Indonesian Muslim in the Netherlands: Responding to Nationalism, Islamism, Democracy, and Pluralism

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Received: 2022-06-10; Accepted: 2022-08-06; Published: 2022-08-31

Abstract: There are very few studies relating to the practice of Indonesian Islam in the Netherlands, and how Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands respond to a number of citizenship issues (such as nationalism, Islamism, democracy and pluralism). This article describes quantitative data based on survey results to understand practice of Indonesian Islam in the Netherlands, and to describe the responses of Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands to a number of citizenship issues. The survey covers demographic information, the practice of Indonesian Islam, responses about several topics such as Indonesia, nationalism and Islam; Islamism, democracy and pluralism, and participation in Islamic organizations. The survey involved 89 respondents living in the Netherlands in 2017. The findings show that rituals associated to Nahdladul Ulama (the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia) are most common among the Indonesian community in the Netherlands. In general, respondents are strongly nationalists. However, some political Islam principles are becoming more commonplace among Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands, which indicates that the support for Islamism is strong enough among them.

Keywords: Democracy; Indonesian Muslims; Islamism; Nationalism; Netherlands; Pluralism.

1. Introduction

Referring to Fachri & Gusnelly (2019), at least 2.1% of the Dutch population are of Indonesian origin (including third and fourth generations). In 2004, the number of Indonesian descents was estimated at around 8,400, with 7,392 of them Muslims, since 88% of the Indonesian population are Muslims (Aidulsyah & Gusnelly, 2019a). The number of Indonesian Muslims based on those who applied for a Dutch passport was estimated at about 16,000 (Aidulsyah & Gusnelly, 2019b). Accordingly, many scholars pay attention to the existence of Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands.
As a civil society organization, and they actively promote the notion of Islam having a tolerant and moderate character and mainstream Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Both characteristic and has been propagated peacefully, and the majority of Muslims is affiliated to moderate and mainstream Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations are classified a "myth" (Mietzner & Muhtadi 2019), vote buying (Hicken et al. 2022), flourishing inequality (Muhtadi & Warburton 2020) and pluralism promoted by religious organization is a “myth” (Mietzner & Muhtadi 2020). Now, Indonesia is increasingly flirting with conservatism and populism (Bruinessen 2021; Jubba et al. 2021; Pribadi 2021; Zuhdi 2018). This article is aimed at surveying Indonesian Muslim community in the Netherlands and Indonesia. However, there are very few studies relating to the practice of Indonesian Islam in the Netherlands and how Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands responded to a number of citizenship issues (such as nationalism, Islamism, democracy and pluralism).

Indonesian Islam, as a field of study, in its country of origin has been very productive, dating back to the colonial period from both Dutch and English writers. Indonesian Islam has for centuries shown special characteristics that helped spread Islam and built Indonesia as a majority Muslim country. Nowadays, it has gone global as many Indonesian Muslim communities are developing outside Indonesia. However, generally, Indonesian Islam was historically portrayed in a negative light on account of its syncretic character (Geertz, 1960; Noer, 1972).

In subsequent decades, more integrative and positive views of Indonesian Islam came from other English-language authors, such as Daniels (2009), Feener (2007); Ricklefs (2012) and Woodward (1989). Among other things, they argue that previous studies in the vein of Snouck Hufgronje and Geertz did not appreciate the special character of Indonesian Islam. The unique character of Indonesian Islam has made Islamization in Indonesia more successful, integrated across the divide between adat (local cultural practices) and Islam, it has allowed for modernization while maintaining Islamic values, and facilitated a transition to democracy while maintaining a religious character within the Indonesian state. Previous approaches that perceive Islam vis-à-vis adat, or in opposition with Middle Eastern forms, or that overemphasized the divergence between Islamic theory and practice resulted in underestimating the role of Islam in Indonesia. For this reason, many had long failed to appreciate the dynamics and the richness of Indonesian Islam.

The next period under the new order regime was marked by the development of new ideas such as democracy, human rights, civil society, and equal rights (Hefner, 2000; Mujani, 2003). These ideas and movements had garnered various responses, ranging from positive to negative. Those who gave positive responses believed that Islam is compatible with democracy, human rights, civil society, and equal rights. On the other hand, those who responded negatively considered that these new ideas and movements are Western and based on human creation, and they saw them as being in opposition to Islamic teachings and in conflict with the Qur’an and Hadith (Abdillah, 1999).

One of the key dynamics in the development of Indonesian Islam has been globalization. Barton (1999) for example, believes that modernization and globalization have significantly changed Indonesian Islam, especially for traditionalist Muslims. He argues that traditionalists have been gaining greater advantages than other groups have in light of this development. Both traditionalist and modernist groups have contributed to the emergence of neo-modernism and have expanded the meanings of traditionalism and modernism. Barton has argued that Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia have been more open to facing the challenges of modernity than Muslims from other Islamic countries. Globalization has been pivotal, though, for the new influences it has brought (Kersten, 2015) and for the new opportunities it has provided. A more recent aspect of globalization that is having a strong impact on Indonesian Islam is the large number of Indonesian Muslims traveling to, studying in, and living in non-Muslim countries, including Europe, North America, and Oceania.

Similarly, Azra (2004, 2006) argues that Indonesian Islam has a tolerant and moderate characteristic and has been propagated peacefully, and the majority of Muslims is affiliated to moderate and mainstream Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations are classified as a civil society organization, and they actively promote the notion of democracy, human rights and gender equality. Only a small number of Muslims join radical groups such as the Islamic Defense Front (FPI) and the Jihad Troops (Lasykar Jihad).

Yet, Indonesian democracy recently has been seen as declining. This is indicated by the increasing number of intolerance cases (Aspinall et al. 2020; Fossati et al. 2020; Mietzner & Muhtadi 2019), vote buying (Hicken et al. 2022), flourishing inequality (Muhtadi & Warburton 2020) and pluralism promoted by religious organization is a “myth” (Mietzner & Muhtadi 2020). Now, Indonesia is increasingly flirting with conservatism and populism (Bruinessen 2021; Juba et al. 2021; Pribadi 2021; Zuhdi 2018). This article is aimed at surveying Indonesian Muslim community in the Netherlands and Indonesia.
their religious activities to understand the heterogeneity of Indonesian Islam and the extent of their responses to nationalism, Islamism, democracy and pluralism issues. It can be assumed that these contemporary issues are often connected to religion, especially Islam, and the response from Indonesian Muslims overseas regarding these issues is often influenced by Islam in Indonesia.

Initially, we employed an online survey to obtain responses from our respondents in the Netherlands. We invited respondents using a media social group, particularly WhatsApp, by contacting key persons from each city and asking them to distribute our questionnaire. We had about six key persons in the Netherlands and they sent our survey link either in their social media group or personally. Furthermore, we not only distributed our questionnaire online but also manually disseminated it because responses from the online survey were too slow. We went to the mosque of Al-Hikmah Den Haag twice to distribute the questionnaire. We planned to visit other Muslim gathering groups (pengajian) in Rotterdam, but due to a technical difficulty, we failed to join the pengajian in Rotterdam. Our attempt to obtain a good response was by contacting the leaders of Islamic organizations to support their members to participate in the survey. We involved four students studying in the Netherlands to intensively contact potential respondents. The survey was distributed from October 22 to November 15, 2017, and we eventually obtained 32 responses from the manual survey and 57 responses from the online survey.

The structure of the article is as follows: first, the introduction discusses several aspects such as the background, significance of the study, development of studies on Indonesian Islam, and the research method; second, the results of the study, covering demographic information, Indonesian Islamic rituals, nationalism, Islamism, democracy and pluralism, membership of Islamic organization; third, the conclusion, which relates the results to the existing literature.

2. Result

This survey aims to understand the portrait of Indonesian Islam’s heterogeneity in the Netherlands. The survey observed Indonesian Islam based on the five principles of being a Muslim and other common rituals practiced in Indonesia. Accordingly, the questions not only include ritual practices of Indonesian Islam but they also relate to demographic information, attitudes and perceptions about Islam and politics. There are six topics. First, the demographic information includes gender, date of birth, level of education, marital status, country or residence, duration of stay overseas, number of family members living overseas, city or province of origin in Indonesia, purpose for living overseas. Second, questions relating Indonesian Islamic rituals, which are classified into two types: rituals conducted by both traditionalists and modernists, and rituals performed by traditionalist or modernist only.

The third section discusses questions relating to Indonesia, nationalism, and Islam. There are six questions addressed in this section, wherein the first and second questions are aimed at examining the responses of respondents regarding Pancasila as the national principle and the needlessness for declaring Islam as the state foundation. The third question relates to the importance of the four pillars of the nation-state (Pancasila, UUD 1945, NKRI, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Fourth, a question relating to love for their homeland Indonesia as an obligation for all Indonesian citizen. Fifth, the Indonesian territory must be preserved and protected including regions where non-Muslim minority groups reside such as West Papua and East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur). The last question relates to the statement that ethnic and religious based discriminations are unacceptable in Indonesia (NKRI).

In the fourth section, the questions relate to responses on the issue of Islamism, meaning to what extent do respondents approve the idea of Islam as an ideology and textual Islam as the purpose of social and political life. The fifth section addresses questions relating to democracy and pluralism and finally, the sixth section presents data about membership of Indonesian Islamic organization.
Demographic Information

By Gender and Age

Table 1 indicates that 49% of the respondents are male and 51% are female. The distribution of respondents by age is quite heterogeneous. The oldest respondent is 76 years old and the youngest one is 18 years old. Most respondents are around 18 to 47 years old at 72%, while those above 47 are at 28%. A closer look at the data shows that the youngest group from 18 to 27 years old, 28 to 37, and 38 to 47 consists of 16%, 21% and 34% respectively. The oldest group from 48 to 57, 58 to 67, 68 to 76 consists of 19%, 8% and 1%, respectively. In other words, the oldest group of respondents (aged 67-76) makes up 9% of the respondents.

Table 1. Age Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birthday</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941 – 1949</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>68-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 – 1959</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>57-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 – 1969</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>47-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 – 1979</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 – 1999</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Educational Background

When we look at the respondents’ educational background (Table 2), most have enjoyed higher education by 70%. However, only 24% of the respondents are senior high school graduates, while 6% of them selected others for educational background. Others in this survey mean educational background from vocational education (Diploma 1, 2 or 3). Respondents with a postgraduate degree are quite dominant at 49%, while those with a bachelor’s degree reach 21%. In other words, in terms of educational background, the respondents can be classified as having well-educated backgrounds.

Table 2. Educational Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral Degree</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Degree</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor Degree</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Reasons for Living Overseas

This survey was distributed to heterogeneous groups ranging from people with a junior high school background to those with a doctoral degree (Table 3). This can be associated with their reasons for being overseas, as most of them go overseas to work (reaching 49%). They were interested in participating in the survey because of our attendance at the mosque of Al Hikmah twice and we distributed manual questionnaires during their pengajian. Some of the respondents were living in the Netherlands because they joined their husbands or wives or other family members for work.
The percentage of respondents living overseas for their study is only at 24%, this is much lower than those living in the Netherlands for work and for accompanying their spouse or their family members, which total at 71%. This indicates that the Muslim community in the Netherlands leads a rather permanent life overseas, implying that they would not be returning to Indonesia within a short period. Arguably, they have established a more permanent community.

By Duration of Stay Overseas

Table 4 shows that there are more participants who have been living overseas for less than 10 years (at 57%) compared to 41% of respondents who have been living overseas for more than 11 years. Some of them have been living overseas for over 20 years (at 21%). In other words, they have migrated from Indonesia for quite a long time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of stay overseas</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10 years</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 years</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20 years</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesian Islamic rituals

In general, Islam as a religion covers belief and it manifested into Islamic teachings. Indonesian Islam is not homogenous in terms of ritual, social identity, political belief and affiliation. Indonesian Islamic rituals can be classified into two types: first, rituals conducted by both traditionalists and modernists, covering the five daily prayers, fasting in the month of Ramadhan, Friday service/shalat Jum’at. Second, rituals conducted by tradionalist or modernist Muslim only.

Some Islamic rituals are considered recommended but not mandatory (sunnah), meaning that those are good rituals but Muslim are allowed to leave them. All Muslims have acknowledged the fact that the value of some rituals is recommended, but the way they are practiced sometimes differ. For example, for a particular night prayer performed during Ramadhan, i.e., shalat teraweh, people associated as traditionalists tend to choose 23 raka’at while modernists tend to choose 11 raka’at. This difference is due to the result of the interpretation of the Sunnah (habits of the Prophet Muhammad)(Toyibah, 2022).

Rituals associated to the traditionalist group (khaul, tujuh harian, tahlilan, ziarah kubur, asking for prayers from a religious authority) are very common among Indonesian community in the Netherlands (Graph 1). Only 20% admitted to never having practiced khaul while 76% indicated that they very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice them (at 44%,13%, 12%, 6% respectively). Commemorating the seventh day of the dead (tujuh harian) was selected by 76% of the respondents (with 46%,17%, 9%, 4% for very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice, respectively). Performing tahlilan was chosen by 82% of the respondents (46%, 20%, 10%, 6% for very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice, respectively) and only 15% indicated that they never practice it. Visiting memorials to pray for the dead was chosen by 84% of the respondents and only 12% said they never practised it. Meanwhile, asking for prayers from a religious authority (kiai or wali) for various personal reasons was chosen by 79% of the respondents at 39%, 24%, 10%, 6% for very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice, respectively. Only 17% indicated that they never practice such ritual.
The survey shows that only 15% said they never practice 23 raka’at of night prayers during Ramadhan/ shalat teraweh and only 3% indicated that they never practice 11 raka’at. We may interpret that many respondents have practiced both types of night prayers during Ramadhan/ shalat teraweh. However, their intensity differs as 68% chose very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice (at 38%, 16%, 18, 15% respectively). By contrast, more respondents chose 11 raka’at at 82%, only 62 % chose 23 raka’at.

Only few respondents (4%) indicated that they never participate in religious gathering (pengajian), while others, around 96% chose very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice at 45%, 32%, 9%, and 3% respectively. Similarly, only 4% stated that they never participate in yasinan (religious gathering for reciting QS Yaa Sin) and the percentage of yasinan intensity is very similar to that of the pengajian at 45%, 32%, 9%, and 3% respectively for very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice.

For maulid nabi and isra’ mi’raj, only around 6% indicated that they have never attended or celebrated such events, and only 1% for halal bil halal. However, the intensity to attend the maulid nabi and isra’ mi’raj are different. For maulid nabi the respondents chose very often, often, sometimes, and rarely practice at 48%, 27%, 14%, 6% respectively. By contrast, for isra’ mi’raj the percentages are at 48%, 20%, 12%, and 9% respectively. Halal bil halal is the most common ritual with only 3% choosing rarely attend with 1% never. However, 3% of the respondents did not respond to the question.

For mandatory rituals (five daily prayers and fasting during ramadhan), no one chose never practice (at 0%) and only 1% chose rarely practice. Others, more than 97%, chose very often, often, sometimes at 76%, 17%,4% for the five daily prayers. For fasting during ramadhan the percentages are at 75%, 18%, 4% for very often, often, sometimes. Friday prayers is usually considered mandatory for men but not for women as they can either attend or otherwise. Therefore, 18% and 12% chose never practice and rarely practice. 64% of the respondents chose very often, often, sometimes (at 46%, 11%, and 7% respectively).

Aqiqah and sedekah (donation) are sunnah and they are commonly practiced by both modernists and traditionalists. The intensity to practice them is not very different from the intensity of other sunnah rituals. 80% of the respondents indicated that they practice it and the intensity for practicing them is very often, often, sometimes, rarely practice at 42%, 16%, 16% , 6% respectively. Sedekah (donation) is more common and only 1 participant indicated never having practiced it. Others practice the sedekah with different intensity.

Graph 1. Indonesian Islamic Rituals
**Nationalism**

According to Anderson (2008) “Nationalism is the pathology of modern development theory”. The idea of nation has been difficult to define, but the nation-state has existed. In this regard, Anderson proposed a definition of nation: it is an imagined political community –and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because not all members of the nation have met or know each other but they feel united by their nationality (Anderson 2003: 6).

In general, nationalism and Islam are considered important factors for the rise of Indonesia as a nation to fight against colonialism. Nationalism is the idea of uniting all local and primordial identities to create a single nation (Kahin, 2003), arguably, colonialism has led to the emergence of Indonesian nationalism. The founders of Indonesia had declared that Indonesia is a nation bounded by the collective agreement of Pancasila and UUD 1945 as the fundamental principles of Indonesia.

The first question refers to Pancasila as the national principle while the second refers to the needlessness of declaring Islam as the state foundation. 97% of the respondents chose strongly agree and agree that Pancasila serves as the national foundation and 3% did not respond to the question (Graph 2).

![Graph 2. Pancasila as the national principle](image)

For the second question, only 68% of the respondents (50% strongly agree and 18 agree) indicated that it is unnecessary to declare Islam as the state foundation. The percentage of the respondents who consider it important to put Islam as the state foundation reaches 28% while the remaining 4% chose not to answer (Graph 3).

![Graph 3. Needlessness of declaring Islam as the state foundation](image)

The third question is associated with the importance of the four pillars of the nation-state (Pancasila, UUD 1945, NKRI, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) (Graph 4). The answer is precisely similar to the previous question about Pancasila as the national principle. 97% of the respondents agree but 3% did not answer the question.
The fourth question refers to love for the homeland Indonesia as an obligation for all Indonesian citizens, 2% of respondents chose less agree, and 3% did not answer the question. Others chose strongly agree and agree at around 95% (Graph 5).

The fifth question refers to all Indonesian areas must be preserved and protected including areas for non-Muslim minorities such as West Papua and East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur) (Graph 6).

The last question in the first part is associated with the statement that ethnicity and religion based discrimination is unacceptable in Indonesia (NKRI), 1 respondent chose disagree, and others chose strongly agree (78%) and agree (18%).

2.1. Islamism

The term Islamism vs democracy has been used by (Qasim Zaman, 2009a) in addition to other comparable binary classifications of Islam, such as moderate vs radical, liberal vs conservative, puritanism vs pluralism, to show the heterogeneity of Islamic interpretation. Hefner’s study on Muslim
Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia is highly pivotal as the continuation of his previous study on Civil Islam in 2000 (Hefner, 2000). The former explores the development of radical Islam in Indonesia after the Soeharto regime, and the later elaborates collaboration between moderate Islam and the Soeharto regime.

For a more practical reason, Islamism in this study refers to the definition used by (Mandaville, 2010):

…. forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shariah. In the eyes of those who advocate Islamist solution, religion is generally viewed as a holistic, totalizing system whose prescriptions permeate every aspect of daily life.

The issues of Islamism include: first, the opinion about whether Islamic law (shariah) should be implemented for Muslims (Graph 7). The result shows that 70% of the respondents chose strongly agree and agree (at 25% and 45% respectively); and only 27% chose less agree, disagree and strongly disagree (17%, 2%)

Graph 7. Islamic law (shariah) should be implemented for Muslim

Second, the opinion about whether the purpose of a general election for Muslims is to appoint a Muslim leader in order to promote shariah (Graph 8). The response of agreement is not as high as the agreement about the implementation of shariah for Muslims. However, the agreement is still quite high reaching 46% (strongly agree and agree at 15% and 31%, respectively).

Graph 8. The Purpose of General Election

The third issue refers to the opinion whether Muslims must choose an Islamic political party, and the result shows that 52% tend to disagree with 13%, 15%, 24% of the respondents who chose less agree, not agree and disagree. By contrast, 43% of respondent agree to the statement (12% and 31% for strongly agree and agree, respectively) (Graph 9).
The fourth issue is the approval on women president in Indonesia. The result shows 31% of the respondents agree that women cannot become President in Indonesia as a majority Muslim country. However, more respondents do not agree with the statement at 66% (25%, 16%, 25% for less agree, not agree and disagree, respectively) (Graph 10).

The fifth issue refers to the statement that non-Muslims should not be a president in Indonesia as a Muslim majority country, wherein 45% of the respondents agree. However, more respondents do not agree with the statement (at 51%). Others (4%) did not answer the question (Graph 11).
The sixth issue relates to halal food certification (Graph 12), wherein 84% of the respondents approve of the statement, I only consume products with halal label. Only 10% chose disagree (with 9% less agree and 15 disagree) and 6% did not answer the question.

Graph 12. Food with halal label

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Agree</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Agree</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seventh question relates to the obligation of wearing a scarf (jilbab) for women, and most respondents (54%) approve of the statement by choosing to agree and agree at 30% and 24%, respectively. By contrast, 42% chose less agree, not agree, and strongly agree at 33%, 7%, 2%, respectively (Graph 13).

Graph 13. Obligation of wearing scarf (jilbab) for women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Agree</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Agree</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democracy and Pluralism

Democracy as a political system, especially procedural democracy, has been accepted significantly in Indonesia. However, substantial democracy is still facing serious problems especially relating to some aspects of democracy, such as belief in equality and justice for all communities. Accepting democracy requires leaving the old paradigm and accepting a new Islamic paradigm to approve the ideas of secularism, liberalism and pluralism. Pluralism has been a challenge for all religions because basically all religions indoctrinate their believers on the exclusiveness of their religion.

Progressive Islam has developed their belief that Islam accepts pluralism based on historical evidence of the life of the Prophet Muhammad in Madinah. He respected other religions (Christianity and Judaism), cooperated and established an agreement to coexist and develop a plural community. Arguably, pluralism is not a new social construct for Muslims. However, the fatwa issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama in July 2005 states that pluralism is forbidden because it considers all religions similar. Pluralism is allowed if the definition refers to the recognition of differences between religions (Munawar-Rahman, 2010, p. 523).

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Regarding to questions about democracy and pluralism, we focus on the issue of pluralism. Many aspects of democracy are important, however, in this study we develop several questions to ask our respondents their opinions about pluralism, and the questions are aimed at understanding their acceptance about the idea of coexisting with other communities of believers. We believe that living overseas would sometimes require them to live in a plural community (Table 6).

### Table 6. Democracy and Pluralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Less Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Not Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I prefer to live among Muslims</strong></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I prefer to share an apartment or housing with Muslims</strong></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I don’t like to get along with non-Muslims</strong></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I don’t like to eat food served by non-Muslims</strong></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most respondents (77%) prefer to live in exclusive communities among Muslims at 37% and 40% for strongly agree and agree, respectively. Those who prefer to share house with Muslims only even more (at 80%) with strongly agree and agree at 35% and 45% respectively. However, only 3% of the respondents do not like to get along with non-Muslims, but the number of respondents who don’t like to eat food served by non-Muslims reached up to 10%.

The data can be interpreted that in terms of privacy, such as choosing a community to live alongside with, the respondents prefer to choose to be in an exclusive group. It is understandable as this relates to various aspects of social life. Similarly, sharing apartment or housing relates to one’s most private life, accordingly, there are more respondents preferring to share residence only with Muslims.

**Membership of Islamic Organization**

Most of the respondents are active members, quite active members of Islamic organizations by 76% (at 38% and 20% respectively). Only 10% of them are not actively engage in Islamic organizations (Graph 14).

![Graph 14. Membership of Islamic organization](image)

The respondents stated that they are a member of Nahdlatul Ulama (76%) and 70% of them have the experience as a board member of Nahdlatul Ulama (at any level). Only 23% stated that they are a member of Muhammadiyah (at any level). Details see Table 7.
Table 7. Membership of NU and Muhammadiyah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Probably Yes</th>
<th>Not Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of Nahdatul Ulama</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experiences as a board</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>member of NU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experiences as a board</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>member of Muhammadiyah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Conclusion

Indonesian Islam after the reform period has been perceived as showing a decline in both democracy and attitude towards pluralism (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018, 2020; Pribadi, 2021; Zuhdi, 2018). Bruinessen (2011) has noted these important changes unfolding since 2000. Some evidences include the bombing that happened concurrently with the eve of Christmas and later the Bali Bombing in October 2002. Another surprising phenomena are the fact that many subnational issuing local shariah regulations despite the failure of reinstating the Jakarta Charter in the constitution, and the emergence of a number of new Islamic movements in various forms such as political party (Prosperous Welfare Party/PKS), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Tablighi Jama’at and Salafi movement, and the strengthening of conservative groups within existing Islamic organizations such as NU (Iqbal, 2020) and Muhammadiyah (Burhani, 2018). Additionally, the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) 2005 issued a fatwa that secularism, liberalism, and pluralism are forbidden (haram) (Hasyim, 2015). Those marked important changes in Indonesian Islam from a moderate and tolerant standpoint to experiencing a conservative turn. The emergence of this new face of Indonesian Islam post-Soeharto does not necessarily mean that progressive Islam has disappeared. Wahid and Ma’arif, two prominent figures of progressive Islam still continue to promote their ideas. However, their power has dwindled and conservative ideas have emerged as a significant challenge to progressive Islam (Qasim Zaman, 2009b).

This survey has confirmed Sakai and Fauzia’s (2014) findings that Islamism has been widely accepted among the Indonesian community, including those living overseas. This confirms (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2020) findings that members of Nahdatul Ulama, the majority respondents of this survey, do not always support pluralism and tolerance, which has been promoted by the elites of this biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia.

In other words, post-Islamism is emerging among Indonesian Muslims living in Indonesia and overseas, but Islamism seems to be more dominant. The idea of post-Islamism (Madinier & Feillard, 2014) was proposed to oppose van Bruinessen argument on the conservative turn or radicalism of Indonesian Islam post Soeharto regime. According to Hasan’s thesis (Ansor, 2016a), he argues that post-Islamism in Indonesia is a democratic consolidation to accommodate the rights of marginalized groups such as women, youth and the rights of non-Muslims. (Ansor, 2016b) mentions, “post-Islamism represents both a condition and a project, which may be embodied in a master (or multidimensional) movement. In the first place, it refers to political and social conditions where, following a phase of experimentation, Islamism’s appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy are exhausted, even among its once ardent supporters”.

The rights of women have been accepted widely but the rights of non-Muslims to be a president remains a serious problem. Non-Muslims should not be president in Indonesia as a Muslim majority country was agreed by 45% of the respondents. However, more respondents did not agree with the statement (at 51%). Women cannot be president in Indonesia as a majority Muslim country was agreed by 31% of the respondents. However, more respondents did not agree with the statement at 66% (25%, 16%, 25% for less agree, not agree and disagree, respectively).
References


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