Between the Republic, Pasundan, and an Islamic State: The Spectrum of West Javanese Muslim Political Responses to Dutch Federalization, 1947–1950

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Abstract

This article examines the formation of the State of Pasundan and the spectrum of Muslim political responses in West Java during the Dutch federalization project of 1947–1950. Moving beyond studies centered on federal engineering, the *menak*, the Pasundan People's Party, or the Republic's role in dismantling the state, it treats Muslim organizations and actors as a politically heterogeneous field. The study applies the historical method of heuristics, external and internal source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. Contemporary Indonesian- and Dutch-language newspapers, Pasundan government and parliamentary records, and visual documentation are triangulated with secondary scholarship. The findings reveal three orientations: Republican-unitarist mobilization through conferences, resolutions, the press, and political delegations; institutional participation by several Muslim figures, which did not necessarily signify ideological endorsement of federalism; and Darul Islam's rejection of both Pasundan and the Republic in favor of an Islamic state. These responses challenged Pasundan's legitimacy from different directions. Muslim agency mattered, but operated alongside a crisis of representation, dual administration, security dependence, and the APRA shock. The article's novelty lies in a relational typology of Muslim responses and an explanation of contested legitimacy rather than a monocausal claim about Pasundan's collapse.

Keywords: State of Pasundan; Dutch federalization; Muslim politics; West Java; Indonesian Revolution; political legitimacy

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Introduction

The proclamation of August 17, 1945, did not immediately produce stable sovereignty. Amid military conflict and diplomacy, the Dutch sought to reorganize the Indonesian archipelago into a federation in which the Republic of Indonesia would be one component among several states. The Linggarjati negotiations opened the way for the idea of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), but their implementation was overshadowed by differences of interpretation and the First Dutch Military Aggression. Van Mook then expanded the federal strategy through the Malino and Denpasar Conferences, formation of states, the *Provisional Federal Government, a*nd the Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg (BFO). Federalism during the revolution was thus more than a constitutional debate between a unitary and federal state. It was a technology of power linking diplomacy, territorial control, co-optation of local elites, and rival institutions to the Republic.[1]

West Java occupied a strategic place in this project. Its territory was extensive and populous, close to Batavia, and an important base of the Republican struggle. The first attempt came through the Pasundan People's Party (PRP), founded by Suria Kartalegawa on November 18, 1946. With colonial officials' support, the PRP proclaimed the State of Pasundan in Bandung's town square on May 4, 1947. Dutch assistance with mobilization, transport, and propaganda made the proclamation appear from the outset a construction from above, while opposition from Paguyuban Pasundan, Sundanese figures, the Wiranatakusumah family, and public meetings showed its thin social legitimacy.[2] The failure of Kartalegawa's version did not stop the project. Through three West Java Conferences, especially the third in February–March 1948, the Dutch facilitated a more formal political structure. R.A.A. Wiranatakusumah was chosen as Head of State and inaugurated in April 1948; a cabinet, parliament, and legislative procedures were then established along parliamentary lines.

Formal institutions did not eliminate the problem of sovereignty. Pasundan's government faced enduring Republican influence, Dutch control, administrative dualism, and the Darul Islam movement. Parliamentary archives do show rules of procedure, amendments to bills, and representation of several factions and groups. Territorial, staffing, and security powers, however, were not fully in Pasundan's hands. In 1949–1950, press reports repeatedly described cabinet crises, TNI-established civilian administrations in several areas, and tensions between federalists and Republicans.[3] The legally parliamentary state structure therefore operated within layered and contested sovereignty.

This is where West Javanese Muslim politics matters. Islam had long been intertwined with Sundanese social identity, but religious and ethnic affinity did not

[1] George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 346–348; Helius Sjamsuddin, Edi S. Ekadjati, Ietje Marlina, and Wiwi Kuswiah, *Menuju Negara Kesatuan: Negara Pasundan* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1992), 31–32.

[2] Agus Mulyana, "Etnisitas dan Politik: Negara Pasundan Soeria Kartalegawa 1947," *Jurnal Majelis* 2 (2023): 112–122; Sjamsuddin et al., *Menuju Negara Kesatuan*, 31–34.

[3] Mohammad Rikaz Prabowo and Aman, "Kedaulatan Semu: Praktik Pemerintahan Negara dan Daerah Bentukan Belanda 1947–1948," *Sejarah dan Budaya* 16, no. 1 (2022): 18–32; I*ndische Courant voor Nederland,* "Djokja Niet Tevreden over de RIS," February 18, 1950.

produce a uniform political choice.[4] Masyumi, Persatuan Islam (Persis), Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Persatuan Guru Islam Indonesia (PGII), Perikatan Ummat Islam/Persatuan Umat Islam, Gerakan Muslimin Indonesia (GMI), PSII, pesantren networks, and individuals responded to Pasundan differently. Some kept their distance and directed loyalty to the Republic; others entered the cabinet and parliament; Kartosuwiryo built an alternative Islamic State of Indonesia rejecting both Pasundan and the Republic. This diversity matters because "Muslim response" can obscure conflicts of orientation, strategy, and arena of action that determine its political meaning.

Earlier studies provide an important foundation. Yohanes Edi Sunarya examined the 1947 State of Pasundan and its political formation; Junaedi emphasized its collapse and the position of the menak; Agus Mulyana studied unrest among Sundanese menak on the path to national integration; and Helius Sjamsuddin and colleagues comprehensively reconstructed Pasundan's journey toward a unitary state.[5] Studies available across different publication years discuss Pasundan's two phases under Kartalegawa and Wiranatakusumah, the PRP's role, the pseudo-sovereignty of Dutch-created states, Wiranatakusumah's Republican position, and the Republic's part in dissolving Pasundan.[6] These works explain institutions, elites, parties, and paths to integration well, but Muslim politics generally appears as an additional element, rather than as a field of actors with divergent orientations and repertoires of action.

The research gap is therefore not simply that "Muslims" are missing from Pasundan's history. The more substantive problem is the lack of a strong explanation of the relationship among three simultaneous positions: Republican unitarism, institutional participation within Pasundan, and the alternative Islamic state. Reading only opposition would overlook Anwar Tjokroaminoto, A. Hassan and PSII elements working through Pasundan's institutions; R.H. Didi Sukardi is a nationalist boundary case whose Muslim family background alone cannot establish an Islamic organizational position. Conversely, treating their involvement as Muslim support for federalism erases pragmatism, the transition of power, and efforts to advance interests within available political space. Equating Darul Islam with the unitarist movement is also mistaken because Kartosuwiryo denied the legitimacy of both competing states in West Java.

This article first seeks to explain how Pasundan's political structure was formed within the federalization project and why its institutions suffered a legitimacy deficit.

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[4] Abdul Syukur, "Islam, Etnisitas, dan Politik Identitas: Kasus Sunda," *Miqot* 35, no. 2 (2011): 332–333.

[5] Yohanes Edi Sunarya, "Sekitar Negara Pasundan 1947" (Universitas Sanata Dharma, 1991); Junaedi, "Runtuhnya Negara Pasundan" (Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Indonesia, 1989); Agus Mulyana, "Negara Pasundan 1947–1950: Gejolak Menak Sunda Menuju Integrasi Nasional" (Universitas Indonesia, 1996); Sjamsuddin et al., *Menuju Negara Kesatuan*.

[6] Khopipah Fauziah, "Antara Negara Pasundan Kartalegawa dengan Negara Pasundan Wiranatakusumah (1947–1950)," H*istoria Vitae 3*, no. 1 (2023): 1–12; Sugih Rachmat Pangersa, "Kiprah Partai Rakyat Pasundan dalam Negara Pasundan 1947–1950," FACT*UM: Jurnal Sejarah dan Pendidikan Sejarah 10,* no. 1 (2021): 113–126, https://doi.org/10.17509/factum.v10i1.32334; Aulia Nuril Annisa, "Peran Republik Indonesia dalam Pembubaran Negara Federal Pasundan di Jawa Barat Tahun 1948–1950" (UIN Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin Banten, 2021), http://repository.uinbanten.ac.id/id/eprint/7209; Prabowo and Aman, "Kedaulatan Semu," 18–32; Resdiyawan, Mulyana, and Fauzi, "R.A.A. Wiranatakusumah V," 133–146.

Second, it analyzes the forms, actors, and arenas of Muslim political responses and their relationship to West Java's reintegration. Its novelty has two aspects. Empirically, it constructs a typology of responses by relating political orientation, arena of action, and contemporary evidence. Analytically, it explains that Muslim responses worked not as a single cause but as mechanisms of delegitimation interacting with dual administration, security failure, conflicts of representation, the current of unitarism, and the APRA affair. This formulation preserves Muslim agency without overstating its causal force.

Methods

This research develops a historical method comprising four main stages—heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography—drawing upon the methodological framework previously applied by Hariadi.[7] At the heuristic stage, primary sources were collected from contemporary Indonesian- and Dutch-language newspapers, Pasundan government and parliamentary archives, and visual documentation. S*in Po* was obtained through the National Library of the Republic of Indonesia's audiovisual and microfilm services; Dutch newspapers su*ch as Algemeen Handels*bl*ad, De* Go*oi, De Locomot*i*ef, Indische Courant voor Nederla*nd, an*d Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatr*a were traced through the Delpher digital archive. Institutional archives include amendments to a bill on the status of Pasundan parliamentary members and parliamentary session reports held by the West Java Regional Library and Archives Service. Principal secondary sources include works by Helius Sjamsuddin and colleagues, George McTurnan Kahin, and studies of the PRP, Muslim figures, Darul Islam, and the transition from RIS to a unitary state.

External criticism examined publishers' identities, issue numbers, dates, document forms, storage locations, and the legibility of digital or microfilm copies. This matters because some newspapers have faded, while digital reproductions can separate an article from its original page context. Internal criticism assessed editorial positions, choice of terms, information sources, and possible bias. Colonial press descriptions of Pasundan as "worrying" or political Islam as a "danger" were not treated as transparent reflections of reality. Westerling's claims of APRA ties to Darul Islam, for example, were distinguished from facts confirmed by other sources. S*in Po*, in turn, was read as a newspaper with its own editorial agenda, not an automatically neutral narrator.[8]

Interpretation was analytical and synthetic: facts were described by actors, time, arena, and orientation, then connected to explain changes in Pasundan's legitimacy.[9] Charles *Tilly's concepts of col*lective claim-making, repertoires of contention, p*olitical opportunity, and worthiness, unity,* numbers, and commitment

[7] Ahmad Farhan Hariadi, "Negara Pasundan dan Respons Politik Umat Islam Jawa Barat dalam Proyek Federalisasi Belanda 1947–1950". Helius Sjamsuddin, Metodologi Sejarah (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2007), 10–11; Kuntowijoyo, M*etodologi Sejarah,* second edition (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2003), 89.

[8] *Algemeen Handelsblad*, "Toestand in Pasundan is zorgwekkend," no. 40033, November 24, 1949; *De Gooi*, "Westerling voorspelt gevechten op grote schaal," no. 12201, January 27, 1950; *Sin Po*, "Berdirinja Negara Pasoendan Tida Mempengaroehi Peroendingan Commissie 3," December 17, 1947, 1.

[9] Louis Gottschalk, *Mengerti Sejarah: Pengantar Metode Sejarah* (Jakarta: Yayasan Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1975), 47–48; Ajid Thohir, *Filsafat Sejarah: Profetik, Spekulatif, Kritis* (Jakarta: Kencana, 2011), 145.

(WUNC) were used in a limited way as interpretive tools, not additional methods.[10] Since the sources lack uniform membership and support figures, numbers are not assumed *and are* stated only when supported by evidence. The historiography follows the chronology of 1947–1950, but groups findings thematically so differences among Muslim responses do not disappear into the sequence of events.

Results

From Kartalegawa's Proclamation to the Institutionalized State of Pasundan

The first phase of the State of Pasundan emerged through the PRP and Suria Kartalegawa's proclamation on May 4, 1947. It called for a Pasundan entity separate from the Republic, made Bandung its capital, and sought a plebiscite in the territory claimed. Van Mook, Colonel Thomson, and Resident Klaassen's political and logistical support demonstrates strong colonial intervention. PRP-organized mobilization, however, did not become stable legitimacy. Opposition from Sundanese figures and public meetings, along with the PRP's image as an extension of Dutch interests, quickly deprived Kartalegawa's version of momentum.[11]

The Dutch then replaced partisan mobilization with conferences. The Second West Java Conference in Bandung on December 16–18, 1947, proposed a provisional government with state status and a representative council. Sin P*o reco*rded both sides of the process: Van Mook praised federalism, democracy, and cooperation with the Dutch, while the Republican delegation called the forum undemocratic and demanded an internationally supervised plebiscite.[12] The Third West Java Conference, held from February 16 to March 5, 1948, gained recognition as a provisional representative body, drew up constitutional arrangements, and chose R.A.A. Wiranatakusumah. Compared with the 1947 proclamation, this formation was more formal and representative, but the final authority validating it remained the Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General. The second phase thus broadened procedures without fully resolving the federal pr*oject's* top-down origins.[13]

Formally, Pasundan had a Head of State, cabinet, and parliament. R. Adil Puradiredja led the first cabinet and simultaneously served as Minister of Home Affairs; other ministries covered prosperity, education, finance, transport and irrigation, and social affairs. Parliament contained around ten factions or groups, including National, Indonesian, PRP, Center, and Unity factions, and Indo-European, Protestant, Catholic, Arab, and Chinese representative*s. The Reglement voor werkzaamheden van de Kamer van Afgeva*rdigden, session reports, and amendments to

[10] Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768–2004* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3–9.

[11] Agus Mulyana, "Etnisitas dan Politik," 112–122; Pangersa, "Kiprah Partai Rakyat Pasundan," 119–125.

[12] *Sin Po*, "Pamerentah Samentara Djawa Barat," December 20, 1947, 1; *Sin Po*, "Conferentie Djawa Barat II Rampoeng: Van Mook: Petoesan Tjerdik Diambil!" December 22, 1947, 1; *Sin Po*, "Berdirinja Negara Pasoendan Tida Mempengaroehi Peroendingan Commissie 3," December 17, 1947, 1–2.

[13] Departement van Binnenlandse Zaken, "De Ontwikkeling van de Federatieve Staatsbouw in Het Jaar 1948" (1949), 19; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 346–348.

bills show actual legislative practice rather than merely symbolic institutions.[14] These procedures nevertheless operated within colonial and federal constraints. Territorial definition, the administrative apparatus, and security depended on outside authorities; cabinet crises showed the difficulty of building stable parliamentary support.

The clearest problem was competing sovereignty. After Renville required the Siliwangi Division to withdraw, West Java's political space did not become empty, but was occupied by the Pasundan government, Republican networks, local administrations, Dutch/KNIL troops, and Darul Islam. Toward the end of 1949, press reports said that the TNI established civilian administrations in Ciamis and Sumedang. Village heads and teachers faced competing demands for loyalty, while more than one authority collected funds.[15] Pasundan's government also needed the Siliwangi Division's help to restore security. This dependence created a paradox: the Republican military, a political rival, was needed to sustain order in Pasundan. Pasundan's crisis therefore involved not only a shortage of ideological support, but also an inability to monopolize administration, taxation, and legitimate force.

Republican-Unitary Consolidation among Islamic Organizations

The best documented response from Islamic organizations was to distance themselves from Pasundan and remain oriented toward the Republic. After Persis resumed organizational activity in Bandung on April 1, 1948, a conference of Islamic organizations and parties in Bandung on April 13 brought together Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis, and PGII representatives. The meeting discussed separating Islamic elements from the State of Pasundan movement. Helius Sjamsuddin and colleagues note that organizations assembled in the Majelis Persatuan Umat Islam did not want to join Pasundan and considered their political distance helpful to the Republican struggle.[16] This choice was not an armed rebellion. Its repertoire consisted of conferences, interorganizational coordination, withdrawal of social legitimacy, and shaping opinion.

Masyumi articulated its demand more openly as recognition of sovereignty appro*ached. Het Nieuwsblad voor* Sumatra on December 15, 1949, reported plans for a conference of West Java Masyumi branches, whose agenda included demanding that the congress return Pasundan to the Republic. The headline, "Masjumi tegen vorming van Islamitische staat," records opposition to forming an Islamic state, but does not by itself identify that proposal with Pasundan. The reported demand to return Pasundan to the Republic is the firmer evidence of the party's position in this setting.[17]

[14] Arsip Pemerintah Negara Pasundan, "Amandemen Rentjana Undang-Undang tentang Kedudukan Anggota Parlemen Pasundan," 1949, Dinas Perpustakaan dan Kearsipan Daerah Jawa Barat; Parlemen Negara Pasundan, "Verslag Der Vergadering van de Parlemen Pasundan," 1948, Dinas Perpustakaan dan Kearsipan Daerah Jawa Barat; Sjamsuddin et al., *Menuju Negara Kesatuan*, 48–50.

[15] *Ons Noorden*, "Eigenmachtig Optreden van de T.N.I. in Pasundan" and "Ook Terreur Door de Darul Islam," September 24, 1949, 3; *Deli Courant*, "Vorming van Een Civiel Bestuur Door de T.N.I.," November 17, 1949.

[16] Darto Harnoko, *Pelopor Pembaharuan* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1986), 45–48; Sjamsuddin et al., *Menuju Negara Kesatuan*, 71–72.

[17] "Masjumi tegen vorming van Islamitische staat," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, no. 438, December 15, 1949, 2; Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 1945–1965* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1987), 145–147.

Since NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and other organizations still had political ties to Masyumi, however, the party's position must not automatically be taken to represent every member. The sources support an organizational tendency more strongly than uniformity among all Muslims.

The unitarist movement took a more organized form through K.H. Abdul Halim. Accounts differ on whether Abdul Halim or Isa Anshary led Gerakan Muslimin Indonesia; both are associated with its Republican orientation. GMI opposed federalism and made Pasundan's dissolution a political agenda. A mass meeting in late 1949 or early 1950 produced a motion for dissolution; Abdul Halim led a delegation to present the demand to R. Sewaka, the RIS Commissioner for Pasundan.[18] *Sin Po on March 8, 1950, also recorded a Majalengka delegation led by Abdul Halim in the political process surrounding Pasundan's proposed merger with the Republic.*Here ulama not only furnished moral legitimacy, but acted as organizers, bearers of motions, and links between popular mobilization and state institutions.

Isa Anshary followed a related path through Persis and Masyumi. As Head of Information for Masyumi in Priangan, Persis General Chair from December 1949, and an influential orator, he connected dakwah, the press, and political speeches with defense of the Republic. His opposition to federalism was not opposition to a non-Islamic state; in this phase he placed the Muslim struggle within the framework of preserving Republican sovereignty.[19] Republican pesantren and ulama networks extended this orientation beyond party forums. K.H. Abdullah Mubarok used personal ties and pesantren authority to advise Wiranatakusumah and help Republican guerrillas; Ajengan Yusuf Taujiri and the Darussalam Force remained Republican despite Dutch pressure and Darul Islam recruitment efforts.[20]

[18] Mohammad Akim, *Kiai Hadji Abdulhalim: Penggerak PUI* (Madjalengka: Jajasan K.H. Abdulhalim, 1964), 121, 142; Miftahul Falah, *Riwayat Perjuangan K.H. Abdul Halim* (Bandung: Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia, 2008), 144–145; S*in Po,* "Pasundan Di Kembalikan Ke RI," March 8, 1950, 1.

[19] Yusril Fahmi Adam and Imas Emalia, "Fundamentalism in Indonesian Political History: A Biography of Isa Anshary," *Buletin Al-Turas* 28, no. 2 (2022): 302–305, https://doi.org/10.15408/bat.v28i2.25589; Pepen Irfan Fauzan, *Negara Pancasila Vis-a-Vis Negara Islam: Pergulatan Pemikiran Isa Anshary 1945–1969* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2019), 93–94.

[20] Asep Salahudin, *Abah Anom Fenomenal Abad 21 & Ajarannya* (Bandung: Humaniora, 2013), 37–38; A.H. Nasution, *Siliwangi dari Masa ke Masa* (Bandung: Angkasa, 1985), 217–220.



Figure 1. A demonstration by West Javanese people against the formation of the State of Pasundan, 1948.

The demonstration documented in Figure 1 shows that opposition to Pasundan had a public arena beyond parliamentary elites. A photograph alone cannot establish the movement's size or representativeness, but the banners and crowd confirm a repertoire of demonstration consistent with resolutions, conferences, and press reports. Its evidentiary value lies in the form of action, not in a claim that all West Javanese people took the same position.[21]

Institutional Participation: Involvement Was Not Uniform Support

Amid the dominant Republican orientation, some Muslim actors chose to work through Pasundan's institutions. The Bandung PSII branch under A.N. Kusnadi, for example, adopted an agenda of strengthening the PSII parliamentary faction, upholding law and a constitution based on Islam, uniting Muslims, and placing trust in Prime Minister Anwar Tjokroaminoto.[22] This choice distinguished the PSII from organizations that withdrew. Parliamentary participation, however, is insufficient to establish unconditional acceptance of the Dutch federal design. It can be read as an attempt to maintain political representation while Pasundan was the government structure effectively operating in Bandung.

Anwar Tjokroaminoto provides the clearest example. The son of H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and a figure in the Sarekat Islam tradition, he formed a cabinet in January 1950, served as both Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs, and included several Muslim figures. The cabinet represented an attempt by Pasundan to broaden its basis of legitimacy among Muslims. It emerged, however, when parliamentary support was fragmented and Pasundan was nearing its end. R. Sujoso's criticism that the Head of State had forced the cabinet into being shows its weak

[21] Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia, *Demonstrasi Rakyat Jawa Barat Menentang Pembentukan Negara Pasundan*, Dokumentasi Arsip Khastara, 1948.

[22] *Indische Courant voor Nederla*nd, "Kabinet Negara Pasundan,"

political foundation. Anwar's arrest after the APRA affair, without evidence in the sources that he was found guilty, further narrowed the cabinet's scope for action.[23]

The Indische Courant voor Nederland cabinet report names A. Hassan as Minister of Religious Affairs in Anwar's cabinet; identification with the prominent Persis scholar requires caution because the newspaper entry alone does not establish biographical identity.[24] Persis's documented organizational orientation was closer to the Republic. If the cabinet member is the same individual, this would be a divergence between institutional service and organizational position, but the available cabinet report does not explain his motives. The appointment cannot establish either Persis endorsement of federalism or the minister's ideological commitment.

R.H. Didi Sukardi provides a boundary case for the typology. From a Muslim family in Sukabumi and active in Paguyuban Pasundan, Parindra, GAPI, and KNID, he became a Minister of State in Djumhana's cabinet in 1949. In speeches he stressed the proclamation of August 17, 1945, the Republic's pioneering role in independence, and national unity.[25] His involvement shows an actor using Pasundan as a transitional space rather than a final political goal. His Muslim family background does not make his nationalist career evidence of an Islamic organization's policy; his speeches show that participation in a federal cabinet need not imply rejection of Republican national unity.

Table 1. Typology of Muslim Political Responses to the State of Pasundan, 1947–1950

Orientation	Main actors/organizations	Arena and actions	Implications for Pasundan
Republican-unitary	Masyumi, Persis, Muhammadiyah, NU, PGII/MPUI, PUI-GMI; K.H. Abdul Halim, Isa Anshary, K.H. Abdullah Mubarok	April 13, 1948 conference, distancing from Pasundan's institutions, resolutions and motions, press, political delegations, support from pesantren networks	Withdraws social and religious legitimacy and strengthens demands for reintegration
Institutional participation	Bandung PSII; Anwar Tjokroaminoto, A. Hassan (identity to verify); R.H. Didi Sukardi (nationalist boundary case)	Cabinet, ministries, parliamentary factions, speeches, and government programs	Provides limited representation, but also brings Islamic and national orientations into the state
Islamic-state alternative	S.M. Kartosuwiryo, Hizbullah/Sabilillah elements following DI-TII	Refusal to withdraw, 1948 conferences, formation of TII, NII proclamation on August 7, 1949	Rejects both Pasundan's and the Republic's legitimacy and aggravates

[23] *Java-Bode*, "Pasundan's Kabinet Woensdag Beëdigd,"; De Lo*comotief, "Kr*itik terhadap Pasundan: Apakah Kabinet Anwar Dipaksa?" Sama*rangsch Handels- en Advertentie-Blad, J*anuary 20, 1950; De *Gooi-en,* "Ook Premier van Pasundan Gearresteerd," January 25, 1950, 1.

[24] *Indische Courant voor Nederland*, "Kabinet van Pasundan," no. 55, January 18, 1950, 1.

[25] Yuda Benharry, "R.H. Didi Sukardi and the Negara Pasundan: A Nationalist in the Federal State during the Indonesian Revolution 1945–1949" (Department of History, Universitas Indonesia, 2009), 232–233; Kasoh S., Suwarno K., and Syafei, *Sejarah Daerah Jawa Bara*t (Jakarta: Proyek IDSN Ditjarahnitra, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1994), 25, 30.

			fragmented sovereignty
Republican-unitary (armed and local networks)	Ajengan Yusuf Taujiri, pro-Republic militia/pesantren elements	Guerrilla warfare, sheltering fighters, resisting federal/DI recruitment, mobilizing the people's mandate	Maintains the Republic's local presence and denies Pasundan a security monopoly

Darul Islam as an Alternative to Both States

Kartosuwiryo occupied a fundamentally different position. After Renville, he refused the order to withdraw and remained in West Java with Hizbullah and Sabilillah elements. A conference in Garut in February 1948 shifted authority from party politics toward an Islamic struggle structure, selected Kartosuwiryo as imam, and established the Indonesian Islamic Army. A subsequent conference in Cirebon formulated a political program opening the way for an Islamic state if the Republic failed to defend its sovereignty. After the Second Dutch Military Aggression, Kartosuwiryo claimed West Java as de facto territory of the Islamic State of Indonesia; NII was proclaimed on August 7, 1949.[26]

This position cannot be subsumed under Republican unitarism. Darul Islam rejected Pasundan as a Dutch federal product, but also rejected the Republic as failing to meet the ideal of a state based on Islamic law. Pasundan's government consequently faced opposition from two directions that were not allied: the pro-Republic movement and an armed Islamic movement. When the Siliwangi Division returned to West Java, clashes with TII formed part of a shifting conflict among Republican forces, DI/TII, Pasundan authorities, and Dutch/KNIL forces.[27] This undermined Pasundan's capacity to claim territory and security, but does not mean that all Darul Islam activity can be counted as a contribution to a unitary-state project.

Colonial press sources often linked political Islam, Darul Islam, and insecurity. Articles using vr*ees* (fear) or gevaar *(dang*er) portrayed Islam as a disruptive factor and the Dutch as a source of order. Westerling's claim that Darul Islam supported APRA did not even receive official confirmation from UNCI.[28] Internal criticism therefore requires distinguishing actual DI/TII conflict from media constructions combining all Muslim actors into a single threat. The conflicting sources instead support the conclusion that Muslim politics was fragmented.

The 1949–1950 Crisis and West Java's Reintegration

As 1950 approached, political and security pressures converged. Republican influence expanded through civilian administrations and the TNI, while DI/TII attacked both Republican and Pasundan authorities. The attack on the Head of State's party in Kuningan in March 1949 and reports of destruction in Leles show that elites

[26] C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 62–68, 75–76; Aga Itbah Baihaki, "Peran Kartosoewirjo dalam Pembentukan Negara Islam Indonesia 1947–1962," *Qurthuba: The Journal of History and Islamic Civilization* 3, no. 2 (2019): 79–80.

[27] C. van Dijk, *Darul Islam: Sebuah Pemberontakan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995), 43, 90–95.

[28] *Algemeen Handelsblad*, "Vrees in Pasundan voor Darul Islam," no. 40037, November 29, 1949; *Groninger Courant*, "Westerling Onderhandelde Met Pasundan," no. 62, January 13, 1950, 1.

and residents faced direct insecurity.[29] Pasundan's government lacked sufficiently independent military forces and therefore needed Siliwangi. Dependence on a political rival revealed the failure of practical sovereignty even while state institutions continued operating.

The crisis also had a representative dimension. The election of Pasundan representatives to the RIS legislature was challenged because its outcome was judged not to reflect fully either parliament or society. The election organizers objected to the method and refused responsibility for its security consequences. Members associated with PSII and Masyumi reportedly left the chamber in protest.[30] This was not the same as a motion for dissolution, but shows that Islamic groups' participation in federal institutions remained accompanied by disputes over procedure and legitimacy. When a state cannot produce representatives accepted by electoral participants, its legitimacy deficit moves from its colonial origins into everyday governance.

Contests over representation were directly linked to dual government locally. For residents, a political choice was not simply whether to accept Pasundan's or the Republic's constitution; it meant deciding to whom to pay taxes, who appointed village officers, which institution governed teachers, and which armed force provided protection. These micro-level choices made loyalty a material resource. When officials and revenues shifted to Republican administration, Pasundan lost the ability to carry out decisions even while retaining offices and formal procedures. Here Islamic organizations and pesantren networks served as intermediaries connecting unitary-state discourse to local decisions, although their influence varied by area and cannot be quantified from available sources.

The APRA affair in January 1950 turned the crisis into an overt shock. Westerling sought recognition of his troops as Pasundan's official army and rejected the state's possible dissolution, but Pasundan's government, through a deputy minister, condemned APRA's actions. An assault on Bandung, the attack on Siliwangi Division headquarters, and the death of Lieutenant Colonel Lembong further damaged the state's image and led to officials' arrests.[31] APRA was not a Muslim movement, and this article does not link it structurally to Islamic organizations without evidence. Its importance lies in the political opportunity it opened: a state already short of legitimacy lost its ability to persuade parliament and the public that federalism could ensure order.

At the end of January, Wiranatakusumah said he was willing to relinquish his mandate as the movement for dissolution expanded. Republicans in parliament led by Oli Setiadi, Hasan Natanegara, Daruji, and Suparno pressed for integration. At the

[29] *Sin Po*, "Penembakan: Rombongan Wali Negara Pasundan Diartikan sebagai Peristiwa Kedji untuk Memboenoeh Wiranatakoesoema," March 17, 1949, 2; *Ons Noorden*, "Eigenmachtig Optreden van de T.N.I. in Pasundan" and "Ook Terreur Door de Darul Islam," September 24, 1949, 3.

[30] *Java-Bode*, "Pasundan-Afgevaardigden in R.I.S. Parlement," Bruining, December 24, 1949, 1; Haryono Rinardi, "Proses Perubahan Negara Republik Indonesia Serikat Menjadi Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia" (Department of History, Universitas Diponegoro, undated), 4–5.

[31] Mohammad Iskandar et al., *Upaya Menyatukan Kembali Republik Indonesia (1950–1960)*, Book Two (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 2019), 41–42; N*oordbrabantsch Dagblad,* "Westerling Vraagt Erkenning van Zijn Troepen," January 10, 1950, 1; N*ieuwe Haarlemsche Courant,* "Pasundan Keurt Actie-Westerling Af," January 24, 1950, 1.

same time, K.H. Abdul Halim and GMI connected demands from Muslim communities with institutional processes. On March 8, 1950, Pasundan's parliament decided on its territory's incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia, then a constituent of the RIS; the RIS presidential decision of March 11 formalized the dissolution and incorporation. The unitary Republic emerged later, in August 1950.[32] This sequence shows that Muslims contributed through delegitimation and mobilization, but the final decision was taken within parliament and the RIS structure amid a much wider unitarist current.

Discussion

Muslim Politics as a Spectrum, Not a Single Bloc

The first finding corrects the hidden assumption that "Muslims" denotes one political subject. Organizations distancing themselves from Pasundan formed a dominant tendency, but Anwar Tjokroaminoto and the Bandung PSII demonstrate institutional participation; a cabinet list names A. Hassan, while Didi Sukardi is a nationalist boundary case rather than evidence of Islamic organizational policy. At the other pole, Kartosuwiryo built an Islamic-state project rejecting both Dutch federalism and the Republic. This spectrum does not simply reflect theological differences. Choices were shaped by organizational position, access to institutions, security needs, social networks, and assessments of which authority was most likely to realize political interests.

The distinction between involvement and legitimacy is crucial. Muslim figures in the cabinet gave Pasundan a source of representation, but did not establish collective Muslim support. Conversely, Islamic organizations' withdrawal weakened Pasundan's social acceptance without erasing the Muslims who participated. The nationalist R.H. Didi Sukardi brought the language of the proclamation and national unity into the federal government. Pasundan's institutions were thus not wholly separate from Republicanism; they were also an arena in which national orientations operated from within. The collaborator-versus-Republican binary is consequently too crude to explain actors' strategies in transition.

These findings expand historiography centered on Sundanese elites, menak, the PRP, and governmental structures. Sunarya, Junaedi, Mulyana, Fauziah, and Pangersa have shown differences between Kartalegawa's proclamation and conference-based Pasundan, as well as shifts in elite and party positions.[33] This article adds that the institutional transition always confronted a layered Muslim political field. The State of Pasundan did not simply fail to gain the support of "the people" in the abstract; it struggled to turn the participation of some figures into legitimacy among Muslim organizations, ulama, and local networks.

[32] *Twentsche Courant*, "Wali Negara Pasundan Stelt Zijn Mandaat Besenikbaar," January 30, 1950, 2; *Sin Po*, "Pasundan Di Kembalikan Ke RI," March 8, 1950, 1; Iskandar et al., *Upaya Menyatukan Kembali Republik Indonesia*, 44; Sjamsuddin et al., *Menuju Negara Kesatuan*, 22.

[33] Sunarya, "Sekitar Negara Pasundan 1947"; Junaedi, "Runtuhnya Negara Pasundan"; Mulyana, "Negara Pasundan 1947–1950"; Fauziah, "Antara Negara Pasundan Kartalegawa," 1–12; Pangersa, "Kiprah Partai Rakyat Pasundan," 113–126.

Claim-Making, Repertoires, and the Limits of Applying Tilly

Within Tilly's framework, the April 13, 1948 conference, GMI motion, Masyumi demands, Isa Anshary's speeches, demonstrations, and K.H. Abdul Halim's delegation *can be read as collec*tive claim-making: collective actors made demands on authorities for Pasundan to be dissolved or returned to the Republic.[34] Their repertoires ranged from distancing themselves from institutions, mass meetings, resolutions, and the press to lobbying and delegations. This diversity explains why opposition need not take the form of rebellion. Withdrawal of legitimacy and a shift in administrative loyalty could be as important as open demonstrations.

The concept of political opportunity helps explain changes in intensity. Before late 1949, Islamic organizations could reject Pasundan without immediately dissolving it because the Dutch still sustained the federal structure. After recognition of sovereignty, dual government, a weakening cabinet, unitarist demands, and APRA changed the balance. GMI and Republican groups gained more room to turn demands from normative statements into institutional decisions. Islamic organizations did not create this political opportunity alone; it emerged from fractures in the federal coalition, changing RIS–Republic relations, and failures of security.

WUNC must be applied cautiously. The standing of ulama such as Abdul Halim and Abdullah Mubarok supports wort*hiness; cr*oss-organizational conferences show unity*; con*tinuing demands indicate commitment. *The sour*ces, however, provide no membership figures, participant counts, or attitude surveys permitting firm claims about numbers. *Photo*graphs of demonstrations and lists of organizations establish mobilization, not representation of all West Javanese Muslims. This restraint matters so theory does not replace source criticism.

Mechanisms of Delegitimation and Causal Explanation

The second finding is that Muslim responses worked through four mechanisms. First, unitarist organizations withdrew normative recognition from Pasundan by declaring the Republic the legitimate vessel of independence. Second, ulama and pesantren networks maintained local loyalty to the Republic, preventing Pasundan's administration from taking full root. Third, Muslim figures' participation in the cabinet and parliament demonstrates institutional access without, on its own, establishing either federalist conviction or a measurable weakening of the state from within. Fourth, Darul Islam advanced an alternative sovereignty claim that aggravated insecurity and weakened Pasundan's territorial monopoly.

These mechanisms interacted with the state's structural weaknesses. Studies of "pseudo-sovereignty" emphasize that Dutch-created states and regions had substantive limitations despite modern-looking formal apparatus.[35] In Pasundan, these appeared in Dutch intervention, security dependence, TNI civilian administration, cabinet deadlock, and a crisis of representation. In other words,

[34] Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768–2004*, 3–9, 37–39.

[35] Prabowo and Aman, "Kedaulatan Semu," 18–32; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 430–431.

Islamic opposition did not topple a previously fully sovereign state; it accelerated erosion in a structure whose sovereignty was deficient from the outset.

A counterargument must be stated clearly. Pasundan's dissolution cannot be explained mainly or solely by Muslims. The unitarist current included nonreligious Republican groups, parliament, the TNI, and RIS government policy. APRA produced a shock originating outside Islamic organizations. Changes in other states also show a national movement toward the unitary Republic.[36] Muslim contributions are best understood as weakening social legitimacy and broadening the coalition for integration, not as a single cause directly producing the March 8, 1950 decision.

A multicausal explanation also distinguishes triggers, conditions, and mechanisms. APRA was a trigger accelerating the January 1950 crisis; security dependence and dual government were structural conditions; conferences, motions, delegations, shifts in loyalty, and parliamentary criticism were mechanisms translating dissatisfaction into political change. Muslim responses operated chiefly through mechanisms and coalitions. This distinction avoids a chronological error in treating every objection since 1947 as a direct cause of parliament's decision three years later.

Reading the press reinforces this caution. Dutch newspapers are useful because they recorded officials' statements, sessions, and conflicts as they occurred, but terms su*ch as zorgw*ek*kend*, vrees, *and* gevaar carry colonial assumptions about order. Indonesian newspapers offer another perspective, but likewise selected issues and actors according to editorial agendas. Newspaper reports are thus not used to calculate support, but to identify claims, actions, and changes of position for comparison with parliamentary archives and historical literature. This triangulation yields a narrower but stronger conclusion: Muslim mobilization was real and diverse, while the scale of social support and operational links among certain actors cannot always be established.

Continuity and Change in West Javanese Muslim Politics

Responses in 1947–1950 show continuity in pre-independence networks alongside changing repertoires. Persis, Muhammadiyah, NU, PUI, PSII, pesantren, and figures shaped by the colonial-era movement entered the revolution with organizational, educational, press, and religious resources. These enabled them to move quickly from dakwah and social consolidation to conferences, parliament, guerrilla warfare, or an alternative state project. The networks provided continuity; the objects of claims and arenas of sovereignty changed.

Muslim identity, however, did not determine one political direction. K.H. Abdul Halim linked Islam to unitarism; a cabinet report names A. Hassan as a Pasundan minister, although his identification and motives require corroboration; Kartosuwiryo made Islamic law the basis for a rival state. These cases show divergent political orientations, but the evidence is uneven and the cabinet appointment alone

[36] Haryono Rinardi, "Dari RIS Menjadi Negara RI: Perubahan Bentuk Negara Indonesia pada Tahun 1950," *Mozaik: Jurnal Ilmu Humaniora* 12, no. 2 (2012): 171, 184; Iskandar et al., *Upaya Menyatukan Kembali Republik Indonesia*, 41–44.

cannot establish a deliberate strategy. The article's substantive novelty is therefore more than adding Muslim figures to an existing narrative: it shows a relationship between internal plurality and the state's legitimacy crisis. Pasundan lost support not because it faced one homogeneous Muslim opposition, but because it could not become a stable meeting point for these orientations.

Historiographical Implications and Evidentiary Limits

The spectrum approach changes what a bottom-u*p perspec*tive means. History from below cannot simply replace state elites with a list of civic organizations. Islamic organizations also had leaders, hierarchies, and interests of their own; some figures crossed boundaries between society and state. A more suitable unit of analysis is the relationship among organizational claims, individual decisions, governmental institutions, and local networks. This explains why Persis's position could differ from an individual's cabinet role if the reported A. Hassan is correctly identified. Didi Sukardi's nationalist speeches, meanwhile, should be assessed on their own terms rather than inferred from his family background.

Distinguishing Pasundan's two phases also matters for historiography. Opposition to Kartalegawa's 1947 proclamation confronted a project resting on the PRP and conspicuous colonial support. After 1948, Muslims faced a state with procedures, a parliament, and a cabinet. The repertoire of opposition thus changed: the question was not only whether to oppose its formation, but whether to withdraw, participate, protest procedures, or use institutions to advance integration. This changing political object explains why an actor's response may appear inconsistent if 1947–1950 is treated as a single static situation.

The article also confines its claims to the sources' reach. Newspapers and government archives record figures, meetings, cabinets, and official statements more often than the experiences of rural Muslims. Visual documentation shows public action, but does not explain who participated, how mobilization occurred, or how long support lasted. The sources also do not permit quantitative comparison among organizations and areas. The typology in Table 1 is therefore an analytical tool for reading orientations and forms of action, not a permanent classification of every member or community. Its identification of the reported A. Hassan remains provisional.

This evidentiary limit clarifies the contribution. The strongest claim is not that a numerical majority of Muslims caused Pasundan's collapse, but that Islamic organizations, ulama, officials, and movements occupied several competing arenas of sovereignty. They influenced who was considered legitimate, which institutions conveyed demands, and to which authority loyalty was given. In the historiography of the revolution, state transformation must therefore be read not only as an outcome of diplomatic and elite decisions, but as a process in which legitimacy was built or withdrawn through social networks operating between the center and the regions.

Conclusion

The State of Pasundan formed in two phases: the PRP proclamation under Suria Kartalegawa in 1947, which rapidly lost legitimacy, and the state produced by the 1948 West Java Conference, with a Head of State, cabinet, and parliament. Institutionalization in the second phase did not create effective sovereignty because Pasundan remained dependent on Dutch support and outside security forces, while the Republic and Darul Islam established competing governments and territorial claims.

Muslim political responses to these conditions were plural. The best-documented tendency among the organizations and ulama examined was support for the Republic and opposition to the federal state through conferences, motions, the press, pesantren networks, and delegations. Some figures participated in Pasundan's cabinet or parliament, but the available evidence does not establish their motives uniformly; the identification of A. Hassan in the cabinet requires corroboration. Darul Islam took a third orientation, rejecting both Pasundan and the Republic. This spectrum answers the study's objectives by showing relationships among actors, arenas, and political change, rather than merely listing positions.

Muslim contributions to Pasundan's end worked through withdrawal of social legitimacy, maintenance of Republican loyalties, participation within institutions, and alternative claims to sovereignty. Their effects, however, were intertwined with dual government, cabinet and representation crises, security dependence, the national unitarist current, and APRA. The article thus offers a historiographical contribution in a relational typology of Muslim responses and a multicausal explanation of delegitimation. It affirms West Javanese Muslim agency without turning Muslims into a single group or sole cause of reintegration in 1950.

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