wawasan
JURNAL ILMIAH AGAMA DAN SOSIAL BUDAYA

De-radicalization through Social Media: Social Media Literacy in Countering Terrorism in Indonesia

M Syamsurrijal[1], Achmad Nurmandi [2], Hasse Jubba[3], Mega Hidayati[4]*, and Bambang Hariyanto[5]

[1] Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram, Indonesia; e-mail: muhammad.syamsurrijal2288@gmail.com
[2] Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia; e-mail: nurmandi_achmad@umy.ac.id
[3] Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia; e-mail: hasse@umy.ac.id
[4] Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia; e-mail: mega.hidayati@umy.ac.id
[5] Western Sydney University, Australia; e-mail: 19539371@student.westernsydney.edu.au
* Correspondence

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Abstract: Radicalism in Indonesia increasingly spreads through social media, and counter-radicalisation efforts by Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT, en. the National Counter Terrorism Agency) and civil society have moved online as well. However, how these efforts function as public literacy remains underexplored. This study examines how de-radicalisation narratives are constructed on Instagram and Twitter and how they foster public literacy against terrorism in Indonesia. We conducted a qualitative discourse analysis of data: posts and comments from four purposively selected Instagram accounts (from 500 de-radicalisation-related accounts) and Twitter hashtags coded in NVivo 12 Plus. De-radicalisation content relied on visual posters, hashtags, and appeals to national and interfaith unity. Twitter activity was dominated by one campaign hashtag ("destroy the roots of radicalism"), and Instagram engagement was concentrated in a few accounts. Sampled comments largely expressed solidarity against terrorism, although some used punitive language. Campaign activity was highest in Papua (24%) and Jakarta (15%). Instagram and Twitter function as participatory public spaces where counter-narratives circulate and citizens voice anti-terrorism sentiment. The data indicate engagement, not measured changes in literacy or in terrorist acts. The study shifts attention from state-led programmes to citizen-level literacy practices and offers an empirical basis for designing and evaluating social media counter-narrative campaigns.

Keywords: De-radicalization; Literacy; Radicalism; Social Media; Terrorism

Abstrak: Radikalisme di Indonesia semakin menyebar melalui media sosial, dan upaya kontra-radikalisasi Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) serta masyarakat sipil juga bergerak ke ruang daring. Namun, bagaimana upaya tersebut berfungsi sebagai literasi publik masih kurang dikaji. Penelitian ini menelaah bagaimana narasi deradikalisasi dibangun di Instagram dan Twitter serta bagaimana narasi tersebut mendorong literasi publik melawan terorisme di Indonesia. Penelitian kualitatif dengan analisis wacana terhadap data, yaitu unggahan dan komentar dari empat akun Instagram yang dipilih secara purposif (dari 500 akun terkait deradikalisasi) serta tagar Twitter yang dikodekan dengan NVivo 12 Plus. Konten deradikalisasi bertumpu pada poster visual, tagar, dan ajakan persatuan nasional serta lintas agama. Aktivitas Twitter didominasi satu tagar kampanye ("basmi akar radikalisme"), dan interaksi Instagram terkonsentrasi pada beberapa akun. Komentar yang diamati sebagian besar menyatakan solidaritas melawan terorisme, meskipun sebagian memakai bahasa punitif. Aktivitas kampanye tertinggi berasal dari Papua (24%) dan Jakarta (15%). Instagram dan Twitter berfungsi sebagai ruang publik partisipatif tempat kontra-narasi beredar dan warga menyuarakan sikap antiterorisme. Data menunjukkan keterlibatan (*engagement*), bukan perubahan literasi atau penurunan aksi terorisme yang terukur. Penelitian ini menggeser fokus dari

program yang dipimpin negara ke praktik literasi tingkat warga, dan menyediakan dasar empiris untuk merancang serta mengevaluasi kampanye kontra-narasi di media sosial.

Keywords: De-radicalisation, Literasi, Radicalism, Media Sosial, Terrorism.

1. Introduction

Indonesia has suffered many physical and psychological casualties due to acts of terrorism. Radicalism can cause the act of terrorism, which uses religion as a tool to achieve its goals. The government has implemented various strategies to combat radicalism but has not shown maximum results. Therefore, it requires the involvement of many parties, such as religious leaders, and new, more effective strategies to fight Islamic radicalism, which has increased recently (Hariyanto, 2020, 2021). De-radicalisation on social media platforms is a practical step to curb the growth of terrorist acts in Indonesia. The purpose of de-radicalisation is to oppose the narrative of Islamic radicalism and appeal to their radical ideology, cast doubt on the hierarchy of terrorist organisations to reduce and eliminate public fear, build a balanced anti-terrorist narrative to strengthen its ideological activities (Gill, Mustafa, & Rizwan, 2020).

Radicalisation is the process of forming extremist views that have a high tendency to produce violent attitudes and actions (Haval, 2017). Meanwhile, Doosje et al. (2016) explain that radicalism is a movement to make changes quickly and precisely through violence for political purposes (Doosje et al., 2016). Radicalisation consists of various processes that are worth analysis. It appears to be driven by different mechanisms, follows different patterns, and must be understood within a social and political context (Porta & LaFree, 2012). Based on a report from the National Counter Terrorism Agency (NCTA) in 2019, there have been several terrorist attacks, including in Sibolga, Sukoharjo, Jakarta, Pandeglang, Bekasi, and Medan (NCTA, 2020). Meanwhile, in early 2021, other acts of terrorism occurred at the Makassar Cathedral Church and the National Police Headquarters (Nufus, 2021). The Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center or INTRAC (Indonesian: Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan) or PPATK also announced that suspicious events related to terrorist events increased by 70 per cent in 2020 (Suwiknyo, 2021). Radicalisation is activism that manifests itself as changes in individuals that transform their socio-political attitudes and beliefs into actions that are usually radical and violent and can also contribute to the emergence of terrorist acts (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009).

Radicalism consistently leads to inhumane physical violence, including the killing of government supporters, suicide attacks, mass killings, kidnappings, and violent thefts (Gill et al., 2020). Several factors contribute to the emergence of radicalism: (a) internal factors, such as poverty, injustice, or disappointment with the government; (b) external factors, such as encouragement from foreign parties that incite religious sentiments, including global injustice, arrogant foreign policies, and modern imperialism by superpowers; and (c) cultural factors, closely tied to popular religious understanding and the narrow, literal interpretation of scripture (Nurdin, 2016).

Acts of radicalism have become a complex social problem because they can cause fear and trauma to people in various regions, including Indonesia (Mahfud, Prasetyawati, Wahyuddin, Agustin, & Sukmawati, 2018; Qodir, 2018). Furthermore, according to Qodir (Qodir, 2018), the causes of radicalism and terrorism are influenced by economic, political, spiritual, religious, and cultural factors. So, more educational opportunities are also needed to reduce radicalisation, especially for the younger generation today (Qodir, 2018). Therefore, radicalism increases with the changing times, including in the era of internet technology. So, it needs an online network de-radicalisation approach, including social media platforms (Wolfowicz, Perry, Hasisi, & Weisburd, 2021).

De-radicalisation is the process of changing an individual's belief system, rejecting extremist ideologies, and reclaiming mainstream values (Gill et al., 2020). Haval (Haval, 2017) defines de-radicalisation as actions designed and implemented by authorities to normalise and persuade groups and individuals who have become radicals or violent extremists to repent and cease violence (Haval,

2017; Kohler, 2017). Porta and LaFree emphasise two often overlooked components in the de-radicalisation process: the "de-radicalisation of attitudes and beliefs" and the "de-radicalisation of violent behaviour, including the process of leaving violent groups and reintegrating into other social groups" (Eitan, Chares, & Bosi, 2015; Porta & LaFree, 2012). In line with this definition, NCTA defines de-radicalisation as reducing radical activities and neutralising radical ideas within terrorist groups, sympathisers, and public members exposed to radicalism (Ali, Özvatan, & Walter, 2023). De-radicalisation requires an approach that follows the growing social context of society, especially in information technology, such as technical tools in the form of social media used as personal and community communication tools. Therefore, de-radicalisation programs must be more personal (Subagyo, 2021). Finally, the community approach must also consider the perception of radicalism that spreads in society through social media.

This situation demonstrates that radicalism has infiltrated online networks and the Internet, posing a significant threat to the state and hindering the development of anti-radicalism movements in Indonesia, particularly on social media. Several studies indicate that social media plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes, participation, criticism, protests, beliefs, movements, and campaigns in social and political discourse (Jubba, Baharuddin, Pabbajah, & Qodir, 2020; Sinpeng, 2021). In addition, the advent of the internet and social media features in online networks aims to support counter-radicalism efforts by preventing radicalisation through messages and narratives found online. It aligns with the objectives of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia to prevent radicalism (Jazuli, 2016).

Research on radicalism has often focused on its association with terrorism, the relationship between radicalism and religion, and the government's preventive efforts to counteract terrorism in public spaces. Few studies have examined the debate of media literacy on social media networks, especially concerning de-radicalisation. However, this research has some specific relationships with previous research related to de-radicalisation. First, understandings of radicalism spread on social media and in public spaces lead to perceptions and propaganda encouraging radicalisation and recruitment (Subhan, 2020). Second, as early adopters of technology, young people are the most vulnerable group to radicalism (Muthmainah & Wijayanti, 2018). Third, de-radicalisation is achieved through campaigns and education on social media and public spaces (Arifin, 2020).

Addressing gaps in previous research, this study analyses Instagram and Twitter to explain how social media shapes de-radicalisation narratives and how these narratives affect public literacy in countering terrorism in Indonesia. It also seeks to inform de-radicalisation strategies through public education and campaigns, and to provide a basis for evaluating government policies on radicalism and terrorism. This research argues that radicalism spread through Instagram and Twitter, directly or indirectly, has influenced some people's attitudes towards radicalisation. These platforms are widely used in Indonesia: the Ministry of Communication and Information reports usage of 85 per cent for Instagram and 57 per cent for Twitter among ten applications, and the author's search indicates that both are the media most used in terrorism and de-radicalisation. De-radicalisation efforts on these platforms therefore serve to counteract radical influence and prevent public exposure to radical ideologies that lead to terrorism.

This qualitative study uses discourse analysis of data, publicly available data from Instagram and Twitter, chosen because internet media are a primary tool for disseminating public discourse. Of 500 de-radicalisation accounts identified on Instagram, run by government and non-government institutions, four (Poldakaltim, husen_hadar, Bambang Soesatyo, and bnptri) were sampled, and their image-based posts, likes, and citizens' comments were analysed. Twitter hashtag campaigns were coded using the hashtag-by-item feature of NVivo 12 Plus, alongside the geographical distribution of campaign activity. Data from the Ministry of Communication and Information on social media use, and from the National Counter Terrorism Agency (NCTA) on radicalism cases influenced by internet media, provided context.

2. Online Media: Propaganda and Counter Radicalism

The open access characteristic of Internet media makes it strategic enough to convey various elements of interest to its users, both positive and negative (Lavis & Winter, 2020). By becoming Internet media activists, people can be influenced by disseminating information, which can change their views, attitudes, and perspectives on specific issues (Joo & Teng, 2017). Provocative content and propaganda are often found on the Internet when spreading information about radicalism, impacting personal choices (Wijayanti, 2020). Radical individuals or groups are known to target internet-based social networks to organise extreme actions (Nurdin, 2016). Managing and interpreting message content on social media largely depends on how the information is disseminated.

The National Counter Terrorism Agency (NCTA) is one of the primary sectors authorised to counter radicalism, formulate policies and strategies, and coordinate the fight against terrorism. NCTA employs three main policies: prevention, protection, de-radicalisation; prosecution and capacity building; and international cooperation. NCTA uses a comprehensive approach from upstream to downstream in implementing its policies and strategies, focusing on addressing the problem through prevention.

Rycko Amelza Dahiel the Head of NCTA, stated that the decline in terrorism attacks from 2018 to 2022 follows an iceberg theory. Groups embracing radicalism and violence now focus more on soft approaches using narratives and religious symbols through social media or internet media rather than openly showing their existence through physical attacks. This shift has led many individuals to fall into the trap of radical ideas. Rycko emphasised that no religious teachings advocate violence. He concluded by stating that breaking the chain of radicalism and terrorism requires the cooperation of all societal elements, including religious leaders. Based on data released by the National Counter Terrorism Agency (NCTA), several cases of violence and acts of terrorism that occurred in Indonesia were primarily influenced by internet media, as happened in many instances of radicalism and acts of terrorism in Indonesia as displayed in Table 1.

Table 1 List of victims of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia

No	Victims of Radicalism	Case
1	Judi Novaldi bin Mulyadi	A teenager from Jambi threatened his father, Mulyadi (47), and took his younger brother Maulana (6) hostage. Police found ISIS paraphernalia: four black Arabic flags commonly used by ISIS, a black striped sweater with Arabic writing reminiscent of ISIS identity, and a red and black Arabic turban written on it. Novaldi stated that he obtained the features often used by ISIS through social media data.
2	Agus Anton Figian alias Toriq or Abu Zulfikar	Anton also belonged to the Abu Hasmy or Abu Hanifah group. He planned to bomb the US Embassy in Surabaya and carry out bombings in the Freeport area. He said that reading news and research on www.arrahmah.com encouraged him to become radicalised. Agus Anton also gained a lot of knowledge about bomb-making from other radical internet media.
3	Muhammad Alfian Nurzi and Asyahnaz	Asyahnaz is from Bandung Regency, and Muhammad Alfian Nurzi is from Kalimantan. Before arriving in Syria, they often communicated with ISIS groups through online media, including social networks.
4	Ahmad Azhar Basyir	He claims to have spent a lot of time searching for articles on the Internet about how to make detonators before finally finding the Facebook account of a Salafi jihadist who studied the matter.
5	Five teenagers from Klaten Vocational School	They claimed to have learned bomb-making from the Albusyro forum.

Data Source: National Counterterrorism Agency

The March 2021 terrorist attacks in Makassar and Jakarta and the December 2022 terrorist attacks provide us with a significant opportunity to understand the dynamics of radicalisation in Indonesia. These cases are known to have occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when activities in many areas were restricted, for example, in public spaces. This situation continued and was followed by increased use of social media as an alternative medium. In times of restrictions, people use social media widely to continue routines and other social activities. The pandemic and the implementation of regulations alone are not enough to prevent acts of terrorism and radicalisation. This data shows that acts of terror and radicalisation do not take into account any conditions. It has led to the assumption that other acts of terror and radicalisation can occur anywhere and anytime. Spreading propaganda is known as an act of terror.

The entire society must actively oppose the actions and propaganda of radicalism. Societal resistance to radicalism is essential, particularly on social media. People should use counter-radicalism narratives to contrast propaganda on social media, enabling other users to express their attitudes and interests against radicalism. These counter-radicalism narratives can take the form of hashtags or other social media features (Schmidt, 2018). Fully utilising the digital potential can help reduce vulnerability to radical propaganda, especially within online social networks (Muthmainah & Wijayanti, 2018).

3. De-radicalisation Literacy on Social Media

Researchers and writers in different countries have different definitions of de-radicalisation (Baaken, Korn, Ruf, & Walkenhorst, 2020). However, the general meaning of de-radicalisation can be used to define efforts to oppose all radicalisation ideas and actions in a more educative and participatory way (Qodir, 2013). De-radicalisation, therefore, should not mimic the methods of radicalism but should instead focus on educational and participatory approaches rather than arrogance or violence.

Data obtained from Instagram shows that there are 500 accounts related to de-radicalisation, originating from both government and non-government institutions or organisations. Only four of these accounts were selected as a sample for this research. The distribution pattern of de-radicalisation content on Instagram is primarily through visual posts, such as images, which have a high level of interaction. These Instagram accounts actively engage in media literacy by posting images and narratives that oppose radicalism, violence, and acts of terrorism in Indonesia. Those are:

a) Instagram account “Poldakaltim” (Figure 1) posts in the form of images. This post has 392 likes and 68 citizen comments on the narrative and literacy of de-radicalisation through Instagram social media.



Figure 1. The Spirit of Unity and Resistance Against Terrorism

Figure 1 explains that Indonesian citizens must unite to fight terrorism. This post received comments from netizens, as conveyed by the nfntieka account: Together with the police, we fight and eradicate radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. This comment received a response from other netizens as conveyed by the kelifharen account, ahmad arafah, national by saying let us fight terrorism.

b) Instagram account posts "husen_hadar" in the form of images that 15,647 citizens liked with 165 comments.



Figure 2. Interfaith Unity Against Terrorism

Figure 2 shows a collaboration between a Muslim (Habib Jafar) and a Christian pastor (Yerry pastor) standing together in solidarity against terrorism, symbolizing religious harmony and collective resilience. Citizen comments have built a narrative and literacy against violence and acts of terrorism, such as the bin_hasan account comment stating that radicals and terrorism do not deserve to exist on earth. Followed by the adierthur account comment by saying let us jihad against terrorism.

c) Bambang Soesatyo's Instagram account posts poster images that got 1,289 citizens and 39 comments.



Figure 3. A Message from Bambang Soesatyo, the Chairperson of People's Consultative Assembly

Figure 3 above is a form of narrative and public literacy built by one of the accounts on behalf of a national figure who occupies a position as one of the chairpersons in the legislature with the jargon that terrorists do not know about religion. Narratives and literacy that are built have received public support in the form of likes and comments from citizens, such as the statement of the amelya_hafizzah account that terrorists are under the guise of religion and against the government. This comment

received a response from other citizens, such as the alie_mf account, saying it was time for the people to unite against terrorism.

d) Instagram account post 'bnptri'



Figure 4. Stop Sharing: Prevent Terrorism by Withholding Victim Media

Figure 4 illustrates that stop spreading radical ideas, let us refrain from spreading photos and videos related to victims of terrorism; terrorism spreads fear and creates unstable conditions. Eight hundred sixteen citizens liked this post, and 23 commented on it. Citizens greatly appreciate and support efforts to build literacy and narratives to stop spreading radical ideas, as conveyed by one Herwiekdelena account by saying Terrorists are the same as communists; they must be sentenced to death, and firmness is needed, not enough in prison. Be aware that recruitment can occur anywhere. Protect your family from latent and misguided dangers. May Allah curse the terrorists.




Figure 5. De-Radicalisation Efforts on Twitter: Analysis of Hashtag (#) Campaigns

Figure 5 shows data on de-radicalisation efforts through internet media, especially the Twitter social media platform using hashtags (#). The data obtained is based on the coding results by maximising the hashtag-by-item feature on the Nvivo 12 Plus as presented in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Analysis of Twitter Hashtag Usage in De-Radicalisation Campaigns: Nvivo 12 Plus Coding Results

Data Source: Processed by researchers using Nvivo 12 Plus (2021)

How social media or internet users respond to radicalisation is shown in Figures 1-4. Starting with the use of hashtags such as #Tumpasakarradicalisme, #Kamitidaktakut, and #Bersatulawanteror, this responsive story begins. For information to spread quickly, hashtags help informational messages reach many other social communities. In social and political debates, Twitter activists use hashtags as a narrative medium (Yang, 2016). Statements regarding anti-terrorist efforts and forms of radicalisation on Twitter are considered de-radicalisation efforts, more in line with current developments marked by the increasing flow of information on online social networks.

The use of social media, mainly through the strategic use of hashtags, is gradually creating space for individuals to express their sensitivity to radicalisation in Indonesia. This approach also slowly reduces people's closed-mindedness in sensitive social discussions, especially those related to terrorism and radicalisation (Rizki & Timur, 2021). Social media is a representative medium that facilitates new interaction models, encouraging public participation in shaping attitudes (Kavada, 2015). Therefore, efforts to combat radicalism on social networks represent a proactive public initiative to directly engage in debates against all forms and notions of radicalism, including online propaganda. Besides hashtags, internet memes are another prevalent approach used on social media to promote de-radicalisation.

In addition to maximising hashtags, image content, and posts are also a means of spreading ideas about eradication and are more educational and easy to understand. Memes, a semiotic internet culture presented as images or animations, can dynamically influence human consciousness and behaviour (Cannizzaro, 2016). The use of images in some of the Instagram account posts in Figures 1-4 is a public response to all kinds of radical actions and ideas. Image and poster content have become a new force for spreading messages and pictures in a way that many people can accept. Memes' repetitive and simple characteristics allow them to be used and disseminated repeatedly.

The use of hashtags and images is an essential shortcut to display the stories involved in supporting de-radicalisation in Indonesia. They represent aspects of digital literacy culture that encourage other social communities to express criticism, interests, or relevant ideas as part of civil society engagement in socio-political discourses (Mihailidis, 2020). These digital features symbolise Indonesia's struggle against radicalism, progressively shaping the common interests of the movement on social media and establishing new public spaces.

4. De-radicalisation movement on social media

Social media has become a new tool to support and campaign against radicalisation in Indonesia. Social media helps raise awareness of how important it is for communities or other civilians to participate actively in this radicalisation.




Figure 7. Geographical Distribution of Anti-Radicalisation Campaigns on Social Media in Indonesia

Data Source: Processed by Researchers using Nvivo 12 Plus (2021)

Figure 7 illustrates the geographical distribution of anti-radicalisation campaigns conducted on social media across various regions in Indonesia. The data highlights the proportion of social media activity related to these campaigns in each region, expressed as a percentage of the total activity observed. Papua leads with the highest level of engagement, accounting for 24% of the total social media activity focused on anti-radicalisation efforts. Jakarta follows with 15%, indicating significant awareness and involvement in the capital city. Surabaya and Pasuruan also show strong engagement, with 14% and 13% respectively. Other regions such as Bekasi and Trenggalek contribute 7% each, while Denpasar accounts for 4%. Smaller percentages of activity are observed in regions like Makasar (3%), Cilacap (2%), and Tanggungharjo (2%). Additional regions including Semarang, Banten, Boyolali, Medan, Tulung Agung, Bojonegoro, Kediri, and Bandung each contribute 1% to the overall social media anti-radicalisation efforts. The distribution suggests that social media is being used actively across the country to raise awareness and engage communities in the fight against radicalisation, with varying levels of participation across different regions.

The rapid dissemination of information on social media significantly impacts the spread of de-radicalisation narratives. Data illustrate how swiftly information on de-radicalisation spreads on Twitter, influenced by the location of social media users. Figures 1-4 demonstrate that social media can foster a community culture within online spaces, with collective interests reflecting public engagement in de-radicalisation discourse in Indonesia. It highlights that eradication efforts rely on public narratives, movements, and social media platforms. Social media facilitates the formation of patterns in relationships and interactions that substantially affect the activities of other online community users (Rainie, Smith, Schlozman, Brady, & Verba, 2012).

Radicalism on social media can also be a public space. Social media can influence reactions in other public areas, and this is based on the fact that its users' use of social media facilitates participation, sharing, and the creation of new spaces (Jubba et al., 2020). These social media capabilities have influenced public reaction in Indonesia to de-radicalisation efforts. In addition, the public perspective shows that de-radicalisation is necessary to prevent the spread of radicalism. Figure 5 shows how the use of Twitter has changed people's perceptions of radicalism and acts of terror in Indonesia, demonstrated by activism in the public sphere. The transformation that occurs in this movement shows that there is a new model for de-radicalisation of counter-radical activities in Indonesia. It also indicates that countering acts of terror and radical ideology also requires public awareness to participate more. This situation serves as a preventive measure to combat revolutionary propaganda. Therefore, social media is considered strategically to fulfil the need to combat radicalism, especially in Indonesia.

The results of this research have some differences and similarities with previous research related to acts of terrorism in Indonesia. Research related to terrorism and de-radicalisation in Indonesia so far has focused more on answering the structure and relationship with various groups in Indonesia and how the terrorists operate and interact. In addition, studies related to terrorism are more focused on the target, mode of operation, and its impact on society and national security. In previous research, studies on de-radicalisation have focused on the effectiveness of programs implemented by the government and non-government, including prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs. In addition, besides de-radicalisation, it is more focused on public attitudes and perceptions of de-radicalisation efforts, as well as factors that support and hinder de-radicalisation programs.

In addition, this research has similarities and differences with previous research related to the efforts of NCTA and the government in countering acts of terrorism, which focused on online and online countermeasures through online media and websites). So, this research is a continuation of previous research that still does not answer how literacy is built by each online media to prevent radicalism and acts of terrorism that not only involve elements of government and community leaders but also involve social media users in Indonesia. This research focuses more on the role of social media, especially Twitter and Instagram, in preventive efforts for all elements of society to eradicate acts of terrorism through social media. This research has implications for the effectiveness of the use of social media in fighting acts of terrorism in Indonesia, which is marked by the decline in acts of radicalism and terrorism that have occurred in the last few years.

5. Social Media Counter-Narratives and Public Literacy in Indonesia

This study yields three main findings. First, de-radicalisation narratives on Instagram and Twitter are built mainly through visual posters, campaign hashtags, and appeals to national and interfaith unity. Second, engagement is highly uneven. One campaign hashtag dominates the Twitter corpus, and a few Instagram accounts attract most of the interaction. Third, the citizen comments analysed mostly express solidarity with the anti-terrorism message, but some use punitive and moralising language. Campaign activity was also concentrated geographically, with Papua and Jakarta showing the highest shares.

The prominence of hashtags and image-based content is consistent with research showing that hashtags and memes lower the barrier to civic participation (Mihailidis, 2020; Yang, 2016), and with Schmidt's (2018) account of how religious radicalism is contested on Indonesian social media. Earlier studies of de-radicalisation in Indonesia have mostly evaluated state programmes, such as rehabilitation, reintegration, and the pentahelix model (Subagyo, 2021). This study adds a complementary view of citizen-level practices, in which ordinary users reproduce and extend official messages. In policy terms, the findings align with the National Counter Terrorism Agency's (BNPT) emphasis on public involvement and on shifting efforts to digital spaces, where radical groups now rely on soft narrative approaches rather than overt attacks.

Two findings qualify this picture. First, the dominance of a single hashtag suggests that visibility depends on a few concentrated campaigns. The data cannot show whether these reflect coordinated activity or organic participation. Second, the punitive comments, such as calls for the death penalty or for terrorists to be cursed, sit uneasily with arguments that de-radicalisation should be educative and participatory rather than coercive (Porta & LaFree, 2012; Qodir, 2013). Engagement may therefore signal public support without indicating critical literacy. This is consistent with reviews finding that evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narratives remains limited and mixed (Carthy, Doody, Cox, O'Hora, & Sarma, 2020). The high activity from Papua is also unexpected, since the conflict context there differs from religiously framed terrorism. The data do not explain it, and it may reflect how location was recorded or the presence of institutional accounts.

The study's strengths are that it analyses naturally occurring public discourse, combines visual data (Instagram) with hashtag data (Twitter), and includes both government and non-government accounts, which captures official and civil society narratives. Readers should nonetheless interpret the results with caution. Only four of 500 identified Instagram accounts were analysed, and they were selected purposively, so the findings are illustrative rather than representative. The data cover two platforms and a single period (2021), and platform features and user behaviour have changed since then, including Twitter's transition to X. Commenters are users who already engage with anti-radical content, so the findings say little about audiences vulnerable to radicalisation. The study did not measure literacy or behavioural change directly, and it therefore cannot support causal claims about reduced terrorism

For policy and practice, three recommendations follow from the findings. First, because engagement was the only available indicator, BNPT and partners should complement likes, shares, and comments with measures of literacy, such as comprehension and critical evaluation of content. Second, because some comments were punitive, campaign accounts should moderate or guide comment threads so that they do not undermine the educative message. Third, because interfaith collaboration and credible public figures drew high engagement, such messengers should be used more, with content designed to reach audiences beyond already-committed users.

For future research, four directions follow from the limitations. Studies should measure audience reception through surveys, interviews, or experiments, which would test whether engagement translates into literacy. They should extend the analysis to other platforms, such as YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, and WhatsApp, and to radical content for comparison. They should use longitudinal designs to assess changes in attitudes over time. Finally, they should investigate regional patterns, including the high activity in Papua, with transparent location data.

6. Conclusions

Instagram and Twitter have emerged as significant platforms for promoting participation, education, and prevention in de-radicalisation efforts in Indonesia. These social media platforms significantly influence individuals' responses to radicalisation actions and ideologies. The activism surrounding de-radicalisation has evolved into a public space, encouraging netizens to engage actively in de-radicalisation literacy on Instagram and Twitter as a measure to prevent latent terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, Instagram and Twitter, among other platforms, prove instrumental in mitigating acts of terrorism in the country.

This research recommends social media networks as a strategic approach to enhance de-radicalisation efforts. It suggests that future educational patterns, movements, and campaigns against radicalism should integrate social media strategies. Since this study focused on only Instagram and Twitter data sources, further research is necessary to explore additional data sources, particularly other social media platforms, to provide a more comprehensive understanding of de-radicalisation dynamics and enhance the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation strategies.

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