The Victimization of the Ahmadiyya Minority Group in Indonesia: Explaining the Justifications and Involved Actors

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Received: 2020-11-21; Accepted: 2020-12-04; Published: 2020-12-31.

Abstract: This article discusses the victimization of the Ahmadiyya minority community in Indonesia. This article can be considered as one of the crucial studies that analyze the problems faced by the Ahmadiyah minority group in Indonesia due to violence. This study’s importance relates to academic efforts in understanding the complexities of the Ahmadiyya community’s victimization in Indonesia. This study is also essential in providing input or recommendations for the state, social elements (NGOs), and the Ahmadiyah group. This article proposes the theory of violence as an analytical framework for understanding violence against the Ahmadiyah group. This article provides vital objectives in understanding two aspects of the victimization process of the Ahmadiyya group. First, justifications for the victimization is based on state and religious decrees. Second, the victimization process involves actors and institutions. Besides, this study was conducted using a systematic qualitative review as a method. The data has been collected through extensive reviews on previous studies, ethnographic reports, institutional reports, NGO reports, government, and media.

Keywords: Indonesia; Islam; The Ahmadiyya; Victimization; Violence.


Kata Kunci: Indonesia; Islam; Ahmadiyah; Viktimisasi; Kekerasan.
1. Introduction

In the previous decade, national and international scholars devoted serious attention to the Ahmadiyya’s situation in Indonesia (Burhani, 2016; Schäfer, 2018b). Many previous studies have concluded that the Ahmadiyya is among the most critical cases in understanding and explaining violence against Indonesia’s religious minorities. Therefore, the group is considered the most victimized religious minority (Djamin, 2014; Schäfer, 2018a). This condition is reflected by the increased violence and discrimination against them (Putra, Holtz, & Rafaedah, 2018). The Ahmadiyya members are currently treated differently by the state and other religious Islamic groups than in the period before 1998 (HRW, 2016).

The Ahmadiyya group was founded by Mirza Gulam Ahmad in India, 1889. The group recognizes Mirza Gulam Ahmad as a prophet and reformist of Islam, also dogmatically believed to be the second coming of Jesus Christ (Addison, 1929; Gualtieri, 2004; Murphy, 2016). Currently, it has approximately 10 million members worldwide, with around 400,000 living in Indonesia. The Ahmadiyya and their movement came to Indonesia in 1924 and are now dealing with religious, social, and political dynamics and tension within mainstream Muslims (Burhani, 2020).

This paper examines the Ahmadiyya group’s victimization in contemporary Indonesia (Connelly, 2016). In general, violence against this minority group is reflected through victimization. Attacks on this and other groups are dangerous trends that have emerged over the years (Fadhillah, 2017; Sari, 2018). This article also has an academic contribution and recommendations. It provides answers to what justifies the Ahmadiyya victimization and the actors and institutions involved (Putra et al., 2018). Accordingly, this article analyzes the actors’ dynamics in terms of violating the Ahmadiyya minority group (Ahmadis).

The underlying factors, in this case, include the leading cause of violence, the involvement of various actors, the problem of human rights protection, the effectiveness of democratic institutions, power relations in society, and the question of state-religion tension, especially during political transitions (Khan & Samadder, 2013; McCoy, 2013; Salehudin, 2012).

In this article, the discussion scope is limited to the justifications for the Ahmadiyya victimization and the actors (institutions) involved. Moreover, this article attempts to initiate a discussion on the complexity of the attacks against religious minorities. Concerning this research, this article primarily refers to previous studies that addressed this topic, anthropological reports from scholars, news, stories published by relevant institutions, and some interviews with informants a few years ago.

Furthermore, this article is elaborated into several sections. The first section contains an introduction covering the reasons for this study, discusses violence as a theoretical lens used in this research, and the methodology used in this study. The second section, in the results and discussion section, there are three essential issues raised: evidence of victimization of the Ahmadiyya group, the justification for the victimization process, and the actors involved in the victimization process. The third section ends this article with a brief conclusion.

Scholars argue that violence is socially and politically constructed (England, 2016). However, it should be understood as a built-in reality within the social, cultural, political, and institutional landscape. This perspective links with the concept of structural violence (Dilts et al., 2012). Violence is when social structures or institutions harm people by preventing them from meeting and fulfilling their daily legal needs (Banerjee et al., 2012).

From the above perspectives, violence is not a spontaneous action. It emerges based on the perpetrators’ particular intentions ([Louis, Amiot, & Thomas, 2015]). Accordingly, violence is an intrinsically planned action of violators to victimize an individual or specific group. Therefore, it has particular justifications (Clarke, 2014).

Violence is also intertwined with social problems that strengthen disorders (Sijapati, 2011). This means that social life (and social structure and norms) is no longer based on appreciation and mutual respect for shared values. The lack of mutual understanding and respect between individuals and groups cause violence (Ramsbotham, 2010). Violence against individuals and minority communities...
arises when social disorder becomes part of community life (Bryant-Davis, Adams, Alejandre, & Gray, 2017).

Violence is also constituted based on three elements, including the perpetrators, their motivation, and victims. Additionally, the violence cycle shows that this vile act is structured (Widom & Wilson, 2015). The structure is reinforced by the fact that behavioral genetics leads to attacks within phases of the same group due to social learning. A combination of behavioral genetics and social learning supports the cycle.

Studies conclude that many forms of violence are based on sexism and racism (Merry, 2010; Witte, 2014). Various acts are tolerated and supported in society, leading to structural violence. The action is institutionalized through perpetrators, reasons, and justifications, arising from social space (Paul, 2016). Certain groups might have a hegemonic position, triggering them to act violently against individuals and other groups.

Racist attacks often depict structural and communal violence (Abdi, 2011). With apparent justification, this model of attack usually targets individuals and minority groups based on ethnicity, gender, and religion (Abdelkader, 2014). Apart from a clear justification basis, violence is also associated with specific social constructions.

Crucial, racial attacks are only possible when the society is racially prejudiced against a particular group and individual. Criminal violence against humanity arises from certain prejudices, building on political, economic, cultural, and social motivations (Guimond et al., 2013; Herrero, Rodriguez, & Torres, 2017). This comprehensive understanding is useful in viewing racial crime from a legal perspective. Criminal law must enter the complexity of racial crime by understanding the motivations and the accompanying factors. Social prejudices give rise to justifications and reasons for violence as crimes against humanity (Bassiouni, 2011; Sadat, 2013).

In several studies, religion and politics contribute significantly to inter-group violence (Fox, 2018). Religion is no longer an incapable issue in politics. Violence against specific minority individuals and groups is linked to religion and politics (Peter C. Phan, 2013). This understanding is connected to identity politics, manifesting itself in various social conflicts (Magnani, 2011). Tension arises from religion, while political relationships present many forms of this vile act around the world. Crucial issues related to these two subjects include religious identity in politics, religious fundamentalism, and the attack on secularism.

The state's victimization is also strengthened through the police's apparatus in protecting its citizens during violence and crime (Bonner, 2014). The victimization presents the undeniable fact that various actors and institutions are involved in the attack, discrimination, and violence against individuals and specific groups in society. Actors and institutions are associated with social, political, and religious groups (Aliyev, 2017).

The actors and institutions justify victimization and violence at any level and form. The threat of violence against individual and religious minority groups arises from the intersection between religious and state actors. This is reflected in the political infiltration of religious influence on state regulation. In other words, the state's position determines the course of the victimization process. Therefore, a weak state allows for unstoppable violence against a religious minority. The lack of state protection enables many civic groups to intimidate the Ahmadiyya (Doenja Abel, 2013; Irawan, 2016, 2017).

The positions of state institutions and actors are an essential issue in this study. The Indonesian central and local governments allegedly failed to protect the Ahmadiyya. As citizens, Ahmadiyya members are not reliably protected by the state. The state cannot prosecute the perpetrators directly involved in violating the Ahmadiyya because it cannot support law enforcement in preventing violence against the group.

This article is part of the author's ongoing academic research interest. For this scholarly study, observation were made in some areas, and interviews were conducted with various informants. However, to complete this article, the systematic qualitative review is used to reveal the hidden reality concerning the problem of the Ahmadiyya (R. K. Yin, 2015; Robert K. Yin, 2017).
The systematic qualitative review focuses on two main targeted elements (Kim, Sefcik, & Bradway, 2017). The first relies on the literature review technique used to determine, confirm, and affirm relevant previous studies, contributing significantly to analyzing Ahmadiyya victimization scientifically in Indonesia. The second links with the standard maintained in tracking previous research concerning this study’s focus (Wuthnow, 2011).

It is essential to consider one of the methodological challenges of this study. The problem is related to the case selection and the method used in the research trajectory. Also, there is a challenge in choosing the conceptual framework, the case study’s sensitivity, and the research ethics (Silverman, 2013). However, by building methodological integrity, the study provides elaboration to the justification and involved actors-institutions in the Ahmadiyya group's victimization in Indonesia.

Data collection techniques used in this study include desk review and document study (Creswell, 2014). Before describing the data collection method used, it is necessary to specify the data needed. Several sets of data were required in this study (Heaton, 2014). The first set related to the Ahmadiyya contemporary situation, citing violence experienced by the group members. It is essential to know about the Ahmadiyya’s position as a religious minority group when they encounter unfair problems, the forms of abuse experienced, the objects of violence, and the actors involved. The second set of data related to the local and national state response to violence against the Ahmadiyya, social institutions’ reactions, the police’s response, and the court in prosecuting violence perpetrators.

Information on the violence against the Ahmadiyya was retrieved from existing literature and studies. This phase involved an extensive review of journals, reports, newspaper articles, social media, previous ethnographic and anthropological notes (Creswell, 2014). This research also conducted a document study as a technique of data collection. There were three categories. The first category was based on previous scientific and scholarly publications. The second category included newspaper and magazine articles selected from the daily newspapers in Indonesia, online media, and international news. The third consisted of non-governmental reports collected from various NGOs investigating violence and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya group.

2. Result and Discussion

The victimization of Ahmadiyya depicts interrelated facts. First, the presence of victimization, which is dominated by the majority and minority relations, has had destructive implications for the Ahmadiyya group. This article also shows that the tyranny of majoritarianism underlies violence against the Ahmadiyya. Second, the first fact tends to dominate the legal and socio-political process regarding the Ahmadiyya group’s status. Third, based on these two points, the justification and actors involved in the victimization process of the Ahmadiyya group are closely related to the social (majority group) and political (state) aspects.

Evidence of Victimization

This section briefly examines the three examples of Ahmadiyya victimization in contemporary Indonesia. The group’s problems arise from its position as a religious minority within the majority groups (Crouch, 2009; Hicks, 2014; Neil Hicks, 2015). The Ahmadiyya group faces different forms of discrimination, attacks, and human rights violations. These facts indicate the injustices towards the members of this group. The Ahmadiyya’s rights are brutally violated by several radical groups identifying themselves as adherents and supporters of Indonesia’s mainstream Islam. They are behind the unstoppable attacks against this group (Breidlid, 2013).

These facts demonstrate that Ahmadiyya is a victimized religious minority group (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2014; Putra, Mashuri, & Zaduqisti, 2015). Attacks against the Ahmadiyya, such as property destruction and burning of their houses and places of worship, are considered victimization. However, the dynamic of victimization is not limited to physical violence but includes religious and non-religious discrimination (Putra et al., 2015).

The first evidence is the Ahmadiyya members’ status living in Mataram Regent, the West Nusa Tenggara Province, Indonesia (Gaffar, 2013; Masnun, 2017; Nurhayati, 2020). The government of this
regent issued a decree on September 13, 2002, that banned the Ahmadiyya. This triggered an attack against the Ahmadiyya members in September 2002 in Pancor, East Lombok, followed by the displacement of group members in this region. Approximately 300 members left the village. In June 2003, about 35 Ahmadiyya families were expelled from Sambi Elen village. In February 2006, there was an attack in the Ketapang Gegerung Lingsar village, West Lombok.

At least 30 families comprising 118 Ahmadis have lived in Wisma Transito, Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara. This is the resident place of Ahmadis displaced from their villages in Ketapang, West Lombok, after intimidation, violence, and expulsion seven years ago (Purnomo, 2013).

The status of the Ahmadiyya group resembles religious refugees. The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines refugees as a person or group of people forced to flee home or their habitual residence due to armed conflict, internal strife, and customs violations of human rights, as well as natural or human-made disasters involving one or more of these elements (Kia-Keating, Ahmed, & Modir, 2015).

Ahmadiyya victimization is also evident in many aspects of members’ lives. They are excluded from the social, political, legal, cultural, economic, and many other spheres of daily life. For example, Ahmadiyya children suffer harassment from teachers and administrators in public schools. They experience abuses of their rights in public life due to their differences in belief. Teachers express verbal violence against these children, while other students oppress them in daily life. The children have lost the vital opportunity to enjoy fundamental rights due to teachers and other students’ intimidation (Amnesty International, 2020; Azkar, 2019; Gaffar, 2013).

Ahmadiyya members also face challenges in obtaining identity cards. This is because they do not fit into legally permitted religions, which must be stated on the national identity card (Bottomley, 2015):

Several men described bureaucratic hurdles when dealing with local officials, requesting new identification documents or building permits. Some Ahmadiyya teachers have been pressured to convert to Sunni Islam or transferred to remote schools when they resisted (Pearson, 2014).

The murders of Ahmadiyya members in Cikeusik village, West Java Province, are the third evidence of the Ahmadiyya victimization. In 2012, Human Rights Watch reported:

In February 2011, more than 1,500 Islamist militants attacked a house in Cikeusik, western Java, killing three and seriously wounding 5 Ahmadiyya men. The incident was caught on film. Public outrage generated around the case prompted the authorities to investigate the attack (HRW, 2012).

According to the same report by Human Rights Watch, the problem was as follows: Police and prosecutors failed to present a sufficiently compelling case against the 12 defendants. The police did not conduct thorough investigations, while the prosecutors also sought reduced sentences, contending that the Ahmadiyya members provoked the attack on themselves (HRW, 2012).

Overall attacks caused the Ahmadiyya to suffer serious injuries, with the murders of members becoming a severe problem in Indonesia. The Ahmadiyya also faced difficulties obtaining court justice, and group members were expelled and their property destroyed (Ugur & Ince, 2015). Non-governmental organizations investigating the situation concluded that there were violations of the rights to security and freedom of religion, while the groups attacked the personal freedom of belief. The human rights investigation team concluded that there were persecutions against one or more members of the Ahmadiyya.

The Justifications for Victimization

This section elucidates the justifications for the victimization of Ahmadiyya group members. This begins by first explaining the legal status of the group. The Ahmadiyya received its official status after the Dutch colonial, and the Indonesian government legally recognized its existence, reflecting their presence and missionary activities (Sidik, 2007). Besides, this legal status provides them the freedom to spread their beliefs and theological teaching and enables the group members to demand political
protection from the state in risky situations. The followers of this group formed an organization called the Ahmadiyya Indonesia. The Ahmadiyya’s legal recognition has been incorporated since 1953 (The decree of the Minister of Justice Number JA 05/23/13 Date. 13-3-1953).

The first justification is derived from religion. Although this group has a legal status, Mejelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, the Indonesian Islamic Clerics Council), the Indonesian Islamic representatives recognized by the Indonesian government, has twice declared anti-Ahmadiyya decrees. The first decree was issued in 1980. The second was in 2005 a fatwa, stating that Ahmadiyya is a sect, not a part of Islam. MUI requested that the government should ban Ahmadiyya in all areas by freezing their organization. MUI’s decree No. 11/Munas VII/MUI/15/2005 was signed on July 29, 2005. Besides the decree against the Ahmadiyya, MUI also issued a fatwa on war against pluralism, secularism, liberalism, interfaith prayer and marriage, and all the holy Al-Quran’s alternative interpretations verses (Menchick, 2007). The two decrees stated that the Ahmadiyya was a non-Islamic group. Since the second decree, MUI has forced the government to prohibit the Ahmadiyya’s belief (Rofiqoh, 2015).

MUI’s decrees triggered individual and societal tension and conflicts within Islam in Indonesia, followed by attacks against the Ahmadiyya group. Some groups, known by human rights defenders, researchers, and scholars as Islamic radical factions and groups, referred to MUI decrees as the primary justification for the Ahmadiyya’s violent actions. Based on the argument that the Ahmadiyya group has destroyed the official theological teaching and dogmatic foundation of Islam, some radical groups named their actions the purification process of Islamic teaching. Ahmadiyya’s violation defines this religious process (Atqa, 2010; Nawawi, 2018; Sirry, 2013).

The Indonesian government attempted to resolve the tension and conflicts between the Ahmadiyya and mainstream Islamic groups. In the ensuing political process, at the beginning of the second justification for the victimization, MUI and its supporters demanded the government to take decisive legislative steps and legal action against all Ahmadiyya activities. MUI and its proponents requested the government to declare the Ahmadiyya a deviant sect. As a result, on the 16th of April 2008, the Attorney General proposed a document banning the Ahmadiyya through the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society.

Many actors in civil society and Indonesian Islam protested the government’s action. Despite this, on June 9, 2008, the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General signed a joint decree. This was the second justification for the Ahmadiyya victimization (Bottomley, 2014). The decree outlined many conditions that were to be adopted by the Ahmadiyya group. It also ordered the Ahmadiyya to cease all religious activities that involved interpreting Islamic teaching’s main elements, including recognizing a prophet after Muhammad. The decree also stated that violators could face up to 5 years in prison. The joint order implied massive discrimination and persecution against the members of Ahmadiyya (ICG, 2008). The Indonesian government could otherwise freeze the status of the group.

The 2008 joint decree politically and legally justified many governors, regents, mayors, and other government actors for arranging the anti-Ahmadiyya regulations. For instance, on February 28, 2011, the East Java provincial government, with 35 million people, banned Ahmadiyya activities, revoked nameplate mosques and schools (madrassa), and prohibited the group from using electronic media in its teachings. On March 3, 2011, Ahmad Heryawan, governor of West Java Province, also banned Ahmadiyya activities (HRW, 2013).

Involved Actors and Institutions

This section discusses the involvement of the state, religious actors, and institutions in the victimization of the Ahmadiyya members in Indonesia (Woodward et al., 2014). The participation of many religious and political actors and institutions indicates that the Ahmadiyya attacks are a form of structural victimization. This means that the interconnected roles of the involved actors in the victimization transform a series of attacks from sporadic events to continued and unstoppable violations.
The Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs is the central religious management body in Indonesia. This ministry was established in 1946 (Seo, 2013). Although many programs are designed to manage and implement Islamic interests, this ministry considers all recognized religions. It is divided into seven general directorates. There are three general branches related to Muslim claims, including Islam’s public guidance, hajj management, and Islamic education. Other directorates are connected to minority religions, such as Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Kong Hu-Chu.

During the tension between the Ahmadiyya and the Islamic mainstream, since the second MUI and the 2008 joint decrees, the Indonesian Religious Affairs Ministry has adopted a hard-line position and view on heretical organizations (Ropi, 2017). The former minister (2009-2014), Mr. Suryadharma Ali, consistently opposed religious minorities, insisting that the government prohibit the Ahmadiyya group. He also advised the Ahmadis to convert to mainstream Islam (Aritonang, 2012). Through the religious minister’s position, the central government’s attitude attracted political movements from provinces and districts, aiming to exclude the Ahmadiyya (Marshall, 2018). The Ahmadiyya were always one of the main targets of the expulsion process. This position causes a severe problem for the state as a principal agency in resolving Ahmadiyya (Crouch, 2012; Seo, 2012).

According to previous explanations, the Indonesian Attorney General is influential in the Ahmadiyya issue. This influence connects to the Badan Kordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Bakorpakem; The Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society) (Bush, 2015; Carnegie, 2015). The institution monitors and bans congregations and religious movements involving indigenous beliefs in Indonesia. It has several units, spreading Attorney’s offices across provinces and districts. The organization has a solid legal basis, Chapter III of the Republic Act, 2004 on the Indonesian Attorney, stating that Bakorpakem must oversee the flow of beliefs that potentially harm people and the state.

Bakorpakem usually works under the Attorney Office’s intelligence department. However, it includes representatives from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Home Ministry, and the Attorney General. Bakorpakem recommended a ban on Ahmadiyya’s religious activities and practices. The recommendation stated that the Ahmadiyya failed to implement their agreement to cease engaging in religious practices. Bakorpakem was essential in preparing the joint decree to ban Ahmadiyya in 2008, which triggered discrimination, violence, and exclusion against the group (Herdiansah, 2016).

The two other essential state institutions are the Indonesian police and the courts. The police are more likely to be blamed by the Ahmadiyya for conflict and violence in society. Although there might be easier ways to resolve the conflict, the police prefer advising the Ahmadiyya to leave their homes than protecting them. The police failed to protect the Ahmadiyya from the mob that threatened them to leave their homes.

It cannot sufficiently protect the Ahmadiyya due to the massive determination to victimize the group. Instead, the police advise the Ahmadiyya to close their worship places to avoid conflicts with other groups (Panggabean & Ali-Fauzi, 2015; Soedirgo, 2018). The Indonesian criminal justice system has proven ineffective in prosecuting violence against the Ahmadiyya, even after being processed in courts. The prosecutors and judges were prejudiced against the Ahmadiyya, although members of the group were victimized. Lighter sentences were instead passed to the perpetrators of violence against the Ahmadiyya. When the courts prosecuted the perpetrators of violence in Cekessuk in 2011, prosecutors only bring Deden Sujana, the Ahmadiyya member, as a witness, who was then sentenced into the article of incitement (HRW, 2013).

It is necessary to consider the link between the religious institution and the state in constructing the anti-Ahmadiyya movement. As previously explained, MUI is a highly crucial Islamic body, holding a dominant position in addressing the Ahmadiyya problem. This institution is a symbol of Islamic domination in the many forms of discrimination against the Ahmadiyya. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the former Indonesian president, supported MUI’s conference in 2005 by promising that the government establishes and maintains cooperation with MUI.

In support of religious life management, Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Umat Bergama (Religious Harmony Forum) was formed from the actors’ center activities in every religious affairs department. In
2006, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Attorney General signed a decree on building worship houses and formed Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Umat Bergama. The local governments implemented the decree. Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Umat Bergama became a consultative forum, providing social and political advice to the governor and other local leaders concerning permitting worship houses (Utami, 2016).

The governors and district leaders have full authority to determine those joining the forum, strongly influenced by the local government. Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Umat Bergama is not part of the solution to the Ahmadiyya’s problem in Indonesia (Mubarok, 2014). The absence of Ahmadiyya members from this forum restricts its independence in advising the government regarding general considerations. The Ministry of Religious Affairs’ strong influence on this forum prohibits the Ahmadiyya group from pursuing fair solutions to its problems.

3. Conclusion

The Ahmadiyya victimization provides insight into the discriminatory relationship between majority and minority groups. It is apparent in the verbal disagreements over different beliefs among social and religious groups. This has been reflected through violence against religious minorities. They have suffered brutal attacks, detentions, torture, and faced massive violence from other groups.

The Ahmadiyya also do not receive reliable political protection from the state. Accordingly, the Ahmadiyya victimization process is new racism infiltrating religious management. The victimization is based on religious considerations and political settings that create unstoppable violations of Ahmadiyya’s rights. It includes the involvement of state actors and institutions in prioritizing majority interests and groups.

The Ahmadiyya minority group’s victimization is, therefore, not only a part of the majority-minority problem but is also connected to the government, which has lost its political attitude. This indicates the level of political power exercised by government actors and institutions in violating the Ahmadiyya and other religious minorities’ social and political rights in Indonesia. The government tends to allow violence and attacks against religious minorities in the form of political empowerment.

The Ahmadiyya victimization shows the government’s inability to ensure political protection towards religious minorities. The democratic state is not politically concerned, and it is not practically responsible for the legal protection of religious minorities. Consequently, there is no political awareness of the need to protect religious minorities from violence.

This research examined violence against one religious minority group in Indonesia, the Ahmadiyya. Violence against this group continues, and they still live in tension with other groups. Therefore, this research is undoubtedly limited in covering all issues related to this minority community. However, this group’s ongoing dynamics present a difficulty for this study to produce a comprehensive overview. Future research should cover various problems, including the quality of human rights protection, the state’s role in protecting citizens, or other issues surrounding methodological issues such as the ethical research dimension.

This article proposes at least three essential recommendations, among others, (a). The Indonesian government needs to re-examine regulations that can be used as justification for violence against the Ahmadiyya minority at both the national and local levels. (b). Key social institutions need to foster an atmosphere of open and equal social life to all social groups, especially minority groups, through education policies and practices (Amri, Afifuddin, & Bin-Tahir, 2018). (c). The Ahmadiyya group, in particular, and minority groups in general, have to build a constructive network with the government, human rights NGOs, and influential and moderate socio-religious institutions (Musawar, Sahid, Jihadi, & Gunardi, 2019; Syam & Nawawi, 2019).

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