



Pembingkaian Board of Peace di Media Kompas.com dan Tempo.co dalam Perspektif Hegemoni Gramscian

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace (BoP) has generated public controversy regarding the consistency of its foreign policy in supporting Palestine. The debate intensified following pressure from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), urging the government to reconsider its participation. Despite growing public attention, limited studies have explored how this issue is constructed within Indonesian media discourse. This study aims to analyze how Kompas.com and Tempo.co frame the BoP issue and how such framing reflects power relations and ideological processes. The research employs a qualitative approach using Robert N. Entman's framing analysis, including problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. To enrich the analysis, this study integrates Gramscian hegemony and the propaganda model by Herman and Chomsky as interpretive frameworks. The data consist of news articles published by Kompas.com and Tempo.co between January - March 2026. The findings show that Kompas.com frames the BoP as a pragmatic diplomatic strategy open to evaluation, while Tempo.co emphasizes accountability and policy consistency toward Palestine. These differences indicate that media actively shape public understanding through selective narratives. Both media rely on elite sources, suggesting that public discourse remains structurally constrained. The study has implications for strengthening critical media literacy and understanding the role of the press in constructing Indonesia's foreign policy.

Keywords: Media Framing, Board of Peace, Gramscian Hegemony, Propaganda Model

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace (BoP) has evolved into a foreign policy issue that has sparked widespread public debate. Indonesia officially joined the BoP on January 22, 2026, through the signing of a charter by President Prabowo Subianto on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos. The forum itself was established with a high membership fee, and Indonesia's participation was subsequently summarized in a number of important facts by the media. At the elite level, this move was praised as an extraordinary diplomatic effort ([Kompas.com. 2026d](#); [Tempo.co. 2026c](#)).

The government emphasized that participation in the BoP aims to strengthen diplomacy in support of Palestinian independence through a two-state solution. This stance was manifested through President Prabowo's approval of the twenty-point peace initiative, while the financial contribution was positioned as a contribution to Gaza reconstruction. After the forum began, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs warned of challenges on the ground, and Indonesia's position was highlighted at the council's inaugural summit ([Tempo.co. 2026e](#); [Kompas.com. 2026d](#)).

On the other hand, various domestic parties and observers questioned the forum's effectiveness and political direction. Some observers considered the formation of the council to be a potential attempt to legitimize the occupation of Gaza, while diplomatic figures such as Dino Patti Djalal regretted the forum's omission of a two-state solution. Pressure also came from university circles through demands from the University of Indonesia Student Alliance, accompanied by public questions about the actual effectiveness of Indonesia's support for Palestine. This controversy even attracted the attention of foreign media ([Kompas.com. 2026g](#)), especially after Israel was said to have joined without having to pay reconstruction contributions ([Kompas.com. 2026e](#)).

The debate became increasingly complex when controversy arose over the contribution burden, estimated at tens of trillions of rupiah, which President Prabowo later denied regarding the claim of a billion dollar contribution. Government officials responded to calls for Indonesia to withdraw from the forum, and finally, Indonesia asserted its readiness to withdraw if the forum was deemed deviant and unfavorable to Palestine ([Kompas.com. 2026h](#)).

The dynamics of the debate over the BoP do not take place in a neutral space, but are influenced by the global geopolitical context and Indonesia's national interests. Several events, such as the death of Indonesian soldiers in Lebanon and the lack of international support, exacerbate the complexity of this issue. Indonesia's position on the Palestinian issue often lies at the crossroads between the principles of justice and diplomatic pragmatism ([Akbarzadeh, 2026](#)). The mass media then plays a key role in shaping public interpretation of this

policy.

The implications of Indonesia's involvement in the BoP are also inseparable from its historical position in foreign policy, which consistently supports Palestinian independence (Ayun et al., 2024). Indonesian foreign policy has been built on the principle of "freedom and activity," which places humanitarian issues as part of the national diplomatic identity (Fadlillah & Komarudin, 2026). Any policy perceived to deviate from this principle tends to trigger a critical response from the public and non-state actors.

Framing in the media not only represents reality but also plays a role in shaping public interpretation of political issues by highlighting certain aspects (Geise & Xu, 2025). From a contemporary political communication perspective, framing is understood as a mechanism for selecting meaning that determines which aspects of reality are deemed important and worthy of public attention.

In the Indonesian context, political communication studies demonstrate that the construction of political messages in the media is inseparable from the ideological interests and strategies of the actors involved (Mughtar & Aliyudin, 2019; Tobroni, 2017). Tobroni (2017), in his study of Mohammad Natsir's political communication, asserts that political messages are always constructed on a foundation of specific values and ideologies, so that the meaning conveyed to the public is a construction laden with interests, not a neutral representation of reality.

Meanwhile, Mughtar and Aliyudin (2019), through their study of political public relations, demonstrate that political actors deliberately manage messages and images to shape public perceptions according to their strategic interests. These two findings reinforce the argument that policy reporting, such as the BoP, cannot be understood as an objective reflection of events, but rather as an arena where media ideology and political actors' strategies intertwine to shape meaning.

This understanding is further reinforced by other studies that emphasize that framing operates as a process of selecting and emphasizing information in public communication, including in the formulation of policy communication strategies (Anshori et al., 2022). Therefore, the framing process is not neutral, but is influenced by social structures, institutional interests, and the surrounding political context.

Furthermore, Hastuti et al. (2025) explain that framing occurs not only at the text level but also through the circulation of information across platforms, influenced by the algorithmic logic of digital media. This dynamic causes the construction of meaning to change more rapidly and become layered in the public sphere.

The construction of BoP policies in the media is crucial because the media functions as a mediator between the state and the public. The media not only convey policies as facts but also frame them within a specific interpretative framework. The resulting differences in framing can influence the legitimacy of

policies in the public eye.

In this context, differences in framing between media indicate a contestation of meaning in the public sphere. Each media outlet tends to emphasize certain aspects according to its ideological orientation and institutional interests. The reality presented by the media is thus a construction, not an objective representation of events. (Eriyanto, 2015)

Framing research in Indonesia demonstrates variations in the construction of reality across media outlets. Kurnia et al. (2024) found that differences in editorial perspectives influence how media frame political issues, while Anggraeni (2018) emphasized that the choice of diction and narrative structure are important factors in shaping public perception. A similar pattern is also seen in the study by Boer et al. (2020), which, using Entman's model, shows how national online media outlets frame the COVID-19 issue differently, positioning millennials and the government. This study emphasizes that media outlets do not simply report events but select and emphasize certain aspects, resulting in problem definitions and attributions of responsibility that are unique to each media outlet.

This argument is relevant to the current research because it demonstrates that differences in framing of the same national issue, as seen in BoP reporting, are a consistent pattern in online journalism practices in Indonesia. Similar findings were demonstrated by Sakti et al. (2023) in their comparative framing of presidential election campaign news, and by Olivia & Setiawan (2023) who compared the framing of Kompas.com and Tempo.co using Entman's model.

Other studies have shown that media framing is influenced by social and cultural dynamics in digital society. Hutagalung and Nurhasanah (2025) assert that framing is increasingly complex due to the influence of dynamic social interactions. This condition demonstrates that framing cannot be separated from the surrounding social context.

Research in the context of national media shows that differences in framing also occur on domestic issues. Pitoyo & Ramadhani (2024) found that Kompas.com and Tempo.co framed the Komdigi case differently in terms of problem definition, causes, and solutions. These findings confirm that media framing is influenced by each media outlet's editorial orientation. A similar pattern was found by Wibowo & Triyono (2024) in reporting on the Rempang Island relocation, which was framed differently by national online media. These findings confirm that media framing is influenced by each media outlet's editorial orientation.

Studies on humanitarian issues also show a similar pattern in media framing. Pertiwi et al. (2024) showed that news about the rejection of Rohingya refugees was framed differently by national media. This pattern is also evident in reporting on the Palestine–Israel conflict, as found by Ibrahim et al. (2025) and

[Annisarahma & Assegaf \(2024\)](#), who demonstrated differences in framing between media outlets on the Israel– Hamas issue. These differences demonstrate that the media not only represents reality but also constructs narratives that influence public perception.

International research reinforces these findings in the context of global conflict. [Park and Oliullah \(2025\)](#) demonstrated that American media framed the Israel– Hamas conflict based on political and ideological interests. These findings confirm that media framing is closely linked to global power structures.

Recent studies on the BoP demonstrate the importance of Indonesia's position within geopolitical dynamics. [Efendi & Pambagyo \(2026\)](#) explain that Indonesia's involvement in the BoP aims to strengthen its position within the United Nations framework and safeguard the Palestinian independence agenda. This perspective demonstrates that BoP policies are not only diplomatic but also strategic in a global context.

The selection of Kompas.com and Tempo.co in this study is based on their position as major media outlets in Indonesia with high reach and credibility. Kompas.com consistently ranks among the most accessed news sites in Indonesia, thus exerting significant influence in shaping public opinion ([Wijaya, 2025](#)). This position makes Kompas a representative of mainstream media with a broad audience and high legitimacy. Kompas is also known as a national daily newspaper with a strong reputation for credibility in Indonesian journalistic practice. This reputation is built through its consistent presentation of balanced, fact-based news. This makes Kompas a primary reference for understanding public policy and national political issues.

Meanwhile, Tempo is one of Indonesia's leading investigative media outlets, with a tradition of critical journalism against power. Various studies have shown that Tempo holds a prominent position in the investigative media category, with a sharper approach to uncovering political issues ([Suprianto et al., 2023](#)). This characteristic makes Tempo relevant as a representative of critical media in this study.

Furthermore, Tempo's position in the Indonesian media landscape is also reinforced by recognition in various media rankings. Tempo, a media outlet with in-depth and investigative analysis, has made a significant contribution to the production of public discourse ([Mahrita, 2025](#)). This confirms Tempo's strategic position in shaping critical discourse in the public sphere.

The differences in character between Kompas and Tempo are important in the Framing analysis because they represent two distinct journalistic approaches. Kompas tends to prioritize narrative balance and stability, while Tempo emphasizes criticism and exposure of conflict. This difference allows the study to more clearly identify variations in framing.

Various studies have shown that mainstream media with high credibility

have a significant influence in shaping public perception. Media with broad reach tend to be the primary source in shaping public opinion. Therefore, an analysis of Kompas and Tempo is important in understanding how foreign policy discourse is produced and distributed.

However, studies on media framing regarding new policies such as the BoP are still limited. Most previous research has focused on the Palestinian conflict or humanitarian issues without examining new diplomatic policies. This limitation indicates a significant research gap.

This study not only utilizes the framing approach but also integrates it with Gramsci's hegemony perspective (Gramsci, 1971), which explains that the media plays a role in shaping consensus through the production of meanings accepted by the public. This perspective allows for analysis of how the media maintains or challenges the dominance of meaning.

This approach is reinforced by the Propaganda Model, which explains the relationship between media and power. Herman & Chomsky (1988) demonstrated that the media is influenced by elite interests in news production. Moore & Colley (2024) asserted that this model remains relevant in explaining media framing in the modern context.

Recent developments indicate that propaganda in digital media operates more subtly. Lin (2024) explains that information construction can influence perceptions without being seen as direct propaganda. This phenomenon demonstrates that framing is part of the power mechanism in modern communication.

This research is novel in examining media framing in relation to the BoP as a relatively new foreign policy issue. It also integrates framing, hegemony, and the Propaganda Model into a single analytical framework. This approach reflects the state of the art in contemporary political communication studies.

This research is limited to news coverage from Kompas.com and Tempo.co between March and April 2026. The selection of these two media outlets was based on differences in editorial characteristics that allow for comparative analysis. The focus of the research is directed at media construction, not policy evaluation.

The research problem formulation in this study covers how the media frames the BoP issue and how these differences are explained through theoretical perspectives. This study also aims to identify the role of the media in shaping public perceptions of foreign policy. The results are expected to contribute to the development of political communication studies.

RESEARCH METHODS

Type of study. This is a qualitative study with a constructivist paradigm that uses framing analysis to examine how the media constructs the reality related to Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace (BoP). Framing analysis was chosen because it can identify how issues are constructed in the media space and how meaning is produced in the context of public policy (Anshori et al., 2022). A qualitative approach was used because the research focuses on the meaning, interpretation, and construction of meaning in media texts, rather than quantitative measurements. The primary focus of the study is understanding how foreign policy is produced as discourse through media reporting practices.

Research Object and Subject. The object of this research is the framing of news coverage regarding Indonesia's involvement in the BoP, while the subject or unit of analysis is news texts published by two national online media outlets, Kompas.com and Tempo.co. The sample was determined using a purposive sampling technique with the following criteria: (1) the news contained the keywords Board of Peace or Gaza Peace Council; (2) it was published in the January–March 2026 period; and (3) it contained policy substance, not just ceremonial coverage.

The sample comprised 20 news articles, with 10 articles selected from Kompas.com and 10 from Tempo.co; the titles and publication dates are presented in the News Corpus section. The adequacy of this sample was determined based on qualitative framing analysis principles, in which sample sufficiency is assessed not primarily by data volume but by the achievement of meaningful saturation and comprehensive representation of the issue's development.

The selected articles encompassed the full news cycle surrounding Indonesia's engagement with the BoP, beginning with the government's decision to join the forum, continuing through the inaugural summit, and extending to subsequent pressures for Indonesia to withdraw.

This temporal coverage enabled the analysis to capture evolving frames, shifts in media narratives, and variations in journalistic interpretation across different stages of the issue. Accordingly, the 20 articles were considered sufficient to identify recurring framing patterns while preserving analytical depth, contextual completeness, and meaningful comparison between the two media outlets.

Table 1 News Corpus

No.	Media	News Headline	Date	Issue Phase
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1	Kompas.com	Foreign Minister Reveals Prabowo's Reasons for Bringing Indonesia to Join the Gaza Peace Council	24 Jan 2026	Join
2	Kompas.com	Gaza Peace Council Reportedly Ready to Disburse IDR 84 Trillion, Will Indonesia Contribute?	16 Feb 2026	First KTT
3	Kompas.com	Prabowo Agrees to Trump's 20- Point Plan for Peace in Palestine	20 Feb 2026	First KTT
4	Kompas.com	Peace Board Begins Operations, Former Deputy Foreign Minister Warns of Challenges on the Ground	20 Feb 2026	First KTT
5	Kompas.com	RI Joins Peace Board, MPR Speaker: Extraordinary Diplomatic Effort	23 Feb 2026	First KTT
6	Kompas.com	Israel Joins Peace Board Without Paying, Refuses to Participate in Reconstruction Contributions	25 Feb 2026	First KTT
7	Kompas.com	4 Demands from the UI Student Alliance to President Prabowo	7 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure
8	Kompas.com	Foreign Media Widely Highlights Indonesia's Threat to Leave Peace Board	8 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure
9	Kompas.com	JK Reveals Prabowo's Position: Indonesia Ready to Leave Peace Board if It Deviates	13 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure
10	Kompas.com	Prabowo Affirms He Never Promised to Donate \$1 Billion to Peace Board	22 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure
11	<u>Tempo.co</u>	Trump Sets Rp 16.9 Trillion Contribution for Gaza Peace Council	19 Jan 2026	Join

Table 1 News Corpus

No.	Media	News Headline	Date	Issue Phase
12	Tempo.co	Indonesia Joins Trump-Created Gaza Peace Council	22 Jan 2026	Join
13	Tempo.co	Facts About Indonesia Joining Gaza Peace Council	24 Jan 2026	Join
14	Tempo.co	Foreign Minister: Peace Council Contributions for Gaza Reconstruction	27 Jan 2026	Join
15	Tempo.co	Observer: Peace Council Attempts to Legitimize Control of Gaza	29 Jan 2026	Join
16	Tempo.co	What Was Indonesia's Position at the First Peace Council Summit?	20 Feb 2026	First KTT
17	Tempo.co	Dino Regrets Prabowo's Failure to Mention the Two-State Solution BoP	22 Feb 2026	First KTT
18	Tempo.co	Zulhas' Comments on Indonesia's Urge to Leave the Peace Council	4 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure
19	Tempo.co	Is Indonesia's Support for Palestine Effective on the Peace Council?	12 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure
20	Tempo.co	Prabowo Believes He Can Influence the BOP for Palestinian Independence	17 Mar 2026	Exit Pressure

Source: Processed by researchers from Kompas.com and [Tempo.co news \(2026\)](#).

Data collection was conducted through a documentary study of online news articles. Researchers conducted a targeted search on the news channels Kompas.com and Tempo.co using the keywords "Board of Peace" and "Gaza Peace Council," then filtered the results based on predetermined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Each article that met the criteria was archived along with its link, publication date, and full content to maintain data traceability.

The data analysis technique used Robert N. Entman's framing model, which encompasses four main elements: defining the problem, determining causes, making a moral judgment, and recommending a solution. These four elements

were operationalized into a coding instrument, as presented in Table 2. Entman's model was chosen because it is able to identify how the media selects and emphasizes certain aspects of reality in shaping meaning (Geise & Xu, 2025).

The analysis process was carried out through several stages: (1) data reduction by sorting relevant text units; (2) coding each article based on Entman's four elements; (3) interpretation of framing patterns in each media outlet; and (4) comparison of framing between Kompas.com and Tempo.co to identify similarities and differences in discourse construction. The framing results are then read through the perspectives of Gramsci's hegemony and the Propaganda Model to explain the relationship between media construction and power structures.


Table 2. Entman's Framing Coding Instrument

Framing Elements	Indicators	Analysis Questions
Define Problems	Issue Definition	How is the BoP positioned?
Diagnose Causes	Causes	What is the source of the problem?
Moral Judgment	Assessment	How is the policy assessed?
Treatment Recommendations	Solutions	What solutions are offered?

Source: Adapted from Robert N. Entman's (1993) framing model; developed by researchers (2026).

The instrument presented in Table 2 was used to categorize each news item based on four framing elements, and the coding process was carried out consistently to ensure uniformity in data interpretation. Overall, the research was conducted through the systematic, step-by-step process illustrated in Figure 1, ranging from defining the research focus and collecting data from media sources to the selection process via purposive sampling, analysis of data units (headlines, leads, content, and sources), application of Entman's framing model, and finally, interpretation using Gramsci's hegemony theory and the Propaganda Model. This workflow demonstrates that the research proceeded logically from the formulation of the focus to the theoretical interpretation.

The diagram shows the research stages, starting with determining the research focus, collecting data from the media, selecting data through purposive sampling, analyzing data units, applying the Entman Framing Model, and interpreting them using hegemony theory and the Propaganda Model. This flow demonstrates that the research was conducted systematically and in stages.



Source: Processed by Researchers (2026)

Figure 1. Research Method Flow

The diagram shows the research stages, starting with determining the research focus, collecting data from the media, selecting data through purposive sampling, analyzing data units, applying the Entman Framing Model, and interpreting them using hegemony theory and the Propaganda Model. This flow demonstrates that the research was conducted systematically and in stages.

Data validity was maintained in three ways. First, inter-coder reliability testing was conducted by involving a second coder who independently coded a portion of the news sample using the same instrument (Table 2). The level of agreement between coders was calculated using Cohen's Kappa coefficient, with a threshold of ≥ 0.61 (substantial agreement according to [Landis & Koch, 1977](#)) as a requirement for data reliability; any differences in interpretation were resolved through discussion until consensus was reached. Second, internal consistency of coding (intra-coder reliability) was maintained using a structured analysis instrument (Table 2) as a standard reference in interpreting each framing element. Third, this study employed theoretical triangulation, namely the use of more than one theoretical framework, framing analysis, Gramsci's hegemony, and the Propaganda Model, to interpret the findings from different perspectives.

It should be emphasized that the comparison of framing results between Kompas.com and Tempo.co constitutes a comparative analysis, not a triangulation. Triangulation requires the use of various methods, different types of data sources, or more than one researcher; while comparing two similar media outlets is a comparative analysis strategy to identify patterns of similarities and differences in news construction.

The research location is virtual because this study is a text study that is not tied to a specific geographic location, namely the official online news website

Kompas.com and Tempo.co served as both the publication platform and the primary source of data. Data collection and analysis were conducted online throughout the research period.

The coding results of the corpus revealed differences in framing patterns between the two media outlets. Kompas.com tended to frame BoP issues within a diplomatic framework that could still be evaluated, while Tempo.co exhibited a tendency toward more critical framing, emphasizing policy consistency and accountability. Table 2 presents representative examples of coding results for several news stories from both media outlets based on Entman's four elements.


Table 3. BoP News Coding

Media	Headline	Define	Causes	Moral	Treatment
Kompas	Withdrawal from BOP	Diplomacy	Public Pressure	Moderate	Evaluation
Kompas	Ready to Pull Out	Strategy	Uncertainty	Rational	Flexible
Kompas	Fallen TNI Soldier	Risk	Security Impact	Limitedly Critical	Evaluation
Tempo	Promise to Withdraw	Consistency	Failed Policy	Critical	Exit
Tempo	MUI Urges Withdrawal	Commitment	Unaffected	Critical	Exit
Tempo	TNI Soldier Killed	Problematic Policy	High Risk	Highly Critical	Exit

Source: Researcher's coding results (2026).

The coding results reveal differences in framing patterns between the two media outlets. Kompas.com tends to frame the BoP issue within the context of diplomacy, focusing on aspects subject to evaluation, whereas Tempo.co displays a more critical framing tendency, emphasizing policy consistency and accountability.

Visualizations of the framing patterns indicate that Kompas.com predominantly employs frames related to diplomacy, rationality, and policy evaluation. In contrast, Tempo.co is more dominant in using frames centered on criticism, moral consistency, and recommendations for exiting the BoP. These differences reflect distinct editorial orientations in framing the same issue.



Source: Researcher's coding results (2026).

Figure 2. Framing patterns of Kompas.com and Tempo.co

The graph is not intended as a quantitative statistical analysis but rather as a representation of the patterns derived from the coding results. This visualization serves as an aid to clarify the framing tendencies observed in each media outlet. Thus, the graph supports the qualitative analysis conducted in this study.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the results of the framing analysis regarding the coverage of the Board of Peace (BoP) on Kompas.com and Tempo.co, along with the accompanying discussion. The presentation is structured around the research questions: how the two media outlets frame the BoP issue using Entman's four elements; how these differences can be explained through Gramsci's theory of hegemony and the Propaganda Model; and what the implications are for foreign policy and public perception. Coding results are integrated with theoretical concepts and contextualized against findings from other studies to ensure the analysis moves beyond mere description toward a deeper interpretation.

Framing Construction of the Board of Peace

The four elements employed in this analysis, defining the problem, determining causes, making moral judgments, and recommending solutions, refer directly to the framing framework formulated by Entman (1993). This framework defines framing as the process of selecting and highlighting specific aspects of reality to shape the definition of a problem, the interpretation of causes, moral evaluations, and recommendations for resolution.

Analysis of the "defining the problem" element reveals a fundamental difference in orientation. Kompas.com frames Indonesia's involvement in the BoP as a diplomatic strategy currently under evaluation, whereas Tempo.co

defines it as an issue of foreign policy consistency. For Kompas.com, the term strategy refers not merely to policy but functions as a legitimization strategy, highlighting the symbolic dimension of Indonesia's presence in the global forum, even though the BoP's direction and effectiveness remain unclear. Conversely, Tempo.co interprets consistency as the alignment between the free and active principle, which supports Palestine, and the government's concrete actions; consequently, the BoP is positioned as a test of policy integrity.

This pattern of divergence at the definition stage aligns with the findings of [Olivia & Setiawan \(2023\)](#) and [Wibowo & Triyono \(2024\)](#), which demonstrate that national online media outlets construct the same event differently starting from the problem-definition stage, thereby reinforcing the arguments made by [Anshori et al. \(2022\)](#) that framing is a non-neutral policy communication strategy.

Regarding the element of diagnosing causes, Kompas.com tends to link the issue to external factors, such as global geopolitical dynamics and limited international support. In contrast, Tempo.co attributes the cause to internal factors, specifically the discrepancy between normative goals and policy outcomes. By highlighting external factors, Kompas.com shifts the focus from the actors' capacity to the complexity of the international system, thereby framing limited results as a structural consequence rather than a policy failure. This interpretation aligns with Indonesia's position within the Global South, which is characterized by limited bargaining power on the Palestinian issue ([Akbarzadeh, 2026](#); [Ayun et al., 2024](#)).

Conversely, Tempo.co places the onus of responsibility on the government; however, this outcome-based approach leaves room for ambiguity, as the indicators for the success of the Balance of Power (BoP) regarding Palestine remain ill-defined, a limitation also observed in studies on the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by [Ibrahim et al. \(2025\)](#) and [Annisarahma & Assegaf \(2024\)](#).

Regarding the element of moral judgment, Kompas.com presents a moderate moral assessment by emphasizing the government's good intentions and rationality, whereas Tempo.co applies a critical, consequentialist moral assessment. Kompas.com's moderation creates space for legitimacy, as the policy is not strictly judged as right or wrong; however, as noted in studies on media-audience relations ([Uth et al., 2025](#)), the absence of a clear judgment can widen the scope for public speculation rather than reinforcing legitimacy. Tempo.co shifts the focus from intent to impact, mirroring the outcome-oriented moral assessment patterns identified by [Park and Oliullah \(2025\)](#) in media framing of the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Regarding the solution recommendation element, Kompas.com advocates a flexible, phased evaluation, whereas Tempo.co pushes for more conclusive,

decisive solutions, including potential policy changes if the current approach proves ineffective. Kompas.com's evaluative recommendation frames the policy as not yet final, thereby deferring critical assessment, while Tempo. Co's conclusive recommendation exerts pressure on the government for accountability. This distinction underscores that framing determines not only how an issue is understood but also the direction of policy evaluation (Sakti et al., 2023).

Overall, the differences in framing are not piecemeal but are consistently distributed across all four elements. Kompas.com constructs a stabilization narrative through a combination of external, moderate, and evaluative strategies, whereas Tempo.co constructs a problematization narrative through a combination of internal, critical, and conclusive approaches. The consistency of this pattern visualized in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 4, reinforces the argument of Geise & Xu (2025) that framing serves as a systematic mechanism for selecting meaning across elements, rather than merely highlighting a single aspect.

Table 4. Comparison of Framing Patterns: Kompas.com and Tempo.co

Framing Elements	Kompas.com	Tempo.co
Define Problems	External strategy	Policy consistency
Diagnose Causes	External factors	Internal factor
Moral Judgment	Moderate	Critical
Treatment Recommendations	Evaluative	Conclusive

Source: Researcher's framing analysis results (2026).

Framing Differences from the Perspective of Gramscian Hegemony

The differences in how these four elements are constructed can be explained through Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, which views the media as an arena for the production of common sense, a process of rendering a policy accepted as natural or normal (Gramsci, 2017).

The media's role in producing this ideological meaning is rooted in Hall's (1982) thesis regarding the rediscovery of ideology in media studies. This thesis asserts that the media do not neutrally reflect reality but rather signify it through specific ideological frameworks. This foundation reinforces a hegemonic reading of the differing framing strategies employed by Kompas.com and Tempo.co.

Within this framework, Kompas.com acts as an agent for the normalization of reality. Through moderate diction such as evaluation, adjustment, and flexibility the BoP issue is framed not as a crisis, but as a natural, time-consuming process. This hegemonic mechanism operates by managing the public's timeframe for deliberation; it delays critical judgment, allowing the policy to proceed without intense pressure, while simultaneously positioning the government as a rational, responsive actor.

Conversely, Tempo.co serves a disruptive function with respect to this

common sense. By employing language that demands consistency, accountability, and concrete results, Tempo.co disrupts the established stability of meaning and opens up space for counter-hegemony.

This disruptive function aligns with the watchdog and investigative character of Tempo's journalism, traits documented in previous studies regarding both its critical coverage of government policies (Alyatalathaf & Putri, 2022) and its investigative practices more broadly (Suprianto et al., 2023). It is this tradition that explains why Tempo.co consistently centers policy accountability as the core of its framing. The relevance of the concept of hegemony for interpreting these dynamics is underscored by contemporary studies on how hegemony shapes consent (Sau, 2025) and by reinterpretations of Gramsci's thought in a modern context (Kiely, 2025).

However, the disruption introduced by Tempo.co is not radical; its critique remains grounded in a shared value framework specifically, a commitment to Palestine thereby operating within the boundaries of the same discourse. Thus, hegemony within a democratic system is dynamic, negotiated through the interplay between stabilization by Kompas.com and disruption by Tempo.co.

Framing Differences from the Propaganda Model Perspective

These dynamics can be further analyzed through the lens of the Propaganda Model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988/2018), which, in the context of democratic media, operates not by distorting facts but by limiting meaning. In the BoP case, neither Kompas.com nor Tempo.co presented false information; reports covered everything from Indonesia's involvement and the MUI's protests to criticisms from political parties and the death of an Indonesian soldier. What proved decisive was how these facts were framed. A narrative such as Indonesia plays an active role in global peace serves as a legitimizing narrative, highlighting a symbolic role without demonstrating actual effectiveness; consequently, the public is steered toward viewing the involvement as constructive within a narrowed interpretive framework.

These findings also demonstrate that propaganda in a democratic system does not eliminate criticism but manages it through "bounded criticism." Criticism from the MUI was framed as a call for evaluation, criticism from Golkar as an expression of concern, and criticism from the PKS remained within the bounds of formal discourse; criticism was not suppressed but channeled to prevent it from escalating into systemic rejection. Indeed, the presence of criticism helps uphold the media's image of objectivity, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy. This mechanism of deeper meaning restriction is consistent with the evolution of digital propaganda described by Lin (2024) and the soft news strategy as an entry point for propaganda identified by Zhu & Fu (2024). It is further reinforced by the logic of algorithmic circulation, which accelerates and layers the construction

of meaning in digital spaces (Hastuti et al., 2025).

Implications of Framing for Foreign Policy

Regarding implications, the framing of the BoP cannot be separated from Indonesia's foreign policy stance. Media coverage reveals a tension between the symbolic representation of diplomacy and the reality of ongoing conflict: the BoP, initially framed as a concrete effort to support Palestine, shifted into a symbol of global engagement that was not necessarily substantively effective. This tension relates to the independent and active principle which positions humanitarian issues as a core element of national diplomatic identity (Ayun et al., 2024; Fadlillah & Komarudin, 2026) as well as Indonesia's established role in mediation and humanitarian aid (Prihantoro et al., 2025).

In this context, Kompas.com tends to mitigate potential perceptual conflicts by emphasizing the policy's rationale. In contrast, Tempo.co opens a public space to question the policy's alignment with the independent and active principle. In international relations, media framing functions as a form of soft power that shapes the symbolic legitimacy of a state's role; thus, coverage of the BoP does not merely represent policy but also constructs Indonesia's position within the global arena (Dessie et al., 2026). When a gap emerges between diplomatic symbolism and the reality of conflict, the risk of eroding public trust increases—an issue relevant to findings regarding the decline of trust in information during the digital era (Dwivedi & Sen, 2025; Uth et al., 2025).

This trend aligns with Alsharairi's (2025) findings that media communication and the framing of the Gaza conflict directly impact public opinion formation; consequently, how Kompas.com and Tempo.co frame the BoP help shape public perception regarding Indonesia's stance toward Palestine.

Furthermore, these findings demonstrate that media framing acts as a bridge between the domestic and international spheres: the narratives constructed by Kompas.com and Tempo.co not only shape domestic public perception but also project Indonesia's image as a diplomatic actor to the global community. While mainstream media stabilizes meaning and investigative media disrupts it, the public sphere simultaneously acquires two interpretive frameworks that determine the extent to which the BoP policy is perceived as legitimate and credible.

Viewed through the lenses of Gramscian hegemony and the Propaganda Model, this situation demonstrates that foreign policy legitimacy is not determined solely by diplomatic achievements at the global level, but also by the media's success in managing consensus and shaping the boundaries of meaning domestically (Sau, 2025; Zhu & Fu, 2024). Consequently, a foreign policy lacking narrative support risks losing legitimacy even if deemed strategically sound from a diplomatic standpoint as evidenced by growing public pressure for Indonesia to withdraw from the BoP.

Thus, a framing analysis of the BoP contributes not only to the study of political communication but also to an understanding of the dynamics of Indonesia's foreign policy as an intersection of symbolic diplomacy, geopolitical pressures, and public perception.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that the framing of BoP coverage by Kompas.com and Tempo.co does not merely reflect differing media perspectives; rather, it is part of a meaning-construction process closely linked to power dynamics, ideology, and political communication structures. Applying Robert Entman's framing approach, the study reveals that the most significant difference lies in the treatment recommendation element, which illustrates how each outlet steers public response to Indonesia's foreign policy.

Kompas.com frames the BoP as a policy subject to ongoing evaluation, thereby encouraging the public to withhold judgment and allow the government space to make adjustments. Conversely, Tempo.co emphasizes policy consistency and tangible results, prompting the public to assess the policy's legitimacy immediately. These differences indicate that framing not only shapes understanding but also influences the orientation of public attitudes.

From a Gramscian perspective, these findings highlight the media's role in both establishing and disrupting hegemony. Kompas.com contributes to creating a "common sense" that normalizes the policy through a stable, moderate approach, whereas Tempo.co introduces a "disturbance" that opens space for critical evaluation. Both outlets operate within the same discursive boundaries; thus, hegemony is not entirely replaced but rather negotiated.

Based on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model, this study finds that propaganda in a democratic media context operates not through information manipulation but through the restriction of meaning. Both outlets present the same facts but frame them in ways that limit the scope of possible interpretations. While criticism of the policy emerges, it does so in a structured manner that stops short of total delegitimization. This demonstrates that propaganda functions subtly through "bounded criticism," wherein criticism itself becomes part of the legitimization mechanism.

The study also reveals that media framing of the BoP impacts public perception of Indonesia's position in global politics. The BoP is understood not merely as a diplomatic forum but as a symbol of Indonesia's engagement in complex geopolitical dynamics. The tension between the free and active principle and global political realities emerges as a key issue mediated through news coverage. The novelty of this research lies in integrating three theoretical frameworks, those of Entman, Gramsci, and the Propaganda Model into a single,

interconnected analysis. The study employs framing not merely as a tool to identify narrative differences, but also as a gateway to understanding how hegemony is constructed and how propaganda operates within a democratic system. Thus, the research makes a conceptual contribution by broadening the understanding that media framing is not simply a communication technique but an ideological practice that shapes the boundaries of public interpretation of state policy.

Based on the preceding analysis, the research objectives are directly addressed. First, the two media outlets consistently frame the BoP issue using opposing patterns across Entman's four elements: a strategy-oriented, external, moderate, and evaluative pattern for Kompas.com, versus a consistency-oriented, internal, critical, and conclusive pattern for Tempo.co. Second, these differences can be explained as the operation of hegemony, specifically, stabilization versus controlled disruption, alongside subtle propaganda that limits meaning within a single discursive boundary. Third, the media's role proves non-neutral, as the constructed framing steers public attitudes toward the legitimacy of Indonesia's foreign policy.

As a novel contribution, this study proposes the concept of complementary hegemony, a condition where meaning stabilization by mainstream media and controlled criticism by investigative media do not negate one another but instead jointly maintain policy legitimacy within an acceptable orbit. The conceptual implication is that the presence of critical media in a democratic system does not automatically serve as a counterweight to hegemony; rather, it can function as part of the mechanism that sustains it. This idea underscores that oppositional media and mainstream media can share the same legitimizing function, despite employing different narrative styles.

Recommendations. From an academic standpoint, future research is advised to: (1) expand the corpus across media types and platforms for instance, by including Detik.com, CNN Indonesia, and official social media channels over a minimum six-month period to capture framing shifts from the initial engagement phase through the post-decision period; (2) combine qualitative framing analysis with quantitative content analysis based on frequency counts and inter-coder reliability tests (Cohen's Kappa) across all articles so that the visualized patterns can be statistically tested; and (3) incorporate audience reception studies, such as in-depth interviews or surveys, to verify whether public attitudes are indeed shaped in the manner inferred from the texts. Moreover, (4) applying critical discourse analysis (Fairclough's model) to examine the relationships among news texts, production practices, and the media's political-economic structures.

In practical terms, the government and policymakers are advised to manage public communication regarding foreign policy more transparently by providing measurable success indicators, thereby narrowing the scope for speculation arising

from the framing of evaluation without clear results.

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