Jihad Resolution and the Spirit of Struggle: Historical Traces of the Battle of November 10, 1945

M. Kautsar Thariq Syah

UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia mkautsarr18@gmail.com

Putri Lailatus Sa'adah

UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia lailatusputeri@gmail.com

Zaenur Rofiq

STAI Al Badar Cipulus Purwakarta, Indonesia larofiqe@yahoo.com

Ajid Hakim

UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia ajidhakimsejarah@gmail.com

Riyan Haqi Khoerul Anwar

STAI Al Badar Cipulus Purwakarta, Indonesia haqikhoerulanwar.hka@albadar.ac.id

Marisa Jahra Salsabila

Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, Indonesia angelcharlie910@gmail.com

Mutiara Khansa Syakira

UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia helocarlie5@gmail.com

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Abstract:

The resolution of jihad on the November 10, 1945 incident became a major history of Indonesia after independence. However, this event is rarely depicted from the perspective of the role of religions in Indonesia, especially through religious fatwas during this battle. One of them is the fatwa of KH. Hasyim announcing, before the meeting attended by NU consuls throughout Java and Madura on October 22, 1945, all meetings of ulama agreed that the result of the deliberation was a decision regarding jihad as part of the struggle for independence. This article discusses the fatwas and appeals issued by several religions in Indonesia when the battle took place on November 10, 1945 in Surabaya. Research shows that there was a jihad fatwa to encourage resistance to the events of November 10, 1945. This was shown in the First People's Sovereignty Newspaper, an Islamic fatwa

published through the People's Sovereignty Newspaper published on November 9, 1945, the contents of which were namely 60 Miljoen Kaoem Moelimin Indonesia Siap Melawan Fi Sabilillah, and dated November 24, 1945, the contents of which were in the Perjuangan Alim Oelama Menentoekan Hoekoem.

Keywords: Indonesian Independence; Jihad fatwa; Resistance movement; 10 November 1945.

INTRODUCTION

Several weeks after the proclamation of independence, in an atmosphere of uncertainty following Japan's defeat and political instability, Surabaya became one of the cities that played a crucial role in maintaining independence. To maintain this independence, President Soekarno, through his envoy, asked KH. M. Hasyim Asy'ari about the law of maintaining independence. In response to this question, Kiai Hasyim answered firmly, it is clear for Muslims to defend their homeland from foreign threats. President Soekarno from Jakarta sent someone to a prominent Kiai in East Java and Rais Akbar from the NU organization, namely KH. Hasyim Asy'ari, who was a resident of the Tebuireng Jombang Islamic Boarding School, asked KH. Hasyim Asy'ari to consider data from Gunseikabu that Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari was a prominent figure in Java. Sukarno asked for an opinion from KH. Hasyim Asyari, "Is the law defending the homeland, not defending Allah, defending Islam or defending the Qur'an? Once again defending the motherland?"

There is indeed an answer to Sukarno's question at the NU Congress I: in Banjarmasin. Indeed, in the historical records of Islamic boarding schools, since the establishment of the Demak Sultanate, the struggle against the Portuguese colonialists led by Adipati Unus, in Malacca, Ambon and Sunda Kelapa, received strong support from Islamic boarding schools. Even the Java War (1825-1830), launched by Diponegoro, could not be carried out from the kingdom, but rather from the Islamic boarding school in Tegalrejo. The physical struggle of the Indonesian people against the colonialists further emphasized the importance of fatwas as sharia legitimacy in defending the homeland as part of faith, so that the struggle became jihad and increasingly persistent in defending independence.

With the birth of the jihad resolution, the minds of Muslims burned to defend independence. Many ranks of young people from Islamic boarding schools carried out jihad in the battle of November 10, 1945 which erupted against British troops who relentlessly wanted to retake Indonesia (Pratomo, 2021). So that the event is commemorated as Heroes' Day inseparable from the spirit of the jihad resolution launched at the NU headquarters in Bubutan Surabaya. KH Hasyim Asy'ari became Bung Tomo's main reference in the battle of November 10, 1945 in Surabaya. In reality, the event involved several religions that helped native fighters fight against Dutch colonialism.

So far, studies on the 10 November incident have focused on studies regarding: the background to the 10 November incident, according to Sa'adah et al (2024) stated that the existence of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Jihad Resolution in response to the emergency situation in defending Indonesia's independence shows a unique approach in the history of the nation's struggle, namely collaboration between religion and nationalism. In addition, the struggle of the heroic figures who contributed to the event, and historical evidence of the November 10 event. According to Muhammad Haerulloh Zikri and Yuli Asmarita, Bung Tomo's role consisted of the actions he took in the battle of November 10, 1945 in Surabaya also aroused the spirit of the people of Surabaya to convey the situation they were facing, namely the return of colonialism to colonize their territory. Bung Tomo built various organizations that had a great influence on the resistance in opposing colonialism (Zikri & Asmarita, 2023). Second, according to Dewi Cyntia and Wisnu, after the November 10 incident in Surabaya, Brigadier General Kretarto was again given the responsibility to fight the Dutch in the event of a Dutch military aggression. Brigadier General Kretarto controlled the Surabaya Mojokerto-Gresik-Jombang area. The arrival of the Dutch in Indonesia, which the Dutch recognized as a police action, considering the reality of the action, was an act of decolonization to control the Indonesian economy and government (Cyntia & Wisnu, 2017).

Existing studies on the November 10 incident in Surabaya in 1945 tend to map the above, namely the background of the historical event, the role of community organizations in the event, and historical evidence of the event. In fact, studies on the November 10 incident are still open from an interdisciplinary perspective or the opportunity for historical studies and other studies. Studies on the involvement of various religions in the November 10 incident are still rarely studied and even do not exist, so this study will fill the gap in the study. This study argues that in the event of November 10, 1945, religion had an effort to support the resistance of the

indigenous people. This article aims to provide information that the event of November 10, 1945 became a major history after Indonesian independence. However, this event is rarely portrayed from the perspective of the role of Muslims in Indonesia, especially through the resolution of jihad in the battle.

METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach because it examines the historical events of November 10, 1945 in depth. The scope of the study includes the history of the events of November 10, 1945, historical manuscripts from Islam and Christianity around the recommendation of resistance to the colonizers to defend Indonesia's independence. The data collection technique used is through literature review. Literature review is a study that has been conducted by people who are related to the discussion of the research and also connects the study conducted with broad discourse in the literature about the discussion. This technique is considered suitable for the research being conducted because it is to track a topic or an event. This research was conducted on February 13, March 21, June 15, and November 2, 2024 at the National Library which was carried out through several procedures. The first step is to select and search for newspapers that contain information on the chronology, declaration of jihad, and the events of November 10, 1945, especially Kedaulayan Rakyat and Merdeka in 1945. The second step is to re-edit the writing in the newspaper, the third step is to process the data into primary sources.

The method used in studying the results of text criticism ultimately produces a text that is free from various errors and textual damage resulting from the copying process. The last phase is historiography, which is the final stage of historical research, following the heuristic phase, source criticism, and interpretation. Historiography is the process of collecting facts from various sources selected in the form of historical writing (Sulasman, 2014, p. 147). After reviewing the available data, all speculation must take into account the structure and style of the writing. The historian must be aware of the reasons put forward and try to help others understand them (Nurcahya et al., 2024). Because historiography is an effort to reconstruct past events. However, writing is only possible after research has been conducted, because without research, writing becomes a reconstruction without evidence. Both research and writing require skills. Research requires the ability to search, find and test appropriate sources (Syah et al., 2025).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Chronology of the Events of November 10, 1945

After the Allied victory over Japan, marked by Japan's unconditional surrender on 14 August 1945, Indonesia declared *de facto* independence on 17 August 1945 (Sa'adah et al., 2024). Next, the Allies carried out military infiltration into Indonesia with the aim of thwarting Indonesian independence. Meanwhile, Japan acted beyond the authority given in the name of the Allies, so that there was a physical struggle to disarm Japan. In fact, there was an intelligence operation that freed Dutch prisoners. On September 19, 1945, the famous Tunjungan flag incident occurred. NICA agents who smuggled in the Recovery Allied Prisoners of Wars and Internees (RAPWI) and had nested in the Yamato Hotel.



Figure 1: Satirical cartoon of NICA Source: Merdeka 12 Oktober 1945

The handover of Japanese power to the Allies was carried out by the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) led by Admiral Lord Louis Mountatten. The Dutch who were placed in the leadership of SEAC to take care of its government included General Van Oyen, Dr. Van Mook and Admiral Helfrich (Abdul Latif Bustami dan Tim Sejarawan Tebuireng, 2015). The Allies in their mission in Indonesia, the Allies brought Dutch officials (NICA), the Dutch East Indies government that maintained the security of Australia while Indonesia was in Japan. The Anglo-Dutch Alliance was born as an agreement between England and the Netherlands in the Chequers Civil Affairs Agreement (CAA) dated October 24, 1945, which stipulated that England would assist the Netherlands in rebuilding the NICA presence in Indonesia. It can be proven that the presence of NICA in Indonesia was intended for the restoration of the Netherlands in Indonesia.



Figure 2: Satirical cartoon of British cruelty in the battle of Surabaya Source: Merdeka 13 November 1945

On October 28, the British position became more critical. Their tanks were successfully disabled. On October 29, 1945, several vital objects were retaken by the youth. To save the British troops from the danger of total destruction, President Sukarno was contacted by the allies. The next day, October 29, at 11.30, Bung Karno, together with General D.C. Hawthorn, General Mallaby's superior, arrived in Surabaya. President Sukarno was accompanied by Vice President Drs. Moh. Hatta and Minister of Information Amir Syarifuddin ("Boeng Karno Dalam Oedan Peloeroe Toeroen Di Soerabaja Menghentikan Pertempoeran," 1945).

Soon they negotiated with Mallaby, the negotiations resulted in a decision: to stop armed contact. The negotiations continued at night between President Sukarno, the Representative of the Indonesian Government in Surabaya, the Youth Representative, and the British side accompanied by General Hawthorn (Notosusanto & Poesponegoro, 1984). After deliberation, they went to the RRI radio station in Surabaya and announced a request to the people of Surabaya to lay down their weapons ("Bertemoe Dengan Brigadier Mallaby," 1945). The negotiations resulted in an agreement: the existence of the Republic of Indonesia was recognized by England and the ways to avoid armed clashes were regulated as follows:

- 1. The leaflets signed by Major General D.C. Hawthorn are declared invalid.
- 2. TKR and Police are recognized by the Union.
- 3. The entire city of Surabaya was no longer guarded by the Union, except for the prisoner camps which were guarded by Union troops together with the TKR.
- 4. Tanjung Perak was guarded together with the TKR, Police and Union soldiers to complete the task of receiving medicines for prisoners of war.

Basically the allies continued to help the Dutch. In this case, it is only limited by the resistance's ability and the lack of its troops and membership to carry out war on a wider scale. Apart from that, there were 3000 allied soldiers and several troops who had been surrounded and several troops from Mallaby had been surrounded and had run out of bullets. There were 40 British and Indian officers and soldiers killed and 60 people injured

("Tentera Inggeris-India Terkepoeng Dimedan Pertempoeran," 1945). On the afternoon of October 30, 1945, at the Al-Irsyad school building, British and Gurkha soldiers opened fire on residents around the building ("Tentang Kedjadian-Kedjadian Jang Mengenai Meninggalnja Brigadier Mallaby," 1945). On the same day, General Mallaby died in the battle of Surabaya ("Panglima Tentera Inggeris Di Soerabaja Tewas," 1945). According to the official report in Surabaya, this statement was made by someone who witnessed for himself how General Mallaby died, not because he was shot by Indonesian fighters, but because of an explosion that occurred in front of the Internatio building in Surabaya, where the car he was riding in caught fire and exploded because of shots from the British themselves ("Sebabnja Kematian Djend. Mallaby: Peledakan Terjadi Didalam Markas Inggeris Sendiri," 1945). However, the Allies gave information to the world as if Mallaby had been killed ("Rahasia Kematian Brigadier-Gen. A.W.S. Mallaby Beloem Terboeka: Soerabaja Doeloe "Roemahnja" Van Der Plas! Serdadoe India Jang Mati Ada Jang "Loentoer"?," 1945) However, the Indonesian side denied this statement, according to the Minister of Information on November 7, 1945, stating:

- a. Tidak benar bahwa toedoehan Inggeris bahwa yang memboenoeh Brigadir Mallaby itoe pasti pihak Indonesia. Dari hasil penjelidikan jang teliti, meninggalnja beliau itoe tidak pasti dilakoekan oleh pihak indonesia.
- b. Jang dapat dipastikan sekarang ialah bahwa pada mobil jang dinaiki Brigadir Mallaby itoe telah timboel peledakan dan ini di sebabkan oleh adanya alat ledakan seorang dari Angkatan Laoet jang berdekatan dengan mobil itoe telah mendapat loeka-loeka dan diangkoet ke roemah sakit oleh pemimpinpemimpin kita.
 - [a. It is not true that the British accusation that the one who killed Brigadier Mallaby was definitely the Indonesian side. From the results of a thorough investigation, his death was not necessarily carried out by the Indonesian side.
 - [b. What can be confirmed now is that an explosion occurred in the car that Brigadier Mallaby was riding in, and this was caused by the presence of an explosive device. A Navy man who was near the car was injured and was taken to the hospital by our leaders ("Disekitar Meninggalnya Brigadir Mallaby: Keterangan Menteri Penerangan," 1945)].

According to the British Minister of War Jack Lawson, in parliament he said, "With the death of Brigadier Mallaby, the Indonesian people have lost one of their friends." In addition, the warning from General Chistison who tried hard to bring the two parties closer received full support from the British ("Kematian Mallaby Dibicarakan Dalam Parlemen Inggeris," 1945). After Mallaby's death, Colonel Pugh took over the leadership of the deceased Mallaby. Mallaby's body has not been found, according to further information ("Hingga Sekarang Beloem Ada Tembak-Tembakan," 1945) Dakota planes drop supplies and Allied troops on Surabaya. Mosquito planes arrive in Jakarta to reinforce the air force. On November 8, 1945, Maj. Gen. E.C.Mansergh sent an ultimatum to the people of Surabaya. P.T.Soerjo, the Governor of East Java, was informed that the allied forces were entering the city of Surabaya and other areas in East Java to disarm (Merdeka, 1945).

The ultimatum was reinforced with an order that was more like an insult to the Indonesian people, making it difficult for the Indonesian people, who were aware of their sovereignty and honor, to surrender (1945). On November 9, 1945, at 12.00, when the Muslims were performing Friday prayers, the allied aircraft handed over a letter addressed to the people of Surabaya containing the surrender of the specified weapons and signed a surrender agreement before 6 pm. If they did not hand them over at that time, there would be action from the allies (1945).

On November 10, 1945 at 6 am, British troops continuously fired on the Surabaya area from warships and dropped bombs in the air. This resulted in injuries ("Pemboenoehan Besar-Besaran Atas Pendoedoek Soerabaja Oleh Tentera Serikat (Allied Forces): Kampoeng Tionghoa Dan Arab Hantjoer," 1945). At 09.15 in the morning, after being ordered by the rebel army in Surabaya, the allied forces began to carry out retaliatory attacks. The attack was after the allied troops carried out an attack (1945). On November 11, 1945 at 10:00 2 Mosquito planes, one of which was destroyed, where a British General was in the artillery section, the other was badly damaged. In addition, the losses of British and Indian troops in Surabaya were very large ("2 Pesawat Inggeris Jang Membom Soerabaja Moesnah: Seorang Brigadier Djenderal Inggeis Doega Djoega Mati," 1945). Additionally, the condition of the city of Surabaya and its surroundings was severely damaged. The British continued to attack from land, sea and air, various types of war equipment were used ("Kekedjaman Inggeis Jang Membom Soerabaja Memoesnakan Perikemanoesiaan," 1945).

Resolution of Jihad on 10 November 1945

The NU position on the serious dissolution of the Allied presence, as reflected in the content of jihad and Muslim resistance as part of its realization, I found strange at first. Greg Fealy did not understand the process of selecting the legal position (*istibathul hukm*) of the NU model, so he saw this as a more dramatic change. NU, which previously seemed moderate and sympathetic to the existence of the Dutch and Japanese governments, now seemed wild and radical. The basis of NU's thinking was the decision of the NU Banjarmasin Congress in 1936 that the congress declared Indonesia as Dar al-Islam when it was still under the rule of the Dutch East Indies. This is in accordance with the political thinking of *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'ah*.

1. The Beginning of the Jihad Resolution Fatwa

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The emergence of the jihad fatwa in 1936 when the NU Congress in Banjarmasin stated that Dutch Indonesia was *darul salam* (peace zone), although under the Dutch East Indies government, and not *darul harb* (war zone). The previous Dutch and Japanese governments, although not Islamic, were obeyed because they had power, including *bi al-syawkah* (legitimate military) power, and both had orderly governments and relatively no interference in religious affairs (Sa'adah et al., 2023). However, by the time independence was declared in a process believed by NU scholars to be consistent with Islamic law, NU's position had changed. The fatwa was then followed by NU issuing a decree to the Republic government to take appropriate action (Abdul Latif Bustami dan Tim Sejarawan Tebuireng, 2015). The demands are stated in the Nahdlatul Ulama Resolution, which contains the following decisions:

- a. Urge the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to take a sincere and fair attitude and policy, efforts to advance independence and religion and endanger the State of Indonesia, especially the Dutch and their accomplices.
- b. Ordered me to continue the struggle of "Sabiillah" for the establishment of an independent Republic of Indonesia and the Islamic religion. The text is entitled Demands of Nahdla Ulama to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia for Action, hereinafter referred to as the Jihad Resolution, October 22, 1945, exactly 18 days before November 10, 1945.

This is the opinion of Nawawi al-Bantani who stated that a country that was once ruled by Muslims, even though it is no longer under Islamic rule, is an Islamic country (Abdul Latif Bustami dan Tim Sejarawan Tebuireng, 2015). Furthermore, according to NU, since the proclamation of independence, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has become a government based on Islamic law and therefore there is no doubt that the Indonesian state is an Islamic state. Therefore, according to Islamic teachings, the effort for independence is an effort to resist. This is where the religious idiom of "jihad fi sabillah" against the return of possessive power finds its conceptual relevance. This is in accordance with the word of Allah:

"Permission (to fight) is given to those who are being fought because they have been wronged. And verily, Allah is Able to help them," (QS. Al-Hajj 22: Ayat 39)

In addition, according to the opinion of al-Anshari in the book Fath al-Wahhab: "furdlu 'ain is an obligation that must be carried out by every Muslim, namely when the enemy has invaded the land of Islam". As for those who die in jihad, Allah's command is to die in the way of Allah and they die as martyrs. In addition, the jihad fatwa issued by Hadhratus Yaikh is based on the thinking style of a faqih who reflects his mastery of the method of istinbath law, as well as his mastery of the historical context in which the resulting legal formulation is applied. by looking at the historical context (Abdul Latif Bustami dan Tim Sejarawan Tebuireng, 2015).

Because the term jihad resolution emerged after Indonesian independence, August 17, 1945, which originated from the fatwa of K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, which was then confirmed in a meeting of NU scholars throughout Java and Madura in Bubutan Surabaya, on October 22, 1945 (Makinudin, 2018). So this Jihad

resolution is based on the Islamic religious argument that requires every Muslim to defend the homeland and maintain the Independence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The jihad resolution that was proclaimed immediately spread widely to the community. This jihad resolution also ignited the spirit of the arekarek Surabaya to fight the Dutch who were piggybacking on the allies (Ahmad, 2022).

The fatwa of KH. Hasyim proves that all meeting participants, according to Saifudin Zuhri, stated that before the meeting attended by NU consuls throughout Java and Madura on October 22, 1945, the results of the deliberation issued a jihad resolution as an effort in the struggle for independence. The essence of the jihad resolution itself is the obligation for every Muslim citizen to defend independence is *fardu ain* (Fadhli & Hidayat, 2018). The results of the meeting implemented the contents of the fatwa that can only be known in writing, as written in Kedaulatan Rakyat Yogyakarta, October 26, 1945: Nahdlatoel Reulama's Demands against the Government of the Kafir Nation of the Republic of Jambiletinakan At Kedaulatan Rakyat, Yogyakarta, November 20, 1945 entitled "Alim Ulama Decides on the Hoekum of Struggle". The contents of KR News stated that there was a meeting of 30 Kiai led by KH. Fadhil and KH. Amir, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ulama Religious Affairs Section at the Notobradjan Mosque (Abdul Latif Bustami dan Tim Sejarawan Tebuireng, 2015) Approving the fatwa of KH. Hasyim Asy'ari Tebuireng Jombang, which is summarized as follows.:

- a. The law of fighting infidels who hinder our freedom today is *fardu 'ain* for every Muslim, even if it is possible for infidels.
- b. The law is that people who die in the war against NICA are martyred.
- c. The law is that people who break our current unity must be killed in view of this fatwa, so the ulama are always ready to fight with all their might to defend religion and freedom ("Alim Ulama Memutuskan Hoekum Perdjoeangan," 1945).

The fatwa of KH. Hasyim Asy'ari was initially, according to Nurcholis Majid, written in Pegon letters. The fatwa emerged when NU held a meeting in Madiun with the People's Security Agency (August 29, 1945) to become the People's Security Army (October 12, 1946). The fatwa was written on a piece of paper, and usually uses Pegon letters. Meanwhile, Antiq concluded that the fatwa was issued when the NICA troops landed in Jakarta on September 8, 1945-October 22, 1945. The previous Jiliad fatwa issued by Hadratus Syekh Hasyim Asy'ari was delivered at a limited meeting of ulama in Tebuireng. Pesantren on September 14, 1945, after President Soekarno had previously asked for his fatwa regarding the attitude towards the arrival of NICA troops accompanied by the Dutch. The fatwa in Pegon writing has not been found. According to Tebuireng, the fatwa of KH. Hasyim Asy'ari as a long process was issued around August 22, 1945. Unfortunately, KH. Hasyim Asy'ari as the Chairman of Masyumi who often discusses national issues and friends of KH. Wahid Hasyim as members of the PPK will provide national information updates, especially regarding the arrival of new visitors.

2. The influence of the Jihad resolution in the battle of November 10, 1945

The fatwa had a wide influence and its substance was disseminated in an event entitled "Soearo Oemmat Islam" with the subtitle Fie Sabielilah, in the Merdeka daily on October 12, 1945 and on the same day the Merdeka daily published the news NICA persecutes "Oemmat Islam Indonesia Nicanchganiaja". Muslims because KH. Hasyim as the Chairman of Masyumi, an expert on the hadith of Sahih Bukhari, the holder of the 24th sanad, and a teacher with scholars who were labeled subjectively modern while studying in Mecca. The role of KH. Hasyim was able to become an integrator of the strength of the Muslim community which was considered diverse. The fatwa as the center of solidarity of Muslims against NICA who wanted to thwart independence. Hadratus Syaikh as a leading hadith expert in Indonesia issued the fatwa after carrying out two methodological stages, namely Ta'yin al-farid lah (determination of fardhu law) and Tahqiq al-Faridlah (realization of fardhu law).

From an Indonesian perspective, the Jihad Resolution can be seen as a form of contribution and manifestation of NU's political participation and involvement in the struggle in national and state life. The essence of the Jihad Resolution is to require clerics and all NU members and Muslims, together with other people's resistance movements, to oppose the re-entry of colonialism and imperialism in Indonesia. This resolution is a call for holy war to clerics and their followers and Muslims to work together with other Indonesian people's fighters to fight the NICA and Dutch troops who want to take back control of the Republic of Indonesia whose independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945.

The Jihad Resolution had a real impact on regular troops, especially trained non-regular Nahdliyyin troops. NU had Kaikyo Seinen Teishinta (Hizbullah) since December 13, 1944. Hizbullah had Jibakutai (Dare to Die

Front) on December 8, 1944 and *Suishinta* (Pioneer Front) on November 1, 1944. Meanwhile, MIAI Surabaya was led by KH. Thohir Bakri and Anwar Zain. Hizbullah members attended training in Cisarua on February 12-March 14, 1945. Those recruited were: Surabaya (Moestaqin Zain, M. Moehad), Mojokerto (Moeljadi, A. Oosim), Gresik (Rodi As' ad M. Ghozali), Sidoarjo (Moh. Farchan, Djawani), Jombang Sa'doellah, Hasyim Lathif with Japanese trainer *Yanagawa*. The training was welcomed by Zainul Arifin, the Central Leader of Hizbullah and the Young Leader (KH. Wahid Hasyim). The jihad resolution was then widely echoed by Bung Tomo by saying the takbir Allahu Akbar through Radio Pemberontakan and when giving advice to the fighters at the Kiai Blauran Headquarters. Kiai and his envoys continued to flood Surabaya by building a headquarters at KH. Yasin's house in Gang Blauran IV/24 Surabaya, so that it was known as the Kiai Headquarters. The students and Muslims fought with the support of the fatwa of KH. Hasyim Asy'ari (Tebuireng), namely: "For all Muslims, who are mature enough to fight against the enemy who will colonize Indonesia again, the law is fardhu' ain. The next fatwa is that dying on the battlefield in order to fight the enemies of Muslims is martyrdom and people who die like that will go to heaven".

Allahu Akbar became a magical sound with religious meaning and jihad ideology so that brave fighters would not be afraid to die. Dying to defend the truth of religion is a martyrdom with a definite reward of entering heaven, as stated in the Jihad Resolution. Its influence was seen in the attack on enemy tanks by students of the Tebuireng Jombang Islamic Boarding School so that the tank could accuse itself of being destroyed (Abdul Latif Bustami dan Tim Sejarawan Tebuireng, 2015). So that there was resistance from the people against NICA and the spirit of defending and maintaining independence made NU immediately take firm action. Nahdliyyin circles held a meeting on 21-22 October 1945 which was later known as the jihad resolution. The jihad resolution was a response to the importance of maintaining the country and maintaining independence (Juma, 2016). In the Indonesian Muslim Congress held in Yogyakarta on 1-2 Zulhijah 1364 H or 7-8 November 1945 representing all Muslims in Indonesia. The meeting was held in the Balai Mataram building. The meeting received attention from all levels of society ("Rapat Oemoem Oemat Islam Indonesia Di Jogjakarta." 1945). Weigh

- a. That every form of Colonization is an injustice that violates humanity and is forbidden by the Islamic religion.
- b. That in order to eradicate the actions carried out by imperialism against Indonesia, every Muslim is required to fight with his body and soul for his independence and religion.
- c. That in such a situation, the people's energy must be mobilized from all levels in general, among Indonesian Muslims in particular ("60 Juta Kaum Muslimin Indonesia Siap Berdjihad Fi Sabilillah," 1945).

The jihad resolution was not merely intended as a struggle to defend the Islamic religion, but also to defend the sovereignty of the nation and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Armed with the jihad fatwa confirmed in the Jihad Resolution, the fighters refused to back down in rejecting the arrival of the colonialists (Royani, 2018). In addition, the influence of the NU jihad fatwa also had consequences for combat movements in various regions. Its influence was in the resolution of the Indonesian Muslim Congress in Yogyakarta on November 7-8, 1945, where a decision was made to provide a higher resolution to the NU Jihad resolution of October 22, 1945.



Figure 3. 60 Million Indonesian Muslims Ready for Jihad in the Cause of Allah on November 9, 1945 Source: Kedaulatan Rakyat 9 November 9, 1945 Perpusnas RI

The sovereignty of the people became news. "60 Million Indonesian Muslims Ready for Jihad in the Name of Allah" "Barisan Sabilillah" and on November 9, 1945". To implement the decision of the Indonesian Muslim Congress in Yogyakarta on 1-2 Zulhijah 1364 H or November 7-8, 1945 in which it was emphasized that:

- a. Strengthening the preparation of Muslims for jihad fisabilillah.
- b. Strengthening the defense of the Indonesian state with various efforts, it is proposed that a line also be named "Barisan Sabilillah" ("Barisan Sabilillah," 1945).

To strengthen the Islamic Front, on November 13, the Sabilillah Front (Laskar) was also established at a congress held in Djokja." Source: Harian Merdeka, November 13, 1945. The Islamic Congress also decided to establish Masyumi. As a political party, the results of the congress showed the importance of the NU Jihad resolution, and the resolution reaffirmed that Hadra Tusyaikh, as Rais Syuriyan, had Fatwa authority in the Islamic Federation. Furthermore, it needs to be reaffirmed in a wider forum, namely at the 16th NU Congress in Purwokerto on March 26-29, 1946, Poetoesan Mu'tamar NU ke-16, 1946. NU Congress in Purwokerto March 26-29, 1946. The Congress issued a jihad resolution issued on October 22, 1945 with:

"Beperang menolak dan melawan pendjadjah itoe fardoe'ain jang haroes dikerjakan oleh tiap-tiap orang Islam laki-laki, perenpoean, anak-anak, persendjata ataoe tidak bagi orang jang berada dalam djarak lingkaran 94 Km dari tempat masoek dan kedoedoekan moesoeh. Bagi orang jang berada di loear djarak lingkaran tadi, kewadjiban itoe djadi fardhoe kifajah jang tjoekoep kalau dikerdjakan oleh sebagian sadja Apabila kekoeatan dalam nomer 1 beloem dapat mengalahkan moesoeh, maka orang2 jang berada di loear djarak lingkaran 94 Km wadjib berperang djuga membantoe no 1 sehingga moesoeh kalah; Kaki tangan moeseoh adalah pemetinh keboelatan tekad dan kehendak rakjat dan haroest diloeroeskan menoeroet hoekoem Islam sabda hadist Riwajat Moeslim"

[Fighting to reject and fight against the invaders is fardoe'ain which must be done by every Muslim man, woman, child, armed or not for those who are within a circle of 94 km from the place of entry and position of the enemy. For those who are outside the circle, the obligation becomes fardhu kifajah which is sufficient if done by only some. If the power in number 1 has not been able to defeat the enemy, then the people who are outside the circle of 94 km are obliged to fight and help number 1 so that the enemy is defeated; The enemy's henchmen are the most important thing in the determination and will of the people and must be straightened out according to Islamic law, the hadith narrated by Muslims]

The decision of the Bahthul Masail al-Siyasah of the 16th NU Congress in Purwokerto, held on March 26-29, 1946. The fact of the fierce resistance of the santri troops led by kyai in Laskar Sabilillah and Hisbullah was seen when a battalion of NICA soldiers entered Malang City through Lawang City and was blocked by Laskar Sabilillah in Singosari. Due to the unbalanced weaponry, the defense of Laskar Sabilillah in Singosari fell with very many casualties (Sunyoto, 2017). The incident of the fall of Laskar Sabilillah's defense in Singosari was reported to Kyai Hasyim Asy'ari, who shocked him and died suddenly on 7 Ramadhan 1366 H/ 25 July 1947.

3. The role of Muslims in the Jihad Resolution in the battle of November 10, 1945

KH. Hasyim Asy'ari (Tebuireng) issued a fatwa to return to colonial power and recognize the power of the newly independent NKRI in accordance with Islamic law. The historical perspective on the role of Islamic boarding schools reveals that these institutions have contributed to the struggle for preservation, justice, truth, and warnings against nahy munkar since their founding. Departing from the institutional experience of the Islamic boarding school that he led for a long time, the Ulama only had the meaning that his opponent was the Western imperialists, namely the Dutch Empire and the Dutch colonial government. Because the Ulama were not trained to develop an attitude of prejudice against their opponents from the leaders of their own political parties.

In addition, the spirit of the youth to fight against all the cruelty of the colonizers cannot be underestimated, from outside the city of Surabaya, assistance continues to arrive. Not only from the youth but also from the ulama and Kiayi circles ("Pemboenoehan Di Soerabaja Berdjalan Teroes Dengan Kedjam! Semangat Rakjat Tetap Menjala-Njala," 1945). Apart from NU circles, Muhammadiyah circles also played a role in the battle. This can be seen in the newspaper Kedaulatan Rakyat published on November 13, 1945, entitled Shalat Hajat Oentoek Mendo'a Kemenangan Teroetama di Soerabaja. In the first and second paragraphs, the people of Yogyakarta are called upon.



Figure 4: Apart from NU, Muhammadiah also played a role in the Battle of Surabaya. Source: Kedaulatan Rakyat 13 November1945 Perpusnas RI

Shalat Hadjat Oentoek Mendo'a Kemenangan Teroetama di Soerabaja

Dengan hormat dan sangat, dipersilahkan seluruh oemat Islam di Jogyakarta mengerjakan sholat hajat di masjid di langgar-langar dan mushola-mushola untuk berdoa kepada allah yang maha kuasa, bagi kemenagan kita terutama di Soerabaja yang kini sedang bertempur.

Seloeroeh gerombolan Moehamadiah, ranting masjumi dan pegawai masjid selengarakanlah hal ini dengan secepatnya dan kerdjakanlah sesoedah berjamaah isja. Hendaklah jang tertoea menjadi imam Perhatikanlah wahai kaoem moeslim seluruhnia. djangan ketinggalan.

[Hajat Prayer to Pray for Victory Especially in Surabaya

With respect and utmost respect, all Muslims in Yogyakarta are invited to perform the hajat prayer in mosques, prayer rooms and prayer rooms to pray to Allah the Almighty, for our victory, especially in Surabaya which is currently at war.

The entire Muhammadiyah group, the masjumi branch and mosque employees, organize this as quickly as possible and do it after the evening congregation. Let the oldest be a priest. Pay attention, all you Muslims. Don't miss it ("Shalat Hajat Oentoek Mendo'a Kemenangan Teroetama Di Soerabaja," 1945).]

Apart from that, to fight the injustice and wrongdoing carried out by NICA, forcing Muslims to act according to religious orders must be fought tooth and nail. To uphold the state and the Islamic religion. Therefore, this congress adopted the decision "To fight fisabilillah against colonialism" ("Rapat Oemoem Oemat Islam Indonesia," 1945).



Figure 5: Prayers that continue to flow from Padang Arafah
Source: Oemat Islam Seloeroeh Doenia Dipadang Arafat Mendo'akan Djihad Moeslimin Indoenesia,"
November 13, 1945 Perpusnas RI

In addition, hopes and prayers continue to flow from Indonesian Muslims who go on the hajj. They also sent radiograms of the Indonesian Islamic conference to King ibn Saud, Abd Rahman Bay, Mr. M. Ali Jinnah and the Indian Congress Party ("Oemat Islam Seloeroeh Doenia Dipadang Arafat Mendo'akan Djihad Moeslimin

Indoenesia," 1945). On the other hand, there were 400 Indian Muslim soldiers who refused to be sent to Surabaya. They did not want to fight with fellow Muslim brothers ("400 Orang Serdadoe India Islam Tidak Maoe Berangkat Ke Surabaja," 1945).

CONCLUSION

The events of November 10, 1945 in Surabaya not only recorded the physical courage of the fighters in defending independence, but also showed the important role of religion, especially Islam, as a driving force for the spirit of resistance. Jihad fatwas, such as those issued by KH. Hasyim Asy'ari, as published in the Kedaulatan Rakyat Newspaper, is proof that the struggle to defend independence is not just an armed struggle, but also a sacred calling to defend the homeland from colonialism. The presence of jihad fatwas shows how spiritual power is the main fuel that drives the people to unite in facing a greater military force.

This study emphasizes that the resistance of the people of Surabaya on November 10, 1945 was not only born from the urge of nationalism, but was also inspired by a religious spirit that saw jihad as a sacred obligation in defending the country. Jihad fatwas became an important milestone in the history of the Indonesian people's struggle, because they showed the role of the ulama in framing resistance as part of worship. Thus, the events of November 10 became not only a symbol of physical resistance, but also a symbol of spiritual awakening that strengthened the people's determination to seize and defend independence.

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