

Dynamics Post-Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Dissolution: Activist Reactions and Public Response

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Abstract

This study examines the complex responses to the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a pro-Caliphate organization, by the Indonesian government in 2017. The primary objective is to comprehensively analyze the dynamics of these responses from activists, sympathizers, and the general public. Employing a qualitative descriptive-sociological methodology with a case study approach, this research collected data through a literature review, observation, interviews, and documentation in West Java, Banten, and Jakarta. The dissolution, initiated via Perppu No. 2 of 2017, triggered diverse reactions and polarized public opinion, reflecting a broader societal rejection of the Caliphate ideology. Importantly, the study found that HTI's movement did not cease but evolved. Post-dissolution strategies include leveraging social media for discourse and issue manipulation, infiltrating other socio-political organizations, and utilizing digital platforms for clandestine cadre regeneration, particularly among university students. This research provides a comprehensive understanding of HTI's post-dissolution dynamics, contributing significantly to the literature on social movements by demonstrating movement resilience and authoritarian learning—the organization's adaptation from a public, confrontational entity to a hidden, digitally-enabled movement in response to state repression. The findings have crucial implications for deradicalization policies and highlight the intricate socio-political responses to state action against ideological groups.

Keywords: Deradicalization, Digital Activism, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, Social Movements, Political Islam.

INTRODUCTION

The government's decision to dissolve *Hizb ut-Tahrir* Indonesia (HTI) triggered a complex social phenomenon marked by diverse community responses, ranging from full support to intense opposition and silent acceptance. HTI activists and sympathizers swiftly condemned the government action as arbitrary, while the majority of other parties backed the policy (Askar Nur, 2021; Assyaukanie, 2023; Wibowo, 2019). Responding to this critical event, this scientific article aims to comprehensively examine how HTI activists, sympathizers, and the general public reacted and adapted to the organizational dissolution via the Perppu (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) Number 2 of 2017 (Osman, 2018b).

To achieve this goal, this research addresses several core questions: the history of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* from its formation to its international development; the history and growth of HTI in Indonesia; the varied responses of activists, sympathizers, and the public to the dissolution; and the post-dissolution activities and future strategies of HTI ex-activists and sympathizers (Azman, 2018; Masnun & Elly Triantini, 2016; Qodir, 2014; Wahid & Nurrohman, 2002).

The state action against HTI must be understood within the broader national commitment to *Wasatiyyat al-Islam* (Islamic Moderation) (Jubba, Awang, Qodir, Hannani, & Pabbajah, 2022; Najib, Theologia, & 2020, 2020; Yakin et al., 2019). This concept, officially promoted by the Indonesian government and embraced by mainstream Muslim organizations, upholds values such as justice, balance, tolerance, and respect for local context. *Wasatiyyat al-Islam* serves as the core counter-narrative against extremist and literalist ideologies,

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including the transnational Caliphate advocated by HTI. This framework establishes the fundamental conflict: the state and majority Islamic organizations prioritize a moderate, national-based interpretation of Islam that accepts the nation-state, while HTI insists on a revolutionary, doctrinal approach that rejects democracy and the pluralistic foundation of the Republic of Indonesia.

Furthermore, the conflict between HTI and the state is fundamentally a clash between two models of political engagement: one revolutionary and anti-democratic, the other committed to Civil Society. HTI explicitly rejects democracy as an infidel system and seeks a Caliphate. Conversely, major Islamic organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah function as strong pillars of Indonesian *Civil Society*, demonstrating deep commitment to Pancasila and the existing democratic framework. This research, therefore, uses the concepts of democracy and *Civil Society* to analyze not only the state's legitimate action but also the pragmatic maneuvers of an anti-democratic movement utilizing democratic processes as mere tools (tactics, not *thariqoh*) (Barton, 2014)

This study uses a case study method with a qualitative descriptive-sociological approach to understand this phenomenon in depth. The research locations focused on West Java, Banten, and Jakarta, known as areas with significant numbers of HTI activists and sympathizers. Data was collected through literature review, observations, interviews, and documentation. Thus, this research is expected to provide a complete scientific understanding and fill the research gap related to the dynamics of the post-HTI movement.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Dynamics of Hizb ut-Tahrir's Transformation: From National Party to Transnational Party

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded by Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani in Palestine in 1952. The movement was initially born as a national political party with the main goal of liberating Palestine from colonization (Science & 2009, n.d.). Al-Nabhani, as the founder and first amir, together with Abdul Qadim Zallum, the second amir, and his followers, viewed the Palestinian issue as a problem of Muslims as a whole that could only be solved by re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate (Mayer, 2004; perspective & 2007, n.d.). Their ideology and methods of struggle were then expressed in monumental works such as *Nidham al-Islam* and *Al-Daulah al-Islamiyah*, which became the main reference for all members (Osman, 2018a).

Over time, HT's vision has undergone significant shifts. With the failure to achieve its initial goals in Palestine, HT began to expand the reach of its movement to other regions, transforming into a transnational party with a broader global mission: to re-establish the Caliphate throughout the Islamic world (Indonesia & 2020, 2020; Studies & 2009, n.d.). Crucially, this global expansion was heavily influenced by host-country dynamics in the Middle East, where repressive government policies—including arrests and crackdowns in countries like Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq—forced HT to seek safer operational bases and fertile ground for recruitment beyond its geographic origins.

This dynamic explains HT's move into Southeast Asia and Indonesia, positioning the eventual dissolution of HTI in 2017 as part of a global, multi-decade pattern where the transnational Caliphate movement continually seeks new venues after facing state repression. This transformation is supported by the use of modern media, such as newspapers, magazines, radio, and websites, to spread their ideas globally. This transition is also reflected in the amir's leadership...

Thus, HT has succeeded in transforming itself from a local movement focused on national issues to a global ideological movement with a wide network in various countries, including Indonesia. This expansion confirms that Hizb ut-Tahrir does not only operate as a local entity, but as an ideology that transcends the geographical boundaries of the nation-state.

The Early and Late History of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), as a transnational Islamic movement, began to expand outward from the Middle East region, one of which was driven by the repressive government policies in its home country (P Setia, Study, & 2021, 2019). Indonesia, as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, is one of the important destinations for this movement. HT's presence in Indonesia, later known as Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), began in the early 1980s when its ideology was introduced by Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, an HT activist from Australia (H Hidayah, Sa'ad, Islam, & 2024, n.d.). Al-Baghdadi's acquaintance with a prominent cleric in Bogor, Raden Abdullah bin Nuh, became the entrance for HTI, even though Abdullah bin Nuh himself was not a member of HTI (Islam & 2008, 2008; Social & 2014, n.d.; Shah, 2022). Initially, HTI's da'wah was slow, but then it grew exponentially and managed to spread throughout Indonesia.

After feeling mature, the initiators of HTI officially registered this organization as a socio-religious organization during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and was legally registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2006 (Hilmy, 2020). Although HTI claims to be a political party in its doctrine, in Indonesia they are registered as mass organizations (Asiyah & Hakim, 2022; Fathoni, 2020). During the 2000s, HTI grew rapidly, held major conferences, and succeeded in spreading the main teachings that demanded the establishment of the Caliphate, considered democracy as an infidel system, and rejected capitalism and secularism (Husnul Hidayah, Sa'ad, & Rosa, 2024). In a period of more than 20 years, HTI managed to spread to 33 provinces and hundreds of cities without ever being involved in legal cases.

However, in July 2017, the Government of Indonesia, through the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs Wiranto, announced a plan to dissolve HTI. This dissolution is based on *PERPPU* (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) Number 2 of 2017 concerning Community Organizations, on the grounds that HTI's ideology is contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, does not carry out a positive role, and its activities cause clashes in society. This step is also in line with similar policies taken by about 20 other countries. After the dissolution, HTI figures, activists, and sympathizers did not necessarily stop their movement. They adopted three main strategies to continue the struggle. First, they actively shape discourse in online media through accounts on social media to continue to spread the ideology of the caliphate. Second, they manipulate discourse, such as using the HTI flag burning incident to manipulate it into an issue of monotheistic harassment. Third, they infiltrate various mass organizations, political parties, and da'wah events to spread ideology and carry out regeneration in a hidden manner (Firdaus et al., 2024; Paelani Setia, 2021, 2022).

Legal Process and Reasons for the Dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia

The dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is an event that drains the energy of the government and various parties, including legal experts and clerics. Although HTI is doctrinally a political party, they have never registered themselves as an election participant party because they consider democracy to be an inappropriate system. The Government of Indonesia quickly issued *PERPPU* Number 2 of 2017, revising Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations (*Ormas*). The main reason for the issuance of this *PERPPU* is due to the existence of an urgent situation that has the potential to damage the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Prasetio, 2019).

The government is of the view that HTI carries out da'wah and propaganda activities that clearly reject Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and seeks to uphold a transnational caliphate (Marfiando, 2020). The government argued that this ideology contradicts Indonesia's democratic consolidation and risks causing instability. This *PERPPU* serves as a legal umbrella to re-examine mass organizations that are not committed to the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, through the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights (Human Rights) Number AHU-30. AH.01.08 of 2017, HTI's legal entity status was revoked, which automatically stated that the mass organization was dissolved.

Response and Reaction to the Dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia

Response and reaction of sympathizers and activists to the dissolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia

Following the revocation of HTI's legal status—a measure enacted via PERPPU Number 2 of 2017—Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) immediately carried out political consolidation to maintain its existence. This consolidation is divided into two main paths: legal resistance and political resistance (Marfiando, 2020). Legal resistance was carried out by appointing Yusril Ihza Mahendra as a legal representative and forming the HTI Defense Team (Tim Pembela (TP) -HTI) consisting of 1,000 advocates (Rahayu, 2017). They rejected the Perppu and filed a lawsuit in court, arguing that HTI is a legitimate mass organization and a legal entity whose constitutional rights must be protected.

Besides legal resistance, HTI also engaged in political resistance by encouraging various parties to reject the Perppu Ormas (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on Mass Organizations). This was carried out through a series of press conferences and discussion forums, which successfully drew support from various Islamic organizations, such as Dewan Dakwah, Persatuan Islam (Persis), Majelis Mujahidin, Hidayatullah, and the Indonesian Da'i Association (IKADI). These forums became a platform to build a narrative framing the government as having acted tyrannically towards HTI, thereby triggering crowd mobilization. (Zulfadli, 2018).

As part of the actuating movement, HTI launched several mass actions as a form of political resistance. These actions, such as Action 287, Action 299, Action to Reject Perppu Ormas, and Aksi Bela Tauhid, aim to reject PERPPU and voice their aspirations. In these actions, a black flag with the words of monotheism (Ar-Rayah) is often raised, which HTI claims to be the flag of Muslims, not the flag of HTI (Habibi, 2019; Jayadi, 2023; Waty, 2019). Although it has been disbanded, the HTI logo and attributes still appear in some mass movements, such as the 212 Reunion and the Hastag #2019GantiPresiden movement (Waty, 2019). Although HTI denies endorsing any of the presidential candidates, they admit that their support for the 212 activities is due to the belief that the movement will be an inspiration for future actions. The issue of "changing the system" raised by HTI spokesman, Ismail Yusanto, together with politician Mardani Ali Sera, was even reported to the Criminal Investigation Branch of the National Police on suspicion of treason because it was considered that he wanted to replace the legitimate state system, namely Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, with the caliphate system fought for by HTI (Ronny Muharrman, 2018).

Community Response and Reaction and Government Attitude

The dissolution of HTI triggered various responses from the public, especially from the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, whose views are widely followed by their followers. NU's rejection of the concept of the caliphate and the formalization of an Islamic state has long been discussed by its leaders. KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) emphatically rejected the idea, considering it absurd and ahistorical (Muhammad Nurkhoiron, 2017). He argued that Islam should be part of the life of the individual, not the state system. This stance was continued by NU leaders after that, such as K.H Hasyim Muzadi and K.H Said Aqil Siradj. K.H Hasyim Muzadi argued that the ideology of the caliphate threatened the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution because it did not come from Indonesian cultural traditions. He also corrected the understanding of "*Islam Kaffah*," by stating that Islam does not have to be through the Caliphate (Ainur Rofiq Al-Amin, 2020). Meanwhile, K.H. Said Aqil Siradj is of the view that the caliphate state is not a solution, and can even destroy a pluralistic Indonesia. According to him, Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia are the price of death (Anis Masykhur, 2019).

Muhammadiyah, through the Chairman of the Central Executive (PP) Haedar Nashir, agreed that the dissolution of mass organizations that are contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be carried out. However, Muhammadiyah emphasized that this step must be carried out constitutionally and through the

judiciary, in accordance with Law No. 17/2013 on Community Organizations. Haedar Nashir argued that the approach through the judiciary should apply in general to all movements that go against the basis of the state, including communism and separatism (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2017). However, Muhammadiyah agrees that every citizen and mass organization is obliged to accept Pancasila as the basis of the state. This organization considers Indonesia as *Darul Ahdi wa Syahadah*, which is a country that is the result of consensus of all elements of the nation (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2017). Therefore, Haedar emphasized that no organization or group should have an ideology or aim to form a state system that is contrary to Pancasila. Muhammadiyah also asked the government to prepare constitutional measures if HTI filed a lawsuit in court (Fahriyani, 2022).

Responses from Key Actors and Mass Organizations on HTI's Dissolution

The dissolution process triggered various responses from Islamic leaders and constitutional law experts in Indonesia, generally falling into three categories:

(1) Support for the State's Action Based on Ideology and Islamic Moderation

Prominent figures fully supported the dissolution, asserting that HTI's ideology directly threatened the nation's foundation. Their stance is a strong manifestation of Wasatiyyat al-Islam (Islamic Moderation) rooted in Indonesian nationalism, which seeks to preserve the constitutional consensus. KH Said Aqil Siradj, then Chairman of PBNU, expressed full support, arguing that mass organizations undermining Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and failing to respect diversity should be dissolved. He emphasized that governance in Islam is a result of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), prioritizing justice over the specific form of the Caliphate. This viewpoint is consistent with the long-standing stance of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—which refers to Indonesia as Darussalam (a peaceful state)—and firmly rejects the concept of a caliphate, viewing it as a threat to the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) that does not originate from Indonesian cultural traditions.

Similarly, Moh. Mahfud MD, an expert in constitutional law, while acknowledging procedural issues, argued that the open promotion of the Caliphate ideology was a dangerous philosophical act that threatened national integrity. The unified position of these figures and NU underscores the mainstream Islamic consensus that the state's action was necessary to protect the nation from ideological extremism, aligning with the principles of moderation and national stability.

(2) Support for the Principle but Criticism of Procedure (Upholding Constitutional Moderation)

Muhammadiyah's position similarly reinforces the core principle of Wasatiyyat al-Islam—the acceptance of a diverse nation-state founded on justice and constitutionalism. The organization, through the Chairman of the Central Executive (Haedar Nashir), agreed with the fundamental need to dissolve organizations contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. This ideological acceptance is defined by Muhammadiyah's conceptualization of Indonesia as *Darul Ahdi wa Syahadah* (a country built upon covenant and testimony), emphasizing national commitment.

However, Muhammadiyah critically asserted that the state's action must be carried out constitutionally and through the judiciary, in accordance with Law No. 17/2013 on Community Organizations. This insistence on legal procedure demonstrates an adherence to the balance and procedural justice inherent in Islamic Moderation. Consequently, Busyro Muqoddas (Muhammadiyah Central Committee) criticized the process as non-transparent and unilateral, reflecting an "excessive concern" and a repressive approach that undermines the rule of law. Muhammadiyah maintained that while HTI's ideology must be countered, the government must also ensure full legal readiness for any constitutional challenges.

(3) Reinforcement by Public Opinion and Data, The alignment of the two largest mass organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, in rejecting the Caliphate ideology provided strong social and religious legitimacy for the

government's decision, affirming that the majority of Indonesian people supported the dissolution of HTI. This public sentiment was quantified by a survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) from May 14 to May 20, 2017 (with 1,500 respondents). The survey results strongly indicated that less than 10% of the Indonesian population agreed with the idea of replacing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with a caliphate. Specifically, only 9.2% of respondents desired a caliphate state, and only 3.2% of the national population familiar with HTI's ideals agreed with the Caliphate promoted by HTI (Saiful Mujani, 2021). These findings confirm that while the threat of the Caliphate movement exists, the majority of Indonesian people explicitly respond to it negatively.

The Government's Response to Ex-Activists and Sympathizers of HTI After the Dissolution

After the dissolution, a 73-page document was circulated containing the names of HTI administrators and sympathizers from among Civil Servants (PNS). This document is distributed randomly, and its dissemination raises great concerns about the potential for exclusion, stigmatization, and persecution of individuals accused of affiliation with HTI (Djafar, 2020). These concerns are similar to past mistakes that occurred in 1965. To avoid horizontal conflicts in society, the government takes various steps to avoid horizontal conflicts in society. These steps include:

Table 1. The Government's Response After the Dissolution of Ex-HTI

| Government Response | Explanation |
|-----------------------|---|
| An Inclusive Approach | Embracing ex-HTI and its sympathizers back into society, as well as opening opportunities for them to be involved in various mass organizations and political parties (Aisyah, 2019). |
| Deradicalization | Block HTI websites and radical mass organizations, multiply inclusive and tolerant Islamic websites, and promote Islamic Moderation that <i>is rahmatan lil alamin</i> (Rizki, 2018). |
| Legal Protection | Issue rules and legal products to prevent acts of persecution and discrimination from the public against individuals accused of affiliation with HTI (Marfiando, 2020; Muazaroh, 2019). |

In addition, the government also makes deradicalization efforts by blocking HTI websites and other radical mass organizations, increasing inclusive and tolerant Islamic websites, and promoting Islamic Moderation that *is rahmatan lil alamin*. These measures show that the government cannot be alone in dealing with this problem and must work together with all components of society.

Activities and Movements of HTI Activists and Sympathizers Post-Dissolution

Although HTI's legal entity status has been revoked, their political ideas and ideology Although HTI's legal entity status has been revoked, their political ideas and ideology remain alive and continue to be disseminated. The dissolution of HTI by the Indonesian government is also in line with policies in more than 20 other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and Palestine, which consider the existence of HT to disrupt public order and threaten state sovereignty (Aswar & Hamid, 2020).

The post-dissolution strategies adopted by HTI in Indonesia—marked by infiltration and digital activism—reflect a common pattern of adaptation seen in HT branches globally, particularly in contexts where public action is prohibited. For instance, in several Middle Eastern countries where HT is banned (e.g., Jordan and Egypt), the movement has long relied on clandestine cells and hierarchical *halaqah* (study circles) to survive and conduct regeneration. Similarly, HT branches in Europe, facing legal restrictions, prioritize digital *da'wah* and issue-based activism to manipulate discourse and recruit students, a strategy mirrored directly by HTI's focus on social media and campus infiltration in Indonesia. The common thread is *authoritarian learning*:

shifting from open protest (which invites state repression) to covert digital and political maneuvering (which sustains ideological continuity).

After the dissolution, HTI activists did not remain silent. They continue to carry out the Islamic *da'wah* movement by carrying out the caliphate system and the Islamic state as the best solution to solve the problems of the *ummah*. For this reason, they use various media, such as print media and online media. The print media used include books published by HTI Press, such as *Daulah Islamiah* and *Mafahim Hizb ut-Tahrir*, as well as the weekly newsletter *Al-Wa'e* (as a replacement for the *Al-Islam* newsletter) and the tabloid *Media Umat* (Aisyah, 2019). Meanwhile, online media, such as online portals/websites, YouTube, and Instagram, are considered very effective in conveying their *da'wah* (Aswar et al., 2020). Ex-HTI activists spread across various regions in Indonesia have several main strategies to continue to exist and develop the ideology of the caliphate, as summarized in the Table 2.

Table 2. Ex-HTI Strategy After Dissolution

| Strategy | Explanation | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| <i>Defect Strategy</i> | An exclusive approach in which HTI activists reject cooperation with other organizations and focus on the establishment of an Islamic state (Firdaus et al., 2024). | Criticizing the government and campaigning for the caliphate at every opportunity, even if it is contrary to the event committee (Yunanto, 2017). |
| <i>Perkind Strategy (Pragmatic Strategy)</i> | A way of playing periodically, where they sometimes cooperate and sometimes refuse cooperation, as well as positioning themselves as the opposition outside parliament. | Voice criticism of government policies and engage in political actions to benefit the legitimacy of the organization among the public. |
| <i>Formation of New Community Organizations (Ormas)</i> | Taking advantage of the right to association by forming a new organization to continue the struggle of da'wah and the ideology of the caliphate. | Continue the struggle of da'wah and the ideology of the caliphate while minimizing the government's suspicions. |

This strategy is an exclusive approach in which HTI activists refuse to cooperate with any organization. They remain focused on the ideals of establishing an Islamic state and continue to criticize the government (Firdaus et al., 2024). This attitude makes HTI often conflict with other Islamic organizations, especially when discussing the concept of statehood. HTI continues to campaign for the caliphate, even in events such as the Tawhid defense action or the PA 212 rally at Monas, where they propagate the establishment of the caliphate even though the event committee has instructed against using the term. This ambitious attitude makes other Islamic organizations reluctant to cooperate with HTI (Yunanto, 2017).

Perkind Strategy or Pragmatic Strategy; The Tactical Exploitation of Democracy, this strategy is a periodic way of playing, which means they sometimes work together and sometimes refuse cooperation. HTI has always positioned itself as an opposition outside parliament (Yunanto, 2017). They often voice criticism and protest against government policies that are considered not pro-people or pro-foreigners (Abdul Qohar, 2017). In this case, they have the same goal as the opposition in parliament, which is to criticize government policies. This is a crucial example of HTI's anti-democratic ideology adopting tactical flexibility: they exploit democratic rights (such as freedom of assembly and protest) and mechanisms (elections) solely as a means (*taktik*) to gain legitimacy and weaken the system they fundamentally reject.

The involvement of ex-HTI in political escalations, such as the Jakarta Regional Elections and their support for the 411 and 212 actions, demonstrates this pragmatic approach. While the founder, Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, demanded party members not compromise, HTI's doctrine allows them to maneuver in politics, considering the election process a strategy (tactics), not the fundamental method (*thariqoh*) for political change. This strategy enables HTI to contribute to other interests, such as attending the 411 and 212 actions, which they consider

beneficial to the legitimacy of their organization among the public as defenders of the Islamic religion, all while remaining ideologically committed to replacing the democratic system with the Caliphate.

In addition to the two strategies, the formation of a New Community Organization (Ormas) post-dissolution is very possible. Even though it has been labeled illegal, HTI cadres or sympathizers still have the right to reassemble and unionize under the legal umbrella of other organizations. The old administrators, such as Ismail Yusanto, can emerge by carrying out a new organization similar to HTI to minimize the government's suspicions, and be able to continue the struggle for da'wah and the ideology of the caliphate. This situation is similar to what happens in other countries, where ex-HTI often takes advantage of empty spaces and becomes a forum for resistance for oppressed groups of people. HTI also used the Muslim Ummah Alliance, the Taqarrub Illallah Council, and the Liberation Echo as a forum to spread the idea of its caliphate (Aderus, et al, & Sukino, 2023; Amin & Ritonga, 2023).

Attitudes and Movements of Ex-Activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia After the Dissolution

The juridical dissolution of HTI through PERPPU Number 2 of 2017 has been rejected by the State Administrative High Court (M. K. T. Syah & Setia, 2021). Even though HTI has been disbanded organizationally, their political ideology and da'wah movement in upholding the Islamic caliphate is still running. Because it has experience as an underground organization during the New Order period, HTI is considered to have adequate experience in developing strategies and tactics.

The possibility that what HTI will do after the dissolution is to change course and join political parties, especially parties that have similar ideologies, such as PKS, PPP, PAN, and the United Nations (Wardani, 2021). This condition can occur if they fail to maintain their ideology in the form of mass organizations. Political parties that tend to be pragmatic can accommodate this group for electoral gains, even offering strategic positions to HTI officials. This pragmatic attitude can be seen from HTI's involvement in political escalations such as the Jakarta Regional Elections, where they demonstrated against Ahok's candidacy. They are also not allergic to alliances with other sharia fighter groups.

HTI's involvement in practical politics that demands compromise actually shifts from the khithah of its founder, Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, who demanded that party members not compromise. However, the HTI doctrine allows them to maneuver in politics, especially in elections. The election process is considered a strategy (*tactics*), not a method (*thariqoh*). For example, HTI encourages Islamic parties to build sharia coalitions and indirectly supports certain candidates. This is considered a long-term effort to expand the base of support for the implementation of the caliphate.

From the beginning, the recruitment and regeneration of HTI started from small da'wah activities among students. Post-dissolution, they used technology and information, such as gadgets, the internet, social media, YouTube, and Instagram, to spread the caliphate massively. This movement is carried out secretly in the campus environment, such as Andalas University and UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (Osman, 2018a). Ex-HTI activists at UIN Jakarta, for example, continue to be active through the GEMA (Student Movement) Liberation organization, when the author tried to conduct interviews with several members of GEMA Liberation regarding the regeneration of members in the campus environment, most of the members refused to be interviewed. A student with the initials (MNTP) as the administrator of the GEMA Liberation Commissariat Branch of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, said

"The cadre still exists, but we cannot answer that question, because we have an SOP about it (cadre of members) so the question must be asked directly to Ust. Ismail Yusanto (HTI Spokesperson)." (Interview, July 18, 2020)

At the Imam Bonjol Padang State Islamic University, Gema Pembebebasan also continues to carry out its activities, said a student with the initials (AP) through an online interview;

"The PERPPU (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) is only a government formality in order to revoke the status of HTI legal entity, not to revoke our spirit, GEMA Liberation". (Interview, July 18, 2020)

Communication Network of Ex-Activists and Sympathizers of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia

The communication activities of ex-HTI activists can be analyzed through the concept of formal communication networks, which are described in the following table:

Table 3. Ex-HTI Communication After Dissolution

| Types of Communication | Explanation | Example |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| Horizontal Communication | Message exchange between administrators who have the same level of authority. | Messages exchanged between HTI administrators and semi-autonomous bodies such as HTI Muslimah and the Liberation Student Movement. |
| Upward Communication | Messages conveyed from subordinates to superiors. | Feedback delivered through social media. |
| Downward Communication | Messages that flow from leaders to subordinates, such as directions, orders, and policies. | Delivery of da'wah and studies, both through forums and social media, to spread ideology (Qohar & Hakiki, 2017). |

Currently, the ex-HTI activist movement is more dominant in downward communication to make it easier for the public to access information about HTI. HTI's ideology did not simply disappear after its dissolution, but continued to be disseminated through various media and small organizations to recruit Muslims. The commitment of HTI figures, activists, and sympathizers to continue spreading their ideology despite the organizational dissolution necessitates a robust and effective communication network.

CONCLUSION

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) began as a national political party in Palestine in 1952 with the aim of liberating its homeland, but later transformed into a transnational movement with a global mission to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate. Entering Indonesia in the early 1980s, this movement grew exponentially and established Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which was registered as a mass organization. However, its ideology that explicitly rejects Pancasila and the democratic system is contrary to Indonesia's constitutional foundation. In 2017, the Government of Indonesia officially dissolved HTI via PERPPU Number 2 of 2017, an action mirrored by dozens of other countries globally. This dissolution, although legally controversial, is supported by the majority of the community and large mass organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. HTI activists did not remain silent; they responded with legal resistance, political consolidation, and continued the spread of their ideology through online media and infiltration into other organizations. This shift demonstrates the movement resilience of HTI. Even though HTI has been formally dissolved, the ideology of the caliphate they adhere to is still alive and continues to be fought through various post-dissolution strategies, including joining political parties or forming new mass organizations. This evolution exemplifies authoritarian learning, where the group adapted its tactics from public mobilization to strategic, covert action, utilizing digital tools to sustain its ideology and regeneration efforts against state repression.

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