Framing the Imam: Tempo Magazine and the Discursive Construction of the Cicendo Police Post Attack, 1980-1982

Moch. Salman Alfarizy[1]*, Samsudin[2], Fathia Lestari[3]

[123]Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University Bandung

*Correspondence: mochsalman.spi@uinsgd.ac.id

Received: March 20, 2024; Accepted: April 30, 2024; Published Online: June 15, 2024;

Abstract

On the night of 11 March 1981, fourteen members of a small millenarian congregation led by Imran bin Muhammad Zein stormed the Cicendo sectoral police post (Kosekta 8606) in Bandung, killed three officers, and made off with firearms later used in the hijacking of Garuda flight "Woyla." The affair became one of the New Order's earliest and most closely watched confrontations between an authoritarian security state and a self-styled Islamic congregation demanding a *bai'at*, or oath of allegiance, to its "Imam." This article examines how *Tempo* magazine, then Indonesia's flagship organ of independent "watchdog journalism," narrated the Cicendo attack across nine articles published between August 1980 and April 1982, a period marked by press licensing controls and mounting pressure to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation (asas tunggal) of political and religious organisations. Employing the historical method of heuristics, external and internal source criticism, and Critical Discourse Analysis (following Wodak and Meyer), the study reconstructs *Tempo*'s coverage against corroborating reportage in *Berita Yudha* and *Panji Masyarakat* and situates it within the broader historiography of Jamaah Imam Imran. Where earlier studies -- Anjar Any's contemporaneous compilation (1982) and Hanan Nurlatifah's reconstruction of the group's biography (2015) -- treat the press chiefly as a repository of facts, this article argues that *Tempo*'s own narrative choices actively produced the meaning of the Cicendo affair. Through a discourse of humanised ambivalence toward Imran, confrontational villainy toward his lieutenant Salman Hafidz, competing eyewitness testimonies staged as an unresolved dialectic, and the strategic citation of Islamic legal authorities to delegitimise coercive *bai'at*, *Tempo* simultaneously performed independent, investigative journalism and reinforced the New Order's securitised reading of Islamic radicalism on the eve of the 1982 general election. The article contributes a media-historical reading of a case that has hitherto been studied almost exclusively as movement history, and demonstrates the analytical yield of discourse-oriented, rather than agenda-setting, approaches to New Order press historiography.

Keywords: Jamaah Imam Imran, Tempo magazine, Critical Discourse Analysis, New Order press, Cicendo, source criticism.

Copyright © 2024. Alfarizy, M. S., Samsudin, & F. Lestari.This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provide d the original work is properly cited.

INTRODUCTION

Religiously inflected political violence directed at symbols of state authority is not a peculiarly contemporary Indonesian phenomenon. On 7 December 2022, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device during the morning assembly at the Astana Anyar sectoral police station in Bandung. Police identified the perpetrator, Agus Sujatno alias Agus Muslim, as a returning convict from the 2017 Cicendo pipe-bomb case and a member of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a network whose *takfiri* doctrine treats the modern Indonesian state and its penal code as objects of religious repudiation.[1] Investigators recovered leaflets protesting the newly ratified Criminal Code, particularly its provisions on morality offences, at the scene, a detail *Tempo.co* reported within days of the bombing.[2]

More than four decades earlier, in the same city, a strikingly similar target -- a neighbourhood police post -- had already been struck by a radical congregation pursuing its own repudiation of the secular state. On the night of 11 March 1981, fourteen members of Jamaah Imam Imran, a small millenarian group led by a former Medan street tough turned self-declared "Imam," Imran bin Muhammad Zein, attacked the Komando Sektor Kota (Kosekta) 8606 police post in the Cicendo district of Bandung. Under the pretext of retrieving a member's impounded motorcycle, the assailants disarmed and locked up the four officers on duty, executed three of them, and made off with weapons, a typewriter, uniforms, and two motorcycles.[3] The stolen firearms subsequently resurfaced in a considerably larger crisis: the 28 March 1981 hijacking of Garuda Indonesia flight GA-206, the DC-9 "Woyla," to Don Muang airport in Bangkok.[4] Both the Cicendo raid and the Astana Anyar bombing targeted the same institutional emblem of state authority for structurally comparable reasons -- the acquisition of arms or the symbolic negation of state law -- separated by forty-one years but joined by an unbroken, if mutating, undercurrent of anti-state religious militancy running through the history of the Indonesian republic.

The Cicendo affair unfolded at a particularly fraught juncture of New Order rule. Suharto's regime, having consolidated power after 1966 through the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party and the systematic marginalisation of political Islam, spent the 1970s forcing Islamic parties into the single vessel of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and, by the 1980s, was moving to compel every social and political organisation to adopt Pancasila as its sole ideological foundation (*asas tunggal*).[5] For a segment of pious, disaffected young Muslims who had spent years working and studying abroad, this climate of ideological uniformity, intensified by rumours of an impending government crackdown on Islam distilled from an internal document of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), supplied both

[1]Verrel Ayub Gaizka Ardato, "Kebijakan Kontra Terorisme Pemerintah Indonesia Terhadap Kelompok Jamaah Ansharut Daulah Terkait Serangan Bom Kota Bandung Tahun 2022" (Skripsi, Universitas Islam Indonesia, 2022), 23-25.

[2]Mutia Yuantisya, Ahmad Fikri, and Septhia, "7 Fakta Bom Bunuh Diri di Polsek Astanaanyar, Mantan Narapidana Terorisme hingga Lone Wolf," *Tempo*, 8 December 2022.

[3]"Penyerbuan di Cicendo," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982, Perpustakaan Batu Api, 14.

[4]Tempo, "Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982, Perpustakaan Batu Api.

[5]Dr. Zainal Abidin Rahawarin, *Dinamika Partai Politik Islam di Indonesia*, Cet. 1 (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2022), 84-87.

grievance and pretext.[6] It was in this same climate that the New Order press operated under a formal licensing regime, the Surat Izin Terbit (SIT), that made every publication's survival contingent on political compliance -- a regime under which *Tempo* magazine, founded on 6 March 1971 by Goenawan Mohamad and colleagues, had already cultivated a reputation for adversarial, investigative "watchdog journalism" under the slogan "Enak Dibaca dan Perlu" (pleasant to read and necessary), and would go on to have its licence revoked twice, in 1982 and again in June 1994.[7] It is precisely at the intersection of these two structures -- an underground congregation contesting the ideological monopoly of the state, and a press institution negotiating its own precarious independence within that same state's licensing apparatus -- that this article situates its inquiry.

The Cicendo attack and its perpetrators have not gone unstudied. Anjar Any's *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau Imran Imam Jamaah* (1982), compiled from a wide array of contemporaneous newspapers and magazines including *Tempo* itself, remains the earliest and most detailed narrative account of the affair, tracing the group from Imran's arrival in Bandung through to his trial.[8] What unites these two works -- notwithstanding their differing emphases -- is that each treats media reportage, and *Tempo*'s reportage in particular, principally as an evidentiary quarry: a repository of dates, names, and testimony to be mined for the reconstruction of "what happened," rather than as a discursive artefact whose own narrative strategies actively shaped how the Cicendo affair, and the wider category of Islamic radicalism it was made to represent, entered public consciousness.

An adjacent approach to press analysis is Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw's Agenda Setting theory, which considers how editorial emphasis elevates a topic's salience for readers. However, [9][10]Agenda Setting theory is comparatively ill-suited to the finer question this article poses: not merely which facts *Tempo* chose to publicise about the Cicendo affair, but how, at the level of narrative structure, character portrayal, and quotation, *Tempo*'s texts constructed and contested the meaning of radicalism, criminality, and religious authority attached to Jamaah Imam Imran. A study of Kompas.com's coverage of terrorism between 2016 and 2020 by Asri Pangestu and Sukma Ari Ragil Putri comes closer to the concerns of this article in its attention to thematic framing of perpetrators and victims, but its object -- a twenty-first-century online outlet operating in a post-authoritarian press environment -- differs fundamentally from a print weekly negotiating survival under an authoritarian licensing regime.[11]

---

[6]Anjar Any, *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau Imran Imam Jamaah*, 1st ed. (Solo: CV. Mayasari, 1982), 14, 21.

[7]Aryo Subarkah Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru: Dijinakkan hingga Dibungkam," Komunika: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi 8, no. 1 (2021): 55-57.

[8]Any, *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau*, 7-8.

[9]Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," Public Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1972): 176-87, https://doi.org/10.1086/267990.

[10]McCombs and Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," 176-87.

[11]Asri Pangestu and Sukma Ari Ragil Putri, "Pola Pemberitaan Media Online Kompas.com dalam Pelaporan Serangan Terorisme di Indonesia 2016-2020," *Jurnal Kajian Jurnalisme* 5, no. 2 (2022): 198, 201, 206.

The research gap that emerges from this literature is therefore twofold. First, the existing historiography of Jamaah Imam Imran has not been read as media history in its own right: no study has asked how *Tempo*'s own narrative construction -- its selection of quotations, its juxtaposition of perpetrator and victim, its recourse to religious authorities -- shaped the meaning of the Cicendo affair for its readership. Second, an agenda-setting framework tuned to topical salience cannot by itself answer questions about representation and power. This article addresses both gaps by applying Critical Discourse Analysis, as formulated by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, to *Tempo*'s coverage of the Cicendo attack across its nine constituent articles published between 16 August 1980 and 3 April 1982, read against corroborating and sometimes contradicting reportage in the pro-government daily *Berita Yudha* and the Islamic weekly *Panji Masyarakat*.

The objective of this article is accordingly twofold: to reconstruct, through the historical method, the socio-political and religious context of the New Order that produced both the Cicendo attack and the press regime that reported it, and to analyse, through Critical Discourse Analysis, how *Tempo*'s narrative choices constructed the meaning of the event for its contemporary readers. Its contribution lies in demonstrating that *Tempo*'s watchdog reputation and its discursive alignment with the state's securitised narrative of Islamic radicalism were not mutually exclusive but were, in this case, mutually constitutive: even as *Tempo* pursued rigorous, source-based investigative reporting and gave voice to competing testimonies and to the defendants' own perspectives, its narrative architecture -- the humanisation of Imran set against the vilification of Salman Hafidz, the citation of moderate Islamic authorities to declare the group's use of *bai'at* religiously illegitimate, and its persistent gesturing toward a concealed "hidden hand" -- ultimately reinforced the New Order's own framing of Jamaah Imam Imran as a dangerous aberration menacing both the state and mainstream Islam. This reading constitutes the article's novelty: it is the first study to position *Tempo*'s coverage of the Cicendo affair as the primary object of historical analysis rather than as a supporting evidentiary source for movement history.

METHOD

This article employs the historical method, comprising heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography.[12]

Heuristics

The primary evidentiary base consists of nine articles published in *Tempo* magazine between 16 August 1980 and 3 April 1982: "Imam Baru di Bandung" (16 August 1980); "Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," "Penyerbuan di Cicendo," and "Dimulai Dengan Armon" (all 9 January 1982); "Woyla Tanpa Imran" (6 February 1982); "Sang Imam pun Menangis" and "Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason" (both 27 February 1982); "Semua Orang Mesti Mati, Kata Imran" (20 March 1982); and "Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at" (3 April 1982). All nine were consulted in their original print form at the Perpustakaan Batu Api, Jatinangor. These were cross-read against a secondary but substantial documentary corpus drawn from the pro-government daily *Berita Yudha* (issues from 20 March 1981 through 14 April 1982, consulted through the Monumen Pers Nasional press collection) and the Islamic current-affairs weekly *Panji Masyarakat* (Nos. 321-323, April-May 1981, held at the Dinas Perpustakaan dan Kearsipan Daerah Jawa Barat). Anjar Any's contemporaneous compilation *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau Imran Imam Jamaah* (1982).

Source Criticism

External criticism assessed the physical authenticity of the nine core *Tempo* articles: all were consulted as original, yellowed newsprint held at Perpustakaan Batu Api, a private archive specialising in twentieth-century Indonesian periodicals, a provenance that supports their material authenticity as artefacts of their stated publication dates.[13] Internal criticism assessed the credibility and evidentiary content of each article: the January 1982 pieces were found to carry the most extensive courtroom testimony and were accordingly weighted heavily for the reconstruction of the trial chronology, while the February and April 1982 articles supplied the fullest detail on planning, doctrine, and the *bai'at* controversy.[14] Internal criticism further exposed a significant discrepancy in *Tempo*'s own reporting: the 9 January 1982 article "Penyerbuan di Cicendo" attributes the fatal shots to a gunman named "Husain," while the 27 February 1982 article "Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason" attributes the same act to "Maman Kusmayadi." Cross-referencing against *Berita Yudha*'s trial coverage resolves the discrepancy: courtroom testimony establishes that the shooter's full name was Hussein Kusmayadi, and that "Husain" and "Maman" in *Tempo*'s earlier reporting denoted the same individual under the *nom de guerre* practice the group required of its members.[15] This apparent inconsistency is treated in this article not as an editorial error to be silently corrected but as historiographically significant: it reveals the

[12]Sulasman, *Metodologi Penelitian Sejarah*, 1st ed. (Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2014), 73.

[13]Kuntowijoyo, *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah*, 1st ed. (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2013), 77.

[14]Kuntowijoyo, *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah*, 78.

[15]"Ceramah2 Imran Selalu Menentang Pancasila - UUD '45," *Berita Yudha*, 21 January 1982, Monumen Pers Nasional.

piecemeal, serial nature of *Tempo*'s investigation as new courtroom testimony accumulated across successive trial sessions.

Interpretation

Following the establishment of verified facts, this article interprets the *Tempo* corpus through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA treats language not as a neutral structural system but as a form of social practice, encompassing the full range of spoken and written communication.[16] In the account developed by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, critical discourse analysis examines how power and inequality are constructed, reproduced, and naturalised through text.[17] This article applies CDA to identify the narrative devices -- selective quotation, character juxtaposition, sourcing hierarchy, and the citation of authoritative voices -- through which *Tempo* constructed the meaning of Jamaah Imam Imran and the Cicendo attack for its readers, and to situate that construction within the wider ideological contest between the New Order state and radical political Islam.

Historiography

The resulting narrative is presented thematically rather than strictly chronologically, in keeping with the character of the source base: because the nine *Tempo* articles themselves range non-sequentially across chronology, biography, courtroom testimony, and religious controversy, this article organises its Results section around the analytical themes that *Tempo*'s own reporting foregrounded -- the chronology of the attack, its motives, the profile of the movement and its leader, the trials, the controversies surrounding the case, and the religious debate over *bai'at* -- before turning, in the Discussion, to a critical reading of the discursive strategies underlying that coverage.

RESULTS

The New Order's Political and Religious Landscape, 1966-1982

By the early 1980s the New Order had spent more than a decade systematically narrowing the space available to organised political Islam. Having declined to rehabilitate the banned Masyumi party after 1966, Suharto's government forced the remaining Islamic parties -- Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, PSII, and PERTI -- into a single vessel, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), through the fusion policy of January 1973, while non-Islamic nationalist parties were compressed into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI).[18] Table 1 presents the party configuration derived from the institutional historical sources used as references.

[16]Wodak and Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis.

[17]Wodak and Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis.

[18]Dr. Zainal Abidin Rahawarin, *Dinamika Partai Politik Islam*, 85; Arief Hidayat, "Perkembangan Partai Politik Pada Masa Orde Baru (1966-1998)," *Jurnal Ilmiah Mimbar Demokrasi* 17, no. 2 (2018): 156.

Table 1. Party Fusion Under the New Order

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)
Parmusi	Partai Katolik
PSII	Partai Murba
PERTI	IPKI
	Parkindo

The restriction of party branches below the district level under the doctrine of "floating mass" (*massa mengambang*), a privilege from which the government's own vehicle, Golkar, was effectively exempted, further hollowed out the PPP's organisational reach.[19] A second wave of ideological uniformity followed with the 1978 MPR decree on the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4) and, ultimately, the 1985 law requiring every social and political organisation to adopt Pancasila as its sole ideological foundation (*asas tunggal*), on pain of legal dissolution and, for the recalcitrant, prosecution under the 1963 anti-subversion law.[20] The PPP itself capitulated in August 1984, formally abandoning its Islamic platform for Pancasila and later replacing its Ka'bah emblem with a star.[21] Both Nahdlatul Ulama, which withdrew from formal politics through its 1983-84 "Kembali ke Khittah 1926," and Muhammadiyah, which accepted the single-foundation policy at its 1985 Surakarta congress on condition that the Qur'an and Hadith remained its doctrinal basis, absorbed this pressure through institutional accommodation rather than confrontation.[22]

It was precisely this climate of enforced ideological accommodation -- what William Liddle characterised as an atmosphere of "Government versus Islam"[23] -- against which a small, uncompromising congregation refusing any accommodation whatsoever came to seem, to its own members, uniquely authentic. The government's own use of manufactured or exaggerated security threats to discipline the Islamic electorate before elections, most notoriously the April 1977 "Komando Jihad" arrests of some 700 people on flimsy evidence of a Darul Islam revival, several of whom were later linked to intelligence operative Ali Murtopo, supplies the immediate political

[19]M. C. Ricklefs, *Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004*, Cet. 3, trans. Satrio Wahono et al. (Jakarta: PT Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2007), 586.

[20]M. C. Ricklefs, Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004, Cet. 3, trans. Satrio Wahono et al. (Jakarta: PT Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2007), 586.

[21]Daud, *Re-Orientasi Politik NU*, 20-21.

[22]Martin van Bruinessen, Rakyat Kecil, Islam, dan Politik (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Gading, 2013), 142-43.

[23]Muhammad Yusuf and Jun Mawalidin, "Pergeseran Pemikiran Nurcholish Madjid Tentang Partai Politik Islam di Indonesia," *Politica: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara dan Politik Islam* 9, no. 1 (2022): 75.

backdrop against which Jamaah Imam Imran's own emergence, arrest, and prosecution in 1980-82 must be read.[24]

Tempo's Institutional Profile and the Press Licensing Regime

The press that reported this climate was itself subject to it. Under Law No. 11/1966 and its 1982 successor, Law No. 21/1982, every publication required a Surat Izin Terbit (SIT), later reformed into the Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers (SIUPP) under Permenpen No. 01/1984 -- a licensing instrument the government could revoke at will, and did, most consequentially against the entire national press corps after the January 1974 Malari riots.[25] *Tempo* was founded on 6 March 1971 by Goenawan Mohamad and colleagues, financed initially through Ciputra and Eric Samola's Yayasan Jaya Raya, and built its identity around the pursuit of corruption, maladministration, and abuse of power -- a journalistic identity that positioned it as a check on government power.[26] That editorial independence was constrained by both the commercial demands of a magazine and the political risks attached to its licence.[27] *Tempo*'s licence was revoked twice, first in 1982 -- the very year in which its most extensive coverage of the Cicendo trials appeared -- and again in June 1994.[28]

The Chronology of the Cicendo Attack

According to *Tempo*'s 9 January 1982 reconstruction, the attack was executed at 00:30 on 11 March 1981 by fourteen members of Jamaah Imam Imran under the field command of Salman Hafidz. Three men -- among them Muhamad Edi and Nurwan Gunawan -- approached the Kosekta 8606 post under the pretext of inquiring after a confiscated motorcycle; when Sertu Suhendrik and Bharatu Zul Iskandar drew near, a third assailant produced a Garand rifle stolen earlier from the Army's Cimahi signal-corps training centre (Pusdikhub AD) and forced the two officers, together with Bharada Andi and the duty commander Serka Suryana, into the post's holding cell, releasing the four civilian detainees held there.[29] *Tempo*'s own photograph of the vacated holding cell -- reproduced in its 9 January 1982 issue -- became one of the article's principal visual anchors for the scene of the killing.[30]

Tempo's reporting on the identity of the executioner shifted between its own successive issues. The 9 January 1982 account attributes the shooting to a gunman named "Husain," acting on Salman's order; the 27 February 1982 account instead names "Maman Kusmayadi" as the triggerman, describing how "Salman gave the signal. Without hesitation, Maman pulled the trigger of his weapon, and the bullet

[24]Elson R.E, *Suharto: Sebuah Biografi Politik*, trans. Satrio Wahono and IG Harimoerti Bagoesoka (Jakarta: Pustaka Minda Utama, 2005), 424.

[25]Aryo Subarkah Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru: Dijinakkan hingga Dibungkam," *Komunika: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi* 8, no. 1 (2021): 55-57.

[26]Aryo Subarkah Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru: Dijinakkan hingga Dibungkam," Komunika: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi 8, no. 1 (2021): 55-57.

[27]Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru," 55-57.

[28]Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru," 55-57.

[29]"Penyerbuan di Cicendo," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982, 14; "Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason," *Tempo*, 27 February 1982, 13.

[30]"Penyerbuan di Cicendo," 14.

pierced the chests of the two officers of the state."[31] Trial testimony reported in *Berita Yudha* resolved this apparent contradiction: the gunman's full name was Hussein Kusmayadi, and he confirmed under oath that, acting on Imran's orders to procure weapons, he and thirteen companions had stormed the post and that, on Salman's command, he had "cocked the Garand from outside the cell bars and emptied the magazine, extinguishing the lives of the three policemen."[32] The group's insistence that every recruit adopt or append the name of a companion of the Prophet as a condition of membership accounts for the discrepancy between "Husain" and "Hussein Kusmayadi" across the different press accounts.[33] After the shooting, the group ransacked the post on Salman's orders, burning its archives and carrying off two .38-calibre pistols, a typewriter, three police helmets, a pair of uniforms, two motorcycles, a telephone, and a jacket, a haul later confirmed publicly by Pangkopkamtib Admiral Sudomo.[34]

Motives and Objectives

Tempo's 9 January 1982 reporting traces the immediate spark to the impoundment of a member's motorcycle, which Salman Hafidz used as pretext to convene his followers at his home on Jalan Kebon Sari, Cimahi, and reiterate Imran's standing order that the congregation procure firearms within one week.[35] That order, according to prosecutor Sukri's indictment as reported in "Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," extended beyond weapons procurement to instructions for the execution of members suspected of betrayal and the abduction of prominent religious and political figures, including E. Z. Muttaqien, Rusyad Nurdin, and Amir Murtono.[36] The pistol seized at Cicendo was subsequently used in the Woyla hijacking seventeen days later.[37] Prosecutor Sukri characterised the entire sequence -- weapons theft, the planned abductions, the eventual hijacking -- as elements of a coherent strategic plan to replace Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution with Islamic law, a reading confirmed within days by Pangkopkamtib Sudomo, who told the press the attackers' motive was "to search for weapons and raise funds to support operations with a specific political background and objective."[38] Salman Hafidz himself, far from denying the charge, confirmed it defiantly at trial: "I did indeed plan a revolution, to replace Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, to overthrow the state -- what more does the prosecutor want?"[39] Imran offered a different register of justification, telling *Tempo* that he acted because "according to a CSIS document, we Muslims would be crushed after the 1982 election," a document he claimed to have obtained from retired General Ishak

[31]"Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason," 13.

[32]"Ceramah2 Imran Selalu Menentang Pancasila - UUD '45," *Berita Yudha*, 21 January 1982, Monumen Pers Nasional.

[33]"Imam Baru, di Bandung," *Tempo*, 16 August 1980, Perpustakaan Batu Api.

[34]"Motif Penyerangan Kosekta Bandung: Punya Latar Belakang dan Tujuan Politik Tertentu," *Berita Yudha*, 20 March 1981, Monumen Pers Nasional.

[35]"Penyerbuan di Cicendo," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.

[36]"Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.

[37]"Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im."

[38]"Motif Penyerangan Kosekta Bandung," *Berita Yudha*, 20 March 1981.

[39]"Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason," 13.

Djuarsa.[40] The presiding judges rejected this defence outright, ruling that Imran's stated motive of "pre-empting the oppression of Muslims" did not mitigate his culpability for a plan to overturn Pancasila and topple Suharto's government.[41]

The Formation and Character of Jamaah Imam Imran

Tempo's 9 January 1982 profile "Dimulai Dengan Armon" traces the group's origin to early 1976, when Imran -- known in Saudi Arabia by the name Armon -- formed a small congregation with six other young Indonesians, among them Mahrizal, Achmad Yani, Lukman Syamra, Faruq, Udep, Abdul Razak, and Salman, while living and working there.[42] On returning to Indonesia in 1979, the group's members, disillusioned by New Order policies they regarded as hostile to Islam -- permit requirements for sermons, the abolition of the Ramadan holiday, the incorporation of mystical belief streams into the state's broad policy guidelines, and prominent corruption scandals -- began aggressive preaching in Bandung and Cimahi mosques.[43] The congregation formally consolidated in June 1980 at the Cimahi home of Adang Suherman, where Imran was inducted as "Imam" through a *bai'at* administered by his own followers, superseding the earlier congregation led by Mahrizal.[44] Its activity was centred on Bandung's Masjid Istiqamah, where, according to Islamic scholar Hamka writing in *Panji Masyarakat*, the group's members regarded established religious leaders as possessing "the weakest of faith" (*adh-'aful iman*) for their unwillingness to enforce *amar ma'ruf nahyi munkar* by force, an outlook that led them to burn a shack believed to house prostitution and to assault its occupants near the mosque grounds.[45] Membership required a formal oath -- "I bear witness there is no God but Allah... By Allah, I pledge allegiance to Imran bin Muhammad Zein as my Imam and leader, and I promise to hear and obey him in all things and every decision, even if it contradicts my own thinking" -- and the adoption of a companion-of-the-Prophet name.[46] A psychiatric examination ordered during Salman Hafidz's trial found him mentally sound but described a personality "rigid, chronically suspicious of others, intensely obedient to superiors, and narrow in outlook" -- traits the examining physician suggested had been channelled and "locked in" by his *bai'at* to Imran.[47] *Tempo* reported that the group numbered only 189 members initiated since 1980, dispersed across Jakarta, Bandung, Cimahi, Mojokerto, Surabaya, and Malang, with the original six Saudi-era companions -- one of whom, Mahrizal, later died in the Woyla hijacking -- forming its inner core.[48] Members were required to roll up their trousers as a mark of piety even during prayer, a practice *Tempo* reported the group treated as inviolable:

[40]"Sang Imam pun Menangis," *Tempo*, 27 February 1982, Perpustakaan Batu Api.
[41]"Semua Orang Mesti Mati, Kata Imran," *Tempo*, 20 March 1982, Perpustakaan Batu Api.
[42]"Dimulai Dengan Armon," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982, Perpustakaan Batu Api.
[43]"Dimulai Dengan Armon."
[44]"Dimulai Dengan Armon."
[45]Hamka, "Yang Ekstrim, Oknum," *Panji Masyarakat*, 20 April 1981, Dispusipda Jabar.
[46]Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, "Gerakan Imran, 'Numpang Lewat,'" *Panji Masyarakat*, 20 April 1981, Dispusipda Jabar.
[47]"Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at," *Tempo*, 3 April 1982, Perpustakaan Batu Api.
[48]"Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.

"if during prayer someone fails to roll up his trouser-leg -- even one's own mother -- then the blood of that deviant becomes licit."[49]

The Portrait of Imran bin Muhammad Zein

Tempo devoted particular narrative attention to constructing a psychologically layered portrait of Imran, born Armon on 1 June 1950 in Ampek Angkek, Bukittinggi, the eldest son of a family that later described him as a headstrong youth given to gambling, drinking, and street fighting in Medan, where he had also joined the paramilitary youth wing of Pemuda Pancasila and, briefly, studied under the Muhammadiyah preacher T. A. Lattief Rousdi, who recalled him as an unremarkable and inattentive student.[50] By his own account to *Tempo*, his 1972 emigration to Saudi Arabia on borrowed fare and two packs of cigarettes marked a spiritual rupture: "I surrendered myself entirely. And in that surrender to God, I found what I had been seeking in Islam -- faith and happiness."[51] Returning to Indonesia in April 1977 under the new name Imran, he began preaching in a jubbah in his native Kotamatsum, Medan, a transformation his father professed pride in.[52] *Tempo*'s courtroom coverage traced a deliberate arc across Imran's successive public appearances: the composed, courteous defendant of his opening trial in January 1982 ("his long hair neatly combed... 'Assalamualaikum,' he said")[53]; the defiant ideologue who told *Tempo* "if Pancasila must be elevated above Islam, then I will resist"[54]; the son who wept before the court recalling his mother in Medan[55]; and finally the condemned man who, on hearing his death sentence, laughed and told his own defence counsel, "Everyone must die -- the question is only whether the manner is pleasing to God," a line *Tempo* adopted as its headline.[56]

The Trials of Imran and Salman Hafidz

Imran's trial opened at the Central Jakarta District Court under Chief Judge Soebandi and prosecutor Sukri, who charged him primarily under the 1963 anti-subversion law (No. 11/PNPS/1963) on the grounds that his sermons had rejected and undermined Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, with subsidiary charges covering the Woyla hijacking, unauthorised arms possession, and premeditated murder.[57] *Berita Yudha*'s parallel coverage preserved the prosecutor's chronological account of Imran's escalating sermons, quoting him as having told his congregation that "Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are void, they do not come from Allah and His Messenger. For that reason they must be resisted and replaced with the law of Allah."[58] Imran acknowledged ordering his followers to search for weapons but

[49]Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, "Gerakan Imran, 'Numpang Lewat.'"
[50]"Dimulai Dengan Armon," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.
[51]"Dimulai Dengan Armon."
[52]"Dimulai Dengan Armon."
[53]"Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.
[54]"Dimulai Dengan Armon."
[55]"Sang Imam pun Menangis," *Tempo*, 27 February 1982.
[56]"Semua Orang Mesti Mati, Kata Imran," *Tempo*, 20 March 1982.
[57]"Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.
[58]"Tertuduh Imran Mulai Diadili di Jakarta," *Berita Yudha*, 31 December 1981, Monumen Pers Nasional.

denied direct responsibility for the Woyla hijacking and the killings of Najamuddin and Suyono, admitting only to ordering the killing of Syamsuddin, "because he slandered me."[59] His defence counsel, Abdurahman Saleh of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH), raised the possibility of an undisclosed "hidden hand" behind the affair.[60] The court rejected all of Imran's defences and, amid a courtroom of roughly three hundred spectators, sentenced him to death, a moment *Tempo* rendered through Judge Soebandi's own gavel: "We sentence the defendant to death."[61]

Salman Hafidz's own trial, held separately at the Bandung District Court under heavy Mobile Brigade guard, was covered by *Tempo* in "Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason." Charged under Article 55(1) of the Criminal Code in conjunction with the 1963 anti-subversion law on the basis of a 130-page indictment, Salman rejected the offer of formal legal counsel, demanding instead an unspecified "law supervisor," and, when none of the courtroom's occupants volunteered, proceeded largely unrepresented.[62] He confronted the prosecutor directly -- "if you don't change the charge, then let's begin the war," he said, raising his fist -- before affirming every accusation against him.[63] *Berita Yudha* reported the prosecution's characterisation of Salman's stated motive in similarly stark terms: because the current government "is founded on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and not on the Qur'an and the Hadith of the Prophet, this is clearly of a political character warranting a subversion charge."[64] He received the death sentence as well; *Tempo* closed its account of his trial with the detail that Salman produced a tube of Rheumason ointment and bound his own forehead with it in the courtroom, a gesture from which the article drew its title.[65]

Controversies and the "Hidden Hand"

Tempo's reporting persistently surfaced anomalies that complicated the state's tidy narrative of Imran as mastermind. The magazine's 27 February 1982 piece "Sang Imam pun Menangis" reported defence counsel Abdurahman Saleh's contention that the case was better understood as "the Najamuddin case" than "the Imran case," given the outsized operational role of Najamuddin -- Imran's own courier, subsequently executed by the group itself on suspicion of betrayal -- and that "there is an intellectual actor who cannot be disclosed in these proceedings."[66] *Tempo* likewise reported the unexplained origin of the CSIS document Imran claimed had motivated his search for weapons, tracing it to two retired generals, A. H. Nasution and Ishak Djuarsa, both of whom confirmed to the press that Imran had approached them on unrelated business and that he had subsequently, and without their knowledge, used Djuarsa's Jakarta residence as the registered address of his self-proclaimed "Dewan Revolusi Islam

[59]"Sang Imam pun Menangis," *Tempo*, 27 February 1982.
[60]"Sang Imam pun Menangis."
[61]"Semua Orang Mesti Mati, Kata Imran," *Tempo*, 20 March 1982.
[62]"Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason," *Tempo*, 27 February 1982.
[63]"Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason."
[64]"Hukuman Mati Untuk Salman, Otak Penyerbuan Kosekta Cicendo," *Berita Yudha*, 14 April 1982, Monumen Pers Nasional.
[65]"Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason."
[66]"Sang Imam pun Menangis," *Tempo*, 27 February 1982.

Indonesia."[67] A member of the national parliament, quoted in *Panji Masyarakat*, observed pointedly that "every time an election (1982) draws near, the issue of 'Komando Jihad' invariably arises. Once the election is over, all talk of 'Komando Jihad' falls quiet as well" -- a remark that, read alongside the 1977 Komando Jihad arrests, situates Cicendo within a recurring New Order pattern of manufactured or opportunistically amplified security threats timed to electoral cycles.[68] *Tempo* also reported the unexplained absence, at Imran's opening trial, of the lawyer he himself had originally requested, Tasrif, S.H., who was said to be travelling abroad.[69]

The Bai'at Controversy and Islamic Authorities

Tempo's 3 April 1982 article "Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at" surveyed a range of Islamic authorities on the legitimacy of the group's coercive oath. The chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), K. H. E. Z. Muttaqien, held that an ordinary oath (*sumpah*) carried greater religious weight than *bai'at*, and that no clear sanction attached to its breach: "*bai'at* is indeed a promise... but there is no clear sanction against one who fails to keep it."[70] The head of the MUI's fatwa commission, Prof. Ibrahim Hosen, situated Imran's practice within the classical fiqh category reserved for the installation of a caliph, concluding "that is what is called establishing a state within a state."[71] The Ministry of Religious Affairs' senior staff expert H. Zaini Ahmad Noch drew the sharper legal consequence: "if what is meant is *bai'at* according to fiqh, then they are called *bughat* -- meaning rebels. And rebels, in fiqh, may indeed be sentenced to death."[72] Prof. H. M. Rasjidi likewise characterised the group as attempting to "build a state within a state" while diagnosing a broader "confusion of thought" (*kekacauan pikiran*) in its theology.[73] The chairman of Bandung's municipal Ulema Council, Drs. Miftah Faridl, distinguished Jamaah Imam Imran's practice from *bai'at* as used by mainstream organisations such as PSII, PII, or the cadre of Masjid Salman, insisting "*bai'at* is not to a person... it is merely an organisational procedure," a distinction *Tempo* used to isolate Imran's congregation as a theological and legal outlier rather than representative of the wider practice of religious pledging within Indonesian Islamic associational life.[74]

DISCUSSION

Read through the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis, *Tempo*'s coverage of the Cicendo affair reveals a set of narrative strategies that operated simultaneously as rigorous, source-based investigative journalism and as a discursive apparatus that reinforced the New Order's own securitised reading of Islamic radicalism. These strategies are best understood not as evidence of editorial insincerity but as the product of the structural position *Tempo* occupied: a magazine whose institutional

[67]"Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," *Tempo*, 9 January 1982.
[68]Hamka, "Yang Ekstrim, Oknum."
[69]"Tertuduh Imran Mulai Diadili di Jakarta," *Berita Yudha*, 31 December 1981.
[70]"Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at," *Tempo*, 3 April 1982.
[71]"Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at."
[72]"Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at."
[73]"Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at."
[74]"Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at."

survival depended on the same licensing apparatus it was reporting around, seeking to preserve its "watchdog" credibility while operating inside the very ideological field -- the defence of Pancasila against subversion -- that the Cicendo case activated.

The most striking discursive device across the nine articles is the asymmetrical characterisation of Imran and Salman Hafidz. Where Salman is rendered almost entirely through confrontation -- raising his fist at the prosecutor, refusing legal counsel, binding his own forehead with liniment in a gesture of theatrical bravado -- Imran is subjected to a considerably more ambivalent narrative arc that moves from composed courtroom civility, through defiant theological argument, to tears at the mention of his mother, and finally to a philosophical serenity in the face of his own death sentence. This is not merely descriptive variation; it constitutes what CDA identifies as a humanising frame selectively extended to the movement's principal ideologue while withheld from its principal executor of violence. The effect, whether intended or not, is to render Imran legible to *Tempo*'s middle-class readership as a psychologically complex figure -- "not simply a subversive criminal," in the article's own closing assessment of "Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im," but "a complex human being: a repentant former delinquent, a radical ideologue, a fragile son before his mother, and a condemned man facing his end with composure and self-possession." Salman, by contrast, is given almost no interiority beyond his defiance; he functions in the text as the movement's unreflective instrument of violence, its id to Imran's superego. This bifurcated characterisation allowed *Tempo* to satisfy two discursive demands at once: sustaining reader interest through psychological nuance, the hallmark of its investigative style, while never permitting sympathy for Imran to compromise the reader's revulsion at the killings, which remained safely externalised onto Salman and the anonymised "fourteen members."

A second device is *Tempo*'s treatment of contested testimony as an open dialectic rather than a settled fact. The magazine's shifting attribution of the fatal shooting -- first to "Husain," later to "Maman Kusmayadi" -- was not concealed but was instead narrated across successive issues as new courtroom testimony accumulated, a pattern this article's source criticism resolved through cross-referencing with *Berita Yudha* but which *Tempo*'s own readers, following the story serially across January to April 1982, would have experienced as genuine narrative suspense. This is a hallmark of investigative journalism under deadline pressure and incomplete access to a still-unfolding trial, and it lends *Tempo*'s reportage a texture of epistemic honesty largely absent from *Berita Yudha*'s more declarative prosecutorial paraphrase. Yet this same technique -- staging identity and motive as unresolved questions -- also had the effect of deferring, rather than settling, the question of individual culpability within the group, allowing *Tempo* to sustain the "hidden hand" thread as a recurring narrative hook across multiple issues without ever requiring the magazine to substantiate or abandon it.

That "hidden hand" motif constitutes the discourse's most ambivalent stratum, and the one most legible from a critical vantage. By repeatedly foregrounding Abdurahman Saleh's contention that the case was better understood as "the Najamuddin case," by tracing the CSIS document to two named retired generals without ever definitively explaining how it reached Imran, and by juxtaposing a

parliamentarian's observation about the electoral timing of "Komando Jihad" scares against its own account of Cicendo, *Tempo* gestured toward the possibility -- voiced by others in this same period, and echoed in the broader historiography of the 1977 Komando Jihad affair -- that elements of the security apparatus itself may have tolerated, monitored, or even indirectly cultivated radical fringe groups as a means of discrediting the wider Islamic political opposition ahead of the 1982 election.[75] Crucially, however, *Tempo* never developed this thread into an accusation; it remained a suggestive undercurrent, voiced through the words of defence counsel and an unnamed legislator rather than through the magazine's own editorial voice. This rhetorical distancing -- attributing the most politically dangerous interpretation of events to quoted sources rather than to the magazine itself -- is a recognisable strategy by which a licensed publication operating under an authoritarian regime could gesture toward institutional complicity in radicalism's cultivation without exposing itself to the charge of making that accusation directly, a discursive manoeuvre consistent with what scholarship on *Tempo*'s political economy has identified as its practice of negotiating journalistic idealism against the material constraints of licensed survival.[76]

The article's final discursive move -- its extensive citation of moderate ulama to adjudicate the religious legitimacy of *bai'at* -- performed a different, and in some respects more consequential, ideological function. By marshalling the MUI's own fatwa authorities to declare Jamaah Imam Imran's coercive oath a form of *bughat*, or religious rebellion, deserving of capital punishment under classical fiqh, and by carefully distinguishing this from the ordinary, non-coercive use of *bai'at* within recognised organisations such as PSII, PII, and the Masjid Salman cadre network, *Tempo* effectively enlisted mainstream Islamic legal authority to ratify the state's own subversion verdict from within the tradition Imran claimed to represent. This was a discursively powerful strategy precisely because it did not rely on the New Order's own secular vocabulary of "subversion" and "national stability," which radical Islamist audiences might dismiss as an instrument of an irreligious regime, but instead deployed the internal theological categories of Islamic jurisprudence -- *bughat*, the illegitimacy of coercive *bai'at* outside a properly constituted caliphate -- to reach the identical conclusion. In this respect, *Tempo*'s coverage did not merely report the New Order's confrontation with radical Islam; it actively supplied that confrontation with a form of religious legitimation the secular state itself could not generate, while simultaneously protecting the reputational standing of mainstream Islamic organisations by drawing a sharp discursive line between their own uses of oath-taking and Imran's.

Positioned against the existing historiography, this reading departs most clearly from Anjar Any's *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau Imran Imam Jamaah* (1982), a work produced in the same year as the trials and drawn from a wide range of periodicals including *Tempo* itself, but organised as a linear chronicle rather than as an analysis of any single outlet's narrative strategy; Any's text treats the press corpus as raw chronicle to be synthesised, not as an object whose internal construction merits

[75]Elson R.E, *Suharto: Sebuah Biografi Politik*, 424.
[76]Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru," 55-57.

scrutiny.[77] None of these studies asks how the meaning of Cicendo was itself produced through *Tempo*'s narrative choices, nor do they situate that production within the magazine's own precarious institutional position under the press licensing regime -- the analytical move this article has sought to make. Compared with an Agenda Setting approach, this study's CDA-based approach demonstrates a distinct analytical yield: where Agenda Setting theory illuminates how consistent topical emphasis elevates an issue's salience for a readership, CDA exposes how the specific texture of that coverage -- its characterisation, its sourcing hierarchy, its selective deployment of authoritative voices -- constructs the meaning attached to the salient issue, a dimension of press historiography that topic-frequency analysis alone cannot capture.[78]

Situated within the broader historiography of the New Order press, this case also complicates any straightforward narrative of *Tempo* as an unambiguously adversarial institution vis-à-vis the state. Existing scholarship on *Tempo*'s "Fourth Estate" self-conception emphasises its structural independence from political power and its steady record of investigative exposés of corruption and maladministration.[79] The Cicendo coverage suggests a more layered picture: *Tempo* could simultaneously practise genuine investigative independence -- surfacing the CSIS document's dubious provenance, giving voice to defence counsel's suspicion of a "hidden hand," and preserving contradictory testimony rather than flattening it into a single official narrative -- while its discursive architecture, taken as a whole, converged with the state's own interest in isolating Jamaah Imam Imran as a theological and political aberration rather than as a symptom of the broader disenfranchisement of political Islam that the fusion policy and the *asas tunggal* campaign had themselves produced. This convergence should not be read as evidence of directed editorial collusion; rather, it illustrates how, within an authoritarian media ecology, even a magazine committed to adversarial, fact-based reporting could produce a narrative whose net discursive effect aligned with the regime's own securitised framing of religious dissent, an outcome achieved through narrative craft -- character asymmetry, staged testimonial dialectic, the strategic recruitment of religious authority -- rather than through explicit propagandistic intent.

CONCLUSION

This article set out to reconstruct the socio-political and religious context of the New Order that produced both the Cicendo police post attack of 11 March 1981 and the press regime that reported it, and to analyse, through Critical Discourse Analysis, how *Tempo* magazine's narrative choices constructed the meaning of that event for its contemporary readership. The New Order's forced fusion of Islamic parties into the PPP, its escalating drive toward Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of every organisation, and its history of instrumentalising manufactured or amplified security threats around election cycles together produced the conditions under which a small, uncompromising congregation demanding absolute obedience through *bai'at* to a self-

[77]Any, *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau*, 7-8.
[78]Wodak and Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis.
[79]Eddyono, "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru," 55-57.

declared Imam could conclude that armed confrontation with the state, beginning with the theft of weapons from a neighbourhood police post, was both necessary and religiously sanctioned. *Tempo*, reporting this affair from within a licensing regime that had already revoked its predecessor's operating permits and would revoke its own twice, produced coverage across nine articles that was simultaneously rigorous in its pursuit of courtroom testimony, contradictory sources, and unresolved anomalies, and discursively aligned, through the asymmetrical humanisation of Imran against Salman Hafidz, the staging of contested testimony as narrative suspense, the persistent but never-substantiated gesture toward a "hidden hand," and the strategic recruitment of moderate Islamic legal authority, with the New Order's own framing of Jamaah Imam Imran as a dangerous theological and political aberration rather than as a symptom of the wider political closure that the regime's own fusion and single-ideology policies had helped to produce.

This article's principal contribution is to reposition *Tempo*'s coverage of the Cicendo affair from an evidentiary source for movement history, as it has functioned in the existing historiography represented by Anjar Any and Hanan Nurlatifah, into the primary object of historical-discursive analysis in its own right. Its novelty lies in applying Critical Discourse Analysis, rather than the Agenda Setting framework concerned with topical salience, to demonstrate that the meaning of a historical event as consequential as the Cicendo attack was not simply transmitted by the press but actively constructed through identifiable and analysable narrative strategies. In demonstrating that a magazine celebrated for its investigative independence could, through the ordinary craft of narrative journalism rather than through directed propaganda, produce coverage whose cumulative discursive effect reinforced state power, this study offers a methodological template for reading other episodes of New Order-era press coverage of religious and political dissent, and underscores the continuing value of discourse-oriented approaches to the historiography of the Indonesian press.

REFERENCES

Abdullah, Asman. "Radikalisasi Gerakan Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid dan Pengaruh Isis di Indonesia." *Jurnal Sosiologi Reflektif* 12, no. 2 (April 2018): 213-32.

Any, Anjar. *Dari Cicendo ke Meja Hijau Imran Imam Jamaah*. 1st ed. Solo: CV. Mayasari, 1982.

Ardato, Verrel Ayub Gaizka. "Kebijakan Kontra Terorisme Pemerintah Indonesia Terhadap Kelompok Jamaah Ansharut Daulah Terkait Serangan Bom Kota Bandung Tahun 2022." Skripsi, Universitas Islam Indonesia, 2022. https://dspace.uii.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/49924/20323191.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Berita Yudha. "Ceramah2 Imran Selalu Menentang Pancasila - UUD '45." 21 January 1982. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Berita Yudha. "Hukuman Mati Untuk Salman, Otak Penyerbuan Kosekta Cicendo." 14 April 1982. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Berita Yudha. "Ikut Cicendo." 26 January 1982. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Berita Yudha. "Motif Penyerangan Kosekta Bandung: Punya Latar Belakang dan Tujuan Politik Tertentu." 20 March 1981. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Berita Yudha. "Peristiwa Cicendo." Opini Kita. 21 March 1981. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Berita Yudha. "Sejak di Arabia, Imran Sudah Anti Pancasila dan UUD '45." 14 January 1982. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Berita Yudha. "Tertuduh Imron Mulai Diadili di Jakarta." 31 December 1981. Monumen Pers Nasional.

Bruinessen, Martin van. *Rakyat Kecil, Islam, dan Politik*. Translated by Farid Wajidi and Rika Iffati. Cet. 1. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Gading, 2013.

Daud, Safari. *Re-Orientasi Politik NU pada Masa Orde Baru (Analisis Tiga Strategi Politik NU Tahun 1984-1998)*. Cet. 1. Bandarlampung: Pusaka Media, 2021.

Elson, R. E. *Suharto: Sebuah Biografi Politik*. Translated by Satrio Wahono and IG Harimoerti Bagoesoka. Cet. 2. Jakarta: Pustaka Minda Utama, 2005.

Hamka. "Yang Ekstrim, Oknum." *Panji Masyarakat*, 20 April 1981. Dispusipda Jabar.

Hanan, Nurlatifah. "Jamaah Imran dalam Peristiwa Cicendo hingga Pembajakan Pesawat Woyla Tahun 1980." Skripsi, UIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 2015. https://digilib.uinsgd.ac.id/id/eprint/73809.

Hasani, Ismail, and Bonar Tigor Naipospos. *Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme: Studi Relasi dan Transformasi Organisasi Islam Radikal di Jawa Tengah dan di Yogyakarta*. Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2012.

Herlina, Nina. *Metode Sejarah*. Bandung: Satya Historika, 2020.

Hidayat, Arief. "Perkembangan Partai Politik pada Masa Orde Baru (1966-1998)." *Jurnal Ilmiah Mimbar Demokrasi* 17, no. 2 (April 2018): 155-64. https://doi.org/10.21009/jimd.v17i2.9090.

Husni, Muhammad. *Eksistensi Radikalisme Jamaah Ansharut Daulah di Kota Bima, Indonesia*. Vol. 9, no. 1, 2023.

Komarudin, Ujang, and Asrul Rahman. *Sistem Sosial dan Politik Indonesia*. Edited by M. R. Muchlis. Jakarta: PT Pencerah Generasi Antarbangsa, 2020.

Kuntowijoyo. *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah*. 1st ed. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2013.

Laisa, Emna. "Islam dan Radikalisme." *Islamuna: Jurnal Studi Islam* 1, no. 1 (January 2014). https://doi.org/10.19105/islamuna.v1i1.554.

McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media." Public Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1972): 176-87. https://doi.org/10.1086/267990.

Panji Masyarakat. "Penjelasan Pangkopkamtib Sudomo." 10 May 1981. Dispusipda Jabar.

Pangestu, Asri, and Sukma Ari Ragil Putri. "Pola Pemberitaan Media Online Kompas.com dalam Pelaporan Serangan Terorisme di Indonesia 2016-2020."

Jurnal Kajian Jurnalisme 5, no. 2 (January 2022): 193-208. https://doi.org/10.24198/jkj.v5i2.34429.

Poesponegoro, Marwati Djoened, and Nugroho Notosusanto, eds. *Zaman Jepang dan Zaman Republik Indonesia, (±1942-1998)*. Cet. 2, ed. pemutakhiran. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia 6. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008.

Rahawarin, Zainal Abidin. *Dinamika Partai Politik Islam di Indonesia*. Cet. 1. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2022.

Ricklefs, M. C. *Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2004*. Translated by Satrio Wahono, Bakar Bilfagih, Hasan Huda, Miftah Helmi, Joko Sutrisni, and Has Manadi. Cet. 3. Jakarta: PT Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2007.

Rizqi, Retanisa. "Efektifitas Penyederhanaan Partai Politik Era Orde Baru." *Bullet: Jurnal Multidisiplin Ilmu* 1, no. 3 (2022): 204-11.

Saimima, Iqbal Abdurrauf. "Gerakan Imran, 'Numpang Lewat.'" *Panji Masyarakat*, 20 April 1981. Dispusipda Jabar.

Subarkah Eddyono, Aryo. "Pers Alternatif pada Era Orde Baru: Dijinakkan hingga Dibungkam." *Komunika: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi* 8, no. 1 (July 2021): 53-60. https://doi.org/10.22236/komunika.v8i1.5672.

Sugitanata, Arif, and Abdul Majid. "Sistem Pemilu sebagai Wujud Demokrasi di Indonesia: Antara Orde Lama, Orde Baru dan Reformasi." *Qaumiyyah: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara* 2, no. 1 (2021): 1-21. https://doi.org/10.24239/qaumiyyah.v2i1.18.

Sulasman. *Metodologi Penelitian Sejarah*. 1st ed. Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2014.

Surpani, and Rumadi. "Dinamika Islam Indonesia: Islam dan Politik di Indonesia." *Dialektika Publik: Jurnal Pelayanan Publik dan Kebijakan Publik* 7, no. 2 (December 2023): 1-12. https://doi.org/10.33884/dialektikapublik.v7i2.8145.

Syaikh Abdul Aziz Abdullah Baaz. *Fatwa-fatwa Terlengkap Seputar Terorisme, Jihad dan Mengkafirkan Muslim*. Jakarta: Darul Haq, 2007.

Tamwifi, Irfan. *Islam dan Kegagalan Demokrasi: Menelusuri Jejak Politik Indonesia Hingga Penghujung Era Orde Baru*. Cet. 1. Surabaya: UIN Sunan Ampel Press, 2014.

Tempo. "Dari Cicendo, Soal Bai'at." 3 April 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Dimulai Dengan Armon." 9 January 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Imam Baru, di Bandung." 16 August 1980. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Penyerbuan di Cicendo." 9 January 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Salman, Revolusi dan Rheumason." 27 February 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Sang Imam pun Menangis." 27 February 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Sebuah Pengadilan Untuk Imam Im." 9 January 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tempo. "Semua Orang Mesti Mati, Kata Imran." 20 March 1982. Perpustakaan Batu Api.

Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme Melalui Pendekatan Ajaran Islam. *Meluruskan Makna Jihad Mencegah Terorisme Dilengkapi Fatwa MUI Tentang Terorisme*. Edisi khusus. Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 2009.

Wibowo, Indiwan Seto Wahyu. *Media dan Terorisme: Analisis Wacana Terorisme Indonesia*. 1st ed. Tangerang: UMN Press, 2015.

Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis. 2nd ed. London: SAGE, 2009.

Wijiharjono, Nuryadi. "Sejarah Pemikiran Politik Indonesia: Tanggapan Intelektual Muslim di Masa Orde Baru dan Pudarnya Peran ICMI pada Pasca-Reformasi." *SSRN*, 2021, 1-24. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3868423.

Yuantisya, Mutia, Ahmad Fikri, and Septhia. "7 Fakta Bom Bunuh Diri di Polsek Astanaanyar, Mantan Narapidana Terorisme hingga Lone Wolf." *Tempo*, 8 December 2022.

Yusuf, Muhammad, and Jun Mawalidin. "Pergeseran Pemikiran Nurcholish Madjid Tentang Partai Politik Islam di Indonesia." *Politica: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara dan Politik Islam* 9, no. 1 (June 2022): 66-85. https://doi.org/10.32505/politica.v9i1.3904.