



Islam on Screen: Talk Shows' Portrayals During Indonesia's 2024 Election at tvOne and CNN Indonesia

Syaiful Halim,^{1*} Zaenal Mukarom,² Moch. Fakhruroji³

¹ University of Mathla'ul Anwar, Pandeglang, Indonesia

^{2,3} UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia

* Corresponding Author, Email: syaifulhalim@gmail.com

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Abstract: This study explores the representation of Islam in political talk shows on two major Indonesian news television stations—tvOne and CNN Indonesia—during the lead-up to the 2024 Presidential Election. Using a qualitative approach and document analysis method, the research focuses on two episodes that exemplify how Islamic identity is framed: *Catatan Demokrasi* from tvOne and *Political Show* from CNN Indonesia. Guided by Halliday's social semiotics and Hall's theory of representation, the analysis investigates both audio-visual content and discursive structures to reveal underlying patterns of meaning. The findings show that Islam is often reduced to a socio-political identity marker attached to certain political figures rather than explored as a religious or philosophical system. Such framing, recurrently amplified by hosts and guests, leads to the oversimplification and banalization of Islamic identity in mainstream media. While political identity and religious symbolism appear repeatedly in these discussions, the programs lack theoretical clarity and depth regarding the concept of identity politics. The study contributes to media and communication studies by offering a critical reflection on the media's role in shaping public perceptions of Islam. It also proposes a new way to conceptualize televised representation by emphasizing the ethical implications of religious commodification during electoral periods. The research calls for a more responsible media practice that upholds the integrity of religious identity and fosters inclusive political discourse.

Keywords: Amanah, Banalization, Discourse, Islamic Identity, Media Framing, Mīzān, Politics of Identity, Representation, Semiotics, Trust

Introduction

Program *Democracy Notes* episode *Who is Behind FPI Reborn?* from the station tvOne presents a theme based on the event of a group of residents, who declared Anies Baswedan as a presidential candidate in the Monas area, Central Jakarta. The attraction of this theme is the involvement of FPI (added with keywords *reborn*) and Anies Baswedan. The FPI referred to in this program is the Islamic Brotherhood Front (formerly the abbreviation of the Islamic Defenders Front), an Islamic mass organization that certain community groups have labeled as radical, intolerant, and an actor of identity politics because it is connected to demonstrations demanding legal certainty over the blasphemy case by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, as well as supporters of the Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno pair in the 2017 Regional Head Election (Pilkada) in DKI Jakarta in the second round and supporters of the Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno pair in the 2019 Presidential Election (Pilpres 2019). In fact, the phrase *FPI Reborn*

not connected to the FPI led by Habib Rizieq Shihab. In fact, this program also features *footage* contains a denial from FPI management (tvOneNews, 2022).

Although the program was designed to discuss the relationship between the FPI *Reborn* and Anies Baswedan, it turns out that the vocabulary of selling verses and selling corpses has emerged. This phrase is connected to the Quran and Muslims, which in itself is connected to Anies Baswedan (in his position as a candidate for the 2017 Pilkada in DKI Jakarta, Governor of DKI Jakarta, former Governor of DKI Jakarta, and also a presidential candidate). This is a political identity construction that unites the keywords Islam and Anies Baswedan, and deliberately ignores the reality of the population in DKI Jakarta where Islam is the majority.

The debate that occurred during the discussion not only explored the design of the producers in the editorial room regarding identity politics, but also represented Islam. This was proven by the emergence of discussion points that led to symbols of Islamic identity. The almost endless debate only left a note that FPI and Anies Baswedan were the subjects of the discourse of identity politics. FPI's sin was to write the keyword Islam in the row of its name and Islamic thoughts in *blue print* organization. In addition, he also has a digital footprint in the form of a stigma as a radical, intolerant Islamic mass organization and an actor of identity politics. Meanwhile, Anies Baswedan's sins are related to his Islamic identity and his political career as a candidate for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, Governor of Jakarta, former Governor of Jakarta, and also a presidential candidate from the Coalition for Change for Unity.

Switch to the program *Indonesia Lawyers Club* (ILC) episode *The Breakup of the Partnership Between Jokowi and Surya Paloh* from account *Indonesia Lawyers Club Of YouTube* (Indonesia Lawyers Club, 2023). This program has attracted attention because in the middle of the discussion, one of the speakers expressed an argument containing the phrase identity politics, followed by the phrase Arab-ness. After that, he also explained the role of Anies Baswedan as an actor of identity politics through an event he called selling religion in the 2017 Pilkada in DKI Jakarta. Although trying to disguise the vocabulary of Arab-ness so as not to be perceived as the Arab race, This does not rule out the imagination that the scent of racism is also played in the midst of the discussion. The emergence of racial categories from identity politics is reminiscent of research on episodes *Justice with Judge Jeanine Pirro* related to the Charlie Hebdo shooting incident from *Fox News* which juxtaposes the keywords Arab and Muslim. The phrase Arab-ness is connected to Anies Baswedan because of his biological characteristics, the family name behind his name, and also his lineage which is connected to the Arab race (Petersen, 2016). The implied meaning is that Anies Baswedan is an actor of identity politics related to racial categories (which are connected to Islam).

Thus, the representation of Islam is connected to the Islamic identity of the candidate for leader named Anies Baswedan and his supporters. Although the name of the religion in question is not mentioned, this will automatically refer to Islam because most of Anies Baswedan's supporters are Muslims. The existence of the phrase selling religion is connected to the context of the events carried out by Anies Baswedan's supporters. Starting from this simple logic, the resource person in the discussion concluded that Anies Baswedan and his supporters were practicing identity politics.

Throughout 2022, the station *tvOne* broadcast eight *item* program *talk show* themed on identity politics through the program *Democracy Notes*, *Two Sides*, And *Indonesia Lawyers Club* (ILC) where the outside shows a debate connected to Islam. Islam is meant from *framing* This is not at all related to the doctrines, teachings, thoughts, or scientific concepts of Islam, but rather Islam as a social reality. To be precise, the Islamic identity of the prospective leader who is preparing to take part in the contest. In the 2022 period, the station *tvOne* is the only television that broadcasts programs *talk show*, with themes connected to the representation of Islam.

Throughout 2023 or a year before the 2024 presidential election, the production pattern *talk show* which highlights political themes that lead to an increasingly lively representation of Islam. This time it's not just the station *tv One*, station *CNN Indonesia* also took part. Various groups of people: government officials, politicians, political observers, academics, religious groups, and social media activists became resource persons. The next stage, the choice of theme based on the understanding of the program producer, *host* programs, and the resource persons

are presented to all levels of society. In this context, once again, what is meant by Islam is not connected to the doctrines, teachings, thoughts, or scientific concepts of Islam, but rather the Islamic identity of the prospective leaders who are preparing to participate in the contestation. However, this does not close the reality that Islam is the most interesting idea to be presented as a spectacle.

Program production activities at television stations are generally divided into two areas, namely programs from the production area (Production Division) and programs from the news area (News Division). From this Production Division, it is divided again into drama programs and non-drama programs where the da'wah program (*religion program*) is one of them. This program contains preaching or education about various Islamic issues. For example, *Mamah and Aa in Action (Indonesian)*, *Peaceful My Indonesia (tvOne)*, or *Islam is beautiful (Trans TV)*.

Siddik's ethnographic research on Islamic preaching programs on several television stations after the Soeharto government in 2021 emphasized the role of Islamic preaching programs on television stations in constructing religious authority that has become fragmented in Muslim society (Siddik, n.d.). The results of this study also provide an overview of the variety of Islamic preaching programs from several television stations and observations of the content presented at the micro level, as well as the central role of television in constructing Islamic preaching messages that place religious authority as the main actor in shaping the nation's morals.

Rakhmani wrote that the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) twin towers in New York, United States, on September 11, 2001 was the gateway to research from the news program side in representing Islam on television. The stigma of terrorism continues to be depicted and monetized by the world media, to the point of worsening the understanding of Islam in a wrong way, while also obscuring the understanding of the meaning of diversity developed by Muslims (Rakhmani, 2016). Religion is shown in the form of news, documentaries, serial dramas, comedies, soap operas, and so on. Religions are depicted in films and depicted in broadcasts and print media, on the internet, and in texts *multiplatform*, explained Al-Azami (Al-Azami, 2016).

The above description emphasizes the existence of programs that represent Islam on television, namely programs designed to provide education about Islam; and programs designed to convey information about politics, security, law, crime, economy, business, social, and culture where religious events, including Islam, are one of the themes. At moments such as Ramadan or religious holiday celebrations, daily news programs or weekly news programs also produce *item-item* related to religious activities. For example, activities *nyekar* ahead of Ramadhan or Eid or Eid al-Fitr prayer activities in large mosques.

In addition to the keyword Islam, representation is another important keyword of this study. According to Hall, representation is one of the key concepts of the cultural circuit that connects meaning and language to culture. Scientists from the *cultural studies* This gives a special mark to the keywords of meaning, language, and cultural circuits. His explanation of meaning includes the process of receiving and interpreting the signifier into a signified and changing the signified into language. This process is what he calls the representation system (Hall et al., 2024). This system is not just a process of receiving, processing, and changing messages in verbal or nonverbal form into verbal or nonverbal language, but this process also shows the existence of a mental process, which ultimately produces language as a form of representation. The keyword language is a sign or form of the result of a mental process that represents knowledge and experience. While the cultural circuit shows the locus of representation events based on the knowledge and experience of each individual.

At the operational level, Hall introduces three approaches to understanding the form of representation, namely reflective, intentional, and constructionist or constructivist. The reflective approach is a reflection of objects, people, ideas, or events in visual and verbal forms that refer to the beliefs and agreements of the majority of society. The intentional approach is a convention or agreement among communication actors regarding objects, people, ideas, or events in visual and verbal forms that refer to the beliefs and agreements of communication actors at the time or *setting* certain events (Hall, 1997). Meanwhile, the constructionist approach is a construction

related to objects, people, ideas, or events in visual and verbal form which refers to the tendency of acceptance by society at the time or *setting* certain events. This means that meaning is formed based on the reality shown by society in a certain period.

Three approaches to representation theory are instruments for reading messages that develop in programs. *talk show* from the station *tvOne* and station *CNN Indonesia* in the 2024 Presidential Election. The choice of this research object is based on observations of the program *talk show* from a number of national television stations throughout 2023. To be precise, the program *talk show* which is suspected of representing Islam. Throughout this period, the station *tvOne* serving 15 item through the program *Democracy Notes*, *Two Sides*, And *Indonesia Lawyers Club* (ILC); and station *CNN Indonesia* presenting five programs item through the program *Political Show*, *Shadow Cabinet*, And *Indonesia's Choice*. In the end, the choice is directed to the program *Democracy Notes* episode *Ganjar's Commotion on Azan Broadcast*, *Identity Politics Becomes Gossip* (tvOneNews, 2024), and programs *Political Show* episode *Anies' Political Safari Gets Bawaslu's Reprimand* (Indonesia, 2024). The reason is, *First*, Both programs have strong indications of presenting texts that lead to Islamic representation. *Second*, Both programs tend to present shows that are merely entertainment. *Third*, Both programs come from television stations that have different affiliations, the station *tvOne* connected to Golkar Party officials and stations *CNN Indonesia* connected to an international television network. These three reasons have the potential to present a different treatment of Islam, as well as being a portrait of television in the country in discussing Islam.

Both programs are produced and distributed from the studio, across transmission towers, to be consumed by audiences across the globe. *platform*. In full, each program along with television advertisements (TVC) in the slot *commercial break* transmitted terrestrial or in-streaming through *platform over the top* (OTT) sort of *Saw it* or *Vision+* regularly *live*; also each program without television commercials (TVC) in the slot *commercial break* Of-streaming through *YouTube* version *live* and version *master edit*. In the program version *streaming* regularly *live*, slot *commercial break* replaced *still graphic* which states that the program is still ongoing. While in the version program *master edit*, There isn't any *still graphic* which states that the program is still ongoing. However, in certain slots of both versions, advertisements will also be shown. *audio-visual* owned by *YouTube*. In terms of content, both programs broadcast terrestrially, *streaming* regularly *live* Of *platform* paid platforms and *YouTube*, and *streaming* in the form of *master edit* Of *YouTube* is no different. For the purposes of this research, primary data comes from downloads from *streaming* regularly *live*.

All of the above descriptions describe the existence of Islam as a social reality that is pulled into political interests, precisely related to the Islamic identity of prospective leaders who are preparing to take part in the contestation; and the existence of television in producing and distributing meanings that represent Islam. These two moments lead to a big question, how is the representation of Islam in television talk show programs in the 2024 Presidential Election?


Method

This study uses a qualitative approach with a document analysis method (Bowen, 2009). The main focus is representation Islam in the program *talk show* television during the 2024 Presidential Election. Data was taken from two news channels—*tvOne* and *CNN Indonesia*—through program documentation uploaded live on *YouTube* throughout 2023.

Analysis was carried out on audio aspects (host narration, resource persons, *voice-over*, and musical illustrations) as well as visual aspects (footage, *graphic*, studio settings, facial expressions, and gestures). Data determination is done through *purposive sampling*, namely selecting one episode from each television station that represents Islam significantly.

The theoretical approach used is social semiotics (Halliday, 2014) especially in the context of situations that include *field of discourse* (social themes discussed), *tenor of discourse* (relationships between communication actors), and *mode of discourse* (language choice and style). Data were analyzed by referring to Halliday's semiotic instruments and representation theory to reveal patterns of meaning formed through television media.

Figure 8



Typology Model of Signs of Islamic Representation on Television According to Halliday's


Results and Discussion

tvOne Station and the Catatan Demokrasi Program

Station *tvOne* is a national television network that focuses on news content. Initially, the television station, managed by PT Lativi Media Karya, was called Lativi, referring to its owner, former Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Abdul Latief. At that time, the concept of its programs was programs that smelled of mysticism, eroticism, crime news, and several other light entertainment. In terms of marketing, this television station was considered unsuccessful and unable to compete with established national television stations (tvOneNews, 2023b).

In 2007, the majority shares were transferred to the Bakrie Group (melalui PT Visi Media Asia) which also owns the station. ANTV. Management and program improvements were also made. On February 14, 2008, the name *Lativi* transformed into *tvOne* where 70 percent of the program menu is news programs. This media segment has also changed, namely targeting viewers aged 15 years and above, with a variety of programs including news and sports, both national and international. Specifically for news programs, this station presents them in the form of daily news programs and weekly news programs, one of which is the program *talk show* (tvOneNews, 2023b).

Figure 9



tvOneNews account on YouTube

The choice to become a news segment television station is a balance for the station *Metro TV* which also plays in the same market niche. This position also opens up competition between red television stations (*tvOne*) and blue television station (*Metro TV*). Furthermore, this spurs the station *tvOne* to always be different than the station *Metro TV*, especially related to the content presented. In this situation, the aroma of sensationalism and spectacular packaging become the capital of each media to present the most interesting and most important news programs to watch. The positive impact is that the existence of both has triggered many entrepreneurs to look at the news segment share and establish television stations with news segments, while also trying to eliminate the dominance of news programs such as *Coverage 6 PM* from TV or *About Indonesia*

from *Radio*.

Station *tvOne* has a number of programs *talk show* like *Indonesia Lawyers Club (ILC)*, *Two Sides*, *Women Speak*, And *Democracy Notes*. Program *ILC* was once an icon for this station, and at the same time positioned this station as a different station compared to its competitors, before this program was only produced for *streaming Of YouTube*. Program *Democracy Notes* considered a new program on the station *tvOne*, which is produced for broadcast on terrestrial frequencies and *in-streaming* through various *platform*.

This program was launched on March 16, 2021. The program concept is a discussion about various current and important issues and events in Indonesia, involving two *news anchor* as *host* program and a number of speakers who are divided into two camps that are assumed to be opposing. One camp is assumed to confirm the discussion theme, while the other camp is assumed to deny it. At the end of the segment, the program presents a preacher to give a short lecture related to the program theme (Sonny, 2021).

Figure 10



Democracy Notes Program Thumbnail on
tvOneNews Account on YouTube

Andromeda Mercury and Maria Elgytia Assegaf (Maria Assegaf) are *host* program *Democracy Notes*. While the resource persons presented are usually from politicians, political observers, academics, activists, religious leaders, cultural figures, social media activists, and students as the audience. *Setting* a round table program that places two camps facing each other at a round table, with *back-drop* written *Democracy Notes* and equipped *giant screen* to display program sponsors or *footage* from the program. Two *host* who stands behind the resource person is positioned as the traffic controller of the discussion, mediator, and decision maker in a discussion that has the potential or is expected to get heated. Meanwhile, dozens of spectators who are brought from campus become witnesses, as well as complements to a performance concept. They will applaud at parts that are considered important at the command of a *floor director*.

In addition to being distributed live through *tvOne*'s terrestrial channels, the program was streamed live through the paid platforms Vidio (owned by Emtek Group) and Vision+ (owned by MNC Group), as well as streamed live through the *tvOneNews* account on YouTube and the master edit version uploaded live delayed. Both uploads were documented on the *tvOneNews* account on YouTube, complete with thumbnails of the program host and resource persons, as well as the program title and program name; content title; and content description. In addition to uploading the full master edit version, the admin of this account also uploaded a cut from the master edit version containing statements from each resource person, with their own thumbnails, content titles, and content descriptions.

Politicization of Religion in the Representation of Islam on Television

Freedom House's 2013 survey on global governance placed Indonesia in the partly free or not too free category, referring to the implementation of democratic values in Islamic-based countries and Muslim-majority countries. This category cannot be taken lightly because it reflects the

quality of democracy in Muslim-majority countries. (Schneier, 2016). This category places Muslims in the country who are considered not yet able to implement the principles of democracy and also unable to implement Islamic law properly. To be precise, in the gray area.

The placement in the gray area is not based on assumptions or momentary views. They sent a number of researchers to conduct surveys and study documentation containing notes from various events in the country in order to get the latest portrait of the face of democracy in a country with a Muslim majority. When associated with the findings of this study, it can be said that the placement in the area labeled as not too free is not wrong. The production design and debate atmosphere of the talk show program from the television station that was the object of the study prove that the ideas that hyperbolize the network of individuals who are preparing to contest and their religious identities. Indirectly, this provides encouragement for the idea of separating religion from political activities: the Muslim community that is in the middle of practical politics, to separate religion from politics, aka secular or profane (Kimball, 2003).

The implementation of this idea, Muslim candidates are not allowed to be close to or touch symbols of Islamic identity. They are forbidden to demonstrate or show religious practices through the media or practice religious commands in public spaces openly. The political constellation in the country not only frames Muslims who are contesting in the stigma as *abangan* people, but also taboo to show their Muslim spirit (Khamdan & Abidin, 2024). This is the reality of Islamic democracy in the country which is still stuttering in implementing democratic practices along with the practice of Islamic law. Ironically, the elimination of democracy in this country with a majority is voiced by Muslims themselves and facilitated by the mainstream media. Instead of supporting the idea of mediating Islam, television actually propagates the idea of simplifying the symbols of Islamic identity as simply as possible..

In addition to placing the representation of Islam as a field of discourse, the talk show programs of the two television stations that were the objects of the study also tried to perpetuate the discourse that was starting to become stale, namely identity politics. In fact, the tvOne station put the key concept in the title of the program: *Heboh Ganjar di Tayangan Azan, Politik Identitas Jadi Gossipan*. Furthermore, the program hosts were also actively asking questions related to the relationship between the broadcast of the *adzan* advertisement with Ganjar as a talent and identity politics (tvOneNews, 2024).

Unlike similar programs produced and distributed a year earlier, this time the speakers seemed to respond to this issue unenthusiastically. In fact, even if there were speakers who tried to answer the host's bait, they did not present comprehensive arguments. This last point makes the audience potentially not understand what is meant by the concept of identity politics in the discussion, the host of the program also did not provide an explanation or proposition related to the concept of identity politics in question (Habermas, 2022).

Likewise with the CNN Indonesia station, even though the key concept was not part of the program title, it turned out that the program host had a question regarding the relationship between Anies' political safari at a mosque in Surabaya and identity politics (Indonesia, 2024). Called saving, he had asked a source who suddenly made a statement related to identity politics to focus on the issue of the discussion, namely ethics related to political marketing. However, in the following segment, he intensively fried the connection between Anies' arrival to perform Friday prayers at a mosque in Surabaya and alleged identity politics practices. The double standard attitude of this media is visible. In the end, the recycling process of the issue that was actually stale occurred.

As if getting bait, the resource person who is used to rehashing the 2017 Pilkada event in DKI Jakarta that brought together Anies and the concept of identity politics also took full advantage of it. The host's bait to get drama like a talk show program was successful. Two other resource persons who were positioned on the opposite side also lost control, by negating the statements of their debate opponents. However, the debate only presented conclusions about identity politics that overlapped with the politicization of religion or the politicization of places of worship (Kulska, 2023). Discussions regarding the concept of identity politics are merely trivial or banal because they do not provide an adequate explanation regarding the substance of the concept of identity politics in question (Hawkins, 2017). This last point makes the audience

potentially confused and not understand the substance of the concept of identity politics in the discussion. Moreover, the host of the program did not provide even the slightest explanation about the concept of identity politics in question.

One of the gifts that is a provision and absolute from the Almighty Creator to mankind (sunatullah) is personal history (Abu Shahba & Khanbaba, 2024). Humans cannot choose the origin of the mother who gave birth to them, whether related to country or region, or race, nation, or tribe. In principle, they are born as red babies in a state of not understanding anything and resigned to the nature of their history (Deloria Jr, 2023). Another word for this history of the self is identity, a buzzword that American feminist and sociologist of identity Steph Lawler has found to be a tricky term: people often think they know more or less what it means, but the precise meaning can be misleading. In popular culture, identity tends to only be explicitly raised when it is seen as problematic (Lawler, 2014).

The phrase something is problematic is a key concept that has the potential to invite long debates and polemics, without even producing common ground (Ilie, 2021). Nevertheless, it still needs to be discussed, especially in a scientific context. In this context, the hypothesis of something problematic is the event of a meeting of various identity realities in a social order. In the end, this meeting embodies another reality, namely differences, both biological differences concerning physical characteristics, psychological differences concerning personal character, sociological differences concerning status and understanding of the structure of society, anthropological differences concerning cultural character and understanding of cultural systems, and theological differences concerning beliefs and the regulation of human relations with the Almighty. In this section, the differences of various realities are placed as nouns referred to in identity politics (Andreevskikh & Muravyeva, 2021).

According to (Hall et al., 2024), The issue of identity in the 20th century refers to the development of Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism, and linguistic reversal in the form of a reversal of attention given to language as something that does not merely carry meaning, but creates meaning. Attention is given to the aspect of linguistic reversal as an aspect that contributes to the issue of identity. This means that the aspect of linguistic reversal is a verb that raises the issue of differences in various identities as intended by Lawler (Lawler, 2014).

Lawler also points to the adjective political as a frame of identity issues. However, in certain places and times, a group of people specifically and explicitly mobilize politically on the basis of the same identity in the political realm, usually referred to as identity politics (Lawler, 2014). Moving on from the combination of nouns, verbs and adjectives, regarding the issue of identity, it can be said that identity politics is the reality of identity differences resulting from political linguistic reversals.

According to Frank Furedi, a significant transformation of identity politics occurred in the 18th century, marked by the conservative movement and celebrated by radicals. At this point, the politicization of identity drew its energy from various conservative reactions to the Enlightenment movement in France, especially to ideas that championed universalism (Bakry, 2021b). The discourse on identity politics at this time is an attempt by identitarians to reject the idea of human universalism while claiming the existence of the identity of particular people and groups..

Statements about the identity of certain people and groups are key concepts of identity politics, while also placing established minorities as actors. This means that in the era of its emergence, identity politics spoke of the movement to maintain the stability of the social identity of people from certain social groups (established minorities), who did not want to be equated with the social identities of people outside their social group. Entering the 19th century, resistance to universalistic values and human solidarity also occurred in Germany through the conservative Romanticism movement, which emphasized the importance of cultural differences and claimed that the identity built on it was more authentic than abstract attachment to universalism (Sagall & Sagall, 2021). This movement was a response to the growing influence of rationalistic and universalistic ideals, as well as French Enlightenment thought (Bakry, 2021a).

The reality and thinking about the German Romantic movement strengthened the character of identity politics in the 18th and 19th centuries, namely the movement to maintain the stability

of the social identity of people from certain social groups (established minority groups), who did not want to be equated with the social identity of people outside their social group (Kersting & Wolf, 2024). This explanation also proves the existence of another reality in identity politics, namely the verb movement to maintain the stability of the social identity of an established minority community group; and is equipped with the goal of not wanting to be equated with the social identity of people outside their community group.

The understanding of identity politics also refers to the ideas of French poststructuralist-postmodernist philosophers (Foucault, 2020) which criticizes the negative consequences of modernism and shows its bias towards the oppressed discourses of the big discourses that dominate and control, which are then called identity politics (biopolitics) such as differences about body politics (Sabarudin, 2018). The key concept is the bias towards the oppressed discourses of the big discourse. If we break it down again, there is the verb bias; there is the object of the oppressed discourse on the big discourse and body politics. Foucault does not mention the group of people in question, but he emphasizes more on the issue of the hegemonic struggle related to identity or body politics—which certainly leads to the issue of minority groups from the majority group (Foucault, 1972).

Foucault's concept of identity politics leaves behind the 18th and 19th century understanding of identity politics that favored established minority groups. Instead, his ideas targeted oppressed minority groups. Moving from this understanding, the boundaries of identity politics shifted to become a discourse on the identity of oppressed minority groups over established majority groups (Teti, 2014).

(Bourdieu, 1991) interpreting identity as something else by mentioning the categories of native (indigenous/native), folk (people), or lay (lay/ordinary) where these categories develop and spread to ordinary community actors as a distinction from the separate categories of experience used by social analysts. The categories of native, folk, or lay, are categories of political body differences as intended by Foucault or objects of identity politics. Meanwhile, Maarif also presents other categories of political differences, which according to him are typical of Indonesia, namely ethnicity, religion, ideology, and local interests (Maarif, 2010).

From the description above, there are four important key concepts of identity politics, namely identity politics is the reality of identity differences due to political linguistic reversal; the movement to maintain the stability of the social identity of people from certain community groups (established minority groups), who do not want to be equated with the social identity of people outside their community group; the discourse of the identity of the oppressed minority group over the established majority group; and identity politics related to the political differences of the body in the form of native (indigenous/native), folk (people), lay (lay/ordinary), ethnicity, religion, ideology, and local interests (Bourdieu, 2018).

In its development, Lawler paid special attention to the categories of good or bad, healthy or abnormal, right or wrong, gender, sexuality, disability, class and others, which resulted from the power relations of the majority social group over the majority social group (Lawler, 2014). The simplest understanding of Lawler's explanation is that identity politics is related to the power relations of the majority community group over minority community groups of a certain gender, a certain sexual orientation, people with disabilities, and community groups that are categorized as bad, abnormal, or wrong, to the point of forming a dichotomy of privilege.

Thus, identity politics is the reality of differences in identity resulting from the power relations between the majority social group and the minority social group (Aminudin et al., 2023). Identity politics concerns the discourse of the identity of oppressed minority groups over established majority groups, movements to maintain the stability of the social identity of people from certain community groups (established minority groups) who do not want to be equated with the social identity of people outside their community group; identity politics relates to differences in body politics in the form of native (indigenous/native), folk (people), lay (ordinary/ordinary), ethnicity, religion, ideology, and local interests, gender, certain sexual orientations, people with disabilities, and community groups that are categorized as bad, abnormal, or wrong, nationalist movements, anti-colonial movements, and class-based struggles; and identity politics aims to gain recognition, ownership of certain identities, and

political framing (linguistic reversal). From these limitations, it can be said, first, that the practices of identity politics are not something wrong or mistaken, but they are normal in democratic life (Baderan, 2022). Religious Muslims are very likely to continue to show their Islamic identity in any situation. Including Muslims who are contesting. So are followers of other religions. However, the political situation often makes this boundary have to be deconstructed arbitrarily to the point of eliminating the religious identity of the contesting individuals (Rachman, 2020).

Second, the debates in the talk show programs of the two television stations that were the objects of this research did not provide any description of identity politics at all. This phrase was used as part of the program title, video tape, and questions from the program host to the resource persons. However, the resource persons gave answers that tended to be unfounded and clashed with each other. In fact, the ideas related to the sociological dimensions that were designed and discussed did not target an understanding of the concept of identity politics comprehensively, other than the use of symbols of Islamic identity in public spaces (Noaime & Alnaim, 2023).

In the Democracy Notes program from tvOne station, the polemic of the call to prayer with Ganjar as a talent in mainstream media and social media became a strong reason for the program producers to place him as a discourse field. This was not related to the chanting of the call to prayer which was not melodious, but because of Ganjar's presence as the talent. In fact, Ganjar's figure must be connected with the level of knowledge of fiqh and morals in his daily life. In fact, the root of this problem is Ganjar's figure who is a Muslim and a potential presidential candidate. These two predicates are united in Ganjar, so that all his movements will always be connected to his Islamic identity and his political identity (tvOneNews, 2023a).


Meanwhile, in the Political Show program from CNN Indonesia station, the polemic Anies' Arrival to perform Friday prayers at a mosque in Surabaya in mainstream media and social media became a strong reason for program producers to place him as a discourse field. This was not related to his Friday prayers, but because of the presence of Anies and his volunteers as guests at the mosque. In fact, the root of this problem is the figure of Anies who is a Muslim and a presidential candidate. These two predicates are united in Anies, so that all his movements will always be connected to his Islamic identity and his political identity (Indonesia, 2024).

In the end, both of the above descriptions were debated within the framework of identity politics. In fact, the nature of the political events carried out by the Muslim candidate leaders is still at the level of politicization of their Islamic identity or politicization of religion. In fact, the event of Anies' arrival to perform Friday prayers at a mosque in Surabaya still needs to be debated, if this is to be forced as a practice of identity politics. The program producers and program hosts have succeeded in conveying this framing of religious politicization to the audience and leaving a note in the minds of the audience that issues related to symbols of Islamic identity have the potential to always be dragged into the realm of religious politicization, even reckless identity politics (Driessen, 2014).

Offering Ideas on Issues related to Islam

The most important note from the entire discussion above is that talk show programs on television are not just statements, debates, and dramas. The audio-visual presentation of language shown on the screen or gadgets implies the existence of program themes, program premises, and program dimensions. Starting from the polemic of the call to prayer with Ganjar as a talent in mainstream media and social media, the program producer determines the program theme, compiles the program premise, and sorts it into program dimensions. This unity of ideas is united as a field of discourse. The basis for choosing the theme is not related to the chanting of the call to prayer which is not melodious, but because of Ganjar's presence as a talent. In fact, Ganjar's profile must also be explored and connected to ethical and moral issues. The root of this problem is Ganjar's figure who is a Muslim and a potential presidential candidate. These two predicates are united in Ganjar, so that all his movements will always be connected to his Islamic identity and political identity (Ilyas, 2023).


Figure 11

Model Premis dan Dimensi-dimensi dari Program *Political Show 2*.

In the program producer area, the program dimensions are framings that lead to the representation of Islam. Meanwhile, in the program host and resource person areas, the program dimensions are indicators related to competence and understanding of the outputs of each dimension, as well as references for placing them in categories of representation (Muliani, 2024). The description of each dimension leads to the forms of representation of Islam in programs and on television.

The output of the political dimension is program instruments and statements related to political marketing without considering ethical principles. Ideally, prospective leaders from Muslim circles do not play around with symbols of their Islamic identity in the public space (Sunier, 2021). The output of the sociological dimension is the program instruments and statements related to the practice of politicizing religion in order to approach Muslim constituents. Ideally, Muslim leader candidates do not politicize the symbols of their Islamic identity in order to gain sympathy from their potential constituents (Pribadi, 2022).

Figure 12



Model Premises and Dimensions of Democracy Notes Program 2.

Meanwhile, in CNN Indonesia's Political Show program, the issue started from the polemic of Anies' arrival to perform Friday prayers at a mosque in Surabaya in mainstream media and social media. After that, the program producer determined the program theme, compiled the program premise, and sorted it into program dimensions. The basis for choosing the theme was not related to Friday prayers, but because of the presence of Anies and his volunteers and Anies' past which was closely associated with accusations of identity politics. The root of this problem is Anies' figure who is a Muslim and a potential presidential candidate. These two predicates are united in Anies, so that all his movements will always be connected to his Islamic identity and his political identity (Indonesia, 2024).

Ultimately, the findings of this study not only reveal an implied message in the form of oversimplification of issues related to Islam, but also the banality of media towards issues related to Islam.

Conclusion

This study found that the representation of Islam in television talk show programs during the 2024 Presidential Election period showed a strong tendency towards the politicization of religious identity. Instead of presenting a deep understanding of Islamic teachings, Islamic symbols were used as rhetorical instruments in political narratives constructed by the media.

Programs such as Catatan Demokrasi (tvOne) and Political Show (CNN Indonesia) showed how the Islamic identity of political candidates was used as part of the construction of identity politics, not as a reflection of Islamic values themselves.

There are two main points that are important findings. First, Islam in television narratives is reduced to merely a social attribute attached to individuals, which is then easily used as a subject of public debate, without touching on its spiritual or normative aspects. Second, instead of broadening public understanding of the concept of identity politics, the debates in these programs actually strengthen the old, shallow discourse, more directed at creating sensation and entertainment than at educating functions.

The main contribution of this study lies in the critical analysis of the role of media in shaping the social meaning of Islam, especially in the context of electoral politics. By combining the approaches of social semiotics and representation theory, this study enriches the study of how religious symbols are strategically processed in mediatic space. At the same time, this study underlines the importance of encouraging the media to move beyond the logic of banality and commodification of religious symbols, and move towards representation practices that are more fair, reflective, and sensitive to the complexity of religious identities in the public space.

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