Symbolic Diplomacy Under a Protectorate: Raja Ali Ja'far's Petition and the Ottoman Response, 1856–1858

Ali Azhar Syihabuddin[1*], Samsudin[2]
[12]Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University Bandung
*Correspondence : aliazharr14@gmail.com
Received: July 5, 2024; Accepted: October 7, 2024; Published Online: December 15, 2024;

Abstract

This article analyzes the 1856 petition of Raja Ali Ja'far, the Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau-Lingga, to Sultan Abdülmecid I and the Ottoman decision-making process through 1858. Its central question is how a kingdom whose foreign relations were constrained by a Dutch protectorate could still seek recognition from a transregional Muslim authority, and why Istanbul's response stopped at symbolic forms. The study uses the historical method through heuristics, external and internal source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. Its main sources include a series of Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi documents in BOA *İ.DH. 368/24377, BOA İ.DH.* 407/26941, BOA A.DVN.MHM. 25/97, and BOA A.DVN. 132/72; Riau-Lingga–Dutch contracts; Tuhfat al-Nafis; and contemporary newspapers. The *findings show* that the petition arose from the convergence of three processes: the narrowing of Riau-Lingga's sovereignty after the London Treaty of 1824 and the Contract of 1830, the Yang Dipertuan Muda elite's need for political legitimacy, and the availability of pilgrimage, ulama, sayyid, and Sufi networks connecting Penyengat, Singapore, Mecca, and Istanbul. The Ottoman government considered the request seriously, but granted only a third-class Nişan Mecidiye and permission for the Friday s*ermon to be de*livered in the Sultan's name; it provided neither a flag nor effective protection. This article argues that the relationship in 1856–1858 was symbolic diplomacy under a protectorate: a negotiation of sovereignty that offered Riau-Lingga a potential additional source of legitimacy without changing the colonial balance of power. Its novelty lies in an integrated reconstruction of Riau-Lingga's internal politics, the mobility of Muslim intermediaries, and Ottoman bureaucratic deliberation, while firmly distinguishing a request for protection, symbolic recognition, and material protection.

Keywords: **R**iau-Lingga; Ottoman Empire; Raja Ali Ja'far; symbolic diplomacy; protectorate; sovereignty

Copyright © 2024. Syihabuddin, A. A., & Samsudin.This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provide d the original work is properly cited.

Introduction

In 1856, Raja Ali Ja'far, the Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau-Lingga, sent an Arabic petition to Sultan Abdülmecid I. He asked that he and his descendants be received under the Ottoman Empire's protection and granted an imperial decree, an order of honor, and the imperial flag. The request seems paradoxical. Since the London Treaty of 1824, the political territory of Johor-Riau had been divided by an agreement between Britain and the Netherlands without the participation of Malay rulers. Six years later, the Riau-Lingga Contract of October 29, 1830, affirmed Dutch protection, restricted treaties with other powers, and placed succession to both the Sultanate and the office of Yang Dipertuan Muda under colonial government approval.[1] The letter to Istanbul was therefore more than pious correspondence. It was a political act that crossed the formal boundaries of the protectorate and showed that colonial power had not entirely closed off local elites' imagination or practice of foreign relations.

This episode took place at a time when pilgrimage and the pursuit of learning were expanding connections between Muslims of the Indonesian archipelago and the Haramain. Penyengat Island developed as a center of Malay-Islamic intellectual life, while Singapore provided a transit port for merchants, ulama, sayyids, and pilgrims. Within this space of movement, the Ottoman Empire came to mean more than a distant kingdom in Istanbul. Its position as ruler of the Haramain and a sovereign Muslim power allowed Southeast Asian elites to imagine it as a source of political and religious recognition.[2] Yet that symbolic meaning was not equivalent to an Ottoman capacity to provide military protection in the Strait of Malacca. In the mid-nineteenth century, Sultan Abdülmecid I's government was pursuing the Tanzimat and managing relations with European states after the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris of 1856.[3] The encounter between Riau's hopes and Istanbul's calculations determined the form of the relationship in 1856–1858.

Existing historiography has opened several important paths. Alaeddin Tekin treats the Raja Ali Ja'far episode as the first phase in the restoration of Riau–Ottoman relations through the early twentieth century and outlines several driving factors.[4] İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock have made available a corpus of Ottoman documents that allows this correspondence to be read through the traces of Istanbul's bureaucracy, rather than solely through colonial reports.[5] Virginia Matheson's study of Sultan Mahmud and the Malay royal line's strategies of survival helps explain Riau-

[1] Tim Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, *Surat-Surat Perdjandjian antara Kesultanan Riau dengan Pemerintahan-Pemerintahan V.O.C dan Hindia Belanda 1784–1909* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1970), 69–76.

[2] Helmiati, *Genealogi Intelektual Melayu: Tradisi dan Pemikiran Islam Abad ke-19 di Kerajaan Riau-Lingga* (Pekanbaru: SUSKA Press, 2008), 2; İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 1:75.

[3] Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 83–86; Hugh McKinnon Wood, "The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 37, no. 2 (1943): 267, 273.

[4] Alaeddin Tekin, "Restoration of Riau Sultanate-Ottoman Relations (1857–1904): Explanatory Factors," *Al-Shajarah* 26, no. 2 (2021): 177–196.

[5] İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

Lingga's internal political configuration, while research on Penyengat, ulama, and intellectual traditions reveals the social infrastructure linking the kingdom to the wider Muslim world.[6] Studies by Michael Laffan and Sumit K. Mandal, along with the volume edited by Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop, further show that Southeast Asian–Middle Eastern connections were built through intermediaries, travel, knowledge, and imaginings of the umma, not only through formal diplomatic representation.[7]

Nevertheless, an analytical gap remains. Studies of Riau-Lingga tend to center on the kingdom's division, the Sultan's politics, and Dutch intervention; studies of Ottoman–Southeast Asian relations more often adopt a regional scale or long time span; and Ottoman archival editions primarily supply a source corpus. As a result, the 1856 petition has not always been reconstructed as the intersection of a crisis of legitimacy for the Yang Dipertuan Muda, the restriction of sovereignty under the 1830 Contract, the work of Muslim intermediaries through Mecca, and a multistage deliberative process in Istanbul. Moreover, the term "diplomatic relations" risks obscuring the difference between communication, a request to become a protected party, symbolic recognition, and effective protection. This distinction matters because the sources show an official Ottoman response but no change in jurisdiction or deployment of force to protect Riau-Lingga.

This article aims to explain the context, process, form, and limits of Riau-Lingga–Ottoman relations in 1856–1858. Its principal questions are why Raja Ali Ja'far sought protection from the Ottoman Sultan while under the Dutch protectorate, how his letter traveled from Riau through Mecca to deliberation in Istanbul, and what political meaning lay in the Ottoman decision to grant an order of honor and permission for the Friday sermon but neither a flag nor material protection. The article argues that Raja Ali Ja'far's petition was a practice of symbolic diplomacy under a protectorate. It negotiated sovereignty through external recognition without the capacity to abolish colonial control. The study's novelty lies in a relational and microhistorical reading of the selected 1856–1858 documentary sequence: the petition, the envoys' account, the Grand Vizier's considerations, the Sultan's approval, the diploma for the order of honor, and news of the petitioner's death. This reading places local agency, intermediary networks, and Ottoman bureaucratic calculations in one causal sequence while avoiding the anachronistic projection of Abdülhamid II's Pan-Islamism onto the mid-1850s.

[6] Virginia Matheson, "Mahmud, Sultan of Riau and Lingga (1823–1864)," *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 119–146; Virginia Matheson, "Strategies of Survival: The Malay Royal Line of Lingga-Riau," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1986): 5–38; Virginia Matheson, "Pulau Penyengat: Nineteenth Century Islamic Centre of Riau," *Archipel* 37 (1989): 153–172; Helmiati, *Genealogi Intelektual Melayu: Tradisi dan Pemikiran Islam Abad ke-19 di Kerajaan Riau-Lingga* (Pekanbaru: SUSKA Press, 2008), 2.

[7] Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Sumit K. Mandal, *Becoming Arab: Creole Histories and Modern Identity in the Malay World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 143–145; Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop, eds., *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

Methods

This study uses the historical method, encompassing heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. At the heuristic stage, research was conducted at the National Library of the Republic of Indonesia, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, the library of UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Batoe Api Library in Jatinangor, and digital source providers. The principal guide to the Ottoman archives is the two-volume Ottoman-*Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives, which assem*bles images, transcriptions, and translations of documents from t*he Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşiv*i (BOA).[8] The core primary sources comprise Raja Ali Ja'far's petition (BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 [1]); the envoys' account explaining their mission (BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 [2]); the Grand Vizier's considerations and the Sultan's secretary's reply in February 1857 (BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 [5]); the decision and approval of June 1858 (BOA İ.DH. 407/26941); *the Meci*diye diploma (BOA A.DVN.MHM. 25/97); and the dispatch document of July 19, 1858 (BOA A.DVN. 132/72). These sources were compared with the Riau-Lingga–Dutch Contract published by *ANRI, Tuhfat al*-Nafis, and press reports on Raja Ali Ja'far's death.

External criticism examined the documents' origins, forms, and identities. The petition is in Arabic, handwritten, and bears Raja Ali Ja'far's official seal. The envoys' account also bears the sender's seal. Archival series identifiers, handwriting, seals, and relationships among documents were checked against digital reproductions and the archival edition transcribed by Kadı and Peacock. This criticism is important because the researcher worked with reproductions and a scholarly edition rather than the physical sheets in Istanbul. Claims about paper, ink, or custodial history were therefore not extended beyond the available information. For news of the death, dates in the English-language press were compared with Javasche Co*urant reports so* that the chronology would not depend solely on court sources.

Internal criticism assessed the purpose, the speaker's position, and consistency of content. Raja Ali Ja'far's petition uses diplomatic language designed to persuade its recipient; its expressions of loyalty, protection, and sincerity cannot be read as a neutral report. Conversely, the absence of the Dutch name from the petition does not mean colonialism was irrelevant. The envoys' account specifically states that the Jawi islands were under Dutch rule. Both documents were read alongside the Grand Vizier's considerations, which acknowledged the sincerity of the request but required assessment of its political implications.[9] This comparison distinguishes the petitioner's stated motives, information added by intermediaries, and the recipient's calculations. Narrative sources such as Tuhfat al-Nafi*s were used to u*nderstand succession and the portrayal of piety among Bugis elites, while taking account of the text's partiality toward the Bugis court milieu.

At the interpretation stage, the evidence was arranged chronologically and read within its social and political context. James C. Scott's concept of patron-client

[8] İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

[9] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 368/24377 (1), (2), and (5), reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

relations was used to test the nature of the exchange Raja Ali Ja'far sought: protection and legitimacy from a higher-status party in return for loyalty and recognition.[10] Pierre Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power helps explain why a medal and the mention of the Sultan's name in the Friday sermon could have political value without accompanying military force.[11] Both concepts serve as interpretive tools rather than substitutes for evidence. The historiography then traces events from the narrowing of Riau-Lingga's sovereignty, the formation of intermediary networks, and the dispatch of the petition to Istanbul's deliberations and the 1858 response. In this way, the article preserves chronology, causality, actors, and context while distinguishing verified facts from possibilities that remain unproven.

Results

The Dutch Protectorate and the Narrowing of Riau-Lingga's Sovereignty

The immediate background to the 1856 petition was formed by political changes that divided Johor-Riau and placed Riau-Lingga within a colonial structure. The London Treaty of March 17, 1824, established the division of British and Dutch spheres in Southeast Asia. That agreement between European powers separated centers of the Malay world previously connected to one another: Singapore and the Peninsula fell within the British sphere, while Riau-Lingga and areas to the south fell within the Dutch sphere. Malay rulers were not parties to the negotiations, but bore their territorial and dynastic consequences.[12] This division increased each branch of the kingdom's dependence on the colonial power supporting it.

The Contract of October 29, 1830, made those consequences more operational. Article 3 stated that the Sultan received the kingdom of Riau-Lingga through the generosity of the High Government of the Dutch East Indies and pledged loyalty. Article 5 prohibited the cession of territory and treaties with other nations without Dutch approval. Article 6 placed Riau-Lingga under the protection of the Dutch East Indies government. Article 7 retained the custom of selecting the Yang Dipertuan Muda from Bugis descendants, but required colonial approval for his inauguration.[13] This arrangement created a fundamental contradiction. The royal government still had offices, rituals, and administration, but external authority and succession were no longer determined entirely from within. A protectorate did not immediately abolish all local institutions; it altered relationships of authority so that key decisions depended on colonial recognition.

This contradiction is visible in the succession following the death of Yang Dipertuan Muda Abdul Rahman in June 1844. Sultan Mahmud proposed Raja Ali

[10] James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (1972): 91–113, especially 92.

[11] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 75–76, 107–109.

[12] C. D. Cowan, ed., "Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore, 1805–1832: A Series of Documents from the Manuscript Records of the East India Company," *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 23, no. 2 (1950): 145–147; Ahmad Dahlan, *Sejarah Melayu* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2014), 276–277.

[13] Tim Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, *Surat-Surat Perdjandjian antara Kesultanan Riau dengan Pemerintahan-Pemerintahan V.O.C dan Hindia Belanda 1784–1909* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1970), 69, 71–76.

Ja'far, Raja Abdullah, and Raja Idris as possible successors, then left Riau for Singapore without making a single choice. The dignitaries deliberated under Raja Ali Haji's guidance and chose Raja Ali Ja'far on June 25, 1844. Yet internal legitimacy was insufficient. The Sultan formally appointed him only after returning, and Raja Ali Ja'far subsequently swore loyalty to the Dutch in July 1845.[14] This sequence reveals three sources of validation that did not always align: elite deliberation, the Malay Sultan's sacral legitimacy, and colonial consent.

The position of Yang Dipertuan Muda also carried its own historical problem. The office belonged to the Bugis elite line, whereas the Sultan derived legitimacy from the Malay dynasty. The Yang Dipertuan Muda could wield considerable practical power, but the Bugis line still needed to justify its position before the Sultan, Malay groups, and the Dutch. Tuhfat al-Nafis portrays Raja Ali Ja'far as a pious leader who respected ulama, upheld religious rules, and curtailed actions deemed contrary to Islam.[15] This portrayal cannot be accepted as disinterested description because the text arose from an elite milieu close to Raja Ali Haji. Yet precisely as political representation, the narrative shows that piety was an important language of legitimacy for Bugis leadership.

Thus, the request to the Ottoman Sultan did not arise in a vacuum. Raja Ali Ja'far had obtained office through court mechanisms, the Sultan's recognition, and Dutch approval, but these three also exposed the fragility of the Yang Dipertuan Muda's autonomy. The 1856 petition sought a fourth source of legitimacy: recognition by a Muslim ruler whose authority reached beyond colonial boundaries. Because Article 5 of the 1830 Contract restricted relations with other nations, the act also tested the political space still available to Riau-Lingga's elite.

Pilgrimage, Ulama, and Muslim Intermediary Networks

The ability to send a petition to Istanbul depended on networks formed before 1856. In 1824, Raja Ahmad and his son Raja Ali, later known as Raja Ali Haji, made the pilgrimage via Singapore and Penang. *Tuhfat al-Nafis* shows that the journey was not only a private ritual but opened connections with ports, ulama, and centers of learning beyond Riau.[16] In the nineteenth century, Penyengat then grew as a center of writing and Islamic education. This tradition strengthened the court elite's standing

[14] Raja Haji Ahmad and Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, ed. Virginia Matheson (Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1997), 288–291; Virginia Matheson, "Mahmud, Sultan of Riau and Lingga (1823–1864)," *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 133; E. Netscher, *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602–1865* (Batavia: Bruining and Wijt, 1870), 299–300.

[15] Raja Haji Ahmad and Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, ed. Virginia Matheson (Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1997), 292–294; İsmail Hakkı Kadı, "The Ottomans and Southeast Asia Prior to the Hamidian Era: A Critique of Colonial Perceptions of Ottoman-Southeast Asian Interaction," in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 160–161.

[16] Raja Haji Ahmad and Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, ed. Virginia Matheson (Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1997), 259–260.

as producers of knowledge while connecting them to the circulation of books, teachers, and pilgrims.[17]

Sufi networks formed one layer of these connections. Syekh Ismail al-Minangkabawi brought the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya into Riau-Lingga circles. Raja Ali Ja'far and other dignitaries reportedly pledged allegiance to it, while collective dhikr was held regularly. *The English* translation of Tuhfat al-Nafis places the acceptance of those teachings during Raja Ali Ja'far's tenure.[18] Sufi affiliation does not in itself prove the existence of a diplomatic chain of command from Riau to Istanbul. It does, however, indicate the presence of a religious language and social ties that could help build trust among people traveling through Singapore and Mecca.

The petition's intermediaries show how that network worked in concrete terms. Raja Ali Ja'far's letter was carried by Syekh Ahmad al-Jawi. In Mecca, Sayyid Zayn bin Husayn and Syekh Ismail Efendi assisted him; their business was then conveyed through the Emir of Mecca, Abdullah Pasha, to the Ottoman bureaucracy. Syekh Ahmad's seal on the envoys' document includes the *designation al-Khalidi a*l-Naqshbandi, indicating his Sufi affiliation.[19] This evidence connects the actors, but must be read with care. It supports the conclusion that religious networks provided infrastructure for mobility and credibility, not that a Sufi order as an organization made Riau-Lingga's political decisions.

The presence of a sayyid as an intermediary also matters. In the Strait of Malacca region, Hadrami families and merchants moved among religious life, trade, and pilgrimage. Their position enabled them to translate local elites' demands into language intelligible to authorities in Mecca and Istanbul.[20] In this case, the intermediaries did more than carry a letter. They added geographical and colonial context that Raja Ali Ja'far did not state openly. Diplomacy thus proceeded through several layers: political intent originated in Riau, found channels in maritime and religious networks, was reformulated in Mecca, and then entered Istanbul's administrative procedures.

The 1856 Petition: A Request for Protection and the Language of Legitimacy

Raja Ali Ja'far's petition addresses Abdülmecid I as Sultan of the Muslims, servant of the Two Holy Cities, and upholder of justice. Raja Ali then introduces himself as a ruler in Bandar Riau who inherited his position from his ancestors. The

[17] Virginia Matheson, "Pulau Penyengat: Nineteenth Century Islamic Centre of Riau," *Archipel* 37 (1989): 153–172; Helmiati, *Genealogi Intelektual Melayu: Tradisi dan Pemikiran Islam Abad ke-19 di Kerajaan Riau-Lingga* (Pekanbaru: SUSKA Press, 2008), 2.

[18] Raja Ali Haji bin Ahmad, *The Precious Gift (Tuhfat al-Nafis)*, trans. Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), 285; Martin van Bruinessen, *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), 99–100.

[19] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 368/24377 (2), reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

[20] Sumit K. Mandal, *Becoming Arab: Creole Histories and Modern Identity in the Malay World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 143–145; İsmail Hakkı Kadı, "The Ottomans and Southeast Asia Prior to the Hamidian Era: A Critique of Colonial Perceptions of Ottoman-Southeast Asian Interaction," in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 170–172.

core of his request is to be "under his protection" and become one of the Ottoman Sultan's subjects and protected parties. He hopes that protection will extend to his descendants. As tangible forms of recognition, he requests an imperial decree, an order of honor, and the imperial flag.[21] This formulation brings together religious, dynastic, and political language. Loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan is presented as Muslim loyalty, but the benefits requested are concrete: strengthening the position of the petitioner and his heirs against possible opposition.

The petition does not mention the Dutch. This omission can be read as a strategy of caution, rather than proof that colonial relations had no influence. Raja Ali Ja'far was known to cooperate with Dutch officials, and open confrontation posed an immediate risk to his office. Yet a request to be received as a protected party by another authority contradicted the logic of Articles 3, 5, and 6 of the 1830 Contract. An Ottoman decree and flag, if granted and displayed, would also introduce an external source of authority into territory claimed to be under Dutch protection. The petition's silence about the Dutch thus preserved ambiguity: Raja Ali Ja'far did not declare hostility, but proposed a relationship that could challenge the protectorate's exclusivity.

The envoys' account clarifies what the petition leaves unstated. They explain Riau's position between Siam and Java and note that the Jawi islands were under Dutch rule. Having supplied that context, they repeat the request that Raja Ali Ja'far be granted the status of an Ottoman subject and placed under the Sultan's protection. The difference between the documents indicates a division of functions.[22] The petition maintains diplomatic etiquette without accusing a particular power; the accompanying account gives the receiving bureaucracy the information needed to assess the political consequences. Colonial relations were therefore not absent from the mission. They appeared through the intermediaries' voices.

The petition also shows that "protection" had several levels of meaning. At its fullest, it could mean a transfer of allegiance and an Ottoman political guarantee. At a ceremonial level, it could mean religious and dynastic recognition through a decree, medal, and flag. The petitioner did not clearly distinguish these meanings. The form of the new relationship can therefore be established only by examining the Ottoman reply. Raja Ali Ja'far's intention went beyond exchanging gifts, but the petition's success cannot be judged from the language of the request alone.

[21] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 368/24377 (1), reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

[22] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 368/24377 (2), reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020); Alaeddin Tekin, "Restoration of Riau Sultanate-Ottoman Relations (1857–1904): Explanatory Factors," *Al-Shajarah* 26, no. 2 (2021): 185–186.




Figure 1. Raja Ali Ja'far's letter to Sultan Abdülmecid I, 1856. Source: BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 (1).

The document in Figure 1 begins the sequence of correspondence. Its seal and formal language mark the sender's authority, while the petition provides access to how Raja Ali Ja'far presented himself before the Ottoman Sultan. Its evidentiary value lies chiefly in the petitioner's stated intention and representational strategy; by itself, the document does not establish that all his demands were accepted.

Istanbul's Deliberations and the Response of 1857–1858

After the mission reached the Ottoman authorities, the Grand Vizier reported it to the Sultan on February 11, 1857. The report mentioned a request for a document placing Raja Ali Ja'far among the Caliph's subjects in keeping wi*th the principle o*f vahdet-i Islamiyet and acknowledged that the request arose from sincere belief. The same official, however, stressed that its political implications required consideration in a deliberative council. The Sultan's secretary approved this step on February 12.[23] This initial response matters because it shows two assessments proceeding together: religious solidarity was considered valid, but diplomatic consequences could not be ignored.

The lapse of more than a year before the final decision shows that Istanbul did not simply issue a ceremonial reply. Information about Raja Ali Ja'far was gathered through Mecca and the envoys' network. On June 20, 1858, the Grand Vizier proposed a limited solution: a thir*d-class Nişan M*ecidiye, permission to deliver the Friday sermon in the Ottoman Sultan's name, and allowances and travel expenses for the

[23] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 368/24377 (5), Grand Vizier to the Sultan, February 11 1857, and the Sultan's secretary's reply, February 12 1857, reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archive*s, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

envoys. The Sultan approved it on June 21.[24] The requested flag was absent from the decision. The Ottoman government thus acknowledged the need for honor and religious connection, but took no step that could plainly be interpreted as establishing new jurisdiction or a protectorate.

The decision was followed by an award diploma dated July 12, 1858, and a dispatch document of July 19, 1858.[25] *The Nişan Mec*idiye, instituted under Abdülmecid I, was a graded order of honor that could be conferred on Ottoman subjects and foreigners alike. Its third class carried greater prestige than an ordinary award and linked the recipient to the state's language of service, courage, and loyalty.[26] Permission for the Friday sermon also had political and religious meaning, because naming a ruler in the Friday invocation could signal recognition of his authority. Both actions, however, remained distinct from a promise of military assistance, the posting of a representative, or intervention against the Dutch.

Table 1. Chronology of Riau-Lingga–Ottoman Documents and Decisions, 1830–1858

Date	Document/event	Main action	Evidentiary significance
October 29, 1830	Riau-Lingga–Dutch Contract	Restricts foreign relations; affirms Dutch protection and approval of succession	Legal and political context of the petition
1856	BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 (1)	Raja Ali Ja'far requests protection, a decree, an order of honor, and a flag	The petitioner's intentions and language of legitimacy
1856–1857	BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 (2)	The envoys explain Riau and Dutch rule over the Jawi islands	Colonial context enters through intermediaries
February 11–12, 1857	BOA İ.DH. 368/24377 (5)	The Grand Vizier requests deliberation; the Sultan approves discussion	The request is judged sincere but politically sensitive

[24] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 407/26941, Grand Vizier to the Sultan, June 20 1858, and the Sultan's approval through his secretary, June 21 1858, reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

[25] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), A.DVN.MHM. 25/97, Mecidiye award diplo*ma for R*aja Ali bin Ja'far, July 12 1858; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), A.DVN. 132/72, dispatch document, July 19 1858; Alaeddin Tekin, "Restoration of Riau Sultanate-Ottoman Relations (1857–1904): Explanatory Factors," A*l-Shajarah* 26, no. 2 (2021): 189.

[26] Kemal Hakan Tekin, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gelenekten Yeniliğe Geçişin Anlamlı Bir Sembolü: Mecidi Nişanları," *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 28 (Autumn II 2014): 396; Edhem Eldem, "The Changing Design and Rhetoric of Ottoman Decorations, 1850–1920," *The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts* 28, no. 2 (2016): 33–34.

June 1857	Contemporary press reports	Raja Ali Ja'far dies	The petitioner dies before the final decision
June 20–21, 1858	BOA İ.DH. 407/26941	A third-class order of honor, permission for the Friday sermon, and envoys' expenses are approved	Official but limited recognition
July 12 and 19, 1858	BOA A.DVN.MHM. 25/97; BOA A.DVN. 132/72	The diploma is issued and dispatch processed	Administrative stage of implementing the decision

The table's chronology shows that the Ottoman decision came too late for the petitioner. Raja Ali Ja'far died in June 1857, almost a year before the final decision, as reported by T*he Free Press* and J*avasche Courant*.[27] His death did not halt the administration of the award, but changed its potential impact. Raja Ali Ja'far could no longer personally use the order of honor and permission for the Friday sermon to strengthen his standing as Yang Dipertuan Muda. The archives confirm the decision and dispatch process, but available sources have not established when the object reached Riau, who received it after Raja Ali Ja'far's death, or how the decision concerning the Friday sermon was implemented.

Limits of the Relationship's Realization

Research has not yet located Raja Ali Ja'f*ar's Nişan Me*cidiye. Two later Riau-Lingga Friday sermon manuscripts, EAP 153/13/21 dated 1894 and EAP 153/11/28 thought to date from 1883–1899, mention the local Sultan and Yang Dipertuan Muda rather than the Ottoman Sultan.[28] This evidence matters as a limit on what can be established, but cannot determine practice in 1858. The gap of several decades, possible political changes, and the small number of manuscripts mean that the absence of the Ottoman name in two later texts does not prove that the permission was never exercised.

Similarly, the disappearance of the medal's trail does not prove that the Dutch confiscated or destroyed it. Without additional sources, it is not possible to decide whether its dispatch was interrupted, whether it was handed to the family, lost in a move, or treated in some other way. Ottoman archives establish the decision and dispatch procedure; they do not establish the object's journey after it left Istanbul's bureaucracy. This limit requires a distinction between the administrative reality on the Ottoman side and the social and political realization in Riau-Lingga.

[27] "The Late Rajah Muda of Rhio," *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, July 16, 1857, 3; "Inofficieel Gedeelte," *Javasche Courant*, September 11, 1857.

[28] Endangered Archives Programme, British Library, EAP 153/13/21, "Khutbah Jumat," 1313 H/1894 M; Endangered Archives Programme, British Library, EAP 153/11/28, "Khutbah Jumat," ca. 1883–1899.

In factual terms, the relationship's outcome can be described at three levels. First, communication succeeded: the petition traveled through intermediaries and was received by the Ottoman center. Second, symbolic recognition was granted through an order of honor and permission for the Friday sermon. Third, effective protection did not take shape: there is no evidence of a defense treaty, posted representative, flag, or intervention against Dutch control. The second level should not be dismissed as mere courtesy, but neither should it be elevated to a change of sovereignty.

Discussion

Negotiating Sovereignty from Within a Protectorate

The findings above show that a colonial protectorate did not produce a completely closed form of political compliance. The 1830 Contract did restrict diplomacy and place succession under Dutch approval, but local elites retained the capacity to establish transregional communication. Raja Ali Ja'far used networks of pilgrims, ulama, sayyids, and ports to communicate beyond Riau. His political agency took the form neither of a declaration of war nor of repudiating the contract, but of seeking alternative recognition in language sufficiently ambiguous to avoid direct confrontation.

This is where the term "symbolic diplomacy under a protectorate" is useful. The diplomacy was real because it involved a ruler, envoys, an official letter, officials in Mecca, the Grand Vizier, the Sultan, and an administrative decision. Yet its aims and outcomes centered on symbols of authority. Raja Ali Ja'far sought recognition for his line of descendants, a need closely tied to the Yang Dipertuan Muda's position between the Malay Sultan's legitimacy and Dutch approval. The Ottomans then gave a form of recognition that could enhance prestige without declaring a transfer of territory. This relationship widened the arena in which sovereignty was negotiated, but did not dismantle the colonial structure controlling Riau-Lingga.

This reading both reinforces and sharpens the political historiography of Riau-Lingga. Matheson shows that Malay and Bugis elites developed survival strategies amid divided authority, while Tuhfat al-Nafis *records the im*portance of legitimacy, deliberation, and portrayals of piety.[29] The 1856 episode adds an external dimension to those strategies. The Yang Dipertuan Muda negotiated not only with the Sultan and the resident, but also linked his standing to a distant center of Muslim authority. Internal politics and foreign relations therefore cannot be separated. The request for Ottoman recognition answered a domestic problem shaped by colonialism.

An Incomplete Patron-Client Relationship

Within Scott's framework, the petition imagines an asymmetrical dyadic relationship. Raja Ali Ja'far offers loyalty, obedience, and recognition to the Ottoman Sultan; in exchange, he expects protection and legitimacy for himself and his descendants. The structure of the request follows patron-client logic: a party with fewer resources seeks security from a higher authority, while the patron gains loyalty

[29] Virginia Matheson, "Strategies of Survival: The Malay Royal Line of Lingga-Riau," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1986): 5–38; Raja Haji Ahmad and Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, ed. Virginia Matheson (Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1997), 288–294.

and extended prestige.[30] The 1858 decision shows, however, that this exchange was only partially realized.

The Ottomans could issue documents, an order of honor, and ritual permission, but the documents do not show coercive force being projected into Riau. Geographic distance, Riau's position under Dutch domination, and the absence of any documented Ottoman fleet or consul assigned to the kingdom limited the response. At the same time, the Tanzimat and the Ottomans' admission into the European order after the Treaty of Paris of 1856 called for caution in matters that might lead to disputes with another European power.[31] The Grand Vizier's concern about "political implications" and the omission of the flag from the final decision are consistent with those constraints. This is an inference from the documents' sequence and international context, not an explicit statement that the Dutch threatened Istanbul.

The patron-client relationship was thus incomplete: strong enough to produce recognition, too weak to change protection on the ground. There is even a double irony. The Dutch were the effective patron because they possessed officials, a contract, and the ability to influence succession, but their recognition reduced Riau-Lingga's sovereignty. The Ottomans were the ideal patron because they offered transregional Islamic authority, but were absent when material security was at stake. Raja Ali Ja'far moved between the two: he swore loyalty to the Dutch to preserve his office while seeking a source of legitimacy not entirely controlled by them.

The Political Force of the Medal and Friday Sermon

Material limitations do not mean that symbols lost their political force. In Bourdieu's framework, symbols work when the granting authority and receiving community recognize their meaning.[32] *The Nişan Mecid*iye linked Raja Ali Ja'far to the Ottoman state's hierarchy of honors. It could show that a Yang Dipertuan Muda in Riau had received Sultan Abdülmecid I's attention. Permission for the Friday sermon worked through another medium. Mentioning the Sultan's name in the Friday ritual could express a religious connection and repeatedly make that recognition audible to congregants. The medal operated through an object and its display; the sermon through language, ritual, and public hearing.

The effectiveness of symbols, however, depends on circulation and reception. Because Raja Ali Ja'far died before the 1858 decision, the principal person expected to make use of the recognition was no longer alive. Because neither the medal's presence nor the delivery of the sermon has been verified, the local impact of either symbol cannot be stated as fact. What can be affirmed is the Ottoman intention to grant both and their potential political significance. The distinction among decision, dispatch, receipt, and use is an important result of source criticism.

The decision did not grant a flag, although one had been explicitly requested. This difference reveals a scale of risk. A medal could be framed as a personal honor

[30] James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (1972): 92.

[31] Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 83–86; Hugh McKinnon Wood, "The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 37, no. 2 (1943): 267, 273.

[32] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 75–76, 107–109.

for a foreign leader; the Friday sermon could be placed within a religious bond; but a flag could more readily be read as a mark of jurisdiction and state presence. The package of decisions in 1858 can therefore be understood as symbolic calibration: meaningful enough to answer the appeal to solidarity and loyalty, but not explicit enough to mark an Ottoman protectorate. The response was a limited acceptance, rather than a rejection.

Intermediaries as Diplomatic Actors

The documentary reconstruction also shifts attention from relations between two courts to the actors connecting them. Syekh Ahmad al-Jawi, Sayyid Zayn bin Husayn, Syekh Ismail Efendi, and Abdullah Pasha enabled the petition to travel, be translated politically, and gain bureaucratic access. Without them, Raja Ali Ja'far's wishes might never have reached the Grand Vizier's desk. Intermediaries also had agency in deciding what information to add. Mention of Dutch power in the envoys' account made the international implications of the request for protection explicit.

These findings agree with Mandal's study of Arab-Hadrami networks and Kadı's critique of colonial assumptions that diminish Ottoman–Southeast Asian connections before the Hamidian period.[33] The Riau case shows, however, that "intermediary" is not a single category. It encompasses an envoy from the Jawi world, a sayyid in Mecca, ulama, Haramain officials, and central bureaucrats. Authority moved through a sequence of different people rather than a direct modern diplomatic channel. The relationship should therefore be understood through nineteenth-century infrastructure, in which pilgrimage, Sufi orders, trade, and official correspondence could overlap.

Syekh Ahmad's Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya affiliation strengthens the possibility that Sufi networks helped build trust. The Penyengat court's closeness to Syekh Ismail al-Minangkabawi and Raja Ali Ja'far's pledge of allegiance provide plausible context. Even so, a shared affiliation does not prove organizational coordination. The article's novelty is not a claim that a Sufi order controlled diplomacy, but its positioning of religious networks as social infrastructure enabling royal diplomacy beyond colonial channels.

Islamic Unity Before Hamidian Pan-Islamism

The term *vahdet-i Islamiyet* in the Grand Vizier's report shows that the language of Islamic unity was already available to the Ottoman bureaucracy when it assessed Riau's request in 1857.[34] This episode, however, preceded Abdülhamid II's reign and the more systematic Pan-Islamist policies of the late nineteenth century. To call Raja Ali Ja'far's petition a direct product of Hamidian Pan-Islamism would reverse the

[33] Sumit K. Mandal, *Becoming Arab: Creole Histories and Modern Identity in the Malay World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 143–145; İsmail Hakkı Kadı, "The Ottomans and Southeast Asia Prior to the Hamidian Era: A Critique of Colonial Perceptions of Ottoman-Southeast Asian Interaction," in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 170–172.

[34] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), İ.DH. 368/24377 (5), Grand Vizier to the Sultan, February 11 1857, reproduced and translated in İsmail Hakkı Kadı and A.C.S. Peacock, *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

chronology. It is more accurately seen as part of a pre-Hamidian vocabulary of Muslim solidarity that grew from the Ottoman position, its authority over the Haramain, pilgrimage mobility, and shared experience of European expansion.

This position clarifies the article's relationship to previous research. Literature on colonial Pan-Islamism helps explain why Ottoman symbols later caused Dutch anxiety, but the 1856–1858 episode had its own logic.[35] The initiative came from Raja Ali Ja'far, not from an Ottoman state campaign to organize Muslims of the Indies. Istanbul responded cautiously after receiving the request rather than initiating mobilization. The chief agency lay with Riau's elite and Muslim intermediaries, while the Ottomans acted as recipients who selected the form of recognition.

Riau-Lingga–Ottoman relations therefore belong to the long continuity of connections between the Malay world and the Middle East, while also showing change. The continuity lies in drawing on transregional Muslim authority and Haramain routes. The change lies in the nineteenth-century legal and political setting: a colonial protectorate, diplomacy among European states, Tanzimat reforms, and the use of modern orders of honor. The Nişan Meci*diye itself em*erged from the modernization of the Ottoman honors system, so the 1858 decision combined Islamic solidarity with the instruments of a state undergoing modernization.

Place in the Historiography and Limits of the Claims

This article confirms Tekin's finding that Riau–Ottoman relations produced ceremonial recognition, rather than a de facto political arrangement.[36] Its contribution is to narrow the time scale and deepen the causal connections among the 1830 Contract, succession to the office of Yang Dipertuan Muda, the petition's contents, the envoys' work, and the 1857–1858 deliberations. Kadı and Peacock's corpus makes it possible to view the Ottoman center as an aren*a of decision; Tuh*fat al-Nafis and the ANRI contract place the mission within Riau's politics; contemporary newspapers correct the assumption that Raja Ali Ja'far lived to enjoy its results. Together, these sources yield a history of the relationship that goes beyond an inventory of contacts.

This reading also rejects two extremes. The first dismisses the medal and Friday sermon as meaningless ceremony. In the context of the Yang Dipertuan Muda's legitimacy, recognition from the Ottoman Sultan had real potential to confer prestige. The second treats the decision as proof that Riau-Lingga effectively became part of the Ottoman Empire. No source shows a change in administration, jurisdiction, or military protection. The category of "symbolic diplomacy" retains the importance of the action without going beyond the evidence.

The final limit of the claims concerns the Dutch role after 1858. The literature shows growing colonial vigilance toward pilgrims, Arabs, and Ottoman symbols in

[35] Anthony Reid, "Pan-Islamisme Abad Kesembilan Belas di Indonesia dan Malaysia," in *Kekacauan dan Kerusuhan: Tiga Tulisan tentang Pan-Islamisme di Hindia Belanda Timur pada Akhir Abad Kesembilan Belas dan Awal Abad Kedua Puluh*, ed. Nico J. G. Kaptein (Jakarta: INIS, 2003), 1, 3.

[36] Alaeddin Tekin, "Restoration of Riau Sultanate-Ottoman Relations (1857–1904): Explanatory Factors," *Al-Shajarah* 26, no. 2 (2021): 184–190.

the second half of the nineteenth century.[37] In the specific case of Raja Ali Ja'far's medal, however, no document establishing its confiscation has yet been found. Nor are two late nineteenth-century sermon manuscripts enough to prove that mention of the Ottoman Sultan was forbidden in 1858. The article therefore replaces a conjectural causal claim with a research agenda: the Riau residency archives, Penyengat family correspondence, inventories of heirlooms, and sermon manuscripts closer to 1858 need to be examined to establish how the symbols were received and used.

Conclusion

Riau-Lingga–Ottoman relations in 1856–1858 arose from the convergence of narrowing sovereignty, a need for legitimacy, and transregional Muslim networks. The London Treaty of 1824 divided the political space of Johor-Riau, while the 1830 Contract affirmed the Dutch protectorate, restricted foreign relations, and inserted colonial approval into succession to the office of Yang Dipertuan Muda. Within this structure, Raja Ali Ja'far sought an alternative source of recognition to strengthen his position and that of his descendants. Pilgrimage, ulama, sayyid, and Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya networks provided social channels connecting Riau, Singapore, Mecca, and Istanbul.

The 1856 petition requested more than an honor: Raja Ali Ja'far wanted a position under Ottoman protection, a decree, an order of honor, and a flag. The envoys added the context of Dutch power, which the main petition did not mention. The Ottoman government judged the request sincere, but discussed its political implications before issuing a limited decision. In 1858, Istanbul approved a *third-class Ni*şan Mecidiye and permission for the Friday sermon in the Sultan's name, and covered the envoys' travel, but provided neither a flag nor material protection. Because Raja Ali Ja'far died in 1857, he could not personally use that recognition.

The article's principal finding is that this episode constituted symbolic diplomacy under a protectorate. Riau-Lingga crossed the limits on colonial communication and obtained official recognition from a Muslim center of power, but that recognition did not change effective Dutch authority. The patron-client relationship imagined by the petitioner received a symbolic response, not coercive protection. The historiographical contribution lies in distinguishing a request for protection, a symbolic decision, and material realization; treating Muslim intermediaries as diplomatic actors; and reading Islamic unity in the 1850s without projecting Hamidian Pan-Islamism onto an earlier period. Given the limits of the available sources, the medal's whereabouts in Riau and the implementation of the Friday sermon remain open questions, not grounds for concluding that colonial authorities confiscated or prohibited them.

References

Primary Sources

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA). A.DVN. 132/72.

[37] Jan van der Putten, "Of Missed Opportunities, Colonial Law and Islamophobia," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 34, no. 100 (2006): 345–346.

———. A.DVN.MHM. 25/97.

———. İ.DH. 368/24377 (1), (2), and (5).

———. İ.DH. 407/26941.

Endangered Archives Programme, British Library. EAP 153/11/28. "Khutbah Jumat." Ca. 1883–1899.

———. EAP 153/13/21. "Khutbah Jumat." 1313 H/1894 M.

"Inofficieel Gedeelte." *Javasche Courant*, 11 September 1857.

Raja Haji Ahmad, and Raja Ali Haji. *Tuhfat al-Nafis*. Edited by Virginia Matheson. Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1997.

Raja Ali Haji bin Ahmad. *The Precious Gift (Tuhfat al-Nafis)*. Translated by Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982.

"The Late Rajah Muda of Rhio." *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, July 16, 1857.

Tim Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia. *Surat-Surat Perdjandjian antara Kesultanan Riau dengan Pemerintahan-Pemerintahan V.O.C dan Hindia Belanda 1784–1909*. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1970.

Secondary Sources

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

Bruinessen, Martin van. *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan, 1992.

Cowan, C. D., ed. "Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore, 1805–1832: A Series of Documents from the Manuscript Records of the East India Company." *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 23, no. 2 (1950): 1–210.

Dahlan, Ahmad. *Sejarah Melayu*. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2014.

Davison, Roderic H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Eldem, Edhem. "The Changing Design and Rhetoric of Ottoman Decorations, 1850–1920." *The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts* 28, no. 2 (2016): 24–46.

Helmiati. *Genealogi Intelektual Melayu: Tradisi dan Pemikiran Islam Abad ke-19 di Kerajaan Riau-Lingga*. Pekanbaru: SUSKA Press, 2008.

Kadı, İsmail Hakkı. "The Ottomans and Southeast Asia Prior to the Hamidian Era: A Critique of Colonial Perceptions of Ottoman-Southeast Asian Interaction." In *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia*, edited by Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop, 149–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Kadı, İsmail Hakkı, and A.C.S. Peacock. *Ottoman-Southeast Asian Relations: Sources from the Ottoman Archives*. 2 vols. Leiden: Brill, 2020.

Laffan, Michael Francis. *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds*. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Mandal, Sumit K. *Becoming Arab: Creole Histories and Modern Identity in the Malay World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Matheson, Virginia. "Mahmud, Sultan of Riau and Lingga (1823–1864)." *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 119–146.

———. "Pulau Penyengat: Nineteenth Century Islamic Centre of Riau." *Archipel* 37 (1989): 153–172.

———. "Strategies of Survival: The Malay Royal Line of Lingga-Riau." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1986): 5–38.

Netscher, E. *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602–1865*. Batavia: Bruining and Wijt, 1870.

Peacock, Andrew, and Annabel Teh Gallop, eds. *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Putten, Jan van der. "Of Missed Opportunities, Colonial Law and Islamophobia." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 34, no. 100 (2006): 341–351.

Reid, Anthony. "Pan-Islamisme Abad Kesembilan Belas di Indonesia dan Malaysia." In *Kekacauan dan Kerusuhan: Tiga Tulisan tentang Pan-Islamisme di Hindia Belanda Timur pada Akhir Abad Kesembilan Belas dan Awal Abad Kedua Puluh*, edited by Nico J. G. Kaptein, 1–28. Jakarta: INIS, 2003.

Scott, James C. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (1972): 91–113.

Tekin, Alaeddin. "Restoration of Riau Sultanate-Ottoman Relations (1857–1904): Explanatory Factors." *Al-Shajarah* 26, no. 2 (2021): 177–196.

Tekin, Kemal Hakan. "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gelenekten Yeniliğe Geçişin Anlamlı Bir Sembolü: Mecidi Nişanları." *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 28 (Autumn II 2014): 393–411.

Wood, Hugh McKinnon. "The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law." *American Journal of International Law* 37, no. 2 (1943): 262–274.