

Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem of Consciousness on Philosophy of Mind: A Critical Study on Soul-Body Relation Point of View in Mullâ Šadrâ's Philosophy

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Abstract

The goal of this research to examine Šadrâ's view on the "soul-body relation" in order to solve the "explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness" which are the basic core of the mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind. The explanatory gap explains how physical property can give influence non-physical things conversely. Meanwhile, the hard problem mentions how physical system (material) can produce subjectivity in the mind (non-physics/ immaterial), especially when we have experience. In this context, there is a gap that appears between the immaterial mind and the material body. In this research, the author develops the research using Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic and philosophical approaches. This research would like to highlight *Hikmah Muta'aliyah* philosophy, which synthesizes philosophy, theology, and tasawuf ('irfân), which can be the reference for Muslims (or anyone interested in Islamic Philosophy) to solve philosophical problems. In other explanations, Islamic tradition [in this paper it is represented by Šadrâ] can contribute to contemporary philosophical discourse without making tendentious claim that Western Philosophy cannot solve problems better than the philosophy of Šadrâ.

Key Words: Soul and Body Relation, Mind-Body Problem, Philosophy of *Hikmah Muta'aliyah*

Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisa pandangan Šadrâ mengenai "relasi jiwa dan raga" dalam rangka menyelesaikan "explanatory gap dan hard problem of consciousness" yang merupakan inti mendasar dari persoalan pikiran/ jiwa-raga (mind-body problem). Explanatory gap menyoal bagaimana properti fisik dapat menimbulkan hal-hal non-fisik atau pun sebaliknya. Sementara itu, hard problem menyoal bagaimana sistem raga (fisik/ material) bisa menghasilkan subjektivitas pada pikiran (non-fisik/ immaterial), terutama pada saat kita mengalami pengalaman. Dalam konteks ini, terdapat kesenjangan yang [tampak] tak terjembatani antara pikiran yang immaterial dan raga yang material. Dalam penelitian ini, penulis meneliti tema tersebut menggunakan metode hermeneutika Paul Ricoeur dan pendekatan filsafat. Penelitian

ini bermaksud untuk menunjukkan bahwa filsafat *Hikmah Muta'aliyah*, yang mensitesiskan antara filsafat, teologi, dan tasawuf (*'irfân*), bisa menjadi rujukan Muslim (atau siapa pun yang tertarik dengan filsafat Islam) dalam rangka menyelesaikan pelbagai problem filosofis. Dengan kata lain, tradisi Islam [dalam hal ini direpresentasikan oleh *Šadrâ*] bisa berkontribusi dalam diskursus filsafat pada konteks kekinian (era kontemporer), tanpa bertendensi untuk mengklaim bahwa filsafat Barat tidak bisa menyelesaikan berbagai persoalan yang ada sebaik filsafat *Šadrâ*.

Kata Kunci: *Relasi Jiwa dan Raga, Problem Pikiran/ Jiwa-Raga, Filsafat Hikmah Muta'aliyah*

A. Introduction

In the discourse of the philosophy of mind, there is a crucial problem, namely the mind-body problem. Since the Greek philosophy era, the problem or relation between the inner mental world and the external physical world has been discussed. What is the soul of a human or the mind? What relation between the body (physical matter) and the immaterial mind?¹ The discourse is mind-body relations. In this context, the mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind was explained systematically by Descartes, related to the relation between mental and physical characteristics.² Regrettably, scholars predominantly address the mind-body problem from a psychological standpoint rather than adopting a comprehensive philosophical approach.³

The subject of mind-body relations emphasizes "qualia". Philosophers interested in mind are known as "qualia" of subjective aspects of mental or mind activities. In other words, qualia are the subjective experiences (inner world) of human being; the question is, "how physical activity in external reality can influence human subjective experience?"⁴ Moreover, one of the problems in mind-body problems [related to qualia] is a spiritual experience. Is spiritual experience material or immaterial? If it holds the position of material experience, the validity of mystical experience will be undermined. Are mind,

¹ Antti Revonsuo, *Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity* (Hove and New York: Psychology Press Taylor & Francis Group), 2009, p. 4. Herein after referred to as: Antti Revonsuo, *Consciousness*.

² Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 7. Hereinafter referred to as: Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind*.

³ Benny Shanon, Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems (Abstract), in *Philosophical Psychology*, Volume 21, Issue 5, 2008, pp. 697-701.

⁴ Uriah Kriegel, *Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representationalism Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

soul, and brain identical in this context? Can we explain it? Is it the right psychoanalytic statement that spiritual experience is considered a traumatic experience at a tender age?⁵

Many academics face a significant challenge as they grapple with the absence of a compelling solution, primarily stemming from their tendency to oversimplify subjective experiences by reducing them to purely physical phenomena, exemplified by the attempt to explain the sensation of falling in love solely from a chemical perspective. When human beings fall in love, they are fulfilled by someone they love, not only in image but also in presence.⁶

The mind-body problem serves as a catalyst for numerous associated challenges. Recognizing the significance of identifying the foundational origins or essence of these mind-body problems, the author undertook an examination to trace their roots. This endeavor is crucial for achieving a comprehensive understanding and resolution of the subject matter. It is noteworthy that contemporary international philosophy journals continue to engage in discussions pertaining to the intricacies of mind-body problems. The author refers to most experts' thoughts, that the roots (the cores) of mind-body problems are explanatory gaps and hard problems [of consciousness]. Here's one statement on the matter: "The deepest core of mind-body problems is closely related to the explanatory gap and the hard problem [of consciousness]."⁷

The philosophers who are concerned with the philosophy of mind try to resolve the explanatory gap and hard problem [of consciousness] through the discourse of the "relation between mind and body". However, the resulting philosophical theory among philosophers rated philosophers still leaves many problems.

An amazing number of different philosophical theories have been put forward to solve the problem of consciousness. Yet so far none of the proposed solutions has been entirely successful. The problem remains with us, and now philosophers have tried to identify its core: *Why exactly is the problem so frustratingly difficult? Is there something special about consciousness that sets it apart from everything else that science obviously can handle?*⁸ The Explanatory Gap illustrates further why the Hard Problem is so

⁵ Michael Mack, *The Savage Science: Sigmund Freud, Psychoanalysis, and the History of Religion*, Journal of religious history, Volume 30, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 331-335.

⁶ Jeff Zaleski; Paul Gediman; Charlotte Abbott; Sarah Gold, *A General Theory of Love* (Reviews), by Thomas Lewis, Fari Amini dan Richard Lannon Reviews, Publishers Weekly, Art and Humanities Vol. 247, Issue 2, 2000.

⁷ Antti Revonsuo, *Consciousness*, pp. 39-40

⁸ Antti Revonsuo, *Consciousness*, p. 39.

hard – why the explanation of consciousness is not going to happen in the same way as the typical explanation of physical things usually happens.⁹

The majority of scholars who adopt a dualistic perspective to emphasize mind-body problems tend to hold a pessimistic stance regarding the prospects of resolving the complexities associated with mind-body relations. David J. Chalmers said that “since the second half of the 20th century, mind-body dualism views have been abandoned; philosophers are more interested in developing variants of materialism, such as identity theory, functionalism, and emergentism.”¹⁰

In the realm of Islamic philosophy, a discourse emerges concerning the interconnection between the soul (*nafs*) and the body (*jism*). Within this framework, Islamic philosophers often equate the mind with the concept of the soul. However, when considering entities possessing a mind or mentality, it becomes evident that they rarely employ the term 'soul' to describe the mind, as previously observed in the distinction between humanity and the entirety of nature.¹¹ For example, Plato says that each of us has a simple soul, which is divine and eternal, unlike our body.¹² In this context, the mind is the mental state in contemporary discourse, such as perception, feeling, memory, imagination, and will; then the mind is seen as a force of the soul in the philosophy of Mullâ Śadrâ.

The Islamic philosophers argued that the soul exists (real), and even the soul is human nature.¹³ They refer to Aristotle for defining the ‘soul’, which is the primary perfection of the instrumental body [natural] with life potential.¹⁴ In this context, the soul is the first principle as the foundation of human relations.¹⁵

In other words, the soul is the perfect starting point for body; because the body is a prerequisite for the soul because it is called a ‘soul’ if the actual

⁹ Antti Revonsuo, *Consciousness*, p. 40.

¹⁰ David J. Chalmers, *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (New York: Oxford University Publishing, 2002), pp. 1-7.

¹¹ Lorens Bagus, *Kamus Filsafat*, Jakarta: Gramedia, p. 379.

¹² Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind*, p. 23.

¹³ Muhammad ‘Abdur Rahman Marhaban, *Min al-Falsafah al-Yunaniyah ila al-Falsafah* (Beirut, Uwaidat li an-Nasyr, 2007), p. 521.

¹⁴ Hasan Zâdeh Âmolî, ‘*Uyun Masa’il al-Hikmah wa Sarh al-Uyûn fi Syarh al-Uyûn*’ (Teheran: Mo’asseseh Intesyarat Amir Kabir, 1385 H.S.), p. 93.

¹⁵ Muhammad Ustman Najjati, *Ad-Dirasah al-Nafsanayah ‘inda al-Ulama al-Muslimin* (Kairo, Darul Asy-Syuruq, 1993), p.117.

body and soul and body join to do activities [together].¹⁶ In this case, the body is a substance that has three dimensions. In this discourse, most Islamic philosophers are dualistic or believe that the soul and the body are real; but they have different perspectives on subsequent discussions.

The important problem that appears as the implication of belief in the existence of mind or mental and body, is “how they do interact?” Whereas the external reality looks like both of them interact with each other in doing activities. Then, how [immaterial] soul can be connected to the [material] body? In other words, how is the relation between mind and body in the external reality? These issues are as well as fundamental questions on the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness.

In Islamic Philosophy, the subject of ‘soul’ is an essential subject matter which is discussed by philosophers, such as al-Kindî (801-873 AD), al-Fârâbî (872-950 AD), al-Râzi (864-930 AD), Ibn Miskâwaih (932-1030 AD), Ikhwân al-Shâfâ, al-Ghâzâlî (1058-1111 AD), Ibn Rûsyd (1126-1198 AD), etc. According to Sirajuddin Zar, the peripatetic philosophers held that soul is an immaterial substance (*jauhar*) that becomes a form (*şûrah*) of the body. Ibn Sina is one of the peripatetic philosophers who discussed comprehensively the relationship between soul and body. According to him, soul and body have existed since the dawn of their existence. However, the soul has a relation with the body after the form is formed, so the body must be prepared in advance to receive the soul.¹⁷

According to the author, analysis of the philosophers [Greek, Western, and Islamic philosophers] still leaves the fundamental issues in mind/soul and body (read: explanatory gap and hard problem). However, despite the success or failure of the philosophers [neither the past nor contemporary philosophers], the author looks at the tradition of Islamic philosophy that can contribute to resolving the problems in this issue. Then, in the contemporary era, experts/scholars analyzed these problems through scientific and psychological approaches, not philosophical approaches; as was disclosed by William R. Woodward.¹⁸

In this research, the author positions Mullâ Şadrâ’s philosophy as an analytic tool for highlighting *the explanatory gap dan hard problem of*

¹⁶ Ibn Sina, *Asy-Syifa’: ath-Thabi’iyyat* (Kairo, Haiah Mishriyah al-‘Ammah lil Kitabah, 1975), pp. 10-13.

¹⁷ A.F.Ahwani, *Ibn Sina: Risalat fi Ma’rifat al-Nafs al-Natiqat wa Ahwaliha* (Kairo, Dar al-Ma’arif, 1952), pp. 181-185.

¹⁸ William R. Woodward, *Fechner’s Panpsychism: a Scientific Solution to the Mind-Body Problem* in *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* Volume 8, Issue 4, 1972.

consciousness. Mullâ Šadrâ (1571-1640) is an Islamic philosopher who success to criticize the previous philosophies by synthesizing theology, philosophy, and mysticism (*'irfân*). He attempted to find a comprehensive answer to the various philosophical problems.

Mullâ Šadrâ [as Ibn Sînâ's view (980-1037) and other philosophers] explains that "soul is construction (*mizâj*) of body."¹⁹ In addition, according to Mullâ Šadrâ, the "soul is seen as a primary perfection (*kamâl auwal*), form (*šûrah*), or power (*quwwah*) from a particular body".²⁰ Mullâ Šadrâ argued that "rational demonstration (*burhân*) delivers on the truth substantiality and the immateriality of the soul."²¹ So, "the soul is not accidental (property/ *'aradl*) but the substance; it is not a material substance (physical) but immaterial".

Moreover, Šadrâ proves that soul and body have dimensional differences, but this dualism is not as understood by Ibn Sînâ, that soul and body are two substances that are related since the dawn of time. Šadrâ refused the pattern of relations of two substances which is believed by Ibn Sînâ. Dualism [according to Šadrâ] is the soul becomes the locus for all power and potential, in contrast to physical exercise that is just recessive to the actualization of all power and potential. Šadrâ often uses the metaphor for the duality of soul and body like the helmsman and boat.²²

Furthermore, the existence of the soul within the body is a fundamental issue that should be given primary consideration. The "body" serves as the vessel for the soul, and thus, it is believed that the body is a manifestation of the soul. On the other hand, the soul represents the genuine human essence, the true reality. The body reacts when the soul reacts. According to Šadrâ, in this context, the soul must be understood universally.²³

In a previous study related to the research topic, Brian J. Fiala's dissertation titled *Explaining the Explanatory Gap* is relevant. According to Fiala, psychological facts suggest that the explanatory gap intuition does not justify the belief that physical theories of consciousness leave out certain facts about consciousness. Fiala begins by making a case for considering that purely psychological analysis of the explanatory gap is not the only relevant factor, but

¹⁹ Mullâ Šadrâ, *al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah fi al-Asfar al-'Aqliyyah al-Arba'ah* (Beirut: Dar Ihya 'al-Turats al-'Arabi, 2002), j.8, pp. 44-50. Hereinafter referred to as: Mullâ Šadrâ, *al-Asfar VIII*.

²⁰ Mullâ Šadrâ, *al-Asfar VIII*, pp. 9-13.

²¹ Mullâ Šadrâ, *al-Asfar VIII*, pp. 23-27 & pp. 225-261.

²² Mullâ Šadrâ, *al-Asfar IV*, p. 12.

²³ Fajar, D. A. (2018). *JIWA DALAM PANDANGAN MULLA SHADRA*. *Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah Dan Filsafat Islam*, 3(1), 13-31.

also that epistemological analysis should be employed. Then, Fiala presents empirical findings supporting the view that various sub-personal psychological processes play a key role in producing the explanatory gap intuition.²⁴

In addition, in Bernard Molyneux's work titled *On the Infinitely Hard Problem of Consciousness*, Molyneux demonstrates that the structure of Leibniz's Law requires an agent to perform unlimited operations in order to psychologically identify phenomenal reference and physical concepts. The resulting problem resembles *the hard problem of consciousness*, inviting responses from dualists and eliminativists. Furthermore, if this is indeed a hard problem, we can predict that regardless of the strength of the arguments for physicalism, an unresolved dissatisfaction is bound to accompany any physicalist theory of consciousness. Based on this, Molyneux indicates that it constitutes the *hard problem of consciousness*.⁵²

In the previous study, in *Explaining the Explanatory Gap*, Fiala acknowledges that psychological research alone is insufficient to resolve the explanatory gap. In this research, the author not only employs epistemological principles to address the mind-body problems but also incorporates ontological principles. Meanwhile, in *On the Infinitely Hard Problem of Consciousness*, Molyneux criticizes physicalist theories of consciousness.

Therefore, this paper focuses on the discussion of the problem of the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness by using the philosophy of Mullâ Šadrâ on soul-body relation. This is an important discussion for the development of modern science that focuses on material physical activities in the process of knowing, but it ignores the subjective consciousness of the relation of mind/soul and body.

B. Methods

This research utilizes the hermeneutical method of Paul Ricoeur. The methodological steps involved in this study include distanciation, interpretation, and appropriation. Distanciation refers to the effort to create distance between what is said and the intense subjectivity of the writer. Similarly, distanciation prevents the interpreter from claiming the ability to attain a truly objective meaning. The reader is not seeking something hidden behind the text, but rather something present within the text. However, distanciation does not hinder the reader from obtaining a good interpretation, or even the best interpretation of the text, in accordance with the strength of

²⁴ See: Brian J. Fiala, *Explaining the Explanatory Gap* (The University of Arizona: ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, January 2012).

the accepted arguments. Interpretation (Verstehen) in Ricoeur's hermeneutics is not dichotomized with explanation (Erklären), but rather exists in a dialectical relationship. Then, appropriation, or making something previously foreign one's own, accompanies distanciation and serves as the culmination of interpretation, representing the reader's creative effort to obtain meaning from the text according to the breadth and limitations of their horizon.²⁵

The author realizes that in analyzing critically the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness there is the distance of space and time that separates the root of the mind-body problems with the philosophy of Śadrâ. However, the bulkheads between both are minimized by using the method of Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics made through distansiation, interpretation, and appropriation. In addition, according to the author, the philosophy of Śadrâ is regarding the mind-body relation still relevant as a reference in the discourse of the philosophy of mind. By employing Ricoeur's hermeneutics, the author perceives a distance between themselves and Śadra. In other words, the author's research on the relationship between soul and body in Śadra's philosophy undergoes distanciation, interpretation, and appropriation by the author themselves.

Furthermore, to discuss the relationship between soul and body in a rooted and comprehensive manner, the author brings forth a philosophical approach. The author chooses this approach considering the multitude of approaches to this theme, particularly from psychology. The philosophical approach is employed to uncover the fundamental roots and perspectives of each issue, thereby achieving research outcomes that adhere to logical principles.

As for the primary data in this research, it consists of the works written by Mullâ Śadrâ, particularly *al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah fi al-Asfâr al-'Aqliyyah al-Arba'ah* dan *al-Syawahid al-Rububiyah*, dan *Spiritual Psychology: The Fourth Intellectual Journey in Transcendent Philosophy Volume VIII & IX The Ashfar*. Moreover, among the works in Philosophy of Mind that serve as references for the issues of the *Explanatory Gap and the Hard Problem of Consciousness* are the following: *Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity* (Antti Revonsuo), *Philosophy of Mind* (David Chalmers), *The Conscious Mind* (David Chalmers), dan *Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness* (Joseph Levine), and other sources.

²⁵ Akhyar Yusuf Lubis, *Metode Fenomenologi-Hermeneutika dan Penerapannya pada Ilmu Sosial-Budaya dan Keagamaan*, Materi Kuliah Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan & Metodologi (Depok: Pascasarjana FIB-UI, 2011-2012), pp.29-37.

C. Discussion

1. Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem of Consciousness

1.1. Historical Background of *Explanatory Gap* and *Hard Problem of Consciousness*

Philosophy of mind is the branch of modern analytic philosophy that studies the nature of mind, events of mind, property of mind, consciousness, and its relation to the body/physical body [especially brain]. The most important mind-body problems discourse is the relation between mind and body.²⁶

Philosophy of mind consists of two main streams, namely, monism and dualism. In its development, the various branches of the two schools tried to solve mind-body problems. Monism is the concept of metaphysics and theology that emphasizes only one substance in nature. Monism believes that the mind and body are not separate entities ontologically. This view was first carried by Parmenides in the fifth century BC. On the other side, dualism is a philosophical concept that says there are two substances, because of the relationship/relation between soul and body, dualism believes in mental phenomena as the non-physical entity.²⁷

The fundamental issue that must be analyzed first in the philosophy of mind, namely whether 'mind is real (read: idealism)', or just 'body is real (materialism)'; brought by "monism". The main streams of monism [variations of physicalism] consist of two, namely monism of physicalism, such as behaviorism, cognitivism, a physicalism of type (type identity theory), functionalism, non-reductive physicalism, weak emergentism, the materialism of eliminative and non-physicalism monism, such as idealism and neutral monism. On the other hand, there is a view that believes that both are real, so-called dualism. Mainstreams of dualism are as follows: interactionist dualism (interactionism), psychophysical parallelism, occasionalism, and property dualism, such as strong emergentism, epiphenomenalism, non-reductive physicalism, and panpsikisme. The second stream is the main -ism in the philosophy of mind.

²⁶ See: Jaegwon Kim dan Ted Honderich etc., *Problems in the Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

²⁷ W.D. Hart, "Dualism", in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Samuel Guttenplan, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 265-267.

1.2. Basic Concepts of Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem of Consciousness

1.2.1. Qualia

Qualia ('kwa:liə/ atau /'kweiliə/) "quale" (Latin: ['kwa:le]), in Latin, means "what kind," is a philosophical term that refers to the experience of subjective consciousness as 'raw feelings'. Examples of qualia are pain due to headache, the taste of lemon ice, or the perception of red from sunset. Daniel Dennett writes that qualia are "a term that is unusual for something very unusual for us: how things look from our perspective [as a subject]".²⁸

Broadly speaking, the philosophers who concern with the philosophy of mind call subjective aspects of mental/mind states 'qualia'. In this context, qualia are an essential discussion of the roots of the mind-body problem [explanatory gap and hard problem of consciousness]. Qualia associated with the simple question is, "Is there a red color on strawberry (external reality) the same?" "How can physical events in external reality affect the human subjective experience?"

1.2.2. Consciousness

The words 'conscious' and 'consciousness' is an umbrella of the term that covers a wide range of mental phenomena. Both are used by a multiplicity of meanings; 'conscious' is heterogeneous in the range, which is applied to the entire organism-creatures, while consciousness for certain mental states and consciousness states-process.²⁹ Meanwhile, according to David Chalmers, conscious experience is the most familiar and the most mysterious in the world. No one we know deep directly on 'consciousness', but it is clear how to reconsolidate with everything we know.³⁰

Consciousness as a conscious state is not a passive state, but an active process that consists of two essential things: differentiation and integration. Although it is chronologically the development of human consciousness took place in three stages: sensation (sensory), perceptual (comprehension), and

²⁸ See: Daniel C. Dennett, "Quining Qualia" in Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (ed.), [Book Chapter], Oxford University Press, 1988. See: S. Blackburn, *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁹ See: David M. Rosenthal, "Two concepts of consciousness." *Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science*. Routledge, 1998. 1-31.

³⁰ Chalmers, David J. *The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory* (New York: Oxford Paperbacks, 1997), p. 3.

conceptual (understanding). The epistemological basis of all human knowledge is the perceptual stage. The sensation is not just stored in the memory of humans, and humans do not experience the pure sensation that is isolated.³¹

1.2.3. Gap

We have recognized an incomplete understanding of 'what is going on in the brain and body objectively'. But there is a "huge gap" between both of them. It is very difficult to see how the gap in our understanding can never be bridged. No matter how deeply we investigate the physical structure of neurons and chemical transactions that occur when they are fired, no matter how much objective information comes.³²

In this context, the unbridgeable gap is how the physical properties could lead to the non-physical things that can be felt when they experience something. How is the relation between material and non-material reality?

1.2.4. Subjectivity of Experience

Subjectivity is another idea that is sometimes equated with the qualitative aspect or phenomenal of consciousness in literature, but once again there is a good reason to recognize it, at least in some form, as a distinct feature of consciousness ~associated with qualitative and phenomenal but each one is different. In particular, the forms of epistemic from subjectivity are regarding clear boundaries on something that can be understood or even understood the facts about conscious experience.³³ Discussion of 'subjectivity' experience is one of the basic concepts in this study because the Explanatory Gap & Hard Problem of Consciousness present when subjectivity appears toward the experience of self-consciousness.

In this context, talk of the mind-body problem refers to the 'explanatory gap' between some aspects of our conscious mental life and the physical description of the imaginal objective from those aspects. It seemed that no matter what physical account of the subjective conscious experience that we imagine will be left completely confused about why there should be a

³¹ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/> access on November 1, 2015.

³² <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/> access on November 1, 2015.

³³ Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?." *The philosophical review* 83.4 (1974): 435-450.

connection between the physical story of objective and subjective conscious experience.³⁴

1.2.5. Basis of Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem of Consciousness

In the discourse of philosophy of mind, particularly concerning the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness as the root of mind-body problems, the author identifies some of the foundations of the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness. These issues arise from the questions of how the relation between the immaterial mind and the material body is understood and how the relation between non-physical experience and the physical body is conceptualized.

In this context, the premises of the soul/mind/mental property are based on subjective experiences (internal empirical), whereas the properties of the body are based on objective experiences (external empirical). The issue at hand is that the subjective mental reality of an individual cannot be objectively captured by second or third parties.

Furthermore, experience or phenomenal consciousness³⁵ is subjective, so conscious experience is difficult to verify.³⁶ Furthermore, philosophers engaged in the philosophy of mind hold the view that conscious experience is the most familiar yet mysterious phenomenon. However, the question remains: why do conscious experiences exist? Is it possible for them to arise solely from neural processes in the physical entity of the brain? In fact science is built exclusively on third-person objective perspective;

Only entities that can be observed from a "real" perspective (physical entities) are considered scientific. The objective approach is not able to explain consciousness and seemingly does not acknowledge the existence of consciousness. If we stick to the physicalist viewpoint of the third-person perspective towards the world, the phenomenal experiential qualities appear to be completely absent. The colors we experience as subjective qualities cannot be found in the physical world.

Furthermore, the central problem in the philosophy of mind pertains to the relation between subjective experience and physical processes. In this context, mind-body problems in philosophy of mind refer to the hard problem

³⁴ Gilbert Harman, "Explaining an explanatory gap." *APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers* 6.02 (2007).

³⁵The fact that we feel joy, or toothache, or experience the sensation of flying in a dream.

³⁶No one but ourselves can observe or have the experiences we undergo, nor can others confirm or know the qualities of our subjective experiences.

of consciousness and the explanatory gap between certain aspects of our conscious mental life and the objective, imaginatively physical explanations of those aspects. This leads to confusion: why should there be a connection between objective physical experience and subjective conscious experience? The mind-body problem arises from the difficulty in understanding how subjective feelings can be reduced to or identified with objective physical facts.

Moreover, in its development, there is a thought-provoking question: is a mental event reducible to a physical event? Can a mental event be a physical event without any reduction? In this context, indeterministic quantum processes do not seem to clarify the issues of the explanatory gap and the hard problem. Despite various attempts made by thinkers to solve the philosophical problems of consciousness (or mind-body problems), they still persist because comprehensive answers have yet to be found at the root.

The hard problem states that we do not know how or why every physical system should give rise to conscious experience. Meanwhile, the explanatory gap refers to the inability to bridge the gap between the physical or neural features of the brain and the non-physical or qualitative features of consciousness, even if we can show that these features are always interconnected. This indicates another problem: subjective facts that are characteristic of the mind cannot be captured through objective-scientific methods. The issues presented arise because the majority of philosophers in the philosophy of mind still question why immaterial thoughts can cause human actions.

2. Principles of Soul-Body Relation in Mullâ Šadrâ's View

According to Mullâ Šadrâ's View, there are principles of soul-body relation based on his philosophy, consists of Fundamentality of Existence (*Ašālah al-Wujūd*), Gradation of Existence (*Tasykik al-Wujūd*), and Trans-Substantial Motion (*Harakah al-Jauhariyyah*).

2.1. Fundamentality of Existence (*Ašālah al-Wujūd*)

The principle of *ašālah al-wujūd* is a fundamental principle because of Mullâ Šadrâ. The principle of *ašālah al-wujūd* states that the foundation of external reality is existence. This indicates that the "existence" in the idea of Mullâ Šadrâ is not the concept per se, but is essential for any reality.

According to him, *wujūd* is *aśīl* (fundamental), while *māhiyyah* is *i'tibārīy* (conceptual).³⁷ In the book of *al-Asfar*, Mullā Śadrā argued various philosophical arguments related to “Fundamentality of *Wujūd* (Existence) and Relativity of *Māhiyyah* (Essence/ Quiddity)”.³⁸

2.2. Gradation of Existence (*Tasykik al-Wujūd*)

Gradation of existence (*tasykik al-wujūd*) is an essential principle in the philosophy of Mullā Śadrā because of the principle of fundamentality of existence. However, the principle of gradation happened on *wujūd*, not *māhiyyah*, in Mullā Śadrā's philosophy.

Based on the principle of *Aśālah al-Wujūd*, existence becomes the foundation of objective reality in the external world. Therefore, both the differences and similarities will get back to exist because there is nothing else, except existence.

Some important elements should be considered for explaining the gradation Mullā Śadrā:

- 1) Plurality of existence is nature [diversity];
- 2) Unity of existence is essential [unity];
- 3) Unity is flowing in the plurality [the presence of unity in diversity];
- 4) Plurality will be back on the unity [the return of diversity in unity].

2.3. Trans-Substantial Motion (*Harakah al-Jauhariyyah*)

Most Islamic philosophers define motion as existent (*maujud*) discharge from the potential condition into an actual condition gradually, not all at once. In addition, "the motion is the first perfection from a potential in terms of its potential for actualized on the first perfection".³⁹ Mullā Śadrā's view about the soul can be justified in trans-substantial motion because explains the creation and subsistence of the soul.

Humans according to Mullā Śadrā was originally derived from the first material (*Māddah al-Ūla*) which joined in form (*śūrah*), through transubstantial motion, it develops and change, its material is developed into a blood clot, then a fetus, infant, children, young adult, old and crumbling. In addition, its

³⁷ Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *Bidāyah*, pp.14-15.

³⁸ Kholid al-Walid, *Gagasan Wujud Mullā Śadrā*, presented in 'Sekolah Filsafat Hikmah Muta'aliyah' in April 25, 2015.

³⁹ Ibn Sinā, *al-Syifa*, Uni Emirat Arab, t., vol. 4, p. 83. Hereinafter referred to as: Ibn Sinā, *al-Syifa*.

form is developed into Motion Soul (*Nafs al-Mutaharik*), then Animal Soul (*Nafs al-Haywâniyyâh*), and Human Soul (*Nafs al-Insâniyyâh*).

The principle of *Harakah al-Jauhariyyah* is based on the principle of *al-Labs ba'da Labs*. In this context, Mullâ Śadrâ criticized the theory of *al-Kawn wa al-Fasâd* by Ibn Sînâ. Theory of *al-Labs ba'da Labs* showed that the motion showed improved quality, without eliminating the previous object.

3. Soul-Body Relation in Philosophy of Mullâ Śadrâ

3.1. Unity Composite Relation (*Tarkib Ittihâdî*)

According to Mullâ Śadrâ, soul and body are not two separate things the first, the soul called the soul is exactly the essence of a substance and not associated with anything [that is not separated from the body and then added to it]. At first, the soul is considered as the stage between the stages of the body. After the soul is transformed and achieved perfection by intellect and knowledge, so soul becomes separated from the body. Therefore, when the soul becomes pure intellect and independent, then the soul leaves the body and becomes self-subsistence (eternal), no longer needing the body.

Soul and body are not two different substances and independent, they are not an existential reality called body on the one hand and soul on the other side. The body is the lowest level of this reality, and the soul is the highest [perfect] level. Mullâ Śadrâ says: "Soul is the completion of these substances and the whole of it."⁴⁰

Exposure above indicated Mullâ Śadrâ believes that the relationship that occurs between soul and body is a "unity relation", which Mullâ Śadrâ called *al-tarkib al-ittihâdî*". This view differs from previous philosophers called "*al-tarkib al-indimami*".

According to Mullâ Śadrâ, the unity of both [soul and body], will be stronger so it can achieve significant levels of intellectual existence into a single unit without a difference.⁴¹ In addition, for Mullâ Śadrâ the relation between soul and body is very important (essential), that is soul belongs to material and body, because the reality of the soul depends not accidental (*'Arađi*), and is added to the body.⁴²

The 'unity composite relation' between soul and body can be demonstrated as follows: "The relation occurs on two things interact in action."

⁴⁰ Mullâ Śadrâ, *al-Asfar VIII*, p. 292.

⁴¹ Mullâ Śadrâ, *al-Asfar IX*, pp., 112-113.

⁴² Mullâ Śadrâ, *al-Asfar VIII*, p. 12.

Because of Mullâ Šadrâ, "soul interact each other with the body in motion towards perfection." So, soul and body relate. In the philosophy of *Hikmah Muta'aliyah*, the soul at the start/organization is carnal, and in the survival/immortality is spiritual. Unity indicates two things are not existentially separate. Something immaterial unites perfectly [in relation] to something material. In conclusion, the relation between soul and body is the "unity composite relation".

3.2. Relation of Body toward Soul and Relation of Soul toward Body (Relation between Soul and External Reality)

Most Islamic philosophers argued that soul and body interact.⁴³ A logical explanation of the interplay of the relationship between soul and body can be demonstrated as follows: "Relation happened between two things interact". In the philosophy of *Hikmah Muta'aliyah*, soul and body interact with each other. Relations between two things affect each other. In conclusion, "soul affects body and body affects the soul."

Referring to the many previous thinkers, Mullâ Šadrâ gives many examples of the interaction of soul and body, as the influence of the condition of the body on soul status (eg. hunger and thirst); emotion and fantasy on the status of certain parts of the body (feathers shiver when thinking of God). Mullâ Šadrâ also confirms that this interaction occurs because the "soul and body is one existence of the difference in gradation level."

Currently, the relationship between the soul and the external world is seen as the most remarkable discourse in the philosophy of mind. However, to understand the relation in Islamic philosophy, then we should focus on discussions related to the nature of "knowledge by correspondence". The soul is recognized as mental existence. Muslim philosophers have generally sought to explain the nature of "knowledge by correspondence" or the mental existence of the ontological aspect. Therefore, their explanation does not include the entire domain of relation between the soul and the external world. So, the discussion of philosophers is about the knowledge by correspondence (*ilm hušuli*).

3.3. *Ittihâd al-'Âqil wa al-Ma'qûl*

Ittihâd (reunification) necessitates the existence of two things [something] that face each other and then the two entities united. The

⁴³ Hasan Zâdeh Âmoli, *Syarh al-'Uyûn*, p. 263.

principle of unity between the subject (*'aqil*), object (*ma'qul*), and intellect (*'aql*) occurs due to an existential unity between the subject who perceives the object perceived, and the subject-object relations manifest the knowledge.

The principle of "Unity between Subject and Object of Knowledge" is closely related to "the power of perception" on the soul. Every perception (*idrāk*) is the soul. For every perception, it is sensuous (*hissī*), fantasy (*khayālī*), estimation (*wahmī*), or intelligible (*'aqlī*).⁴⁴

The main argument put forward by Mullā Śadrā in his efforts to uphold the principle of *Ittihād al-'Āqil wa al-Ma'qûl* is known as the argument of relation (*Burhan al-Tadlayuf*). To uphold this argument, Mulla Sadra rests on three main premises in his work.⁴⁵

According to Mullā Śadrā, "relation is equality in *wujûd* of actual or potential." Based on this argument, according to Mullā Śadrā, because the actual object is present, then the subject must present actually; and then dimensional unity occurs on both.⁴⁶

3.4. Monis of Existential-Dualism of Essential

An intriguing question, is 'soul-body relation' according to Mullā Śadrā can be categorized as dualism or monism? According to the author, based on the principal le *Aśālah al-Wujûd*, *Tasykik al-Wujûd*, and *Ḥarakah al-Jauhariyyah* then the relation between soul and body in the philosophy of Mullā Śadrā can be called "Monis of Existential-Dualism of Essential".

Recognition of the "monis of existential" because of Mullā Śadrā must be understood in a gradation or hierarchy. This is because in the unity, there is plurality or otherwise there is unity in diversity. When applied in *aśālah al-wujûd* and *tasykik al-wujûd*, the soul and body are one of *wujûd* in different gradations. Moreover, "the relation of soul and body called dualism for different intensity/ quality of being."

In addition, based on the principle of *Hikmah Muta'aliyah*, unity of being is essential as a plurality of being (*wujûd*); it is essential. Unity in plurality and plurality will be back in unity. Furthermore, if added another principle namely that *wujûd* is *basith* (simple), then the combination of the concepts above necessitates that *wujûd* is graded.

⁴⁴ Mullā Śadrā, *Al-Asfar III*, p. 337.

⁴⁵ Kholid al-Walid, *Perjalanan Jiwa Menuju Akhirat*, pp. 54-56.

⁴⁶ Kholid al-Walid, *Perjalanan Jiwa Menuju Akhirat*, p. 56.

The relation between soul and body in the philosophy of Mullâ Śadrâ is called "monis of existential-dualism of essential." It is based on the principle of *harakah al-jauhariyyah* and *‘illiyah*. Mullâ Śadrâ looked at the soul because of trans-substantial motion from the body.⁴⁷

In this context, the soul is simple (*basith*) in terms of substance and composite (*murakkab*) in terms of the relationship with the material body. Referring to the view of Mullâ Śadrâ, the material human body is an entity that is the purest among the forms of matter, while the soul occupies the highest level among all the souls.

4. Completion of Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem of Consciousness through Soul-Body Relation Mullâ Śadrâ

According to the author, Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem of Consciousness based on "Problem Bases" can resolve through the soul-body relation of Mullâ Śadrâ.

First, **how is the relation between immaterial mind and the material body?** Based on completion of view of Soul/Body Relation of Mullâ Śadrâ, there is no need to be a mediator between both refer to the ontological principles, namely fundamentality and gradation of existence, then trans-substantial movement and causality. In the context, the view of soul-body relation of Mullâ Śadrâ which is based on the ontological principles necessitates "monistic dualism essential existential". Moreover, there are some important points are Soul-body-relation is very essential, soul exists within both by [soul is a body on origination], and soul develops step by step in the body. In this context, Mullâ Śadrâ believes in materiality and immateriality of the soul. Soul occurred within the body, then descended from matter. So, gap problem between soul (mind) and body is not real.

Second, **how is the relation between non-physical experience and the physical body? Or "How physical body [material] can influence significantly human subjective experience [immaterial]?** Refers to the philosophy of Mullâ Śadrâ about soul-body relation, so the question is not problematic things. Soul is the actuality of body, whereas the body is the soul that becomes the body. Experiences [spiritual, sad, happy, sick, love, hate, etc.] relate to the body. Physical body influences human subjective experience. Every human being feels experiences, without clarification to others [*badihi/ self-evident*]. Soul [faculties of the soul] causes effects to occur on external reality. Soul is the source of actions in material form. Something that happens in the body

⁴⁷ Mullâ Śadrâ, *al-Asfâr VIII*, p. 390.

implies soul through subjective experience. Body is just given influence toward soul, but it is not a source of subjective experience which is experienced the soul. Soul is called the first perfection because it can be caused by the actualization of the matter [soul is the actuality of instrumental natural body]. Proven to be related to immaterial (non-physical) experiences with the material (physical) body. On the contrary, the material body can influence the human immaterial subjective experience.

Third, **the premise of soul property is based on subjective experience (internal empirical), while the on-body property is based on objective experience (empirical external) that indicates the "dichotomy of subject and object or subjective and objective"**. Refers to Mullâ Šadrâ's thought, there is no dichotomy between subjective and objective. The premise regarding the soul does not only based on internal empirical experience but also externally through empirical experience; soul and body relate to each other. According to Mullâ Šadrâ, Mind-body relation called the combined entity (*tarkîb ittihâdi*). Thus, the experiences of the property (faculties) are not based solely on the subjective experience (internal empirical), but also on the objective experience (external empirical). In this context, soul is impossible to do or experience something without the body, and vice versa. Furthermore, logical consequence of the view of Mullâ Šadrâ is the premise of soul property is not only based on subjective experience, but also objective experience. So even premises associated with body properties are not only based on objective experience, but also subjective experience.

Fourth, **experiences or consciousness are subjective**. In the philosophy of Mullâ Šadrâ, there is the principle of *ittihâd al-'âqil wa al-ma'qûl* (unity between subject and object of knowledge). Experience or phenomenal consciousness is not purely subjective because there are subject-object relations that lead to unification. Experience or phenomenal consciousness which we derive from the perception of external reality is not purely subjective.

Fifth, **conscious experience is difficult to verify**. Mullâ Šadrâ did not try to verify a conscious experience with the scientific method that is destined for the material object because it is a non-appropriate step. Furthermore, subjective experience that occurs in humans is consciousness that has proven itself (*badihi/self-evident*).

Sixth, **why is there a conscious experience?** Is it possible to arise from neural processes in the brain [physical entity]? This problem can be answered by proving the first mind-body relation. Conscious experience is the result of mind-body relations, so it's not purely neural processes in the brain [entity material]. The view of the materiality of soul and immateriality of soul and

principle of *nafs jismāniyyah al-hudûts wa rūhāniyyah al-baqâ'* indicates that Mullâ Śadrâ can answer this question. The process of nerves in the brain is not the source of conscious experience but rooted in the soul. Conscious experience is the result of the relationship of the immaterial soul that relates to processes in the corporeal brain. Soul and body relate to each other, but the body only influences the soul, but it is not the source of subjective experience experienced by the soul.

Seventh, **knowledge is built exclusively on a third-person objective perspective.** Because of Mullâ Śadrâ about *ittihād al-âqil wa al-ma'qûl* and soul-body relations, knowledge is not just limited to the objective experience (empirical-external). Mullâ Śadrâ believes there is unity between the subject perceived, the object perceived, and perception. On that basis, knowledge is not only based on a third-person objective perspective because we can not let go of the subjectivity of the researcher. There is a necessary relationship between subject and object that affected the results. Mullâ Śadrâ shows the unity between the intellect and intelligible to prove that perception, the mental subject that perceives an object, and knowledge itself, is the same. Knowledge is not built exclusively on a third-person objective perspective, but also involves subject and object. Refers to the view of Mullâ Śadrâ who believes in the unity of subject and object, then knowledge is constructed based on objectivity and subjectivity.

Eight, **the objective approach is not able to explain consciousness.** If the experience could not be verified objectively, it does not mean that consciousness does not exist. Something unknown to us [the third person] does not mean 'anything'. The only limitation, we are unable to uncover, or premises that we build invalid so could not arrive at a valid conclusion. Consciousness in the philosophy of mind as well as *idrâk*. According to Śadrâ, each *idrâk* are sensuous faculties (*hissî*), fantasy (*khayâlî*), estimation (*wahmî*), or intelligible (*'aqlî*).

Ninth, **subjective quality can not be found in the physical world.** This issue arises because the physical world is only limited to objective quality. Refers to the view of Mullâ Śadrâ, there is an interaction between subject-object, and even leads to the unity of subject-object. So, we can find a subjective quality of the physical world; it is based on the senses.

Tenth, **the relation between subjective experience and physical processes.** The question is answered by reference to a philosophical view of Mullâ Śadrâ associated with the relation of soul and body. Subjective experience that happened to a subject is necessarily related to the physical

processes that occur in a physical entity. The physical process that may occur in the subject or going on a physical entity outside the subject.

Eleventh, **why should there be a connection between objective physical experience and subjective conscious experience?** The connection between the objective physical experience and objective conscious experience is a necessity. Soul and body exist, and there is the relation of unity between both which is a necessity. One of experience is experienced by the soul is connected to the experience experienced by the body, and then subjective conscious experience, while the experience of the body is physical objectively. Therefore, subjectivity and objectivity can not do/ experience something independently because there is a relation of unity between subject and object.

Twelfth, **difficulty to understand how subjective feelings be reduced [or identic] with the objective physical fact.** The feeling experienced by the subject has a relation with a physical fact but does not intend to reduce or identify both. Relation of unity that occurs between both is an implication of the relation of soul and body. Because of Mullâ Šadrâ, there are five external faculties. Moreover, the soul has five internal faculties that are principles of external faculties. Subjective feeling experienced by the soul has relations and implications on objective physical facts [bodily] because the soul faculties include immaterial internal faculty and material external faculty.

Thirteenth, **are mental events reduced to physical events?** It is possible mental events that occur in the soul manifest in the physical event, but it is not reductionistic. Some non-existential things can not be manifested in external reality in the epistemology of Mullâ Šadrâ [discussion of mental existence (*zihni*)]. Materiality of the soul when it appears without contrary to the nature of its immaterial nature. Unique and immaterial soul in every human being that comes into this world as a material entity~ in different individuals whose particularity is rooted in the specific physical material (*maddah*).

Fourteenth, **subjective facts which are characteristic of the mind can not be captured through the scientific method objectively.** The inability of experimental method is intended for physical entities, not necessitating that the subjective facts could not be investigated by the objective scientific method. Scientific discipline will simply assume that the subject exists, while the discussion of the evidence of its existence and the other ontological categories discussed by philosophy (metaphysics). Every scientific discipline requires metaphysics to prove the reality of the subject and the general principles it uses. In addition, subjective facts that have been identified with the characteristics of the soul, reality is also present in the physical entity. During the process of knowing, we can not break the dichotomy between objectivity

and subjectivity on reality [either immaterial or immaterial] which have the position as an object of knowledge. Therefore, according to Šadrâ's philosophy, the subjective and the objective experience are reduced when expressed on a concept that is arranged through an intermediary language.

E. Conclusion

Based on the research of the author, so the main conclusion in this thesis is "explanatory gap and hard problem of consciousness can be solved by Mullâ Šadrâ philosophical point of view on soul-body relation". According to the author's view, Šadrâ's philosophy of mind-body relation can solve the problem because it is based on principles of *Hikmah Muta'aliyah* philosophy, which is "monism of existential-dualism of essential" [in author's term]. The other conclusions of this research are:

First, the "explanatory gap problem and the hard problem of consciousness 'exist' in the discourse of philosophy of mind as the root of the mind-body problem." According to the author's research, the basic concepts on these issues are an essential term. In addition, the author concluded that "to analyze critically the root of the mind-body problem, so the first step is identification bases and implications of explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness.

Second, the basic concepts formulated in this paper were originally based on the view of some philosophers. The author concludes that what is meant by "soul [in the philosophy of Mullâ Šadrâ] is mind in the discourse of philosophy of mind." Thus, the evidence is relevant and becomes *hujjah* for the author to continue the research of soul-body relation in the philosophy of Mullâ Šadrâ as a solution to the root of mind-body problems, which is an explanatory gap and hard problem of consciousness. Additionally, in this paper, the author underlines the ontological principles in the philosophy of *hikmah muta'aliyah*.⁴⁸ Therefore, it can be concluded that "the ontological principles [not only epistemological principles] comprehensively could form the basis for a philosophical view of mind-body relation as a solution to the explanatory gap and hard problem."

Third, the author concludes that the discussion of the "mind-body formation process is the initial discussion (the 'door') before entering the 'building' of soul-body relation in the philosophy of Mullâ Šadrâ." In other words, the discussion is interrelated. The author holds that the relation of soul

⁴⁸ The principle of primacy of existence (*ašālah al-wujūd*), gradation of existence (*tasykik al-wujūd*), trans-substantial motion (*ḥarakah al-jauhariyyah*), dan causality (*'illiyah*).

and body in the philosophy of Mullâ Śadrâ has distinctive characteristics compared to other philosophers in the discourse of philosophy of mind. The author concludes that the real point of soul-body relation Mullâ Śadrâ 's philosophy is 'Monis Existential-Dualism Essential'.

Fourth, the author concludes that the "explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness can be analyzed philosophically through the philosophy of Mullâ Śadrâ on soul-body relation." The analysis is based on the bases of problems and implications of explanatory gaps and hard problems of consciousness. The author concludes that the "view of monistic existential-dualism essential" related to soul-body relation is the essence of Mullâ Śadrâ's philosophy to resolve the explanatory gap and hard problem of consciousness. Moreover, "Mullâ Śadrâ's philosophy is not only can be a solution to the root of mind-body problems, but also it could have implications for optimistic view on soul-body relation in the discourse on the philosophy of mind."

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