances the sense of safety experienced by tourists.

### **Implementation Strategies for Tourism Destination Management**

Drawing on the analysis of current conditions, the identification of structural barriers, and the theoretical review, this study formulates four implementation strategies grounded in empirical findings rather than normative prescription alone. It is important to note a distinction between the empirical findings reported above and the policy strategies presented in this section. The empirical findings, derived from the documentary analysis of the three case study

destinations, include: (1) the absence of a permanent inter-agency coordination platform among TNI, Polri, BNPB, and tourism authorities; (2) the limited integration of early warning data across intelligence agencies at the destination level; (3) the gap between large-event security mobilization and routine destination security management, as demonstrated by the contrast between the Mandalika MotoGP operation and standard practice; (4) the reliance of coordination on personal relationships rather than institutionalized systems, as observed in both the Labuan Bajo and Mandalika cases; and (5) the four structural barriers of regulatory fragmentation, institutional capacity imbalance, budgetary constraint, and knowledge deficit. The following strategies are proposed policy responses to these empirical conditions. They represent the author's analytical recommendations and should not be read as descriptions of existing practice.

### ***First Strategy: Strengthening the Early Warning System and Tourism Intelligence***

The findings demonstrate that the fragmentation of intelligence information across agencies is the most critical weakness in the current destination defense system. This points to an urgent need to build a permanent and institutionalized intelligence-sharing platform, not merely a periodic coordination forum.

A National Tourism Intelligence Data Center must be developed as a subsystem of the State Intelligence System, integrating social, spatial, and security data to support evidence-based decision-making. This platform must be capable of analyzing data from integrated CCTV networks, social media monitoring, local community reports, and environmental sensors in real time. Artificial intelligence and big data analytics must be applied to increase the speed of threat detection and the accuracy of risk prediction. Integrating tourism intelligence into destination management produces three measurable primary benefits: improved situational awareness for policymakers and tourism business actors; more efficient crisis management because threats are identified earlier; and strengthened public and investor confidence because tourism is perceived to operate under professional and transparent security oversight.

### ***Second Strategy: Establishing an Integrated Tourism Security Task Force***

The Mandalika case study demonstrated that ad hoc coordination schemes, while effective in the short term, cannot serve as the foundation of a sustainable destination resilience system. The gap between the success achieved at large events and the weakness of day-to-day coordination demands the institutionalization of a permanent coordination mechanism.

An Integrated Tourism Security Task Force, referred to hereafter as Satgas KPT, must be established at each National Strategic Tourism Area (KSPN), composed of representatives from TNI (the local Kodim), Polri (the local Polres), BNPB, the regional Tourism Office, and the local community. Unlike the event-based task forces that have existed until now, the Satgas KPT must operate permanently with three core functions: routine integrated security patrols, emergency response system management, and the development of tourism crisis protocols and the conduct of regular simulation exercises. This task force reports directly to the head of the regional government and coordinates with the TNI Territorial Command. To ensure continuity, the standard operating procedures of the Satgas KPT must be documented and tested regularly through joint exercises conducted at least twice per year.

### ***Third Strategy: Integrating Risk Management into Destination Governance***

An analysis of national tourism policy documents reveals that risk management continues to be treated as a reactive rather than a proactive component of governance. This is inconsistent with the principles of ISO 31000:2018, which positions risk management as the core of strategic planning (International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 2018).

Every KSPN destination must be required to maintain a risk register developed collaboratively among the regional Tourism Office, TNI, Polri, and BNPB. This register must encompass threat identification across natural disaster, social, security, and economic categories; scenario-based impact analysis on tourism; measurable mitigation strategies; and an assessment of defense resource readiness. This approach repositions security and order as core components of destination sustainability rather than as supporting factors activated only during a crisis.

#### ***Fourth Strategy: Empowering Communities in Destination Resilience***

The findings of this study indicate that local communities represent the most real-time and accurate source of social intelligence, yet this potential has not been systematically organized within any destination defense framework. Through a Community-Based Tourism Resilience approach, communities are engaged as active actors in environmental monitoring, resource management, and grassroots emergency response.

TNI can play a strategic role through its Territorial Development program (Binter) by providing education in security awareness, national defense, and disaster preparedness to tourism communities. This program not only builds community capacity but also creates a social intelligence network that is organic and self-sustaining in nature. The approach generates a collective sense of security at the grassroots level and strengthens the overall social resilience of the destination, which is the most difficult resilience dimension to measure yet the most decisive in determining long-term outcomes.

#### **CONCLUSION**

This study set out to examine how defense synergy can be integrated into tourism destination management to strengthen security, order, and resilience across Indonesian tourism destinations. The findings support a substantive conclusion on three fronts: theoretical contribution, policy contribution, and the boundaries of what this study can and cannot claim. This study demonstrates that defense synergy is a critical component of tourism destination management and plays a significant role in strengthening security, order, and resilience in Indonesian tourism destinations. The analysis of Bali, Mandalika, and Labuan Bajo shows that effective destination resilience depends not merely on the availability of defense resources, but on the existence of an integrated institutional framework that enables coordination among defense, security, tourism, and local government stakeholders. The study identifies four key dimensions of defense synergy—threat intelligence, infrastructure protection, emergency preparedness, and security diplomacy—and finds that these dimensions contribute directly to the ability of destinations to prevent, respond to, and recover from security and non-security threats. At the same time, regulatory fragmentation, institutional capacity imbalances, inadequate funding mechanisms, and limited understanding of defense roles remain major barriers to the systematic implementation of defense synergy in tourism governance.

The findings indicate that Indonesia possesses sufficient defense capabilities to support resilient tourism development; however, these capabilities have not yet been integrated into a coherent and sustainable governance system. Therefore, strengthening tourism destination resilience requires the institutionalization of defense synergy through clearer regulations, stronger inter-agency coordination mechanisms, dedicated resource allocation, and enhanced stakeholder capacity. Defense should no longer be viewed solely as a reactive instrument during crises but as a permanent and strategic element embedded within destination management. By adopting this approach, Indonesia can build tourism destinations that are safer, more resilient, and better prepared to support long-term national development goals.

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