Coalitions, Incumbency and Contested Legitimacy: Direct Mayoral Elections in Depok, 2005–2024

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Abstract

This article reconstructs the dynamics of political competition in the five direct mayoral elections held in Depok, West Java, between 2005 and 2024, and asks how party support, candidate pairs and the implementation of the elections changed over two decades. Using the historical method—heuristics, external and internal source criticism, interpretation and historiography—it combines the Depok election commission's tabulation records, court decisions, legal texts, press reports and an oral interview with the commission's chair, and it tests William Riker's size principle against the record. The findings show that the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) anchored one pole of competition in every election and won four consecutive times before losing in 2024 to a twelve-party coalition, while its partners and rivals changed from one contest to the next. Coalition size neither guaranteed nor precluded victory: smaller legislative blocs won in 2015 and 2020. The article argues that outcomes depended on the fragmentation or consolidation of the opposition, on incumbency and personal authority, and on candidate credentials, and that disputes shifted from contests over who had won to problems of administration and participation. It contributes an integrated chronology of the five elections and a critical historiographical reading of coalition arithmetic in Indonesian local politics.

Keywords: Depok; direct local elections (pilkada); coalition politics; Prosperous Justice Party; political history; Indonesia

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Introduction

Direct elections of regional heads (*pemilihan kepala daerah*, or pilkada) are among the most consequential institutional legacies of Indonesia's post-1998 reform. Under the New Order, mayors, regents and governors were chosen formally by regional legislatures (DPRD) that did little more than ratify candidates already approved in Jakarta, and Law No. 22 of 1999 on regional government, passed in the first years of reform, still left the choice to the DPRD. The first direct elections, held from June 2005 under Law No. 32 of 2004, therefore opened a new arena in which parties, bureaucrats, religious networks and ordinary voters negotiated the legitimacy of local power.[1] Terms were fixed at five years, with a limit of two terms in the same office.[2]

Depok, a city on the southern fringe of Jakarta that gained municipal status in 1999, offers an unusually clear window onto this transition.[3] It held five direct mayoral elections, in 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2024. In the first four, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an Islam-based party with a strong cadre structure, and its changing partners won every time; in 2024 the sequence ended when a PKS–Golkar ticket lost to a coalition of twelve parties. Continuity of such length, followed by an abrupt rupture, poses a historian's question: how did political competition in Depok change between 2005 and 2024, and what explains both the durability of one party's success and its end?

Two questions guide the inquiry. First, how were party support and candidate pairs configured in each of the five elections, and how did those configurations relate to the results? Second, how did the implementation of the elections unfold, including the legal and administrative disputes that accompanied them?

Existing scholarship is substantial but fragmented. Firnas, Rizky and Maesarini analyse bureaucratic neutrality in the early elections and locate its failure in a persistent patrimonial bureaucratic culture.[4] Susan, Saraswati and Indarja describe the administrative implementation of the 2015 election under Law No. 8 of 2015.[5] Studies of 2020 stress the pandemic setting,[6] the ideological, intellectual and religious-

[1] Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah.

[2] Lili Romli, "Pilkada Langsung, Calon Tunggal, dan Masa Depan Demokrasi Lokal", *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* 15, no. 2 (2018): 144, https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v15i2.757.

[3] "Pilkada Depok: Momen Gerindra-PDIP Runtuhkan Hegemoni PKS", CNN Indonesia, 26 September 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200926124139-32-551232/pilkada-depok-momen-gerindra-pdip-runtuhkan-hegemoni-pks.

[4] Muhamad Adian Firnas, Kiky Rizky, and Indah Wahyu Maesarini, "Relasi Birokrasi dan Politik: Persoalan Netralitas Birokrasi dalam Pilkada Depok Awal Reformasi", *Jurnal El-Riyasah* 15, no. 1 (2024): 9–10, https://doi.org/10.24014/jel.v15i1.29113.

[5] Yoanes Tito Susan, Retno Saraswati, and Indarja, "Pelaksanaan Pemilihan Walikota dan Wakil Walikota Depok dalam Rangka Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah Serentak pada Tahun 2015", *Diponegoro Law Journal* 6, no. 1 (2017): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.14710/dlj.2017.14305.

[6] Sugeng Astanto and Irwan Siregar, "Kesiapan Warga Kota Depok dalam Menghadapi Pilkada Serentak 2020 di Era Adaptasi Kebiasaan Baru (AKB)", *ABDIMAS: Jurnal Pengabdian kepada Masyarakat* 4, no. 1 (2023): 8, https://doi.org/10.53008/abdimas.v4i1.1599.

authority resources of PKS,[7] and the social capital of the winning pair.[8] Unpublished theses add accounts of coalition capital, party strategy, digital campaigning and abstention in 2020.[9] The 2005 dispute has attracted legal analysis,[10] and work on the 2024 defeat of the PKS incumbents so far exists mainly in unpublished form.[11]

Three limitations follow. Most studies address a single election or a single theme; to our knowledge none ties the maps of party support, the legal disputes and the vote totals of all five elections into one narrative; and the literature rarely tests general coalition theory against the Depok record. This article therefore has two objectives: to reconstruct the party-and-candidate maps of the five elections, and to explain the dynamics of their implementation. It contributes an integrated chronology built on the election commission's own tabulation records, a critical reading of coalition arithmetic against Riker's size principle, and an account that places the judicial disputes of 2005 and 2010 and the withdrawn petition of 2024 within a single trajectory of institutional learning. Its novelty lies in treating Depok's elections as a connected historical sequence rather than as isolated events.

The argument is that shifts in party support in Depok were driven by calculations of interest, by electoral strategy and by the emergence of popular figures, not by the number of parties behind a ticket. PKS sustained its influence through consistent nomination, dense local networks and a willingness to work with varied partners, while competition more broadly depended on strategy, candidate capacity and the capacity to build public trust. Implementation matured over two decades, although disputes over results and, increasingly, over participation never disappeared.

Method

The study follows the four stages of the historical method: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation and historiography. In the heuristic stage, sources were gathered in five groups. The first is oral evidence: an interview with Willi Sumarlin, chair of the Depok City General Elections Commission (KPU Kota Depok), conducted

[7] Muhammad Ariel Azfar Hadi and Danis Tri Saputra Wahidin, "Hegemoni Partai Keadilan Sejahtera pada Pilkada Kota Depok 2020", *Jurnal Politik Profetik* 12, no. 1 (2024): 19–36, https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v12i1a2.

[8] Intan Rizkika Permatasari, Arry Bainus, and Idil Akbar, "Pemanfaatan Modal Sosial Pasangan Idris-Imam dalam Pemenangan Pemilihan Walikota Depok Tahun 2020", *Jurnal MODERAT* 8, no. 1 (2022): 29–42.

[9] Muhammad Ghaly Fairuz Riadi, "Koalisi dan Modalitas: Analisis Kekalahan Pradi Supriatna-Afifah Alia dalam Pilkada Kota Depok 2020", Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2022; Hasya Ibrahim, "Partai Politik dan Strategi Pemenangan: Studi atas Strategi PKS dalam Kemenangan Pasangan Mohammad Idris dan Imam Budi pada Pilkada Kota Depok Tahun 2020", Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2022; Munaliah, "Kampanye Politik dan Partisipasi Politik di Tengah Pandemi Covid-19", Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2021; Andini Ela Prasetya, "Analisis Perilaku Abstention (Golput) pada Pilkada Kota Depok Tahun 2020", Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta, 2023.

[10] Ni'matul Huda, "Telaah Kasus Sengketa Hasil Pilkada Depok dalam Perspektif Yuridis", *Jurnal Hukum* 12, no. 32 (2005): 252–61, https://journal.uii.ac.id/IUSTUM/article/view/4716/4150.

[11] Devi Agni Rahmasari, "Analisis Faktor Kegagalan Kandidat Petahana Imam-Ririn dalam Mempertahankan Dominasi PKS di Kota Depok pada Pilkada 2024", Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta, 2025.

at the Commission's office.[12] The second is archival: the Commission's tabulation records for 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2024, including the Model DB forms that record votes by subdistrict.[13] The third is published institutional and legal material: an oversight memoir by members of the national election oversight body,[14] statutes, regulations of the national Commission, and court decisions. The fourth is the press and official websites, among them the Commission's data portal, consulted on 26 November 2025, and reports in *Tempo*, *Antara*, *Bisnis* and *Detik*.[15] The fifth is the secondary literature reviewed above.

Source criticism proceeded on two levels. Externally, the tabulation forms follow the standard Commission format, with form codes, signature spaces and institutional stamps, and show no sign of digital alteration, although some pages of the 2020 record are poorly legible because of scanning. The Commission's website is a digital-only source with incomplete and unevenly organised data and had to be checked against the paper records. Press reports such as those in *Tempo* and RMOL carry identifiable authors, dates and publishers but are brief, offering the core of an official or expert statement without legal reasoning or opposing views. Internally, the tabulations are arithmetically consistent: subdistrict totals reconcile with city totals, and valid and invalid votes sum correctly. Yet as statistical records they say nothing about witness objections, campaign conduct or political atmosphere, and they were circulated only to the provincial commission and the candidates' witnesses, which limited public scrutiny. The memoir is authoritative on oversight at the national level but reflects an institutional viewpoint.

The interview is treated as oral historical evidence, and its date is kept distinct from the dates of the events it describes. The informant is an institutional insider with direct authority over the 2024 election and previous experience in election oversight. His account was systematic on regulatory change, participation and party strategy, but it described social conflict in normative, somewhat defensive terms, offered participation trends without comparative data, and cited legal bases with admitted uncertainty. These claims were therefore checked against documentary sources. Three divergences appeared: he put 2024 turnout at roughly 65 per cent, whereas the Commission's own counts imply about 62 per cent; he said that PKS and PDI-P each held ten council seats, whereas the Commission's statement of May 2024 gave PKS thirteen and PDI-P six; and he described the 20 and 25 per cent nomination thresholds that had been recalibrated shortly before the 2024 nominations (discussed below). In compiling the tables, vote counts were reconciled with the official decisions reproduced in the Constitutional Court record (2010) and with press reports of the Commission's plenary (2024). Two discrepancies in preliminary compilations were resolved in favour of the official figures: the 2010 total of Badrul Kamal and Agus

[12] Interview with Willi Sumarlin, Chair of the General Elections Commission (KPU) of Depok City, KPU Kota Depok office, Depok, 6 February 2025, 14.37–14.54 WIB.

[13] Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kota Depok, "Rekapitulasi Hasil Pemilihan Walikota dan Wakil Walikota Depok", official records for 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2024 (Depok: KPU Kota Depok).

[14] *Catatan Pengawasan Pemilu untuk Demokrasi Indonesia: Memori Jabatan Anggota Bawaslu RI Periode 2012–2017* (n.p., n.d.).

[15] Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kota Depok, "Data Pemilu Pilkada Tahun 2005–2024", accessed 26 November 2025, https://kota-depok.kpu.go.id/.

Supriyanto (149,168, not 169,168) and the 2024 total of Imam Budi Hartono and Ririn Farabi (396,863, not 396,463). Percentages are recomputed from vote counts.

In the interpretive stage, verified facts were organised around the questions above and analysed through William Riker's theory of political coalitions. Riker's size principle holds that, under conditions of zero-sum competition, rational actors and full information, only minimum winning coalitions form, since every additional partner dilutes the winners' payoff.[16] The principle is used here as a heuristic for nomination coalitions and is tested critically against outcomes, alongside the historians' categories of causality, agency, and continuity and change. In the historiographical stage, the findings are arranged chronologically within a thematic frame: the institutional setting, the maps of support and results, the candidates, and the process of implementation.

Results

The institutional setting

The first direct elections took place under a design that later reformers regarded as flawed. Law No. 32 of 2004 did not treat pilkada as part of the national election regime: regional election commissions (KPUD) stood outside the hierarchy of the national commission and answered to the DPRD, and the DPRD recruited the election supervisory committees (Panwas), opening space for local political interference.[17] Candidates could be nominated by a party or coalition holding at least 15 per cent of DPRD seats or of the accumulated valid votes in the last legislative election.[18] Within the Depok administration, a patrimonial bureaucratic culture blurred the line between politics and administration; incumbents standing for re-election tended, from about two years before polling, to steer government programmes toward building a constituency among civil servants through persuasion and implicit pressure.[19] This was the environment of the first Depok election.

Depok's own institutional history shaped that environment. Until 1999 the area was an administrative city (*kota administratif*) inside the Regency of Bogor, and its senior officials built their careers in the regency's civil service; Yuyun Wirasaputra, for example, headed Beji subdistrict in 1988, when Depok still held that status.[20] Municipal status created a new executive and a new DPRD almost from nothing, and the first mayor, Badrul Kamal, governed from 2000, in the early years of Depok's autonomy.[21] The election of 2005 was therefore the first in which voters could judge

[16] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).
[17] Romli, "Pilkada Langsung," 144.
[18] Law No. 32 of 2004, art. 59(2).
[19] Firnas, Rizky, and Maesarini, "Relasi Birokrasi," 9–10.
[20] Rohmat Rospari, "Yuyun Wirasaputra yang Merupakan Wakil Wali Kota Depok dari Wali Kota Depok Nur Mahmudi Ismail", edisi.co.id, 2022, https://www.edisi.co.id/berita/pr-974823944/yuyun-wirasaputra-yang-merupakan-wakil-wali-kota-depok-dari-wali-kota-depok-nur-mahmudi-ismail.
[21] Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 002/SKLN-IV/2006 (2006), https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/002-SKLN_IV-2006.pdf.

an incumbent who had himself built the city's administrative institutions, and it is unsurprising that bureaucratic reach became one of its central themes.

Party support and results, 2005–2024

2005. The first direct election, on 26 June 2005, offered five pairs (Table 1). The incumbent mayor, Badrul Kamal, ran with the Golkar–PKB combination; his former deputy, Yus Ruswandi, ran against him as mayoral candidate after PDI-P left the "Koalisi Kebersamaan" in a dispute over who should be Badrul's deputy, and joined PPP and PDS in a new alliance.[22] Harun Heryana and Yuyun Wirasaputra were former senior officials; Nur Mahmudi Ismail was a civil servant with no direct roots in the city's bureaucracy.[23] Yuyun Wirasaputra, who stood as Nur Mahmudi's running mate, told Firnas and colleagues that Badrul Kamal's influence over the bureaucracy was the greatest of all the candidates with an official background.[24] PKS, standing alone, took first place with 43.90 per cent against 39.03 per cent for Badrul Kamal; the other three pairs together won about 17 per cent. One of the contenders, Ilham Wijaya, died before the process had run its course.[25]

Table 1. Candidate pairs, supporting parties and votes, Depok mayoral election, 26 June 2005

No.	Candidate pair	Supporting parties	Votes	Share (%)
1	Wahab Abidin–Ilham Wijaya	Demokrat	32,461	6.13
2	Harun Heryana–Farkhan A.R.	PAN, PBB, PBR, PKPB, PKPI	23,859	4.50
3	Badrul Kamal–Syihabuddin Ahmad	Golkar, PKB	206,781	39.03
4	Yus Ruswandi–Soetadi Dipowongso	PDI-P, PPP, PDS	34,096	6.44
5	Nur Mahmudi Ismail–Yuyun Wirasaputra	PKS	232,610	43.90
	Total valid votes		**529,807**	**100.00**

2010. On 16 October 2010 four pairs competed (Table 2). The incumbent Nur Mahmudi, now with Idris Abdul Somad (known as Mohammad Idris) as running mate, was backed by PKS, PAN and three smaller parties. His former deputy, Yuyun Wirasaputra, stood with Pradi Supriatna and fourteen parties including Hanura and

[22] Suliyanti Pakpahan, "PDIP Depok Mundur Jika Calonnya Tak Dipilih", Tempo.co, 2005, https://www.tempo.co/arsip/pdip-depok-mundur-jika-calonnya-tak-dipilih-1993419.

[23] Adam Rio Ronaldo, "Pengaruh Saluran Komunikasi Politik terhadap Partisipasi Politik Masyarakat dalam Pemilihan Walikota Depok di Kelurahan Cinere Tahun 2020, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta, 2024.

[24] Firnas, Rizky, and Maesarini, "Relasi Birokrasi," 9–10.

[25] Tempo.co, "Mantan Calon Wakil Walikota Depok Meninggal", 2005, https://www.tempo.co/arsip/mantan-calon-wakil-walikota-depok-meninggal-1987649.

Gerindra; Badrul Kamal returned with seven parties, among them Golkar, Demokrat, PDI-P, PKB and PPP; and an independent pair, Gagah Sunu Sumantri and the actor Derry Drajat, completed the field.[26] The Commission recorded 555,565 valid and 16,483 invalid votes in a decision of 23 October 2010, and confirmed Nur Mahmudi and Idris as elected two days later, for the term 2011–2016.[27]

Table 2. Candidate pairs, supporting parties and votes, Depok mayoral election, 16 October 2010

No.	Candidate pair	Supporting parties	Votes	Share (%)
1	Gagah Sunu Sumantri–Derry Drajat	Independent	54,142	9.75
2	Yuyun Wirasaputra–Pradi Supriatna	Fourteen parties, among them Hanura, PBB, PKPB, PKNU, Gerindra, PMB, PKP, PDK, PPI, Patriot, PPRN, PNI Marhaenisme, PSI and Partai Buruh	124,511	22.41
3	Nur Mahmudi Ismail–Idris Abdul Somad	PKS, PAN, PNBK Indonesia, Republikan, Pelopor	227,744	40.99
4	Badrul Kamal–Agus Supriyanto	Demokrat, Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP, PDS, PDP	149,168	26.85
	Total valid votes		**555,565**	**100.00**

2015. The election of 9 December 2015 belonged to the first wave of simultaneous regional elections, involving 269 regions under Laws No. 8 and No. 9 of 2015.[28] Nur Mahmudi could no longer stand after two terms, which marked a generational change in Depok. Two pairs ran (Table 3). Mohammad Idris Abdul Shomad and Pradi Supriatna, backed by PKS, Gerindra and Demokrat, defeated Dimas Oky Nugroho and Babai Suhaimi, who had the support of six parties. Council seats from the 2014 election show the paradox: the Dimas–Babai coalition held 28 of 50 seats (PDI-P 11, PAN 6, Golkar 5, PPP 4, PKB 1, NasDem 1), while Idris–Pradi had 20 (Gerindra 9, PKS 6, Demokrat 5).[29] The Commission's plenary on 16 December 2015

[26] Tia Haspari, "Bursa Calon Walikota Depok Didominasi Wajah Lama", Tempo.co, 2010, https://www.tempo.co/arsip/bursa-calon-walikota-depok-didominasi-wajah-lama-1802657.

[27] Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 201/PHPU.D-VIII/2010 (2010), https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_PUTUSAN%20201-PHPU.D-VIII-2010%20Depok%20telah%20baca.pdf.

[28] Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 2015 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2014 tentang Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati, dan Walikota menjadi Undang-Undang.

[29] "Anggota DPRD Kota Depok Terpilih Resmi Dilantik", *Republika*, 4 September 2014, https://news.republika.co.id/berita/nbc63o/anggota-dprd-kota-depok-terpilih-resmi-dilantik.

recorded 692,865 ballots, of which 664,453 were valid and 28,412 invalid, from 1,235,030 registered voters, a participation rate of 56.10 per cent.[30]

Table 3. Candidate pairs, supporting parties and votes, Depok mayoral election, 9 December 2015

No.	Candidate pair	Supporting parties	Votes	Share (%)
1	Dimas Oky Nugroho–Babai Suhaimi	PDI-P, Golkar, NasDem, PPP, PAN, PKB	253,086	38.09
2	Mohammad Idris–Pradi Supriatna	PKS, Gerindra, Demokrat	411,367	61.91
	Total valid votes		**664,453**	**100.00**

2020. The election of 9 December 2020 pitted two figures from the outgoing leadership against each other: the mayor, Mohammad Idris, with Imam Budi Hartono, and his own deputy, Pradi Supriatna, with Afifah Alia (Table 4). Each side claimed credit for the achievements of the previous term.[31] The Pradi–Afifah coalition controlled 33 of the 50 council seats against 17 for Idris–Imam's PKS, PPP and Demokrat, roughly two-thirds of the council against a third.[32] The smaller bloc won. Turnout was 777,737 of 1,229,362 registered voters, or 63.26 per cent, below the 77.5 per cent target set nationally; the 451,625 who did not vote exceeded the winner's tally of 415,657.[33]

Table 4. Candidate pairs, supporting parties and votes, Depok mayoral election, 9 December 2020

No.	Candidate pair	Supporting parties	Votes	Share (%)
1	Pradi Supriatna–Afifah Alia	Gerindra, PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PSI, PAN and parties without council seats	332,689	44.46
2	Mohammad Idris–Imam Budi Hartono	PKS, PPP, Demokrat	415,657	55.54
	Total valid votes		**748,346**	**100.00**

2024. On 27 November 2024 two pairs competed (Table 5). PKS and Golkar nominated Imam Budi Hartono and Ririn Farabi, a physician announced by Golkar's

[30] Arie Permana, "Publisitas Politik Pilkada Depok 2015 pada Pasangan Idris-Pradi di Berita Online www.depoknews.id", Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, 2016.

[31] Permatasari, Bainus, and Akbar, "Pemanfaatan Modal Sosial."

[32] "Pilkada Depok," CNN Indonesia. Another compilation consulted gives 37 seats for the Pradi–Afifah coalition; as that figure, added to the 17 seats of the rival bloc, would exceed the council's 50 seats, the lower figure is used here.

[33] Prasetya, "Analisis Perilaku Abstention."

Depok branch.[34] Eight parties with council seats, together with Perindo, the Labour Party, Partai Ummat and Gelora, nominated Supian Suri, the city's former regional secretary, and Chandra Rahmansyah of PKB. In the council elected in 2024, the Supian–Chandra coalition held 30 of 50 seats (Gerindra 8, PDI-P 6, PKB 5, Demokrat 5, PPP 2, PAN 2, PSI 1, NasDem 1) against 20 for PKS (13) and Golkar (7).[35] Supian Suri and Chandra Rahmansyah won 451,785 votes against 396,863, and about 881,000 voters cast ballots out of roughly 1.4 million registered, or 62 per cent.[36]

Table 5. Candidate pairs, supporting parties and votes, Depok mayoral election, 27 November 2024

No.	Candidate pair	Supporting parties	Votes	Share (%)
1	Imam Budi Hartono–Ririn Farabi A. Rafiq	PKS, Golkar	396,863	46.76
2	Supian Suri–Chandra Rahmansyah	Gerindra, PDI-P, PKB, Demokrat, PAN, PPP, PSI, NasDem, Perindo, Partai Buruh, Partai Ummat, Gelora	451,785	53.24
	Total valid votes		**848,648**	**100.00**

Votes, margins and the growth of the electorate

Set side by side, the five contests show a margin that first widened and then collapsed (calculated from Tables 1–5). Valid votes rose from 529,807 in 2005 to 848,648 in 2024, an increase of about 60 per cent that reflects the city's demographic growth as well as the greater organisational capacity of parties and election managers. The margin between the PKS-backed pair and its principal rival was 25,829 votes (4.9 percentage points) in 2005. It widened to 78,576 (14.1 points) in 2010, when the opposition divided among three tickets, and peaked at 158,281 (23.8 points) in 2015, the first two-pair contest. It narrowed to 82,968 (11.1 points) in 2020, when two figures from the same outgoing leadership faced each other, and became a deficit of 54,922 votes (6.5 points) in 2024. The PKS-backed vote itself was remarkably stable at the top: between about 228,000 and 416,000 votes in the first four elections and 396,863 in 2024, only about 19,000 fewer than in 2020. What changed was the opposing total, which rose from 332,689 in 2020 to 451,785 in 2024, a gain of some 119,000 votes. The end of PKS's run, in other words, came less from an erosion of its own vote than from the consolidation of its opponents.

[34] "Golkar Depok Umumkan Dokter Ririn Farabi A Rafiq Maju di Pilkada 2024", *Tempo*, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/politik/golkar-depok-umumkan-dokter-ririn-farabi-a-rafiq-maju-di-pilkada-2024-63001.

[35] "KPU: PKS Bisa Usung Cawalkot Depok Langsung Tanpa Koalisi", *Detik News*, 29 May 2024, https://news.detik.com/pemilu/d-7363254/kpu-pks-bisa-usung-cawalkot-depok-langsung-tanpa-koalisi.

[36] Feru Lantara, "KPU Depok Menetapkan Pasangan Supian-Chandra Mengungguli Imam-Ririn", Antara Jawa Barat, 3 December 2024, https://jabar.antaranews.com/berita/563473/kpu-depok-menetapkan-pasangan-supian-chandra-mengungguli-imam-ririn.

Candidates, credentials and networks

Across the five elections, three types of candidate recur. The first is the bureaucrat-politician: Badrul Kamal, Yus Ruswandi, Harun Heryana and Yuyun Wirasaputra in 2005 and, in a new form, Supian Suri in 2024, who rose through the city administration from deputy mayor's aide to regional secretary before resigning to run.[37] The second is the party-cadre or party-aligned academic: Nur Mahmudi Ismail, first president of the party that preceded PKS and later a national minister, and Mohammad Idris, a doctorate-holding lecturer who was deputy mayor from 2011 and mayor from 2016.[38] The third is the outsider with a social or commercial profile: the actor Derry Drajat (2010); Dimas Oky Nugroho, an academic and civil-society organiser (2015);[39] Pradi Supriatna, a publisher and Gerindra branch chair, and the businesswoman Afifah Alia (2020);[40] and Ririn Farabi, a physician presented as a representative of younger and female voters in 2024.[41] The pattern is one of gradual diversification of candidate profiles around a stable core of officials and party cadres.

Religious and organisational affiliations gave several of these candidates a second constituency beyond their parties. Badrul Kamal's running mate in 2005, KH Syihabuddin Ahmad, was a Nahdlatul Ulama cleric who chaired the PKB executive board in Depok from 2002 to 2007 and entered the city council through PKB in 2004; his nomination paired an incumbent bureaucrat with a figure recognised within the Nahdliyin community.[42] On the other side of the same election, PDI-P left the Koalisi Kebersamaan because it insisted that Soetadi Dipowongso be Badrul's running mate, a reminder that the choice of a deputy was itself a bargaining chip.[43] Imam Budi Hartono, by contrast, was a long-serving PKS legislator: a member of Depok's council from 1999 to 2009 and of the West Java provincial council from 2009, with a record in youth, religious and social organisations.[44] Pradi Supriatna's capital was of another kind. As publisher of the daily *Monitor Depok*, chair of Gerindra's Depok branch, adviser to the land-transport operators' association Organda in Depok and vice-chair

[37] Dicky, "Sekda Kota Depok Didorong PDIP Maju Jadi Calon Wali Kota", IDN Times, 2023, https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/sekda-kota-depok-didorong-pdip-maju-jadi-calon-wali-kota-00-gvw69-mmtgpq.

[38] Antaranews, "Jejak Langkah Nur Mahmudi di Kota Depok", 2018, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/744658/jejak-langkah-nur-mahmudi-di-kota-depok; Daryono, "Profil Mohammad Idris, Wali Kota Depok yang Dilaporkan ke Polisi terkait Relokasi SDN Pondok Cina 1, Tribunnews.com, 14 December 2022, https://www.tribunnews.com/metropolitan/2022/12/14/profil-mohammad-idris-wali-kota-depok-yang-dilaporkan-ke-polisi-terkait-relokasi-sdn-pondok-cina-1.

[39] Jihaan Khoirunnisaa, "Dimas Oky Nugroho, Aktivis Sosial di Balik Perkumpulan Kader Bangsa, *Detik News*, 2023, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6812638/dimas-oky-nugroho-aktivis-sosial-di-balik-perkumpulan-kader-bangsa.

[40] Riadi, "Koalisi dan Modalitas."

[41] "Golkar Depok Umumkan," *Tempo*.

[42] M. Rizqy Fauzi, "Rais Syuriyah PCNU Kota Depok Kenang Lebaran Saat Nyantri di Tebuireng", Jabar.nu.or.id, 2023, https://jabar.nu.or.id/depok/rais-syuriyah-pcnu-kota-depok-kenang-lebaran-saat-nyantri-di-tebuireng-3bNhC.

[43] Pakpahan, "PDIP Depok Mundur."

[44] Muhammad Rizki Imami, "Profil Imam Budi Hartono yang Maju Wali Kota Depok pada Pilkada 2024", Berita Satu, 2024, https://www.beritasatu.com/bersatu-kawal-pilkada/2824932/profil-imam-budi-hartono-yang-maju-wali-kota-depok-pada-pilkada-2024.

of the Depok board of the community organisation Forkabi, he combined media presence, party office and ties to occupational and community groups.[45] That a dedicated study of Forkabi's alignment in 2015 exists shows that such organisations were treated as political actors in their own right.

Implementation and disputes

2005. The first dispute was also the most dramatic. On 4 August 2005 the West Java High Court (PT Jabar), seized by Badrul Kamal's camp, annulled the result that had favoured Nur Mahmudi, in what has been described as the first time a court reversed an officially declared pilkada result.[46] On 16 December 2005 the Supreme Court granted the KPUD's petition for review and set the High Court ruling aside, holding that the High Court had exceeded its authority under Law No. 32 of 2004 by weighing allegations of inflated and deflated vote counts beyond the tabulation the KPUD had compiled.[47] Badrul Kamal and his running mate Syihabuddin Ahmad also brought an authority dispute against the KPUD to the Constitutional Court in January 2006,[48] but the proceedings did not alter the outcome and Nur Mahmudi took office in 2006.[49]

2010. On 25 November 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected all petitions of the three losing pairs, finding allegations of civil-service mutations, money politics and black campaigns unproven or within the mayor's legal authority.[50] The litigation did not end there. In 2012 the Supreme Court annulled, in an administrative case, the commission decision on the candidacies, and the Ministry of Home Affairs called the ruling futile because the mayor had already taken office.[51] In July 2013 the Minister of Home Affairs stated that Nur Mahmudi remained mayor and that the Supreme Court decision did not automatically remove him,[52] and the former chair of the Constitutional Court, Jimly Asshiddiqie, said the Court's ruling was final and

[45] Mahkamah Konstitusi, Putusan Nomor 201/PHPU.D-VIII/2010; Isworo Dwi Panji S, "Studi Terhadap Keberpihakan Forkabi pada Pilkada Depok Tahun 2015", Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2018.

[46] "Sengketa Pilkada, MA Kabulkan Peninjauan Kembali KPUD Depok", Hukumonline, 16 December 2005, https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/sengketa-pilkada-ma-kabulkan-peninjauan-kembali-kpud-depok-hol14067/; Huda, "Telaah Kasus."

[47] "Sengketa Pilkada," Hukumonline.

[48] Mahkamah Konstitusi, Putusan Nomor 002/SKLN-IV/2006.

[49] Antaranews, "Jejak Langkah," 2018.

[50] "Nurmahmudi-Somad Tetap Pemenang Pemilukada Depok", Hukumonline, 25 November 2010, https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/nurmahmudisomad-tetap-pemenang-pemilukada-depok-lt4cee8135be10b/.

[51] "Kemendagri: Putusan MA Mubazir, Pilkada Depok Tak Perlu Diulang", *Detik News*, 28 June 2012, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1953308/kemendagri-putusan-ma-mubazir-pilkada-depok-tak-perlu-diulang.

[52] "Putusan MA Tak Otomatis Lengserkan Nur Mahmudi, Bisnis.com, 3 July 2013, https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20130703/16/148609/putusan-ma-tak-otomatis-lengserkan-nur-mahmudi; Juli Hantoro, "Mendagri: Nur Mahmudi Tetap Wali Kota Depok, Tempo.co, 2 July 2013.

binding.[53] The episode exposed overlapping jurisdictions between courts over the validity of results.

2015. The 2015 election was marked by administrative disputes in the candidacy stage, problems of voter lists, budget limits and logistics, but all stages were completed.[54] Campaigning relied on printed and online news and, for the first time, on Facebook and Twitter, which both pairs registered with the KPUD as official campaign media.[55] The losing coalition, led by PDI-P, announced that it would not go to the Constitutional Court.[56]

2020. The 2020 election, postponed from September to 9 December because of the pandemic, was run under Commission Regulation No. 13 of 2020, which required health protocols throughout, encouraged campaigning on social media and permitted face-to-face meetings only indoors and with no more than 50 participants.[57] The Commission adapted with webinars, podcasts and social media outreach, and relied on district election committees, democracy volunteers and religious figures to sustain participation.[58] Idris publicly attributed his result to cooperation with PKS and its mass base.[59]

2024. The campaign produced alleged violations: civil-service neutrality, unpermitted events, destruction of campaign props, negative and black campaigning and obstruction of campaign activity. These were handled through an integrated law-enforcement centre bringing together Bawaslu, prosecutors and police, and Bawaslu's Depok chair, M. Fathul Arif, urged contestants to keep the contest peaceful.[60] The Commission held a focus-group discussion to prepare the debate materials, stressing neutrality and balance.[61] The PKS–Golkar pair filed a petition with the Constitutional Court seeking annulment of the result and re-votes in several subdistricts, but withdrew it before the substance was examined in early January 2025.[62] The transition

[53] Ade Mulyana, "Jimly Asshiddiqie: Putusan MK soal Pilkada Depok Final dan Mengikat", RMOL.ID, 11 August 2013; Feru Lantara, "Perkara Pilkada Depok 2010 Sudah Selesai", Antara, 2013, https://megapolitan.antaranews.com/berita/5646/jimly-perkara-pilkada-depok-2010-sudah-selesai.

[54] Susan, Saraswati, and Indarja, "Pelaksanaan Pemilihan."

[55] Permana, "Publisitas Politik."

[56] "PDI-P Legowo soal Hasil Pilkada Depok 2015", Bisnis.com, 22 December 2015, https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20151222/78/504389/pdi-p-legowo-soal-hasil-pilkada-depok-2015.

[57] Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia, Peraturan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia Nomor 13 Tahun 2020 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Peraturan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Nomor 6 Tahun 2020; Astanto and Siregar, "Kesiapan Warga," 8.

[58] Linda Rahmawati, Ari Ganjar Herdiansah, and Antik Bintari, "Strategi KPU Kota Depok dalam Menyosialisasikan Pilkada Serentak Tahun 2020 di Masa Pandemi Covid-19", *Jurnal Ilmiah Muqoddimah* 6, no. 1 (2022): 77–87, http://dx.doi.org/10.31604/jim.v6i1.2022.77-87.

[59] Munaliah, "Kampanye Politik."

[60] M. Yudha Aldino, "Bawaslu Kota Depok Tanggapi Berbagai Dinamika Kampanye Pilkada di Kota Depok", 2024, https://kotadepok.bawaslu.go.id/berita/bawaslu-kota-depok-tanggapi-berbagai-dinamika-kampanye-pilkada-di-kota-depok.

[61] Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kota Depok, "Diskusi Kelompok Terumpun Perumusan Materi Debat Pasangan Calon Walikota Depok 2024", 2024, https://kota-depok.kpu.go.id/blog/read/8182_diskusi-kelompok-terumpun-perumusan-materi-debat-pasangan-calon-walikota-depok-2024.

[62] Nanda Perdana Putra, "Sengketa Pilwalkot Depok 2024, Paslon Imam-Ririn Cabut Gugatan di MK", Liputan6, 2025, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5870711/sengketa-pilwalkot-depok-

then moved to aligning the new mayor's programme with the regional medium-term development plan.[63] On participation, the informant pointed to voter fatigue from two elections in one year, a rise in the ceiling of voters per polling station from 300 to 500 that forced mergers of stations and longer walks between housing estates and villages, and the sense that the same faces kept returning; he also insisted that, in his term, there had been no horizontal conflict between supporters.[64]

The political map after each election

After 2005, PKS and its coalitions stayed at the centre of local government through four consecutive victories, even as their partners changed: PAN joined in 2010, Gerindra and Demokrat in 2015, and Demokrat and PPP in 2020.[65] The result of 2024 ended that continuity and produced a new balance of forces for the term 2025–2030.

After 2005 the political map was therefore one of a PKS-backed mayoralty facing, for most of the period, a council it did not control. In 2015 and 2020 PKS-backed mayors governed with minority blocs of 20 and 17 of 50 seats respectively. The new mayor of 2025, by contrast, begins his term with 30 seats behind him, a reversal that makes the relationship between executive and council an open question for further research.

Discussion

The size principle and the limits of coalition arithmetic

Riker's principle clarifies how parties gain access to the ballot but explains little about who wins a direct election. Nominations require a minimum share of seats or votes, which pushes small parties toward coalitions, and the informant described exactly that logic: PKS and PDI-P, he said, could have nominated alone but preferred to coalesce.[66] Yet the Commission's own statement in May 2024 gave PKS thirteen seats, a share above the 20 per cent threshold then cited, and PDI-P only six.[67] The informant's recollection is imprecise, and the rule he cited had been altered: Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 of 20 August 2024, just before candidate registration, replaced the seat-based threshold with a share of valid votes, 6.5 per cent for cities with over one million registered voters such as Depok.[68] Seen

2024-paslon-imam-ririn-cabut-gugatan-di-mk; "Paslon PKS (Imam-Ririn) Cabut Gugatan Pilkada Depok di MK", Bisnis.com, 8 January 2025, https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20250108/15/1829932/paslon-pks-imam-ririn-cabut-gugatan-pilkada-depok-di-mk.

[63] Berita Depok, "Pilkada 2024 di Kota Depok Berjalan Lancar, Pemerintah Siap Jalankan Masa Transisi, 2025, https://berita.depok.go.id/pilkada-2024-di-kota-depok-berjalan-lancar-pemerintah-siap-jalankan-masa-transisi.

[64] Interview with Willi Sumarlin, 6 February 2025.

[65] Hadi and Wahidin, "Hegemoni."

[66] Interview with Willi Sumarlin, 6 February 2025.

[67] "KPU: PKS Bisa Usung," *Detik News*.

[68] Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 60/PUU-XXII/2024 (20 August 2024); "MK Ubah Ambang Batas Pencalonan Calon Kepala Daerah, Antara News, 2024,

against that, coalition formation in Depok looks less like the pursuit of a minimum winning coalition than like a bargaining game over access, patronage and positioning.

The seat data are the decisive evidence. In 2015 the smaller bloc, with 20 seats against 28, won by nearly 24 percentage points; in 2020 the bloc holding 17 of 50 seats defeated one with 33. Only in 2024 did the larger bloc, now oversized with twelve parties and thirty council seats, win. Riker himself allowed that uncertainty about information produces coalitions larger than the minimum, and a twelve-party coalition is consistent with that qualification; but the earlier results show that size neither guaranteed nor precluded victory. Partisan alliances were also unstable. PAN stood with PKS in 2010 and against it in 2015, 2020 and 2024; Golkar fought PKS in all of the first four elections and joined it in 2024; Gerindra shifted from an anti-incumbent camp to PKS in 2015, and then against it in 2020 and 2024; PPP changed camp in every one of the five elections; and Demokrat appeared alone, then with Badrul Kamal, with PKS in two elections, and finally with Supian Suri. Only PKS consistently anchored one pole. These alliances were instruments of calculation, not durable identities, and the vote moved with candidates and strategy more than with party labels.

The margins reported above point to a second structural factor, the fragmentation of the opposition. In 2005 and 2010 the winner took a plurality (43.90 and 40.99 per cent) in fields of five and four pairs, and the non-PKS vote was divided among rivals who could not agree on a single candidate: in 2010 Badrul Kamal ran with seven parties, Yuyun Wirasaputra with fourteen, and an independent pair ran alone. When the field narrowed to two pairs in 2015 and 2020, PKS-backed candidates won majorities, so bipolarity alone did not defeat them. Only in 2024 did a unified opposition coincide with a challenger who carried administrative credentials and an incumbent pair that, on Rahmasari's account, ran defensively. A twelve-party alliance is therefore better read as a solution to a coordination problem than as a minimum winning coalition: it was an oversized arrangement that may have been rational for parties that had repeatedly lost by competing separately or by backing candidates without a distinctive profile.

Incumbency, bureaucracy and personal authority

If coalition size did not decide outcomes, other resources did. The incumbent advantage is visible in 2005, when the unequal reach of Badrul Kamal and Nur Mahmudi in the bureaucracy was noted by an interested witness, and in 2020, when the sitting mayor beat his own deputy. Reports of bureaucratic partisanship in 2005 and 2010 suggest that the patrimonial culture identified by Firnas and colleagues was real, but the Constitutional Court's 2010 reasoning, that civil-service mutations fell within a mayor's authority, reveals how hard it was to prove.[69] Hadi and Wahidin add that PKS's 2020 win rested on an Islamic ideological message, on scholars and educational institutions, and on the religious authority of Idris himself, which implies

https://babel.antaranews.com/berita/426875/mk-ubah-ambang-batas-pencalonan-calon-kepala-daerah.

[69] Firnas, Rizky, and Maesarini, "Relasi Birokrasi," 9–10; "Nurmahmudi-Somad," Hukumonline.

that part of PKS's strength was personalised.[70] The 2024 defeat is consistent with this reading. According to Rahmasari, the PKS incumbents ran a defensive campaign, Imam Budi Hartono was perceived as an extension of the party who could not step out of Idris's shadow, voters had grown tired of nearly two decades of one-party dominance, and the national victory of Prabowo Subianto in the presidential election created momentum for the parties behind his rivals.[71] In this account, continuity until 2020 and change in 2024 had the same root: a dominance that depended on a few trusted figures and could not be passed on automatically.

Causality in these elections was therefore layered rather than singular. Structural conditions, among them the legal framework of 2004 and its later revisions, the growth of the electorate and the national political momentum of 2024, set the range of plausible outcomes. Individual choices determined which was realised: PDI-P's departure from Badrul Kamal's coalition in 2005, Pradi Supriatna's decision in 2020 to challenge the mayor with whom he had been elected in 2015, and Supian Suri's decision to leave the civil service and stand. The historian's task is to keep both levels in view, since an account that stressed structure would make PKS's defeat inevitable only in hindsight, and one that stressed agency alone would miss why the same kinds of choices produced different results in 2015 and 2024.

The 2024 winner's profile supplies a final irony. A bureaucrat who rose to regional secretary, Supian Suri turned the institutional legitimacy built within the administration into electoral capital, a path quite different from the party-cadre trajectory of PKS candidates. The bureaucratic culture that scholars had seen as an obstacle to neutrality in 2005 became, in a transformed shape, a resource for candidacy two decades later.

Disputes, institutional learning and the question of participation

The dispute record suggests institutional learning. The conflicts of 2005 and 2010 concerned who had actually won and which court could say so; the High Court overstepped, the Supreme Court corrected it, and the Constitutional Court's finality was still questioned in 2012 and 2013 through administrative litigation. By 2015 the loser conceded; in 2020 problems were procedural and sanitary; and in 2024 the losing pair withdrew its petition. The movement is not from conflict to harmony but from contests over legitimacy of the result to disputes over administration and, increasingly, participation. Participation was 56.10 per cent in 2015, 63.26 per cent in 2020 and about 62 per cent in 2024, and in 2020 abstainers outnumbered the winner's voters. The informant's explanations of fatigue, merged polling stations and recurring faces are plausible but remain testimony; they are consistent with the interpretation that legitimacy in Depok's later elections was constrained less by fraud allegations than by weak mobilisation.

Historiographical positioning

Earlier studies have treated bureaucratic neutrality, administration, PKS strategy, digital campaigning, abstention or the 2024 defeat each in isolation. Read

[70] Hadi and Wahidin, "Hegemoni."
[71] Rahmasari, "Analisis Faktor Kegagalan."

together, and set against official tabulations, they point to three continuities (PKS's organisational weight, the importance of incumbency and personal authority, and recurrent disputes over procedure) and three changes (shifting alliances, diversifying candidate profiles, and a move from litigation over results toward problems of participation). Figure 1 summarises the electoral side of this pattern. Studies of pilkada in the reform era often treat elections as episodes of institutional design, whether of thresholds, supervision or administration. The Depok sequence suggests that institutional learning and personal authority interact: procedures became steadier from 2015 onwards, yet legitimacy at the ballot box still depended on whether a few recognisable figures could command trust. That reading qualifies accounts in which one party's hegemony is treated as a settled fact of local politics, because the same sequence shows how quickly such hegemony can dissolve once rivals coordinate.




Figure 1. Vote share of the PKS-backed pair and its principal rival, Depok mayoral elections, 2005–2024 (percentage of valid votes). Source: calculated from Tables 1–5.

Conclusion

The article set out to reconstruct how party support and candidate pairs were configured in Depok's five direct mayoral elections, and how their implementation unfolded. On the first question, the evidence shows that party support changed from election to election in response to interests, strategy and the emergence of popular figures, while PKS remained the fixed pole around which other parties arranged themselves. It kept its influence by consistently nominating candidates, strengthening its networks and cooperating with varied partners. Support for a pair was not a function of the number of parties behind it: in 2015 and 2020 the smaller legislative bloc won, and in 2024 a twelve-party coalition ended PKS's run of victories.

On the second question, implementation developed gradually and with refinements to procedure, even though disputes over results, changes in legislation and adaptations of governance persisted. Vote totals varied with candidates' capacity and record, campaign strategy, party strength and the social and political conditions

of each period. Taken together, Depok's elections from 2005 to 2024 represent a continuing, developing competition and a sign of the deepening of local democracy, not a fixed pattern of dominance.

The contribution of the article is an integrated chronology of the five elections, anchored in official tabulations and cross-checked against court records and press reports, together with a critical test of coalition theory against that chronology. Its novelty is the demonstration that Depok's elections form a connected sequence in which coalition arithmetic mattered for access but not for outcome. The limits of the evidence are plain: a single interview with an institutional insider, tabulations that record numbers but not motives, and a secondary literature on 2024 that is still mostly unpublished. Further research on oral testimony from candidates, party officials and voters, and on subdistrict-level voting patterns, would test and refine the interpretation offered here.

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