

Party Institutionalization and Electoral Failure: The Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) in the 2024 Elections

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ABSTRACT

Political party institutionalization is crucial to organizational stability, autonomy, and electoral competitiveness. In Indonesia, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) failed to enter the national parliament in the 2024 election despite substantial public visibility and an explicit appeal to young voters. Existing discussions have paid limited attention to how uneven institutionalization helps explain this outcome. This study examines PSI's electoral failure through systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion, and reification. Using a qualitative case-study approach, it draws on official electoral documents, media reports of party statements and campaign messages, and relevant academic literature. The findings indicate uneven institutionalization: available evidence points to inconsistent application of internal procedures and limited strategic autonomy, especially in presidential-coalition positioning. PSI also relied heavily on Joko Widodo's political image, but exit-poll evidence indicates that this association did not substantially improve its electoral performance. In contrast, PSI maintained recognizable anti-corruption, anti-intolerance, youth-oriented, and 'joyful politics' themes. The study shows that visibility and personalistic branding cannot substitute for organizational consolidation, implying that emerging parties require stronger procedures, autonomy, and institutional identity to build sustainable electoral competitiveness.

Keywords

Party institutionalization; electoral performance; Indonesian Solidarity Party; party autonomy; political personalism

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INTRODUCTION

The 2024 Indonesian legislative election exposed a familiar but important problem in Indonesia's party politics: electoral participation and public visibility do not necessarily produce parliamentary representation. In its final threshold decision, the General Elections Commission (KPU) identified the parties that met and did not meet the national parliamentary threshold, and its subsequent seat-allocation decision assigned DPR seats to the qualifying parties. PSI did not meet the threshold and therefore obtained no DPR seats for the 2024–2029 period (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2024a, 2024b). The outcome shows that a party may be visible, active, and politically connected while still failing to secure national parliamentary representation.

PSI is a particularly interesting case because its failure was not a case of complete political obscurity. Kaesang Pangarep, the youngest son of President Joko Widodo, formally joined PSI on 23 September 2023 and was appointed chairman on 25 September 2023 (Detiknews 2023b). The unusually rapid leadership change became part of a wider public debate about Kaesang's political capital and the significance of his family connection to Jokowi (Subekti, Putra, and Pasaribu 2024). Under Kaesang, PSI continued to associate its identity with Jokowi, including through the language of 'Jokowisme' (Ramadhan and Ihsanuddin 2024). PSI also declared support for Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka in the 2024 presidential election (Detiknews 2023a). Together, these developments gave PSI substantial national visibility and linked its electoral strategy to a prominent presidential family and the eventually winning presidential ticket.

These factors made PSI analytically different from a party whose principal problem was simply lack of national attention. PSI had a young and highly visible chairman, proximity to the incumbent president's family, and association with the Prabowo–Gibran ticket. Yet KPU's final threshold and seat-allocation decisions show that PSI still failed to qualify for DPR representation (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2024a, 2024b). The central puzzle, therefore, is why these forms of visibility and elite connection did not translate into sufficient electoral support.

This puzzle points to a wider issue in the study of Indonesian political parties. Electoral performance can be examined through campaign strategy, coalition position, public image, leadership appeal, and elite endorsement, but party institutionalization adds an organizational perspective. Earlier research on PSI Bandung found that systemness remained far from ideal because agreed rules, procedures, and mechanisms were not fully translated into organizational management, while value infusion was comparatively more consistent (Suryana, Ardiansyah, and Manan 2020). A separate study of Kaesang's rapid rise to the PSI chairmanship examined the political capital surrounding his appointment and the public response to it (Subekti, Putra, and Pasaribu 2024). Taken together, these studies make PSI a useful case for examining how organizational institutionalization interacts with personal visibility and electoral performance.

The literature on party institutionalization provides the main conceptual foundation for this analysis. Randall and Svåsand (2002) distinguish dimensions of party institutionalization that include internal and external aspects of organizational consolidation. Comparative research has applied related approaches in different settings. Perepechko, ZumBrunnen, and Kolosov (2011) examine how organizational characteristics such as legitimation, penetration, charisma, ideology, and centralization relate to party institutionalization and electoral outcomes in Russia. Croissant and Völkel (2012) compare levels of party-system institutionalization in young democracies in East and Southeast Asia. Kalua (2011) applies the dimensions of systemness, autonomy, value infusion, and reification to parties in Malawi. Zollner (2021) uses the transformation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia's al-Nahda into political parties to reflect on party-institutionalization theory. Recent Indonesian research has also applied an institutionalization perspective to explain the United Development Party's failure to pass the parliamentary threshold in the 2024 election (Subekti et al. 2025).

These studies clarify why organizational development matters, but the relationship between high political visibility and weak electoral performance remains important to investigate empirically. Research on personalism provides an additional lens. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright (2017) describe the broader rise of personalized politics, while

Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, Nietzsche, and Wright (2021) document increasing personalism in democracies. Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, Li, and Wright (2022) conceptualize personalist parties as vehicles that advance leaders' political careers and give leaders greater control relative to other senior party elites. This literature motivates a distinction between personal visibility and party institutionalization; it does not, by itself, establish the mechanism operating in PSI.

This study addresses that gap by asking: how did weak party institutionalization contribute to PSI's failure to qualify for the Indonesian House of Representatives in the 2024 election? More specifically, it examines why PSI's association with Jokowi, Kaesang Pangarep's leadership, and the party's position within the Prabowo–Gibran coalition did not generate enough votes to pass the parliamentary threshold.

The main argument of this article is that PSI's failure reflects the limits of personalistic and elite-centred electoral strategies when they are not supported by strong party institutionalization. PSI succeeded in gaining attention, but attention is not the same as institutional strength. Its political visibility was not matched by sufficient organizational rootedness, ideological consolidation, territorial penetration, cadre development, or durable voter linkage. As a result, PSI could appear prominent in the national political conversation while remaining electorally fragile.

The article makes three contributions. First, it connects party institutionalization more directly to electoral failure, rather than treating it only as a general feature of party development. Second, it adds to the study of Indonesian parties by showing that elite endorsement, dynastic association, and coalition access do not automatically produce electoral success. Third, it contributes to wider debates on democratic competition by showing how personalism can generate short-term visibility without building long-term party consolidation. In this sense, PSI's failure is not only about one party's inability to enter parliament. It also reveals a deeper organizational weakness in Indonesian party politics, where parties may look politically strong on the surface while remaining institutionally shallow underneath.

METHODS

This research uses a qualitative method with a case-study approach. The case examined in this study is the Indonesian Solidarity Party, or Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI), and its failure to qualify for parliamentary representation in the 2024 Indonesian legislative election. PSI is selected because it represents an analytically important case: although the party gained considerable public visibility, was associated with President Joko Widodo's political network, and joined the coalition supporting the winning presidential ticket, it still failed to pass the parliamentary threshold. For this reason, PSI is treated not merely as a single-party case, but as a lens through which to examine the broader relationship between party institutionalization, personalistic mobilization, and electoral failure in Indonesian democracy.

The study relies on documentary research as its main data-collection technique. The empirical materials consist of official electoral documents and media reports that reproduce or describe party statements, internal-rule disputes, campaign messages, coalition positioning, and post-election evaluations, supplemented by relevant academic literature. Official electoral evidence is taken from KPU's 2024 decisions on the national parliamentary threshold and DPR seat allocation (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2024a, 2024b). Media materials are drawn from established national outlets where the relevant statements or events can be attributed to named actors or organizations. For event-related documentary material, the collection window covers January 2023 through the KPU's final threshold and seat-allocation determinations on 25 August 2024; academic literature is not restricted to that period.

The analysis is guided by Randall and Svåsand's (2002) theory of political party institutionalization. This framework examines party institutionalization through four indicators: systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion, and reification. Systemness refers to the degree of organizational regularity, internal structure, and procedural stability within the party. Decisional autonomy concerns the extent to which the party is able to make decisions independently rather than being dominated by external actors or personal networks. Value infusion refers to the degree

to which members and supporters attach meaning, loyalty, and commitment to the party beyond short-term electoral interests. Reification refers to the extent to which the party is recognized by voters and political actors as a stable and meaningful political institution.

The data are analysed through several stages. First, relevant documents and media reports are collected based on their connection to PSI's organizational development, leadership change, coalition strategy, campaign positioning, public image, and electoral performance. Second, the data are selected and classified according to the four indicators of party institutionalization. Third, each indicator is examined to identify how PSI's organizational condition shaped its capacity to convert political visibility into electoral support. Fourth, the findings are interpreted in relation to the wider debate on party institutionalization and personalistic politics. Finally, conclusions are drawn by linking PSI's electoral failure to the broader problem of weak party organization in Indonesian democratic competition.

RESULTS

This section analyzes PSI's failure in the 2024 legislative election through four dimensions of party institutionalization: systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification. The findings show that PSI's electoral failure was not simply the result of limited publicity or weak campaign visibility. Rather, the party's inability to pass the parliamentary threshold reflected deeper problems of institutionalization. PSI gained national attention, especially after Kaesang Pangarep became party chairman and the party aligned itself with Jokowi's political legacy. However, this visibility was not supported by sufficient organizational stability, internal autonomy, durable value attachment, or public recognition as a consolidated party.

Systemness: Weak Rules, Leadership Shortcuts, and Internal Instability

Systemness refers to the extent to which a party has stable organizational rules, predictable internal procedures, and institutionalized mechanisms

for leadership and decision-making. In PSI's case, a central indicator of possible weakness was the speed of Kaesang Pangarep's rise to the chairmanship. Kaesang formally became a PSI cadre on 23 September 2023 and was appointed chairman at the party's Kopdarnas on 25 September 2023 (Detiknews 2023b). This rapid transition generated immediate attention and raised questions about how established party procedures and cadre-development mechanisms operated in leadership recruitment.

The concern was not only the speed of the appointment. Contemporary reports reproduced or described provisions of PSI's Articles of Association and Bylaws (AD/ART) governing central leadership, cadre status, and party deliberation, and argued that Kaesang's appointment was difficult to reconcile with those provisions because he had only just joined the party (Betalia 2023; Suryana 2023). PSI representatives disputed the allegation that the appointment violated party rules and defended the Kopdarnas process (Suryana 2023). The documentary evidence therefore supports a narrower conclusion: the appointment generated a substantive public dispute over the binding force and interpretation of PSI's own internal procedures. In Randall and Svåsand's framework, such a dispute is relevant to systemness, but the available sources do not independently establish every internal step in PSI's decision-making process.

The leadership change also occurred against a background of cadre turnover and internal criticism. By September 2023, reporting documented departures by a number of PSI figures and criticism from former members concerning the party's direction and organizational culture (Dhirmanto 2023). These reports substantiate the presence of internal contention, but they do not by themselves demonstrate that cadre exits caused PSI's national vote share. They are used here as evidence of organizational strain relevant to the systemness dimension.

Taken together, the leadership shortcut and the dispute over internal procedures are consistent with weak or uneven systemness. A strongly institutionalized party should be able to manage leadership succession and strategic change through procedures whose authority is broadly recognizable. In PSI's case, the documentary record instead shows that Kaesang's rapid appointment became a controversy about the application

of party rules. This study therefore treats the episode as evidence of institutional fragility rather than as proof that the leadership change, by itself, caused the 2024 electoral result.

Value Infusion: Clear Branding without Deep Voter Attachment

Value infusion refers to the extent to which a party's members, cadres, and supporters attach meaning and loyalty to the party beyond short-term electoral incentives. PSI has repeatedly presented anti-corruption and anti-intolerance as core values. Before the 2024 election, then-chairman Giring Ganesha described anti-corruption and anti-intolerance as a 'way of life' for PSI cadres (Safitri and Rahmawati 2023). After the election, PSI again emphasized anti-corruption and tolerance in training for its elected provincial and district/city legislators (Budi 2024). The recurrence of these themes indicates continuity in the party's stated value identity, although public statements alone cannot establish how deeply those values are internalized by all members or voters.

The party's youth-oriented identity and a lighter style of political communication also remained visible. Under Kaesang's leadership, PSI promoted 'santuy' and joyful politics and explicitly linked this style to engaging younger citizens. In a December 2023 event with young people, Kaesang described his effort to change PSI's style toward 'politik santuy' (Purbaya 2023). This messaging was consistent with PSI's broader attempt to present itself as an accessible political vehicle for younger voters, but messaging should be distinguished from evidence of durable voter attachment.

Existing research makes that distinction especially important. Suryana, Ardiansyah, and Manan (2020) found that PSI Bandung's value infusion was relatively consistent even while its systemness remained weak. Thus, the 2024 outcome should not be used to retroactively claim that PSI lacked identifiable values. Rather, KPU's result shows that recognizable values and branding were insufficient to carry PSI across the national parliamentary threshold (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2024a). This study therefore interprets value infusion as a comparatively stronger

dimension of PSI's institutionalization, while remaining cautious about inferring voter loyalty from party messaging alone.

The more difficult question concerns the relationship between those values and PSI's increasingly personalized electoral presentation. The party continued to use reformist and youth-oriented language, while some of its most visible political signals centered on Kaesang, Jokowi, and coalition positioning. This tension does not prove that PSI's values were abandoned. It does, however, raise an institutionalization question about whether the party's public identity was anchored primarily in durable organizational meanings or increasingly in prominent political personalities.

PSI therefore displayed identifiable and repeatedly articulated values, but the available documentary evidence cannot directly measure how deeply those values were internalized among cadres or voters. The safer conclusion is that value infusion was more visible and consistent than some other dimensions of institutionalization, yet it was not sufficient to secure national parliamentary representation. This distinction is important because value consistency and electoral success are related but not identical outcomes.

Decisional Autonomy: Dependence on External Political Authority

Decisional autonomy refers to a party's capacity to make strategic decisions without domination by external actors or personal networks. PSI's presidential-election positioning provides a relevant case. The party had earlier supported Ganjar Pranowo, but under Kaesang it formally declared support for Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka in October 2023 (Detiknews 2023a). The change itself does not establish weak autonomy; the key issue is how PSI publicly described the relationship between its choice and Jokowi's political preferences.

PSI leaders repeatedly framed presidential positioning in relation to Jokowi. In August 2023, Grace Natalie said PSI was waiting for Jokowi's direction and would support a candidate trusted by him to continue his development agenda; in the same interview, however, she explicitly rejected the claim that PSI lacked independence and pointed to the party's

Kopdarnas mechanism (Amin 2023). Contemporary reporting also quoted Grace as saying that PSI was ready to move in accordance with Jokowi's direction, while an outside observer interpreted the party's orientation toward Prabowo through its loyalty to Jokowi (Liputan6.com 2023). These sources support the existence of a public dependence-versus-autonomy tension. They do not prove direct external control over PSI's final decision.

Within Randall and Svåsand's framework, that tension is relevant because decisional autonomy concerns whether a party's strategic choices are institutionally its own. PSI's repeated public references to Jokowi made the autonomy of its presidential positioning open to question, even as party leaders defended their internal decision-making procedures. The evidence therefore supports describing PSI's autonomy as contested or limited in public presentation, rather than asserting as fact that Jokowi dictated the party's decisions.

This study interprets the autonomy problem as one possible institutional mechanism behind PSI's electoral fragility. Close identification with Jokowi could increase visibility, but it could also make the party appear derivative rather than organizationally distinct. The documentary data cannot isolate the independent causal effect of this perception on voting behavior. The stronger conclusion is that PSI's strategic positioning blurred the boundary between an autonomous party identity and alignment with an external political figure, a pattern directly relevant to the institutionalization framework.

Reification: Public Visibility without Institutional Recognition

Reification refers to the extent to which a party is recognized by the public as a stable, meaningful, and enduring political institution. Before and after the 2024 election, PSI's public image was strongly associated with Jokowi and Kaesang. Kaesang's rapid rise to the chairmanship made presidential-family political capital central to public discussion of the party (Subekti, Putra, and Pasaribu 2024), while PSI figures continued to describe 'Jokowisme' as part of the party's identity even after Jokowi's presidency (Ramadhan and Ihsanuddin 2024). These sources substantiate the strength

of the personalized association, although they do not by themselves measure reification among voters.

The strongest evidence that this association did not translate proportionally into PSI votes comes from SMRC's post-election exit poll, as reported by Antara. Among voters who said they were satisfied with Jokowi's performance, only 3 percent chose PSI, and SMRC concluded that identification with Jokowi had not significantly boosted PSI's electoral support (Mulya 2024). This finding directly supports the article's narrower claim: Jokowi's positive image was not automatically convertible into votes for PSI.

The reification evidence should therefore be interpreted cautiously. The sources establish that PSI achieved substantial recognition through Kaesang and Jokowi and that this association did not yield a commensurate electoral payoff (Subekti, Putra, and Pasaribu 2024; Mulya 2024). They do not provide a direct, nationwide measure of PSI's territorial penetration, grassroots organizational density, or repeated voter contact. Accordingly, the article treats the gap between personalized visibility and parliamentary failure as evidence consistent with incomplete reification, while leaving the strength of local organization for future field-based research.

The reification problem, then, was not an absence of public image. PSI had a highly visible image, but much of that visibility was personalized around Jokowi and Kaesang. The available evidence supports distinguishing recognition of prominent personalities associated with PSI from recognition of PSI as an independently consolidated party institution. That distinction is central to the argument: public familiarity can coexist with weak institutionalization.

Taken together, the four dimensions point to uneven rather than uniformly absent institutionalization. The evidence is strongest for contested systemness, a public tension around decisional autonomy, recognizable but electorally insufficient value infusion, and personalized visibility that did not translate into DPR representation. These patterns are consistent with the argument that PSI's electoral failure cannot be understood through visibility alone. Because the study relies on documentary evidence rather

than interviews or individual-level voter data, however, the findings should be read as a structured institutional explanation rather than a definitive causal decomposition of PSI's vote share.

DISCUSSION

The PSI case contributes to the literature on party institutionalization by showing how a party can be highly visible but weakly institutionalized. Existing studies have emphasized that institutionalized parties require stable rules, organizational depth, value attachment, autonomy, and public recognition (Randall and Svåsand 2002). The findings from PSI support this theoretical view, but they also refine it. PSI's failure shows that weak institutionalization does not always appear as organizational absence. It can also appear as organizational substitution: formal party development is replaced by personal branding, coalition access, elite endorsement, and symbolic association with a popular leader.

The findings speak to comparative studies of party institutionalization. Perepechko, ZumBrunnen, and Kolossov (2011) show that organizational features such as legitimation, penetration, charisma, ideology, and centralization are relevant to party institutionalization and electoral outcomes in Russia. Croissant and Völkel (2012) document substantial variation in party-system institutionalization across young democracies in East and Southeast Asia. Kalua (2011) applies systemness, autonomy, value infusion, and reification to party institutionalization in Malawi. Zollner (2021) uses movement-to-party transformations in Egypt and Tunisia to reflect on institutionalization theory. Recent Indonesian work similarly links weak party institutionalization to PPP's failure to cross the 2024 parliamentary threshold (Subekti et al. 2025). The PSI case extends this discussion by emphasizing that national visibility and elite association should not be treated as substitutes for institutional consolidation.

The theoretical payoff is that party institutionalization should be distinguished from party visibility. In contemporary democratic competition, parties can quickly gain attention through celebrity leaders, social media branding, dynastic figures, coalition alliances, and association with popular executives. These resources may help a party appear politically relevant.

However, they do not necessarily generate internal stability, autonomous decision-making, ideological loyalty, or voter attachment. PSI's experience illustrates this distinction clearly. Kaesang's chairmanship increased media attention, Jokowi's gave the party symbolic branding, and support for Prabowo-Gibran placed PSI within the winning presidential coalition. Yet these resources were not enough to overcome weak organizational roots.

The case also connects to debates on personalism in democratic politics. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright (2017) identify a wider rise of personalized politics, Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, Nietzsche, and Wright (2021) document increasing personalism in democracies, and Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, Li, and Wright (2022) define personalist ruling parties in terms of leaders' control and the use of parties as vehicles for personal political careers. PSI is not equivalent to the ruling-party cases analyzed in that literature, so the comparison must remain limited. The relevance lies in the analytical warning that party visibility centered on individuals should not be conflated with organizational institutionalization. In PSI's case, Kaesang and Jokowi increased the salience of personal political associations without ensuring parliamentary representation.

Alternative explanations for PSI's failure should also be considered. The parliamentary threshold itself created a demanding institutional barrier, but it cannot on its own explain variation among parties because the same rule applied to all national contestants (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2024a). Another possibility is timing: Kaesang assumed the chairmanship only months before the election, leaving limited time for any leadership change to affect organization and campaigning (Detiknews 2023b). These explanations are compatible with, but do not prove, the institutionalization argument. Comparative research across parties would be required to isolate their relative importance.

A further explanation concerns PSI's concentration on younger voters. A youth-oriented target is not inherently an institutional weakness, and this study does not have individual-level data showing that such targeting caused PSI's failure. The relevant institutional question is whether a recognizable target constituency became a durable and sufficiently large electoral base. KPU's final result shows that it did not translate into enough

national votes to cross the threshold (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2024a), but the mechanisms behind that outcome require voter-level research.

Coalition competition is another plausible explanation. PSI supported the Prabowo–Gibran ticket alongside other parties in the winning coalition (Detiknews 2023a). Association with a successful presidential ticket therefore did not guarantee a corresponding legislative vote for PSI. This observation is consistent with the article's central distinction between access to high-profile political alliances and the independent institutional capacity of a party to secure votes for itself.

The PSI case therefore suggests a broader pattern in Indonesian democracy. Political parties increasingly operate in an environment where personal figures, dynastic connections, presidential approval, and coalition pragmatism are important electoral resources. Yet these resources are unevenly distributed and often captured more effectively by older, better-institutionalized parties. For newer parties such as PSI, personalistic strategies may provide visibility but not necessarily organizational depth. The result is a form of electoral fragility: the party becomes visible enough to be discussed nationally, but not rooted enough to survive electorally.

At the same time, the limits of this study should be acknowledged. This article is based on a single case and relies primarily on documentary sources, media reports, party statements, and secondary literature. These sources are useful for tracing public narratives, organizational decisions, and electoral strategies, but they cannot fully capture internal deliberations, voter motivations, or grassroots organizational dynamics. Future research should therefore examine PSI through interviews with party elites, local cadres, campaign teams, voters, and former members. Comparative work with other non-parliamentary parties would also help determine whether PSI's failure reflects a party-specific weakness or a wider pattern among small Indonesian parties.

Despite these limits, PSI remains a theoretically useful case. Its failure shows that electoral politics in Indonesia cannot be understood only by looking at campaign visibility, elite endorsement, or coalition alignment. The more important question is whether parties can institutionalize those resources into stable organization, autonomous decision-making,

coherent values, and durable voter recognition. PSI was visible, but it was not sufficiently institutionalized. That gap between visibility and institutionalization is the central explanation for its failure to enter parliament in 2024.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that PSI's failure to qualify for parliament in the 2024 election coincided with important weaknesses and tensions in its institutionalization. In terms of systemness, Kaesang Pangarep's rapid rise from new cadre to chairman generated a documented dispute over the application and interpretation of PSI's internal rules. In terms of decisional autonomy, PSI repeatedly framed its presidential positioning in relation to Jokowi while simultaneously defending the existence of internal party mechanisms, making autonomy contested rather than simply absent. In terms of reification, PSI's public image became strongly personalized around Jokowi and Kaesang, yet exit-poll evidence indicates that Jokowi identification did not significantly lift PSI's vote. Value infusion appears comparatively stronger: anti-corruption, anti-intolerance, youth-oriented, and joyful-politics themes were repeatedly articulated. The overall pattern is therefore one of uneven institutionalization. PSI achieved visibility and recognizable branding, but these assets did not translate into the votes required for DPR representation.

The wider implication is that personal visibility, family association, coalition access, and presidential popularity should not be treated as functional equivalents of party institutionalization. PSI's case suggests that such resources may generate attention without guaranteeing stable internal procedures, an autonomous organizational identity, or parliamentary success. At the same time, the documentary design limits causal inference: the study cannot determine the independent effect of each institutional dimension on individual voting decisions. Future research should compare PSI with other non-parliamentary parties, examine local organization and candidate networks directly, and use interviews and voter-level data to test the mechanisms proposed here.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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