

THE POLITICAL USE OF ISLAMIC VARIATION IN INDONESIAN ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

The Indonesian State Islamic Higher Education (PTAIN) system was created to encourage a progressive form of Islam to oppose political Islam and to be apolitical. Because PTAIN are the official government form of Islamic higher education, PTAIN faculty members can be important opinion makers in the Indonesian Islamic community. PTAIN are critical to understanding the Indonesian Islamic community because they engage in innovative scholarship on Islamic theology, ethics, law, and practice and in the education of young Muslim leaders in many fields. This article explores some of the ways PTAIN have been politicized to play a role in the debates about the future of Indonesian Islam which is developing (or at least showing) more complex variations. It offers a theoretical model for understanding the variation found in Islam.

Keywords: Islamic Higher Education, Politicized.

ABSTRAK

Pendidikan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (PTAIN) Indonesia diciptakan untuk mendorong Islam yang progresif dalam rangka menentang Islam politik dan menjadi apolitis. Karena PTAIN merupakan penjelmaan pemerintahan yang resmi dalam pendidikan tinggi Islam, civitas akademik PTAIN dapat menjadi pembuat opini penting dalam masyarakat Islam Indonesia. PTAIN sangat penting untuk memahami masyarakat Islam Indonesia karena mereka terlibat dalam upaya intelektual dalam bidang teologi Islam, etika, hukum, dan praktek dalam mendidik pemimpin muda Muslim di berbagai bidang. Artikel ini membahas beberapa cara PTAIN telah dipolitisir untuk memainkan peran dalam perdebatan tentang masa depan Islam Indonesia yang berkembang (atau setidaknya menunjukkan) variasi yang lebih kompleks. Artikel ini menawarkan model teoritis untuk memahami keragaman yang ditemukan dalam Islam.

Kata Kunci: Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, Politisasi.

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian State Islamic Higher Education (PTAIN) system was created to encourage a progressive form of Islam to oppose political Islam and to be apolitical. Because PTAIN are the official government form of Islamic higher education, PTAIN faculty members can be important opinion makers in the Indonesian Islamic community. PTAIN are critical to understanding the Indonesian Islamic community because they engage in innovative scholarship on Islamic theology, ethics, law, and practice and in the education of young Muslim leaders in many fields.

Indonesian institutions of higher education and their faculty members play a much more public role than their counterparts in American society in both popular culture and national government. Professors regularly write newspaper columns, op-ed pieces, and bestselling books. Those within the PTAIN system may also be religious leaders preaching Friday sermons, running *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), or hosting religious lessons (*pengajian*) in their homes. Further some are known on the global stage, such as the late Nurcholish Madjid as well as Azyumardi Azra, whose work has been recognized and honored internationally, including being named an Honorary Commander of the British Empire for his service to interfaith understanding (Osman, 2010).

This system plays a central role in the critical reexamination of Islam as well as acts as a bridge between various strains of Islam because students come from diverse Muslim backgrounds (Kraince, 2008, p. 349). Not only are the institutions and their faculty and staff important participants in the discourse about the future, they are subjects of it as well. Debates about the future of Islam in Indonesia are intertwined with debates about curriculum and program changes, the addition of secular subject, and progressive ideas advanced by some professors. There is concern that the addition of non-religious majors will leach away students the traditional religiously focus programs and erode the Islamic character of the university. Further, historical and social scientific approaches to the study of religions have been integrated into the older religious faculties. People outside of the State Islamic Higher Education system have gone as far as accusing faculty members of apostasy (Lukens-Bull 2013, p. 3). In a very real way, debates about higher education in Indonesia are debates about the nature of society.

In my first book (2005), I examined how the Muslim community centered around *pesantren* is actively negotiating both modernity and tradition in the contexts of nation-building, globalization, and a supposed clash of civilizations. Zamahksyari Dhofier (1999) described a system in the early stages of change, as *pesantren* were taking on aspects of secular education. By the mid-1990s, many *pesantren* found it increasingly difficult to maintain the

balance between the traditional Islamic education and government schools. In fact Tebu Ireng, the most famous *pesantren* of all was, according to some extent, no longer able to train religious scholars (Lukens-Bull, 2005, p. 43) and many schools have refocused their purpose. No longer do they seek to train clerics and scholars, but now they seek to train people for the general workforce who have the morality of Muslim clerics and scholars (Lukens-Bull, 2000). One result is that many of these *pesantren* were no longer able to produce graduates who have the knowledge and skills to become religious leaders. The *pesantren* community asked from whence the future leadership will come. One possible answer given in the mid-90s was Ph.D. holders (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 10).

The debates about *pesantren* in the 1990s foreshadowed the debates facing the PTAIN system in the early years of the 21st century. As I have explored elsewhere, *pesantren* education has made a number of accommodations to modern educational demands (2005). This shift in educational goals means that it was no longer possible to give all students the same level of traditional skills and a “secular” education. Therefore, the emphasis in *pesantren* shifted to character development and moral education. In *pesantren*, the key methodology for this is to create an environment in which desired values are inculcated and reinforced. PTAIN in 2008 were facing some of the same issues and have proposed a similar solution (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 11).

DISCUSSION

History of PTAIN

As I have discussed elsewhere (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 12), several IAIN were created in the 1970s, in part, to be tertiary education for *pesantren* and *madrasah* graduates. IAIN were not born out of nothing but was presaged by two institutions: one focused on the training of Islamic teachers for government curricula schools, called *Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri* (PTAIN; not to be confused with the current usage of the acronym) and the other, the *Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama* (Government Worker’ Academy of Religious Science) was designed to train government functionaries in the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) (Abdullah, 1999). Hence, the largest faculties in IAIN, across all campuses, were *Syari’ah* (Islamic law) and *Tarbiyah* (education). These two faculties provide the judges, teachers, and officials for Indonesia’s religious bureaucracy and religious educational system (Steenbrink, 1974, p. 159) including those for the Marriage Registration section of the Department of Religious Affairs. Azyumardi Azra, former Rector of UIN Jakarta, argues that the IAIN are not and have never been a “seminary” and have always had an agenda beyond simply training religious leaders (2011, p. 44).

PTAIN were created at a time when Islam was being pushed to the margins of Indonesian politics. A number of events in the early history of the Republic of Indonesia had placed Islam in the margins (Pringle, 2010, p. 69-70). During the 1965-66 bloodlettings which followed an allegedly communist coup attempt, the Indonesian military recruited Muslim militias to help in the killing of an estimated 500,000 people. After this empowerment as partners with the state, Suharto understandably wanted to remove any potential threat to his own power. One way to do this was ensuring that the PTAIN System be explicitly apolitical (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 12).

Some have argued that the IAIN (in Jakarta and Yogyakarta) were “gifts” to the *pesantren* community to appease them after the “gift” of UGM (Gajah Mada University) was given to the nationalists (Saeed, 1999, p. 182). These so-called gifts were given so that Suharto could garner support for what would become a 32 year regime. This interpretation is subject to debate. First it is questionable that there is, or has ever been, unified communities to be happy about their respective “gifts” (Meuleman, 2002). Second, it is clear that the establishment of the PTAIN System served a number of Suharto’s political goals including the bureaucratization of Islamic practices such as family law, marriage, and inheritance. Suharto was arguably biased in favor of “progressive” Islam. The IAIN were to be depoliticized institutions that were removed from the Islamist politics (Saeed, 1999, p. 183). The reforms under a number of Suharto’s handpicked Ministers of Religious Affairs demonstrate how his agenda was carried out. These include moving away from a doctrinal focus to more critical and inquisitive approaches, engaging social science and historical perspectives, sending faculty members to Western countries for their doctoral education, and eventually becoming more than schools for studying religion (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 13).

Reform of IAIN

Amin Abdullah, the Rector of UIN Yogya from 2000-2010, said that from 1977-1997 PTAIN were focused on normative instruction or *‘ulûm ad-dîn*. That is, how best to practice Islam and how to teach others about these best practices. Even the sometimes controversial work of some scholars, such as Harun Nasution’s approach to the relationship between reason and revelation (see Martin and Woodward 1997) fit within what Abdullah called *‘ulûm ad-dîn*. Abdullah may be overestimating the recent changes as well as underestimating the influence of Harun Nasution, who is arguably the most important scholar and teacher in the history of Indonesian Islamic higher education and will be discussed in detail in following section. For now, it is sufficient to note that Nasution encouraged students to examine aspects of

Islam that they might not have previously considered.

Nasution's influence was so strong that some claim that his students and many in the system as merely repeating their teachers and not possessing a high degree of intellectualism themselves (Meuleman, 2000, p. 289). This paternalistic and misleading claim is given lie by the quality of the research of many PTAIN professors (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 15).

Long before the PTAIN System was established, the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University in Montreal started working with Indonesian graduate students in the 1940s (Webster, 2009, p. 92). The number of students sent to McGill expanded in the 1970s with the establishment of the IAIN. Under the leadership of Munawir Sjadzali (1983-1988) as Minister of Religious Affairs, the professors were sent to get advanced degrees in the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, and other Western countries. This is sometimes referred to as the creation of *ulama-plus* – people who are *'alim* (religious experts) but are more intellectual in their orientation. Before this time, the ties between IAIN and the Middle East were very strong with the faculty having a particular orientation toward al-Azhar Mosque/University in Cairo (Saleh, 2001, p. 7). Even though the shift toward critical studies informed by social sciences and humanities started almost from the beginning, Amin Abdullah argues that there was not a critical mass of PhD trained faculty for the approaches to be mainstreamed until the 1990s (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 16).

Evolution of Some IAIN into UIN

Starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s, six IAIN were transformed from Institutes to Universities by adding at least two non-religious *fakultas*. The motivation for these changes included concerns about employability of students and wanting to make sure that the Muslim community was not economically marginalized. Opinions about these changes are mixed both on and off campus. On campuses that have made the change, there is some concern about what will happen to the original religiously oriented *fakultas*; that the new, “secular” *fakultas* will provide too much competition and will eventually drive their *fakultas* out of existence. On campuses that have not made the change, there has been a call for a wider mandate. That is, they are adding programs like Psychology, Nursing, Management, and Public Health under the existing *fakultas* (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 16).

Debate and concern about the future of State Islamic Higher Education is not new. In the 1990s, it was not apostasy or even liberalism that was the problem. Rather, the worry was that IAIN might not be as capable of training future *ulama* as traditional (*salaf*) *pesantren*. Elsewhere I recall the story of an IAIN graduate being less skilled in reading *kitab kuning*

than young students at a traditional pesantren (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 17). Being able to read *kitab kuning* is an important measure in the *pesantren* world; it is the one used to criticize Tebu Ireng in the mid-90s (cf., Lukens-Bull, 2005, p. 58). The debates in the 1990s of whether success in Islamic studies should be measured by traditional, some would say, medieval standards or by more modern and internationally recognized standards of scholarship gave rise to the debates taking place in the first part of the 21st century (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 17).

Accusations of the Worst Kind

Elsewhere I have described a conversation with Asyurmadi Azra, former Rector of UIN Jakarta and then director of the graduate school, (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 21) in which he was not very concerned about a 2005 book which accused many PTAIN professors of apostasy and described the campuses as a whole as cesspools of unbelief (Jaiz, 2005). Azra was not the only PTAIN faculty member who felt the book and similar accusation were not worthy of any attention. By paying any attention to it, the concern was that I would be granting it some level of legitimacy. Further, this line of investigation would prove fruitless. I find that I must respectfully disagree with my friends. Although these accusations of apostasy come from a vocal minority in Indonesian society, they reflect a dimension of the debates that cannot be ignored (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 21). As Michael Gilsenen argues that the process of defining social elements as Islamic or non-Islamic is inherently political. He describes an overall process whereby certain classes and groups that are politically and economically dominant in society legitimize a form of religion that increasingly relates to a specifically class view of how Islam is to be defined, practiced, studied, taught, and authorized. This will be the "real" and legitimate Islam ... (1982, 211).

In Indonesia today, the inverse is also true, declaring what is true Islam is part of efforts to gain political ascendancy. Convincing the general public that the State Islamic Institutes and Universities have gone astray is part of an overall attempt to establish a specific understanding of Islam and Islamic law as the single legitimate form to be endorsed by the state. To understand this debate we must begin by understanding the dynamics of variation in Muslim belief and practice (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 22).

Some critics go so far as to accuse specific PTAIN faculty members of apostasy. Some PTAIN instructors claim these accusations are because of the transition of several IAIN into UIN. However, the major work raising concerns about apostasy does not mention the transition into UIN (Jaiz, 2005). Hartono Ahmad Jaiz and Adian Huseini, two of the most vocal critics

of the PTAIN System today, are part of what is called *Islam garis keras* (hardline Islam) as well as IAIN graduates who were not selected to become junior instructors. This term applies to a wide range of ideologies and organizations which, while not new, have gained greater prominence since the end of the Suharto Era and the growth of democracy. While most of the hardliners are non-violent, violent groups among them have become more active in the post-Suharto Era. Today, the PTAIN System is working in a context of the growing impact of hardline Islam (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 17).

PTAIN are often referred to as the fortress (*benteng*) of Islam by those who are critical of some of the developments; they wish for PTAIN to be solid and unchanging like the walls of a fortified city. Most PTAIN faculty will not use the fortress/walled city metaphor. They prefer to identify the system as one of the pillars of moderate Islam along with the socio-religious organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which together represent just over half the Indonesian population (van Bruinessen, 2009, p. 219). It might be more appropriate to call State Islamic Institutes and Universities the engines of moderate or progressive Islam to the vehicle comprised of NU and Muhammadiyah; PTAIN are dynamic moving systems that are central to the continuation of moderate Islam. They are intricately connected to both NU and Muhammadiyah, as both NU and Muhammadiyah high schools are important sources of IAIN students. Further, many if not all religious teachers in NU and Muhammadiyah high schools are IAIN graduates (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 32).

It is critical to consider the relationships between that which ties various Muslim communities together and what makes them distinct. This is what Talal Asad calls for when he suggests that the anthropology of Islam must devise a conceptual organization of the diversity in Islam (Asad, 1986, p. 5). The most insightful contemporary theories regarding this relationship have attempted to explain variation within Islam by constructing linguistic analogies, including studying religion as discourse (Asad, 1986; Bowen 1993b). The discourse model has two central shortcomings. The first is that it is not very specific on the dynamics between a translocal or “universal” form and local forms. The second is that “discourse” sounds neat and tidy with equal participants trying to shape the outcome; it tends to overlook the political nature of such processes (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 22).

Linguistic Analogies

Indonesian discourse makes a distinction between *agama* (religion) and *keagamaan*, which literally means religiousness, but is often used to mean religious practice, or expression. Many scholars have identified a need to examine the relationship between Islam writ large and what actual people do

with their religion in everyday life (Bowen 1993a: 7, Woodward 1988: 65, 87-88, El-Zein 1974b). The most insightful contemporary theories regarding this relationship have attempted to explain variation within Islam by constructing linguistic analogies, including studying religion as discourse, (for a more complete review of the academic debates about the variation in Islam see Lukens-Bull 1999, Marranci 2008) (Asad 1986 ; Bowen, 1993b).

I wish to expand the linguistic analogy and draw a parallel between *agama* (religion) and *langue* (language as a system) and between *keagamaan* (religiousness) and *parole* (speech acts) (cf. Saussure, 1972). The factors that shape religious expression include idiosyncratic, social and historical factors. Idiosyncratic factors, those on the individual level, include factors such as the choice of how or whether to practice in a consistent manner. Idiosyncrasies, by definition, are hard to describe and model. More importantly then, idiosyncratic factors include choosing which social or historical factors to draw upon. Social and historical factors have given rise to patterns of practice among groups of people that are analogous to dialects (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 23).

One way to distinguish between dialects is mutual intelligibility. In the context of religion, “intelligibility” does not simply entail mutual understanding but refers to recognizing someone as being on the correct path. However, claims of non-intelligibility may be exaggerated in religion as well as in language. Certain language communities may deny similarities with other communities as part of identity politics. For example, Straits Chinese call their dialect of Malay, *Babah-Nyonya*, deny any similarity with standard Malay in a national context in which “speaking Malay” would deny their own ethnic heritage. Similarly, it is common enough to encounter circumstances in which Muslims may deny that the practices of other Muslims are properly called Islam (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 23).

Apostasy Accusations and Dialects

One way in which thinking of different expressions of religion as dialects is useful concerning the dynamics between standard and non-standard forms. Prejudice toward non-standard languages is common enough. It leads to a number of problems in education; non-standard languages are not recognized as separate dialects but as “broken” forms of the standard (Labov, 1972; Rickford 1999). In religious discourse terms like syncreticism, superstition, or even apostasy are used to denigrate non-standard forms.

Ada Permurtadan di IAIN (There is Apostasy at IAIN) was published in 2005 by Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, a 1970s graduate from IAIN Yogyakarta. He accused many famous alumni and instructors of leaving the true path of

Islam. His reasons range from the absurd (Nurcholish Madjid receiving a liver transplant from a Chinese person) to what he would consider socially subversive (equal rights for men and women) to the theologically serious (stating that all religions may lead to paradise). The accusation of being an apostate (*murtad*) is consequential and Jaiz lays out what he understands the consequences to be. The apostate is to be warned and given three days to repent. Failing repentance, Jaiz says that they should be killed, denied a proper burial, and have their property confiscated from their heirs and the proceeds used to advance the Muslim community (2005, p. 95ff in e-book version). I personally know of one death threat arising out of the accusations. It was delivered in a truly Indonesian (Javanese) fashion, heavily veiled and indirect. Fortunately, no one has taken Jaiz's rhetoric to its conclusion and tried to murder an alleged apostate (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 34-35).

As I discussed elsewhere, one way to look at these accusations is to take a step back and consider the different ways the linguistic analogy adopted here illuminates the debates. The chief value of this analogy is the ability to model the relationship between what differentiates believers in different settings and what ties them together. In specific, it is useful to look at how the concept of apostasy finds expression in different dialects. Cultural Islam, the mainstream "dialect" in Indonesia, would limit apostasy to converting to another religion or denying Islam. When the discussion of apostasy occurs on PTAIN campuses no one is willing to make such an accusation; they will say that someone is too liberal but that they are not an apostate because they still keep the required rituals (*ibadah*). The *salafi* "dialect" agrees with the three basic ways of being an apostate used by Cultural Islam but would add many other ways including anything that smacks of feminism such as gender parity in employment, not agreeing with polygamy, or women's rights quickly leading to accusations of apostasy from Jaiz and his ilk (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 35).

The aphorism "a language is a dialect with an army and a navy" highlights the theoretical importance of standard, or power, dialects. Similar relationships exist within Islam, although it may not be armed forces but petrodollars that define the power dialect or "orthodoxy." Debates over orthodoxy and apostasy are negotiations over power relations. The interplay of power and symbols is found in the social construction of symbol systems, which is the process of defining shared meaning. All conscious efforts to construct, maintain, or alter meaning constitute politics (Sederberg, 1984, p. 7; Urban, 1991, p. 12). Disputes about shared meaning of political expression and competing ideologies are not epiphenomenal to politics, but are politics itself (Fairclough, 1989, p. 23; Cohen, 1979).

Relationship with the State

Another set of accusations concerns accepting the Republic of Indonesia as a secular state and opposing the establishment of a *syari'ah state* in Indonesia (Jaiz, 2005, p. 20, 64). Even worse, in Jaiz's book, is being supportive of the idea of *jihad nusantara*, meaning that the struggle for national development counts a form of jihad. If there were any doubts about Jaiz's religio-political orientation, none remains after his scathing attacks on Muslims who are also Indonesian nationalists. He is clearly influenced by Sayyid Qutb, the father of modern Islamic radicalism, who argued that all forms of nationalism were blasphemy or attributing an equal to God (Woodward, 2001) which suggest a dialectal commonality between them. Harono's position vis the Indonesian state clearly marks him as a fringe author. However, he is not alone; Islamist groups have capitalized society's frustrations with government corruption to argue for a *syari'ah state*. PTAIN are often referred to as the fortress (*benteng*) of Islam by those who are critical of some of the developments; they wish for PTAIN to be solid and unchanging like the walls of a fortified city. Most PTAIN faculty will not use the fortress/walled city metaphor. They prefer to identify the system as one of the pillars of moderate Islam along with the socio-religious organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which together represent just over half the Indonesian population (van Bruinessen, 2009, p. 219). It might be more appropriate to call State Islamic Institutes and Universities the engines of moderate or progressive Islam to the vehicle comprised of NU and Muhammadiyah; PTAIN are dynamic moving systems that are central to the continuation of moderate Islam. They are intricately connected to both NU and Muhammadiyah, as both NU and Muhammadiyah high schools are important sources of IAIN students. Further, many if not all religious teachers in NU and Muhammadiyah high schools are IAIN graduates (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 37).

If anyone on PTAIN campuses might agree with Jaiz's accusations it would those be those associated with PKS, DDII, and other Islamist groups; but none concurs. At most, they allow the possibility of apostates on other campuses but deny any on their campus and rejected the label when asked about specific individuals on other campus, such as Asyurmadi Azra. I asked a PKS affiliated faculty member, what would make someone an apostate. He said that it would take a clear statement of rejection or a lapse in ritual practice (*ibadah*). He makes a distinction between apostasy and liberalism and holds that being liberal on worldly issues does not make someone an apostate. Imam Suprayogo, the Rector of UIN Malang, similarly limits apostasy to converting to another religion, "There are no IAIN professors who have become Christian or Hindu" (Interview, February 2009).

Reaction to Accusations

There are three basic reactions to the apostasy accusations. The first is to dismiss them as the ravings of an uneducated lunatic. They are called trash and even "bullshit" (using the English term). The arguments are dismissed as lacking an understanding of Islam, the goals of higher education, and even the facts about what is happening on PTAIN campuses. Not surprisingly this reaction comes from those who have been accused of apostasy by name or by those who take positions similar to those who have been directly accused (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 38).

The second response is to deny that there any true apostates on PTAIN campuses. The ways to do this include defining apostasy narrowly as converting to another religion or becoming an atheist. Another approach is to defend freedom of thought both in an academic setting and in Islam in general. People who take this position frequently disagree with the positions taken by their more liberal colleagues but are unwilling to engage in *takfiri* (calling others *kafir*, or unbelievers). However, they also defend academic freedom and the right for people to make arguments and for other to judge for themselves, which distinguishes them from those who take the third response (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 38).

The third response also refuses to call anyone an unbeliever or a *murtad*. However, it calls into question the value of academic freedom. Those who take this position argue that all PTAIN academics should first and foremost position themselves as Muslims and must make all their arguments based on Quran and Hadith, or at least make them all consistent with Quran and Hadith. They even argue that if the findings of social science are inconsistent with the revealed text, they must be subordinated to scripture. They do not argue that the "liberals" are apostates but suggest that it might be best that they no longer serve as IAIN teachers if they want to base their arguments on social science perspectives. It is telling, however, that even the most "liberal" IAIN academics consider themselves and their opinions as consistent with the sacred sources, thus suggesting that those who take this third response are taking narrow interpretations of the sacred texts and insisting that all their colleagues follow suit (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 39).

Azyurmadi Azra argues that Jaiz is not interested in dialogue or understanding. Azra says that similar accusations came from people associated with *Dewan Dakwah* (DDII). He related the story of encountering a DDII leader whose child graduated from the psychology program at UIN Jakarta. Azra asked the DDII leader if his child had become an apostate yet and the leader just stood there dumbfounded. Azra said that certain people just cannot stand seeing Muslim organizations succeed if they do not profit from it themselves and that is the reason for these accusations. Azra suggests

that Jaiz has had no impact. It is possible that Azra underestimates the impact of the accusations. Either that or the impact is greater outside of Jakarta. At the very least, Jaiz keys into issues and concerns that are current in society, or to use the analogy employed here, he is using a particular religious dialect which is understood by a particular community. I had a doctoral student in my class at IAIN North Sumatra who made a point of taking me on almost anything I said. His behavior was explained to me as being due to the fact that he was a Friday preacher and that it was important that he maintain certain appearances. Since, “sitting pretty in front of Orientalists” is one of the signs of apostasy; he was making sure that no one remembered him “sitting pretty” in my class (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 39).

A former dean of the *Fakultas Ushuluddin* in Yogya, which Jaiz says is the center of these alleged problems, said that they Jaiz’s ideas are being consumed (*dimakan*) by many people, especially those in *pesantren* and this has impacted recruitment efforts. Another professor asserts that she needs to position herself carefully, she said that when she wants to do an event, she has to start by saying that she is from UIN from the *fakultas* of Tafsir-Hadits and that she was raised in a *pesantren*. She leaves out entirely her time in the United States. She simply says that she was educated through Madrasah Aliyah in *pesantren* and then went to a larger *pesantren*, namely IAIN, in a “*pesantren*” department, namely *Tafsir-Hadits* (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 40).

The differences of opinion around IAIN are much more than that and they are reflections of differences in expression much like dialects of a language. The last place this should take us is a return to a Geertzian mode of analysis of the forms of Islam. There is no benefit in imagining *abangan*, *santri*, and *priyayi* nor in Wahabi, Sufi, Muhammadiyah, or NU dialects and stopping there. If we use those labels to explain behavior, then this approach has not moved us forward. The labels may be useful in identifying major dialect families, but to really understand the dynamics involved in various expressions, we will need to understand the ways in which the variation in religious practice is affected by a number of factors and how expressions of religion can be diglossic, polysemic, and even idiosyncratic.

CONCLUSION

In the most general terms, when a religion expands into new areas, it gains new inflections; others will rise from historical developments in each local setting. Over time, local expressions would become completely unintelligible to one another, and as such, be “dialects” of the same religious language, or perhaps be regarded as separate entities all together. Variations on how Muslims see and understand the nature of jinn in different cultures sometimes as familiars to be controlled (Saniotis, 2004), sometimes as

protectors of Muslim (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 141) and other times as sources of affliction (Lukens-Bull, 2005, p. 98). However, the variation is not completely free-floating; the *hajj* and the education of *ulama* (Islamic scholars) kept widely dispersed Muslim from becoming entirely isolated (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 141-142).

This model about the relationship between the generative (*langue*) and the expressed (*parole*) in Islam is not wholly new, but rather builds upon the work of other anthropologists and seek to refine the definitions of these two concepts by examining the mechanisms through which they interact. From this point, we can see that anthropologists studying Islam must shift or refocus their research questions to take into account the nature of what they are studying. In one sense, Islam cannot be found in the texts. In another sense, what makes Islam a world religion and not just a collection of local practices is found primarily in the texts. But the real task of the anthropologist of Islam is to describe the relationship between text and practice, or more correctly, the universal and the local (Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 152).

I have argued in this paper that many of the debates in Indonesia today reflect differences in dialect and have examined them as they relate to the PTAIN system. There are those in Indonesian society who for Indonesian Islam to take a conservative turn, to be more like Islam in other lands, and as they imagine in was in the glory days of the community in Medinah. They are concerned that the application of social science in the study of Islam will lead to a far too liberal interpretation of Islam. On the other side, people are concerned that Indonesians would no longer enjoy full freedom to express their faith as they understand it. The concerns are not only about school learning and peer-reviewed articles but also concerns about what dialect of Islam will dominate.

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