

Persistence of The Tarekat Naqshabandiyah in Local Politics of Indonesia Post New Order

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Received: 2021-03-20; Accepted: 2021-07-11; Published: 2021-12-30

Abstract: In the Indonesian context, tarekat is seen as a social movement with a broad impact. Its existence and activity need to be paid attention to by the State, society, and other political infrastructure. Many experts have carried out the discourse on tarekat with various points of view. This study focuses on the socio-political sphere of tarekat and its movements in local Indonesian politics after the Soeharto Era using a qualitative approach with interpretive data analysis involving the informants who understand the tarekat activity in Rokan Hulu in depth. The emergence of spiritual organs with various ideological variants, visions, and missions indicates the strengthening of civil supremacy in Indonesia. As part of a religious civil society organization, the Naqshabandiyah order can grow and exert a strong influence on the dynamics of Indonesian local democracy, especially in Rokan Hulu - Riau. The existence of this movement strengthens Bruinessen's argument about the tarekat as a "storehouse of sounds," whose symbolization of motion is described by the gesture and commands of the teacher. After the New Order, there was a shift in the political orientation of this group; the nature of taqlid to master teachers was only for religious matters, while on political issues, there was a shift in direction that was more directed at the individual interests of the congregation. Even so, the Naqshabandiyah Rokan Hulu tarekat could still maintain its existence and political power.

Keywords: Democracy; Local Politics; Naqshabandiyah Order.

Abstrak: Dalam konteks ke-Indonesia-an, tarekat dipandang sebagai gerakan sosial yang berdampak luas sehingga keberadaan dan gerakannya perlu menjadi perhatian oleh Negara, masyarakat dan infrastruktur politik lainnya. Diskursus mengenai tarekat telah dilakukan oleh banyak ahli juga dengan berbagai sudut pandang. Kajian ini memfokuskan diri pada lingkup sosial – politik tarekat dan gerakannya dalam ranah politik lokal Indonesia pasca Orde Baru. Studi ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan analisis data secara interpretatif yang melibatkan informan yang memahami gerakan tarekat di Rokan Hulu secara mendalam. Munculnya organ-organ keagamaan dengan berbagai varian ideologi, visi dan misinya menandakan menguatnya supremasi sipil di Indonesia. Tarekat Naqshabandiyah sebagai bagian dari organisasi masyarakat sipil yang bersifat keagamaan mampu tumbuh dan menanamkan pengaruh yang kuat dalam dinamika demokrasi lokal Indonesia khususnya di Rokan Hulu – Riau. Eksistensi gerakan ini sekaligus memperkuat argumentasi Bruinessen mengenai tarekat sebagai "Gudang Suara" yang simbolisasi gerakannya digambarkan oleh *gesture* dan titah tuan guru. Pasca Orde Baru terjadi pergeseran orientasi politik kelompok ini, sifat taqlid kepada tuan guru semata hanya untuk urusan agama sedangkan dalam urusan politik terjadi pergeseran orientasi yang lebih mengarah pada kepentingan individu para jamaah. Walaupun demikian, Tarekat Naqshabandiyah Rokan Hulu tetap mampu mempertahankan eksistensi dan kekuatan politiknya.

Kata Kunci: Demokrasi; Politik Lokal; Tarekat Naqshabandiyah.

1. Introduction

The shift of the tarekat movement from a socio-religious movement to a socio-political movement has been going on for such a long time. These movements are not small in political power interests (including the pilgrims Tarekat Movement in Rokan Hulu Regency). The shift in the direction of the Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah in Rokan Hulu Regency of Riau can be seen in the process of regional head elections and other political events. In this process, it was clear that the Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah influenced mobilizing voters, both from the congregation and society in general, to win the candidate candidates who were carried. Even so, the shift in the direction of the tarekat movement has become an inseparable part of the history of the spread of tarekat teachings in Indonesia (Handoko, 2020). Judging from the historical point of view of the spread of the teachings of the Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah (especially in Rokan Hulu Regency), it can be seen that wave after wave of arrival of shaykhs who have been masters of the majority tarekat teachers is a movement that purifies their religion trying to replace local religious practices with teachings and practices that they get from their place. They studied in Basilam (North Sumatra), including shari'ah. The spread took place in a colonial atmosphere and the spread of the teachings of the tarekat and the efforts to fight against colonialization.




Figure 1. The Position of Sharia in Four Spiritual Levels
Source: Handoko (2021)

Figure 1 explains that there are four levels in the spiritual level of the teachings of the Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah. Each level is believed to be the ritual direction of the followers of the order so that the achievement of each spiritual level determines the level of depth of teachings that a member of the order has passed. The four general spiritual levels in Islam, are *shari'ah*, *tarekath*, *haqiqah*, and the fourth level of *ma'rifat* which is the 'invisible' level. The fourth level is considered to be the core of the realm of essence, for the essence of all levels of religious, spiritual depth. In terms of the ability to perform the rituals of the tarekat, the believers believe that the more in performing the rituals the closer to God and will reach the highest level of spirituality in his life. Therefore, the *tarekat* build a *surau* or "*suluk*" house as a place where they perform *tarekat* rituals with the guidance of a *murshid*.

Apart from the historical series of dissemination of the teachings of the Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah in Rokan Hulu, the strong influence of tarekat teachings in the socio-cultural conditions of the Rokan Hulu community has indeed made the tarekat organization a potential political base and ideological. Therefore, it is not surprising that tarekat movements are heavily influenced by political interests (both institutions and political actors). As a movement with social power highly calculated in Rokan Hulu, the Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah has influenced regional policies in the political context and strategic regional development policies (Siregar, 2011). The literature on Islamism is full of theories that have criticized Islamic phenomena which play a minor role in modernity. This view has sparked the emergence of various approaches which pessimistically predict clashes between religions,

especially Islam, and the West. Although this argument has received attention due to some acts of violence committed under the banner of Islam, on the other hand, this argument has been counterbalanced by an emerging Islamic trend embracing pragmatic changes in its approach to establishing itself as a legitimate political actor in a modernized country. This shift in behavior and the relatively recent pragmatism of Islamic activists have often been interpreted in passing as a tactical strategy for gaining power; however, Islamist movements are active agents operating in their societal context. Thus, the question of Islamist practitioners and their commitment to politics and ideological affiliation is an important question to investigate beyond the classical assumptions stemming from a view that predicts a clash between Islamists and democratic principles (Mellouki, 2015).

The socio-political changes have also influenced changes in the political behavior of the tarekat people as part of the Indonesian Muslim community. Pabbari explained that the weakening of traditional religious values in political life is reflected in the political attitudes of tarekat, who have a theological view that the right to decide party choices is not a religious obligation. Then there could be differences between the political philosophies of religious elites and their congregations in their political affiliations (Pabbari, 2008). The other side of this study finds that between theological perspectives and the tendency of tarekat political affiliation, there is a particular tendency for congregations not to follow the political choices of the teacher. It cannot be separated from the political legacy of the New Order at that time which was very dominant in depoliticizing Islam, that the practice of the tarekat must be differentiated and separated from political choices. At the same time, elections are the personal right of each citizen to determine his political will.

Diversity at the local level is very susceptible to social problems between one element and another. Including the relationship between religion and politics can emerge as a problem in unstable conditions (Kasim, 2012). The number of sacral or belief streams that exist at the local level is a form of the cultural wealth of the Indonesian nation. Not a few of these cultural properties are used as political instruments for local political elites, such as ethnicity, language, and religion. The relationship between religious elements at the local level and the democratic process at the local level cannot be separated from the support of local elites, both religious and non-religious elites (Hasan, 2015). Socio-political movements based on religious identity have created two main groups, namely groups that prioritize structural approaches and groups that maintain cultural traditions or, in other terms as cultural Islam (Khamdan & Wiharyani, 2018). On the other hand, Islamic leaders who have Islamic political thoughts think that it can realize da'wah with a political role. The struggle for da'wah becomes more accessible because it is supported by power. However, Islamic figures who have a cultural point of view consider that Islam is a source of social ethics and morality, so they do not want to get involved in politics (Chalik, 2010). While related to political parties, Nurhadi (2016) explains the relationship between tarekat and political parties based on the interdependence that dominates each other.

Formulating the relationship between religion and the State has created multi-interpretations when it is developed in modern life. The Islamic political order places God as the epicenter of the ruler as the lawgiver, however, the sharia established by Allah is an ideal system and this is what many tarekat adherents understand as a form of responsibility for the teachings of the tarekat which require its adherents to be involved in the relationship between religion and the State. According to tarekat proponents, the effort to extract moral messages from Islamic teachings in the socio-political field becomes a problem of legal reasoning (*ijtihad*). Thus, al-Quran and al-Sunnah constitute an ethical framework that is the source of the highest value for formulating a country's form and system, which is illuminated by the values of political ethics (Ridwan, 2017). Therefore, the tarekat understands political issues as issues related to government or limited to political structural problems and includes political enculturation clearly and broadly. Politics by the tarekat is not only understood as a struggle to occupy or gain power, more than that, it also includes a series of activities related to the benefit of the ummah, this kind of political structure based on the principles of fiqh saying,

"*tasharruf al-imam alaa al-raa'iyah manutun bi al-maslahat*" (leaders' policies must be oriented towards the benefit of the people) (Porter, 2013).

The relationship between tarekat and politics cannot be avoided. In the history of tarekat development in Indonesia, tarekat displays a typology of socio-political movements. In this historical process, the tarekat trend has changed in dealing with the social situation of its time (Abdurahman, 2008). The tarekat sign in the nineteenth century appeared as a resistance movement against Western colonialism in the form of physical rebellion. In contrast, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the tarekat movement shifted to strengthening the socio-religious basis in the countryside. Then after independence, the tarekat socio-political movement was shown in political participation and cooperation with the government or socio-political forces for the struggle for freedom and nation-building. Departing from the tarekat socio-political movement, as Abdurahman (2008) explained, the tarekat socio-political movement always shows the intertwining of elements between teachings and rituals with their social environment. The activities generated by the tarekat take place and continue to change according to the socio-political dynamics in Indonesia. The socio-political movement of the tarekat has presented a unique side with various patterns of teaching development and its role in the socio-political dynamics, including the socio-political activity of the Naqsyabandiyah order. The exploratory study conducted by Martin Van Bruinessen on the Qadiriyah Wa Naqsabandiyah Tarekat provides an overview of the role of the tarekat in the process of Islamization in the archipelago. Many historical sources state that the Islamization of the Archipelago, which took place peacefully, was the Islamization process carried out by Sufi preachers with the model of Sufism and contextual. In the historical process, the phenomenon of the existence of the tarekat shows that the tarekat participated in influencing and being involved in various historical events, especially in the struggle for independence and after it.

The interrelationship between tarekat and power is a unique feature of tarekat socio-political movements. Tarekat has never really been out of control. This characteristic is mentioned in many references such as that written by Putra (2012), Sufi orders in the past played a role as a political force in many Islamic countries. Meanwhile, as part of the study of socio-political movements, this study tries to understand the phenomenon of religious resiliency (read-Islam) in a political context to identify religious groups' role and political influence on a local scale (Read - Tarekat Naqsabandiyah Rokan Hulu). Fahrurrozi (2010) explained that the transformation of the use-value of religion as a way of life and a source of normative values based on divine belief becomes an exchange value by using its functions adapted to human needs for religion. Batubara & Malik (2014) stated that religion in the political space is used as a means of political promotion, placing religious symbols on political banners, and using ulama as an instrument to increase political electability.

2. Results and Discussion

The year 2006 marked the arrival of a new phenomenon in democratic institutionalization in Rokan Hulu. Rokan Hulu, as a new autonomous region, conducted direct regional head elections for the first time and presented new experiences in local politics for the Naqsyabandiyah congregation. Democracy is characterized by a natural election system for regional rulers (Regent/Deputy Regent) or the people giving a leadership mandate directly to the desired Candidates for Regent and Deputy Regent without going through a representative institution. Many political elites used this opportunity at the local level of Rokan Hulu to build their political networks by making claims against the social base of society (farmers, laborers, civil servants, to tarekat). This claim is based on the simple understanding that the political elites view the Rokan Hulu people, whose majority of people live in the countryside, as political objects that are easy to control. By isolating oneself as part of that society, the community's political attitude and its political choices were to mobilize voters for the party and for itself. Such assumptions developed over a reasonably long period, namely the 2004 to 2014 elections, while for the 2019 Election, political issues were monopolized by religious issues at the central level, whose influence was also felt by the people of Rokan Hulu. It is at least proven by the

significant increase in PKS votes in the 2019 Election (17,770 votes) compared to the 2014 Election (13,809 votes) (Handoko, 2021).

The increase in the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) votes was not felt by other Islamic parties, such as the United Development Party (PPP), which experienced a significant decline from 19720 votes in the 2014 11886 votes in the 2019 election. Likewise, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) experienced a decrease in the number of votes from 7,745 in the 2014 election to only 3685 in the 2019 election. The decline in PPP and PBB votes could be due to a shift in the orientation of choosing Rokan people, or it could be due to an error in determining political support in the 2019 presidential election, which then shifted voters two the party to PKS and the National Mandate Party (PAN). As for the National Awakening Party or (PKB), the case is different because PKB already has its voter base, namely among students at Islamic boarding schools and adherents of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) among ex-transmigrants. Of course, there are different treatments by tarekat people in choosing a party; the variables of figures and elite patrons in the party also shape the preferences of tarekat and Rokan people in determining their choice of political parties in addition to religious issues and socio-political changes as explained above. The relationship between the tarekat and the Rokan Hulu political elite is like two sides of a coin; there is a reasonably close relationship. However, there are normative boundaries that both parties still maintain. The formation of the kinship system and social classification helps explain this so that the identification of kinship and social classification systems can explain the pattern of political relations between the tarekat and the Rokan Hulu political elite in the dynamics of power after the New Order (Handoko, 2021).

Social Friendship and Classification Systems and Local Political Elites

Sociologically, Tarekatt's bond of solidarity will further strengthen social integration which is based on shared moral feelings and beliefs and is strengthened by shared emotional experiences in the form of *wirid* and remembrance. This bond is more basic than a contractual relationship made based on the rational agreement because such a relationship relies on at least one level/degree of consensus on the moral principles on which the contract is based. That is why the ritual of allegiance is very sacred and sociologically a very fundamental basis in building the social contract of the Tarekatt community so that there is a symbiotic relationship between the student and the murshid and strengthens solidarity with both the murshid and his family as well as fellow Tarekatt practitioners. That's the social security structure that is built to strengthen social integration, especially in the Tarekatt community. The other side of the results of this study describes a form of social safety valve that can be observed when the Tarekatt Naqsabandiyah comes into contact with political issues.

One more characteristic of Tarekatt should not be ignored in the discussion of Tarekatt, namely the formation of bonds of solidarity among fellow practitioners of Tarekatt. The social bonds that bind between individuals and their groups are more due to shared beliefs, ideals, and moral commitments. However, there may be variations in terms of different views on certain matters, but the same belief is the main basis of social integration. The bond that unites individuals and groups (Thariqat institutions) is a form of solidarity. In Durkheim's terms referred to as mechanical solidarity. As a social network, there are no less than 30 congregational groups spread across the research area, both in Rokan Hulu and outside the Rokan area. By conducting direct observations using the technique of writing field notes, it was found that the practice of Tarekatt, although individually they did not know each other, with the symbols used they could quickly adapt to the environment they encountered.

The kinship system in Rokan society influences Rokan people's political choices towards parties and candidates. The dispersal of tarekat within political parties and elites has both explicit and implicit aims. The scattering aims to strengthen the existence of the tarekat in the socio-political environment of the Rokan community. In daily life, tarekat people have common adherents of the *ahlu sunnah wa al-jamaah* (Adherents to the Sunnah and the community) or NU people. If there is a difference, then the difference lies in the mode of the inner life. One of the fundamental characteristics

of the difference between tarekat and non-tarekat adherents is the conscious act of carrying out the tarekat's practice. The mindful attitude of the tarekat people is also seen as a manifestation of the teacher-student relationship and the formation of a kinship system and social classification of the tarekat people in Rokan Hulu.

The Establishment of A Friendly System

The system of ties within the Javanese family is called *somah* (Syam, 2013). It is somewhat similar to the kinship system of the Rokan, *somah* or *seumah* is a family unit in the form of a *nuclear family* and *extended family*, which forms a kinship system, including the family system in Rokan society and among the Naqsyabandiyah order. Almost the same in Javanese culture, the kinship system in the Rokan community is influenced by tradition and Islam to search for the family tree. The formation of a kinship system influenced by traditions and religious values seems to have persisted. However, many Rokan children and grandchildren have received education outside the region, the kinship system and blood ties are still well preserved. *Seumah* for the Rokan people can consist of an essential family and an extended family. Most Rokan people apply the broad family pattern, especially for those who are classified as rich. For the Rokan, the house is for the essential family and for the extended family who needs it; this situation is expected in the old villages and the flow of the Batang Lubuh and Batang Sosah rivers. The house for the Rokan people has four main functions: ritual, economic, child socialization, and caring for family members who are sick, unemployed, old age, orphaned, etc. System *seumah* has builds on community Rokan kinship system, where the system was noticed rope foster kinship between conjugal and family area. Foster care also characterizes the kinship system in the Rokan community, whose ties are referred to from time immemorial. There has been no denial of the kinship system. The majority of informants in this study said the kinship system building was maintained in the socio-cultural and even political changes until today. So it is not surprising if, in socio-political relations, tracking of the kinship system is carried out by Rokan people.

Perpetuating kinship is an important part of the lives of the Rokan people and the naqsabandiyah order which is conceptualized by the phrase "connecting a broken trunk - extending a short pole, raising sedahan - taking one step first", namely strengthening the relationship in the family, tracing back the family tree, respecting the old and prioritize the leader in the kinship system. The establishment of such a kinship system aims to strengthen the basis of blood ties in the tradition of the Rokan people. This basis also persists in the socio-political sphere of the Rokan people and the tarekat; to a certain extent, the kinship relationship is used for the benefit of mobilizing political support for parties and political elites in the name of kinship.

The kinship system of the Rokan people also forms a pattern of teacher-student relations of the Naqsyabandiyah order; it reflects at the same time that the close relationship in the kinship system forms taqlid attitudes between the elders in the family and their children and grandchildren. Respect for the tarekat teacher is translated into respect for parents because tarekat teachings in society are so thick. In addition to teaching tarekat and reciting the Koran, the master teacher is also involved in other assemblies; in that assembly, many ask for consultations on mate, wedding days, building houses, and even advice on politics (MST, Tambusai Community Leader, Personal Communication, September 15, 2020).

Obedience in the kinship system of the Rokan people is also formed from the attitude of compliance between the tarekat teacher and the tarekat student, which later characterizes the relationship between the tarekat and the political elite. The kinship system in Rokan society makes it easy for the political elite to immerse themselves in that community group. For the political elite, entering the tarekat world has two meanings., *First*, entering the tarekat world is something sacred as a process of inner purification. *Second*, entering the tarekat world can attract the attention of the tarekat to itself or its political choices. The choice of action taken by the tarekat when choosing two of

the same activities is equally tricky; then, the choice will be made by using rational action with a purpose. That is, when you must choose to carry out activities that are aimed at self-interest and the interests of the public (public) in the same momentum, the choice will be made by using the consideration of which two activities are in contact with the needs of the community and which touches on one's actions.

The formation of the kinship system among the tarekat people in Rokan Hulu can vary; this variation also colors the socio-political relations of the tarekat and the Rokan people in general. The kinship system in the Rokan community is matrilineal. However, for religious matters, the Rokan people emphasize the paternal line, while for property issues, the mother line seems to be more dominant. This system also dominates the socio-political environment in the Rokan Hulu community; the political elite is dominated by men (98%), even if there are women-only to fulfill the representation quota as mandated by the Election Law and the Political Party Law.

The kinship system of the Rokan people is close to the maternal lineage (matrilineal) like the Minang people, but it seems that such a kinship system does not apply for political and power matters. People somehow trust men more to become community leaders, the position of female police officers seems more due to the luck factor of having a large (*extended family*) (MF, Politician of the Democratic Party, Personal Communication, September 15, 2020)

Tracing kinship makes it easier for political elites to enter the tarekat world and gain support. Referring to the family tree of the Rokan people, there are almost no Rokan people who are not adherents of the tarekat, especially in the old villages along with the flow of the Batang Lubuh and Batang Sosah rivers. These villages were also the basis for the development of the tarekat at first and along the river flow, the culture of the waters of the Rokan people developed until the mid-1990s. From this historical background, it is easy to trace kinship formation among the tarekat and the Rokan people. The following picture illustrates the construction of the kinship system of the tarekat and the Rokan people.




Figure 2. Jamaah – Syekh Relations and the Formation of Kinship Systems in Rokan Hulu
Source: Research Processed Data, 2020

Figure 2 explains the formation of social relations and ties in the Rokan Hulu community that social relations and ties are influenced by the teacher-student relationship in the *tarekat*. The pattern of patron-client also shows that the close relationship between teachers and students affects the solidarity relationship in the Rokan community. From this relationship, it can be interpreted that the relationship between teacher pupils and tarekat students who immerse themselves in spiritual / blessing livelihood efforts helps interpret the process of forming a kinship system in the Rokan Hulu

community. The relationship between teacher and student who does not follow also applies to kinship relations of the Rokan people, even though blood ties are no longer close/indirect. The kinship system in the Rokan community is closely related to the relationship between tarekat and political elites; this finding is somewhat similar to that expressed by Rohma (2020), which discusses the role of *kiai* in the process of social change through what is he calls the part of the mediator. *Kiai* can link superiors and subordinates' interests because *kiai* can understand the world of associates and the world of superiors. Likewise, with the tarekat, the pattern of the relationship between the teacher and the tarekat, in fact, also shows the same thing as what Horikhosi said (Syam, 2013). Therefore, forming a kinship system in Rokan society makes it easier to trace the political networks of the tarekat and the Rokan Hulu political elite because by looking at kinship ties, a straight line can be drawn in the direction of their political support. It is also possible that the formation of the kinship system as described above will also change with the times. Especially at this time, there is also the incessant entry of transnational Islamic movements that are gradually eroding traditional Islamic groups' hegemony that inhabit rural areas. However, historically, it will give an image that conventional Islam in the countryside is indeed fragmented in such a way. However, this social classification based on spiritual levels only uses terms and does not cause friction between the various social groups.

The interaction between individual members in society has also significantly changed; interactions in rural areas are affected by the acceleration of technological development and urban community relations. Therefore, external influences - the social environment, have more precedence than internal factors - the process and outcome of education in the daily behavior of tarekat people outside of their tarekat recitation activities. Changes in people's cognitive or life orientation and behavior are closely related to the increasing flow of information and media penetration. In the villages along the Batang Lubuh and Batang Sosah rivers, almost all households have TV and cellphones, which diminishes the social classification among themselves, including their perspective on politics, which tends to change from a traditional to a traditional rational view, although more a lot of pragmatic. However, traditional values still dominate the political behavior of the majority of the Rokan Hulu community, at least it can be seen from the pattern of support, segregation of political issues to the use of religious and cultural symbols in political contestation.

Social Classification of Tarekat People

Research by Horikhosi and Geertz (Syam, 2013) explains the states that the kinship system in Javanese society uses a bilateral approach, a kinship designation determined by generational aspects and widens to place the ego in the middle. However, for the Rokan people, such a classification is not appropriate. As described above, in the kinship system of the Rokan people, it is clear that the kinship system follows the maternal lineage (matrilineal). Therefore, to see the social classification of the tarekat people, it is also inseparable from the kinship system that is interconnected with one another. Maintaining kinship is an integral part of the life of the Rokan people, which is conceptualized by the phrase "*relating broken rod*," that is, holding marriages between distant relatives. However, the system itself is currently considered obsolete along with the social and cultural changes of the Rokan people as a result of acculturation and the recent development of global life. However, this kind of kinship system is still considered relevant for parents. The social classification of tarekat people as a causal relationship with the kinship system is categorized into several groups in stages. The following picture explains the question of social sort based on the spiritual level of the tarekat; that spiritual level is also a reference in exploring tarekat knowledge for students. The practitioners of the Naqsabandiyah Order consist of three groups according to their respective stations. The classification of these three levels is based on the individual quality of perseverance in practicing guidance, *dhikr*, until reaching the level of *ma'rifah* through *riyadah* and as taught by the master teacher, one's ability to gain knowledge using *ladunni* knowledge. The three levels are: (1) The lay level, (2) The Khawas level, and (3) The Khawas bi al-Khawas level.

The sociological solidarity ties of the tarekat will further strengthen social integration based on shared moral feelings and beliefs and are strengthened by shared emotional experiences in the forms

of *wazik* and *dhikr*. These bonds are more fundamental than contractual relationships made based on the rational agreement because such relationships rely on at least one degree of consensus on the moral principles on which the contract is based. That is why the *bai'at* ritual is very sacred and sociologically. It is a fundamental basis in building the social contract of the tarekat community, so there is a symbiotic relationship between students and murshid and strengthening solidarity with both murshid and their families and fellow tarekat practitioners. That is the structure of social security built to enhance social integration, especially in the tarekat community. The other side of the results of this study illustrates a form of social safety valve that can be observed, namely when the Naqsyabandiyah order comes into contact with political issues.

One more feature of tarekat should not be ignored in the discussion of tarekat, namely the formation of solidarity bonds among tarekat practitioners. The social bonds that bind the individual and the group are more due to shared beliefs, ideals, and moral commitment. It does not rule out variations in terms of different views on some issues, but the same idea is the primary basis for social integration. The bond that unites individuals and groups (tarekat institutions) is a form of solidarity. In Durkheim's terms, it is called mechanical solidarity. As a social network, there are no less than 30 groups of the congregation who are scattered in the research location, both in Rokan Hulu and outside the Rokan area. By making direct observations using the technique of writing field notes, it was found that tarekat practitioners, although individually, did not know each other. Still, with the symbols used, they could quickly adapt to the environment they encountered. The peak of the form of social solidarity can be seen in the rituals carried out during the haul Sheik Abdul Wahab Rokan, where the social entity consists of various social groups, be it farmers, laborers, civil servants, the private sector, or officials. They blend without any visible social status differences. It indicates a robust social entity among tarekat practitioners. They know each other, discuss social, religious, economic, and political issues.

Followers Social Interactions in Rokan Hulu

Mead's view (2008) distinguishes social interactions into non-symbolic interactions and symbolic interactions. Non-symbolic interaction means that humans respond directly to the actions or cues of others. In contrast, extended interactions mean that humans interpret each other's actions and signals based on the meaning that results from their interpretations. According to Mead, there are several essential things in symbolic interaction: (1) Symbolic interaction is a formative process in its own right; (2) It has developing behavioral adjustments, and this is done through a process of the dualism of definition and interpretation; and (3) In making the process of interpretation and definition of one-to-another human-centered action, symbolic interactions span the broadest general forms of human relations.

Social interaction, which is part of the social process in the tarekat community, is sociologically formed from communication, conflict, or social integration between tarekat practitioners and those outside the tarekat. The pattern of social interaction between adherents of the Naqsyabandiyah order with NU and Muhammadiyah people describes a harmonious lifestyle, there is no visible conflict, this is in line with Geertz's thoughts when explaining how difficult it is for pure Islam to break through the nuances of religious life in rural communities coupled with the weakening of critical attitudes in Islamic purification. The life of the tarekat in Rokan society does not only follow a specific pattern developed in a strict tarekat such as *mutalaqqi*, namely dealing directly with the teacher according to the standardized lineage, but the life of the tarekat in the Rokan community also develops without going through the lineage. They do spiritual cultivation through inner contemplation by strengthening the spiritualization of sharia. In various literature studies, this kind of Sufism model is known as Modern Sufism (Buya Hamka), Neo Sufism (in Fazlur Rahman's terminology), urban Sufism (AN Burhani), and Positive Sufism developed by the Indonesian Islamic Media Network (IIMaN) led by Haidar (2008). So far, religious education and teaching that was inherited from the classical - scholastic period only emphasized the need for salvation based on individual piety before God, as is the case in tarekat communities in general, without stressing the need for piety between

groups or social piety. This assumption is based on that if individual piety is achieved, the social piety will be fulfilled one day. Of course, this dramatically simplifies the problem because, in group reality, this is not the case. Logic, psychology, interests, fanaticism, group commitment, and loyalty are very different from logic, psychology, interests, fanaticism, and individual responsibility. The trend of society regarding the importance of the tarekat in the future is still very actual. The tarekat must be able to build itself to accommodate the interests of its congregation in ways that are appropriate to the current situation. However, the tarekat does not have to be a formal, standard form because, in the life of the Rokan community, spiritual nuances have developed, which are integrated into the Rokan culture with spiritual and cultural nuances. The spiritual energy contained in the Rokan culture supports the growth of the tarekat. It even helps each other between local cultural spiritualism and religious spiritualism that develops in religious communities in rural Rokan Hulu.

Rokan Hulu Political Elite and Its Relationship with Tarekat

The politics of religious piety in Indonesia has always been associated with the political contest of general elections. Islam is used as a tool of politicization in gaining personal power, the politics of piety is related to Islam as the majority religion so that it can be used as a tool of legitimacy to achieve leadership both nationally and locally (Setyaningrum, 2017). A person's piety is not seen from the appearance of the symbols of the Religion used by a person alone, but is seen from a person's soul and his concern for social. One's practice becomes a measure in determining one's piety not merely from physical symbols. Often piety is estimated by a person's style regardless of his social life, piety in a socio-political view whose essence is to look at the elements of social interest and sense of socialization with fellow human beings (Mayasari, 2017). The relationship between religions and countries leads to change and diversity of religion, the occurrence of pluralization of religious fields, religious individualism and the occurrence of monopoly by the state on Islam (Meddeb et al., 2017). Muslims are the largest population in Indonesia, not ruling out the possibility of socio-religious symptoms that will affect Muslims. Rozaki (2013) explained that the faces and expressions of Muslims in public space can be seen from two sides, on the one hand Muslims are seen as intolerant and unfriendly. The occurrence of acts of terrorism and inter-religious conflict. But on the other hand, Muslims are seen as friendly, egoistic, modern and tolerant. Islam becomes a representative in the public space to participate in the political system. The Ulama have long participated in supporting the continuation of nationalism for the sake of maintaining the unity and unity of Indonesia as well as maintaining the integrity of the religious community. Putnam (York, 2001) said that there are five aspects of political elites and power: First, political power is like other social goods distributed unequally. Second, essentially, people are grouped into two groups: those who have essential political power and those who do not. Third, internally, elites are homogeneous, united, and have consciousness. Fourth, the elite governs their survival; then, their membership comes from a limited level of society. Fifth, elite groups are autonomous. To understand the elite in certain conditions and how a collective decision in a group is carried out collectively.

The interaction between the ruling elite and the masses apart from the existence of the ruler (political elite, religious elite, social elite), which is also understood as mass power is an important element that determines the political behavior of the elite and society. Identifying the political elite of Rokan Hulu is not an easy matter because there is also no recognition from groups of who they call elite. Therefore, the elites' identification in this study is seen from their role, position, and influence in Rokan society and their impact in socio-political relations with the Naqsyabandiyah order. According to KH. Maknur, leader of Surau Subussalam Kunto Muara Dilam, finds out the elite category in Rokan society their role and position in society can be used. This concept seems to be in line with the views of Vilfredo Pareto, who proposed two categories of elites, namely the *governing* and the *nongoverning elite*. Some characteristics distinguish one elite from another in certain conditions, namely leading and exercising political control. This identification of local elites makes it easier for the author to describe the relationship between the tarekat and local politics in Rokan Hulu. It also correlates with the use of tarekat symbols by local elites in political contestation in Rokan Hulu.

Table 1. Categorization of Upstream Rokan Political Elites Elite

Position	
<i>Governing Elite</i>	<i>Nongoverning Elite</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regent / Deputy Regent ▪ Members of Regional Legislative Council ▪ Bureaucrats / Regional Civil Servants ▪ Director BUMD ▪ Village Head ▪ Members of BPD ▪ Village 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Teachers Tarekat ▪ Leaders of Traditional Institutions ▪ Academics ▪ Entrepreneurs ▪ Officials Community Figures ▪ Management Political Parties ▪ Student

Source: Research Data, 2020

Table 1 explains that there are two elite groups in the Rokan Hulu community, the elite in question is considered capable of influencing the perceptions and social actions of the Rokan community, so that the existence of these elites is important. The two elite groups in question are within the government group, and outside the government, each elite group will act in its discretion, and every action is influenced by its socio-political and religious background. Grouping local political elites above illustrate that elites located in government institutions and those not domiciled in government institutions are connected. The relationship between these elites can be observed from kinship lines, tarekat lines, social and political organization lines, to professional lines. MJ Aboel Tambusai said that the local political elites of Rokan Hulu had links between kinship lines and socio-political organization lines.

The local elites of Rokan Hulu do not stand alone; they must be connected. Relationships can be traced from kinship lines and other social lines even though they are of different ethnicities. Still, there are sometimes many similarities for political affairs because it could be that the social line was formed from their previous organization. Like Kelmi Amri, M Sahril Topan, Nasrul Hadi, and Hardi Candra, they are one line within the organization (SPSI, KNPI, Partai etc.) (MJT, Address North Tambusai, congregation Surau Kuala Tambusai, Personal Communication, September 15, 2020).

The elite grouping above helps to understand the formation of tarekat relations with the elite. The case of Rokan Hulu, as the result of the interview above, shows that there is no elite apart from the social and kinship sphere. There is a connecting line both culturally (kinship) and structurally (social organization) so that sometimes elite integration with the public is formed. Select integration with the audience attempts to connect between the ruling elite and the ruled audience or people. Integration between the elite and the public does not mean eliminating the differences between them. If integration is seen as a process, the integration of the elite with the public is an institutional process of the people. The existence of local political elites cannot be separated from the development of political dynamics after the New Order. The link between the political elite and the tarekat will undoubtedly increase because each party needs the other. The categorization of political elites according to the table above is intended to make it easier to understand the political influence of the tarekat in local politics in Rokan Hulu in general, accompanied by the facts of the tarekat's political influence on both political parties and local political elites. The relationship between tarekat and local political elites is described as the relationship between murids and students of the tarekat. In dealing with the tarekat masters, the elite position themselves as students; this attitude seems to be in line with the nature of the relations in the tarekat.

The relationships and interactions of murshids and students in the perspective of the tarekat are called 'shuhbah'. Meanwhile, the relationship pattern emanating from the essence of the tarekat is *ihsan*, the spiritual peak that passes through Islam and faith. Having Islam is the 'initial' of someone who enters the circle of Divine rules. Say then do charity 'dhâhir'. Rabitah, in the sense of language, means to be laced or related. Meanwhile, within the meaning of the term tarekat, *rabitah* is a spiritual connect students and teachers by presenting visual or face-to-heart murshid or sheik pupil when dhikr or charity to obtain *wasilah* in order pupil journey towards God or the answered prayer. A student earnestly studies from his teacher, and a teacher sincerely provides education and teaching to his students so that there is a harmonious relationship between the two. Students who get knowledge from their teachers will gain the understanding that it is blessed and beneficial" (KTA, Chairman of Surau Suluk Kuala Tambusai, Personal Communication, September 15, 2020).

The strong relationship between the teacher and the tarekat students has become a social force for the tarekat group in its role in the social and political environment in Rokan Hulu. The teacher-student relationship is manifested in a patron-client solid relationship. The patronage built between students and murshid tarekat in each *surau* (mosque) has formed an intense bond and mutual need. The strong relationship between students and murshid has made the tarekat group a religious group that is always considered. Some parties assign their cadres to become congregation *surau suluk*; political parties recruit congregations of tarekat who are considered to have strong influence to become part of that political party. The Naqsyabandiyah order cannot be visualized to represent specific political forces, institutions, and political actors as a potential political basis. The public considers the ability to position themselves so that tarekat's actions are unbiased. This description at least expresses the position of the tarekat movement and its role amid social change, as mentioned above. It shows that the tarekat always has a responsibility individually and socially. There are two different perceptions about the political role played by the tarekat people. First, in their view, fanaticism for teachers can quickly turn into political fanaticism that influences society to achieve political goals. Second, tarekat people see the development of the tarekat as a symptom of depoliticization and as an escape from socio-political responsibility. It is more oriented towards *ukhrawi* (hereafter) affairs than worldly problems. These perceptions are an empirical basis for seeing how the political process involves religious elites in strengthening the relationship between religion and politics. Then, tarekat groups' formation of political orientation cannot be separated from the above perception. The birth of tarekat groups as religious groups that have strong influence and bargaining value has had a significant impact on their political attitudes.

3. Conclusion

The existence of the tarekat in the socio-political changes in Indonesia, especially in Rokan Hulu, has strengthened the political position of the tarekat. The bargaining politics developed by the tarekat group places the guru as the epicenter of non-formal political power in Rokan Hulu. At the same time, cultural roles that are in direct contact with grassroots communities are more dominantly articulated by tarekat students. In addition to managing the Surau, murshids also develop education in their respective environments, including maintaining traditionalist Muslim religious ritual practices, such as *istighasah*, *yasin* recitation, *Manaqib Kubra*, and the like, such a reality does preserve the existence of the tarekat itself. The political change from a centralized system to the realm of decentralization has brought about consequences for changes in local politics. The struggle of the tarekat with politics is considered the result of this political change; the phenomena that sometimes appear unexpectedly and the rapid changes in the flow of democratization are included in the flow of socio-political change in Rokan Hulu. This study can help map the grouping of political loyalties at the fundamental level to produce policies, plans, and programs suitable for religious groups and the surrounding community.

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