

Niqab in Indonesia: Identity and Nationalism of the Female Students in Palopo

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Abstract: This research discusses the politics of identity that are increasingly strengthening in the public sphere. This phenomenon grows through the religious sentiment circulated massively on social media and is also evident in dress and daily behavior. This article wants to see: (1) the extent to which the identity of female students that wearing *niqab* influences the national insight, (2) how their perspectives and attitudes in national and state life. As a result, the sentiment of *niqab* female students' identity grew more vital in the public sphere. It is directly proportional to their low acceptance of government leaders of different religions. The government role is also considered lacking in helping them to overcome the life problems they face. Interestingly, the position of the Pancasila in the group gaining acceptance is relatively high. The primary data of this study through a questionnaire with the techniques of purposive sampling of 30 female students that wearing the *niqab* from various religious organisations spread across many campuses in the City of Palopo.

Keywords: Campus life; dress code; identity; national insight; public sphere; social media.

Abstrak: Penelitian ini membahas tentang politik identitas yang kian menguat dalam ruang publik. Gejala ini tumbuh berkembang melalui sentimen agama yang diedarkan secara masif di media sosial dan juga tampak nyata dalam cara berpakaian dan perilaku sehari-hari. Berangkat dari hal tersebut artikel ini ingin melihat: (1) sejauh mana identitas mahasiswi bercadar berpengaruh terhadap wawasan kebangsaan, (2) bagaimana cara pandang dan sikap mereka dalam hidup berbangsa dan bernegara. Hasilnya, Sentimen identitas mahasiswi bercadar berkembang semakin kuat dalam ruang publik. Hal ini berbanding lurus dengan rendahnya penerimaan mereka terhadap pemimpin pemerintah yang berbeda agama. Peran pemerintah juga dinilai kurang dalam membantu mengatasi persoalan-persoalan hidup yang mereka hadapi. Menariknya, posisi Pancasila di dalam kelompok mendapatkan penerimaan yang cukup tinggi. Data utama penelitian ini melalui kuesioner dengan teknik purpose sampling terhadap 30 mahasiswi bercadar dari sejumlah organisasi keagamaan yang tersebar di banyak kampus di Kota Palopo.

Kata Kunci: Cara berpakaian; identitas; kehidupan kampus; media social; ruang publik; wawasan kebangsaan.

1. Introduction

Religion, a pre-modern primordial force, which has been tamed through the process of secularisation by confining it to private spaces, remains as a political force today (Hardiman, 2018). Everywhere we witness the return of religion into the public sphere, even religious discourse has been contesting with various secular lessons. Democracy is a sensible way to manage differences in the interests of the citizens who seem increasingly overwhelmed to face the invasion of religious identity sentiment (Nag, 2018), either in the form of information circulating on social media and that appears in everyday life. Social media, a channel for the release of political sentiments over religion, makes it difficult for the government to stem it. The Information and Electronic Transaction (ITE) Law (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2008), which is expected to reduce it, is seen by many activists of democracy as a counter-productive product in the spirit of democracy.

On the other hand, the practice of intolerance towards minority groups is a touchstone on the life of the nation and state. From this, the discourse of the majority group develops, the constitution of a democratic state is considered to conflict with Islamic law. From the Jakarta elections until now, the public ear has been accustomed to hearing dichotomous phrases such as "Which is better, defending the country or defending the Religion of God."

Once the sentimentality was felt split the public life in two, there is pluralism and plurality on one side. There is also communitarianism, identity, and groups on the other side. The first hold to the argument that we live in a democratic rule of law; with that, the behavior of life in the public sphere must be guided by democratic norms. Religion is a private matter. The second one is driven by religious laws (Shari'a), which manifest in how to dress.

Regarding secular law, it is considered something that can contaminate the faith, even the dichotomy of these two things can divide a family. Gallup International Poll recently released a survey result about *The World's Most Religious Countries*; thus, Indonesia became the third country out of 55 countries whose inhabitants made religion a significant consideration in their daily lives. The study mentioned that Islam is the most popular religion in Indonesia, with 80.2% of its population. The Constitution of the Country guarantees the freedom to practice one's religion. The International spiritual movement called Subuh was founded in Indonesia (Gabrillin, 2019).

According to historical records, the hijab in Indonesia was first worn by noblewomen in Makassar, South Sulawesi, in the 17th century. Then Javanese women adopted it in the early 1900s following Aisyiyah, one of the country's most prominent Islamic mass organisations (Qibtiyah, 2019). Under the New Order regime, the Ideologue of the government led by President Soeharto bans women from wearing hijab in public. The government believed that the hijab was a symbol of radicalism adopted from the Middle East. The government considers the veil to symbolise a radical understanding of religion imported from the Middle East. And This case was confirmed by the study of Jean Gelman Taylor's, The Professor of Historical Study from the University of New South Wales. He did not find a figure of hijab during the 1880s and 1890s in Indonesia (Taylor, 2003).

Hijab is not just everyday clothes. It manifests a deep commitment or belief about the relationship or friendliness between men and illegitimate women (Mujani, 1993). Furthermore, the hijab received a wider negative stigma after the September 11, 2001 tragedy in the United States. Subsequently, the hijab was often associated with symptoms of religious fundamentalism. In addition, the violence that occurs in various sides of the world, especially in Indonesia, is often motivated by a religious doctrine in which the perpetrators of a husband and wife wears a *niqab*. In modern Indonesian society, the number of women wears hijab Islamic veils increases significantly (Turmudi, 2016). They are growing rapidly on Islamic campuses and spread widely in the community. The hijab has nowadays was evolved to a further stage, namely the *niqab*. Then it brings greater rejection than the hijab. In addition to the negative stigma attached to the *niqab*, namely the flow of fundamental Islam, which is also closely related to terrorism, *niqab* also faces rejection from the government, especially public administration and services (Ratri, 2011). Within Islam itself, there is a different point of view about the limits of covering the roughness. The party in Islam believes that *niqab* is an obligation of every adult Muslim woman who is a minority. Two major organisations in Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah agree that closing the roughness may use the hijab, not the *niqab*.

Up till now, there is no exact number of women who wears *niqab* in Indonesia. However, suppose the development of it is observed. In that case, it is growing rapidly among female students on Islamic campuses, such as the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) and the State Islamic University (UIN). Interestingly, wearing a *niqab* did not only comes from female students of Wahda Islamiyah and Salafi idea but also spread to various other Islamic organisations such as the Campus Da'wah Institute, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian Student Action Unit (KAMMI), and the Islamic Student Association (HMI). From the introductory study taken by researchers, a kind of shared sentiment emerged about the identities of various Islamic organisations. The communitarian feelings of Islam strengthen through group boundaries as they are triggered by feelings of injustice that are not felt by many Islamic groups. It is developing a kind of nostalgia for the ideal community of religion through

a "struggle for recognition" (Lash & Featherstone, 2001), which is slowly eroding national solidarity. Wearing a *niqab* in public is often considered to threaten the "neutrality" of the larger group, namely the nation (Hardiman, 2018).

As reported by the Indonesian Survey Circle Study (LSI) Danny JA, the percentage of Indonesian community support for Pancasila in the last 13 years decreased by 10%. In 2005, the pro-Pancasila public number reached 85.2%. Five years later, in 2010, the figure was 81.7%. In 2015 the figure was 79.4%, and in 2018 it was 75.3%. Other findings from the survey show that in the same period, the pro-Pancasila public declined, while the pro-NKRI Sharia public experienced an increase of 9%. In 2005, the figure reached 4.6%, in 2010 it reached 7.3%, and in 2015 it reached 9.8%, and in 2018 the figure was 13.2%. According to the survey results, there are three reasons why pro-Pancasila public factors are declining: economy, alternative understanding, and socialisation. *First*, economic inequality is higher among the people. Public income below Rp 1 million pro-Pancasila in 2005 reached 91.8%, in 2010 it reached 85.7%, in 2015 it reached 79.1%, and in 2011 it reached 69.1%. While the public income above Rp 3 million in 2005 reached 77.8%, in 2010 it amounted to 76.8%, in 2015 it reached 76.6%, and in 2018 it reached 76.4%. *Second*, alternative understanding is increasingly developing in society. An intensive understanding of alternatives beyond Pancasila can attract, especially the Muslim community. The pro-Pancasila Muslim community in 2005 reached 85.6%, in 2010 it reached 81.8%, in 2015, it reached 79.1%, and in 2018 it was 74%. While other religions, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, and Buddhist, are pro-Pancasila, stable with 82.8% in 2018. It is quite stable because the figures did not move far from 81.7% in 2005. *Third*, Pancasila is not socialised from the community to the community. The declining number of people who are pro-Pancasila is evenly distributed across various education levels. The pro-Pancasila community among elementary school graduates in 2005 reached 86.5%, in 2010 it reached 83.1%, in 2015 it reached 80.1%, and in 2018 it reached 76.3%. Whereas pro-Pancasila junior high school graduates in 2005 reached 84.7%, in 2010 it was 81.3%, in 2015 it reached 80.0%, and in 2018 it was 76.5%. For high school graduates, the pro-Pancasila in 2005 reached 83.3%, in 2010 it reached 80.1%, in 2015 it reached 78.4%, and in 2018 it was 74.0%. For those who have studied or above who are pro-Pancasila, in 2005 it reached 82.2%, and this percentage continues to decline. In 2018, the percentage reached 72.8% (Arismunandar, 2019).

The increasing of trans-national Islamic ideology cannot be separated from the fundamental changes in life in daily life, where currently many people spend their time in front of televisions. The rise of religious films with a nuance in the middle east has had great success in Indonesia. The movie of "*Ayat-Ayat Cinta*", for example, a film that features a woman wears a *niqab* sucks 3.7 million viewers. There has never been an Indonesian cinema that touches the inner depths of the majority of young Muslim people besides this film. In addition to breaking the record number of viewers, the film has also succeeded in attracting new types of viewers, namely adult females in a religion study group and people who live in the suburbs with limited literacy levels. These two groups have never been to a movie theatre before (Heryanto, 2015). The success of these religious-themed films is a picture of the current situation of Indonesian society, namely that there is a big ideological competition that plays behind the scenes after the end of the New Order regime, which is marked by the start of the process of "Post-Islamization" in Indonesian society. The Islamization process referred to here is expanding the worldview, appearance and celebration of material elements and practices that contain Islamic values in society (Heryanto, 2015). Finally, a new group of modern Indonesian Muslims was formed, mostly loved by the younger generation. This new generation of Muslims is also separated from the religious authority of old figures, who are considered to have been linked to national power. Since then, a kind of moral movement and purification of religion has been pioneered by various Islamic ideologies from the Middle East that are considered to be in conflict with local cultural styles and erode the nationalism's integrity of citizens.

Besides, a strong awareness of identity as a nation will be a grand alternative that can curb smaller identity groups or encourage tolerance in plural societies. Conversely, the rise of the number of women wears *niqab* in society as a result of the strengthening of the ideology of transnational Islam is often associated with the weakening of national consciousness. These face-to-face conditions have

consequences for strengthening ethnonationalism as a reaction to the strengthening of group identity sentiments. Our society is getting used to hearing the clash of opinions in public and the mass media in the form of symbolic slogans, for example: Choose which, the Tawhid Flag versus the Red and White Flag, Defending the State versus Defending the Religion of God, the Indonesian Movement without Dating, to the Republic of Indonesia amidst sharia versus Humane Public Spaces.

In Indonesia, especially in Palopo, "Indonesianness" is often threatened because of the massive reproduction of identity values through religion, from the phenomenon of "hijrah" of millennials to the effects of the religious-political movement of 212. Many female students originally only wore a headscarf. Ordinary people have now shifted to wearing the veil and believe in secrecy as a symbol of women's highest piety. The real thing that can be seen from how they greet each other using Arabic and often wearing signs of religious movements, ranging from key chains, hats, and bags, is inscribed with the words tauhid. The image of women fighting for emancipation did not in any way offend Raden Adjeng Kartini; they idolised women in the Islamic tradition from a very traditional perspective.

A strong impulse of identity into public forces the nation to build a citizen self-management system that distinguishes two regions: public and private. Because every citizen has different private attitudes, the state limits the private attitude so that it does not interfere with the rights of others. The program for managing these different identity interests is divided into two. *First*, there are legal rules that force them to respect the interests of other identities for their own sake. *Second*, the state does not deal with the private attitudes of its citizens, nor will it carry out a moral or political intervention into the private matters of citizens. As Immanuel Kant said, no one, including the government, can force us to be happy in his way (Hardiman, 2018).

The fundamental question that arises here is from the perspective of Niqab students, to what extent do religious groups desire to actualise their ideology and identity in a plural society? Collecting data in this study using purposive sampling, selecting who is the best subject in the population to provide the information needed, with unique characteristics, namely veiled female students who are part of or have studied from an Islamic religious organisation. This sample was selected based on the sample taken by the data following the research objectives (Silalahi, 2012). Data were collected by distributing questionnaires with closed questions to 30 religious groups such as Wahdah, Salafi, HTI, KAMMI, and HMI. The questions in the questionnaire are always directed to answer the questions, as shown in table 1.

Table 1 Variables and Research Question Formation

Identity Variable	Affirmation of Identity
	Pancasila Position in the Group
	Perception Towards groups
Nationality Variable	Perception Towards the Government
	Attitudes Toward State Rules
	Level of Group Acceptance of Government Leaders of Different Religions

Respondents' answers to each research question were then analysed using descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics is a procedure for organising and presenting information in a form that can be used, communicated, or understood (Silalahi, 2012). The number of respondents who answered each research question was added up, and this number was considered to represent the opinions and attitudes of the respondents towards each research question. Furthermore, the data is described in a step-by-step discussion by presenting the data in a descriptive, analytic, and argumentative manner.

2. Two Mainstream Views on the Niqab

The *niqab* is a head covering cloth or face for women. In Arabic, the veil also means niqab, a *shar'i* term for the veil used for Muslim women (Zempi, 2019). The use of the niqab is an important part of the life experiences of many Central and Southeast Asian people. From various studies on the niqab that many parties have done can be classified into two big topics. First, the niqab is seen as a traditional

value. Many of the research themes in this section discuss the niqab and religious identity, morality, ideology and belief. This is seen in Hanna Papanek's research on *Purdah: Separate Worlds and Symbolic Shelter*. The use of niqab in Central Asian society, said Hanna, is a system of seclusion of women from the public sphere and a high standard of woman decency. An important characteristic of the purdah system is the limitations of women in interacting between women and men (Papanek, 1973). Hanna Papanek compares different categories of niqab usage between Muslims and Hindus. The Muslim purdah limit does not apply in the immediate family unit but only outside it.

In contrast, the Hindu purdah is based on avoidance rules between a woman and her male affinity. Muslim seclusion began at puberty, the actual Hindu ex-communication starting with marriage (Papanek, 1973). Uma Bhowon and Harsha Bundhoo also conducted a similar study of the reasons for veiling by young Muslim women in social contexts where ethnic or religious identity was not contested or threatened. The five-year qualitative study found normative reasons why Muslim women use the *niqab*, ranging from arguments of loyalty and commitment to religious values—not limited to a piece of clothing. Modesty is considered an important dimension of the veil and is prescriptive, a reminder to live their lives according to the Muslim belief system (Bhowon & Bundhoo, 2016).

Second, the niqab is seen as part of the phenomenon of modernity that has come in contact with various fields, such as lifestyle, social status, religious politics, gender, feminism, emancipation, bodily autonomy, to the economy. Maurisa Zinira in Indonesia researched this theme. In the article *The Politics of Veiling: A Study of Hijab and Female Muslim Identity Representation in Indonesia*, Maurisa discusses the use of niqab as a forming identity and as a way to discipline women's bodies (Zinira, 2017). Maurisa also described the shift in the meaning of the veil, ranging from the use of the veil as a religious identity, social status to the use of the hijab in economic and lifestyle aspects. A broader and deeper perspective has also been described by Anna Mari Almila at her introduction inside *Handbook to Veil and Veiling*, Introduction: The Veil across the Globe in Politics, Everyday Life, and Fashion. Anna begins her description of the origins of the niqab found in the tradition of the Ibrahim religion (Almila, 2017), then proceed to look at the political aspects and institutionalisation of the niqab law on women's bodies, starting from the individual, group, and state levels, as a way of controlling women throughout human history (Almila, 2017). The practice of the veiling of women has been exclusively associated with Islam and is persistently interpreted as being entirely repressive of women (Asha, 2008).

The debate about wearing a *niqab* continues. Various assumptions are attached to the *niqab*, positive or negative women, seclusion or freedom, choice of faith or lifestyle, and so on. But Md. Research Mahmud Hasan found something else. He identifies wearing niqab in everyday life by Muslim women potentially misused by men, used for diametrically opposite purposes. This Islamic dress for women can be squandered by the patriarchal power system and the women themselves (Hasan, 2018). In many European countries, the ban on wearing niqab in public is not in harmony with the values of freedom and human equality. Also, the *niqab* is considered a symbol of oppression against women (Zempi, 2019).

Other opinions about wearing niqab in Muslim women's communities come from ethnographic research which conducted by SameeraTahira Ahmed and Thomas Bernard Roche in Oman. The results of the study show that wearing niqab by women in Oman does not always originate from Islamic legal law, but rather personal choices that are rooted in the Islamic idea of piety and respect and that non-Muslim countries must respect the freedom of women to dress according to their religious beliefs (Ahmed & Roche, 2018). Irene Zempi also carried out similar research. In addition to the veil as a personal choice, Irene found niqab as a form of Muslim women's negation of western cultures and lifestyles that are not in accordance with Islamic values (Zempi, 2016). Wearing a *niqab* is considered a moral movement and obedience to religion, and most importantly, it allows them to maintain a different feeling from other citizens proudly.

3. Identity Variable

Affirmation of Identity

Niqab students in Palopo City have a strong interest in attending group activities to form identity confirmation. As many as 53.3% of respondents answered strongly agree that their attachment to the group was very intense; at least once every week, they felt the need to attend group events, 33% answered agreed, and another 13% disagreed, as shown in table 2.

Table 2 Affirmation of Identity

Response Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	16	53.3 %
Agree	10	33.3 %
Disagree	4	13,4 %
Strongly Disagree	-	-

Position of Pancasila in the Group

However, although the percentage of confirmation of identity is very high, recognising Pancasila as the basis of the state also received a very high response. As many as 56.6% of respondents accept Pancasila as the basis of the state even though the group values strongly bind them, 16.7% answered strongly agree, and 26.7% others disagree, as shown in table 3.

Table 3 Position of Pancasila in the Group

Response Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	5	16.7 %
Agree	17	56.6 %
Disagree	8	26.7 %
Strongly Disagree	-	-

Perceptions Towards other groups

About perceptions of other groups, respondents tend to assume that other values or other groups in their environment are not a problem in the group. However, this percentage is not far from those who argue otherwise. As many as 43.3% of respondents answered the values of other groups could be a threat to the values in the group, 46.7% answered the values of other groups were not a problem in the group, and another 10% answered did not question at all the existence another group, as shown in table 4.

Table 4 Perceptions Towards other groups

Response Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	-	-
Agree	13	43,3 %
Disagree	14	46,7 %
Strongly Disagree	3	10 %

4. Nationality Variable

Perceptions Towards the Government

About perceptions of government, as many as 10% of respondents answered strongly agree that the role of government is not much to help the problems of daily life, 50% give answers agree, and 40% disagree as shown in table 5.

Table 5 Perceptions Towards the Government

Response Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	3	10 %
Agree	15	50 %
Disagree	12	40 %
Strongly Disagree		

Attitudes Toward State Rules

As many as 50% of respondents agreed to follow state law rules about attitudes towards state rules even though it contradicted the values in the group, 43% answered disagree, and 6.7% strongly disagreed, as shown in table 6.

Table 6 Attitudes Toward State Rules

Response Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	-	-
Agree	15	50 %
Disagree	13	43 %
Strongly Disagree	2	6,7 %

5. Group Acceptance Rates for Government Leaders of Different Religions

The level of acceptance of respondents towards government leaders of different religions, as many as 66.7% of respondents strongly disagree with leaders of different religions, 20% disagree, and only 13.3% agree, as shown in table 7.

Table 7 Group Acceptance Rates for Government Leaders of Different Religions

Response Category	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Strongly Agree	-	-
Agree	4	13,3 %
Disagree	6	20 %
Strongly Disagree	20	66,7 %

6. Identity and Nationalism

Niqab female students in Palopo City have a strong interest in making or attending group activities as identity confirmation. This can be seen from the fairly high sample response, as shown in table 8. However, although the percentage of confirmation of identity is very high, recognising Pancasila as the basis of the state also received a very high response. In terms of perceptions of other groups, respondents tend to assume other values or other groups in their environment are not a problem in the group. However, 43.3% of other respondents consider that to be a problem.

In the aspect of nationality variables, overall, 60% of niqab female students in Palopo City tend to assume that the government does not play many roles in overcoming the problems of people's lives; the other 40% answers the opposite. Regarding their attitude to state rules, 50% of respondents agreed

to follow state law even though it contradicted the values in the group, 43% answered disagree, and 6.7% strongly disagreed. The level of group acceptance of government leaders of different religions is very low, at 13.3%, while 86.7% of other respondents disagree.

Table 8 Main Identity and Nationalism

Variable	Response Category%			
	SA	A	D	SD
Identity Variable				
Affirmation of Identity	53.3 %	33.3 %	13.4	-
Pancasila Position in the Group	16.7 %	56.6 %	26.7 %	-
Perception Towards groups	-	43.3 %	46, 7%	10 %
Nationality Variable				
Perception Towards the Government	10 %	50 %	40 %	-
Attitudes Toward State Rules	-	50 %	43 %	6-7 %
Level of Group Acceptance of Government Leaders of Different Religions	-	13.3 %	20 %	66.7%

Table 8 shows, strengthening the existence of niqab female students does not significantly influence the stance of Pancasila as the principle of the nation. However, the 26.7% number that has not accepted Pancasila so far sufficiency creates subversion in public. They continue to preserve religious issues and isolate themselves exclusively. Respondents tend not to cooperate with followers of other religions in humanitarian matters. This condition confirms the high percentage of rejection of other groups' identities which reached 43.3%. This syndrome indicates one thing, specifically the social inequality that is still wide open in our society (Hardiman, 2018). Said Hannah Arendt, the basic experience of the republic is the feeling of togetherness among fellow citizens who are equally strong to organise public life in the excitement that is not alone (Arendt & Jaspers, 1955). But the principle of democracy deteriorates not only if equality disappears but also if the spirit of excessive equality.

As to the government's viewpoint, overall, 60% of respondents said that the government did not help much in the problems of their daily lives. Respondents tend to answer that the existing system and governance cannot solve poverty and civil rights problems. They said that the government has not fully complied with the law that it made itself. They even tend to agree that fighting for an Islamic government system is an obligation that every Muslim in Indonesia must carry out.

Another finding from this study is the high percentage of people who disagree with leaders of different religions. Overall, 86.7% of respondents denied the leaders from another religion, even though they realised justice and social welfare. This high tendency for identity erodes rationality in public. Our country that embraces the ideology of Pancasila is not a country that is too secular but also not a religious state. The ideology of Pancasila takes the middle ground of the two tensions. Although in reality (real politics), we see Islam as the majority religion getting privileges from the government, whether in the form of services, rights, infrastructure, MUI Fatwa, regional regulations (Sharia regulations), to the Sharia banking system (read Sharia Bank). Privileges from this government do not mean not good. That is a compromise born of a sophisticated political strategy to maintain social solidarity in a pluralistic society on one side. However, on the other hand, the cessation of Majority Privilege with democracy will have consequences at a very high price, that democracy will fail to care for individuals to be rational citizens (Civic reasons).

7. Affiliate Level

In the life of the nation and state, the religion that is present in the public sphere is not merely an attribute of identity, such as membership in a party or professional group, which can be moved and replaced at any time, the religion that is present in the public sphere is a package of worldviews (comprehensive world view). Because it is a complete package of outlook on life, we witness the totality of religious practitioners practising the values they profess in everyday life, ranging from sleeping,

waking, eating, dressing to ideal leadership and state concepts. The following is the level of affiliation of veiled female students to in groups feeling, families and nationalism:

Table 9 Affiliate Level

Comparison Category	Response Category%			
	SA	A	SA	A
In Group Feeling	46,7 %	53,3 %	-	-
Family vs In Group	13,3 %	50 %	26,7 %	10 %
Local Culture vs In Group		10%	46,7%	43,3%
State Vs vs Group	16.7 %	56.6 %		26.7%

College students in Palopo are strongly attached to their groups. Meanwhile, if the respondents might choose between the family ties and the religious groups, the knot to the family and its values were quite high, namely 63.3%, while the ties to the groups were 36.7%. Furthermore, if the respondents were ordered to choose between local or group values, their choice of local values was only 10%, while the ties to the groups reached 90%. Finally, if the respondent is faced with the choice between countries and groups, the attachment to the nation is 73.3%, while the group commitment is only 26.7%.

Table 9 shows the level of their relationship with family is high. The family is one of the main reference sources in shaping life values, attitudes, and choices. In the context of our society, which is known to be weak in individual economic autonomy, the family's tendency in life is very high. This is also reinforced by religious values, which say that "heaven is under the feet of the mother". The weakness of individuals autonomy strengthens the tendency of collectivity in culture, but in this research, the collective adherence in the local culture is only 10%; Indeed, in the history of the Indonesian people, the communitarian spirit of religion has a great interest. There are several big conflicts at the hand of the Race and Religion (SARA) issues had tarnished the image of Indonesia as a plural state. Meanwhile, the affiliation of respondents to the nation is still very high, as seen in table 9 above. But loyalty to the country above is not unconditional loyalty, but conditional faithfulness, where cultural and religious groups coincide with openness in a duel of opinion in public, even competing to influence government policy.

The conclusions of this study indicate that the community of women wear niqab strengthen significantly. The strengthening of these identities is not the only one of religious parties but spread widely in various religious groups. It means that this point of view exclusively belongs to groups that assume Wahabism and are also starting to grow in other Islamic groups. The strengthening of transnational Islamic identities also implies significant cultural group harmony. The willingness of respondents to leave local cultural values for the values of religious groups is a form of transformation of communitarianism, culture, religious religiousism. Regarding the position of the state, respondents assessing the current nation legality is still very strong. However, as stated above, religious groups try to incorporate religious laws into the official state regulations in the form of regional regulations (Sharia regulations), the development system, to the Criminal Code. Regarding the acceptance of students who wear niqab by the state, many agencies or government institutions do not allow women to wear the *niqab* in public, including religious institutions. Even many Islamic campuses do not allow wearing *niqab* in the campuses. Respondents' attitudes to state tendencies such as this can be repudiated in the form of opinion in religious, moral nuances in social media. They believe that the *niqab* is a way of self-purification of a world filled with sin. Instead, they are surprised by the state forbidding *niqab* but allowing miniskirts.

There are three causes of the above research findings: First, the weakness of the critical mind makes it easy to move the student into that closed religious understanding. Secondly, the liability of individual autonomy and the strong tendency of the collectivity of religious groups to make students do not have many choices that ultimately make the groups a second family, so they have to protect it. They also tend to disagree with the feminist movement, emphasising equality, independence, and liberation of women from all kinds of patriarchal traps. Third, the intensive flow of Islamic ideology in the light of

Humanism in public and social media and the lack of socialisation of Pancasila makes alternative ideas willingly accepted by the mass of students.

8. Conclusion

"Indonesianness" is constantly under threat due to the massive reproduction of identity values through religion. This symptomatic politics of identity is an obstacle in the practice of Indonesian democracy. There is a powerful tendency for citizens of faith, especially female students, to be veiled towards the moral problem of justice rather than the ethical problem of a good life. Many citizens of the country of faith have the motivation to obey the law only if the rule also comes from religious values. Indeed, the role of the public religion in Indonesia cannot be avoided; the state itself has guaranteed freedom of religion. The state needs sophisticated political instruments. Religious aspirations like this in the public sphere should not be countered with rational arguments. They must be treated like an endangered species that must be protected. While believing, citizens have become accustomed to translating the "home language" of their religion into "public language" to convince their listeners who are secular or from other faiths.

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