

Contesting #IslamNusantara on Instagram: A Shared Interest Pool

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Abstract: As one of the demanding discourses of Indonesian Islam, Islam Nusantara has made a further round of Indonesian Muslim polarisation among the proponents on the one side and the opponents on another, let alone in the digital era nowadays. For the Muslim communities, new media are not only used for communication activities but also to assist the *da'wa* (proselytisation) and its contestation. This paper, thus, aims to portray activities of social media users, particularly Instagram, using the #IslamNusantara hashtag to convey their ideas. This paper seeks to explore the motives of how the Instagram users do involve in the contestation of #IslamNusantara and to what extent they publish their argument to support, criticise, or even refuse the concept of Islam Nusantara. The method used in this article is netnography, analysing a total of 344,000 hashtags #IslamNusantara on Instagram. Finally, this paper anticipates a yet-to-end online contestation among the Muslim communities within a new interest pool: #IslamNusantara.

Keywords: Contestation; interest pool; Instagram; #IslamNusantara; netnography.

Abstrak: Sebagai salah satu wacana keagamaan yang hangat dibincangkan di masyarakat Islam di Indonesia, Islam Nusantara telah melahirkan babak baru polarisasi Muslim Indonesia; antara pendukung di satu sisi dan penentang di sisi lain. Apalagi di era digital saat ini, di mana umat Islam tentu tidak sekedar menggunakan media baru untuk sarana komunikasi belaka, tetapi juga untuk membantu sarana dakwah dan kontestasinya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menggambarkan aktivitas pengguna media sosial, khususnya Instagram, yang menggunakan tagar #IslamNusantara untuk menyampaikan ide-ide mereka, dengan menggali motif bagaimana pengguna Instagram terlibat dalam kontestasi #IslamNusantara dan sejauh mana mereka mempublikasikan argumen mereka untuk mendukung atau mengkritik, bahkan menolak konsep Islam Nusantara. Metode yang digunakan dalam artikel ini adalah netnografi, dengan menganalisis sejumlah 344.000 tagar #IslamNusantara di Instagram. Sebagai simpulan, artikel ini mengantisipasi bahwa kontestasi daring di antara komunitas Muslim Indonesia belum akan segera berakhir, terlebih dengan adanya kolam minat (*interest pool*) baru: #IslamNusantara

Kata Kunci: Instagram; #IslamNusantara; kolam minat; kontestasi; netnografi.

1. Introduction

The discourse contestation of Islam Nusantara that surfaces in Indonesian Muslim society in recent years cannot escape the fact that Indonesian Muslims share no common value in all aspects of their daily religious lives. In general, Indonesian Muslims can be classified into several groups, primarily based on the variety of schools expressed in the practice of Islamic teachings and/or organisational affiliations (see, among others, Burhani, 2013; Fossati, 2019; Van Bruinessen, 1999; Wanandi, 2002). In practice, some of these different groups contest each other in affirming their religious authority and truth. However, regardless of the contextual or casuistic differences, based on historical considerations,

most groups share a common view to recognise Walisanga strategy in Islamising Nusantara people who at the moment already had their own cultural values (Baso, 2015; Kasdi, 2017; Mustofa, 2015; Suparjo, 2008).

Historically, scholars had given theory suggestions and responded to theories about when, where, and how Islam entered Nusantara, the archipelago officially known as the Republic of Indonesia – including parts of Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand. The earliest scholars were undoubtedly from the colonial Dutch East Indies, including J. Pijnappel, C. Snouck Hurgronje, and D. A. Rinkes (Drewes, 1968), who developed the Gujarat theory suggesting that Islam came to the archipelago from the Indian origin. Meanwhile, based on archaeological arguments about the remains of the Fatimah bint Maimun tomb in Gresik, dated 475/1082 and considered similar to the tombstones in Bengal, S. Q. Fatimi (1963) suggested a Bengal theory - that Islam in the archipelago originated from Bengal. Later, Fatimi's theory was refuted by several experts such as Azyumardi Azra (2013), who considers the similarity of tombstones cannot be used as a benchmark. He argues that the Islamic school generally adopted in the archipelago (Shafi'i) is different from the Bengal (Hanafi) school.

A Persian theory also sees some cultural similarities developed by the Muslim Nusantara community with the Persian Shia community, such as the 10 Muharram tradition and Tabuik in Bengkulu (Suryanegara, 2010). Then the Mecca Theory, as initiated by Buya Hamka (1963 as on Suryanegara [2010]), explains that, in line with the Chinese Tang Dynasty chronicles, in the 7th century AD, Arab Muslim traders lived on the west coast of Sumatra. This Mecca theory was later developed by Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas (1972), who stated that the most crucial evidence of the Islamisation of the archipelago was the internal characteristics of Islam in the Malay world itself.

Regarding what Naguib al-Attas calls the internal characteristics of Islam, Aksin Wijaya (2015) also gave his support implicitly by formulating what he called the "basic character," which gave birth to the "existential journey of Islam" in the archipelago. According to him, the search for essential characteristics cannot be avoided and is a pity to miss in previous studies that have formulated various theories. Furthermore, Azra et al. (2010) also see the need for a re-examination regarding these various theories. A more comprehensive understanding of the Nusantara Islamisation has many interrelated factors influencing the whole process.

Departing from the background of the presence of Islam in the archipelago, which is not singular and competitive, the polarity continues to grow and becomes an unavoidable fact. Wijaya (2015) stated that after entering the archipelago, Islam is no longer just looking for existence but also dominates. This effort is at least reflected in several contexts, such as the struggle for the dominance of philosophical Sufism vis a vis Sunni, Muslims versus foreign invaders, reformers versus traditionalists, Muslims versus the government, including within one group or school of Islam itself (Permana, 2021).

The struggle of ideas between groups in Islam seems to be continuing to this day, even growing and occurring in almost all aspects of daily lives and constructing a kind of polarisation between those promoting religious moderation and those with conservative views (Jubba, Awang, & Sungkilang, 2021; Van Bruinessen, 2011). The Walisanga da'wa strategy is no exception, which in essence is widely accepted as the success story of Nusantara Islamisation and has become a role model for the teachings of *ahlussunnah wal jama'ah* (Sunni). Today, many groups claim that they are Sunni, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and Salafis. They also acknowledge Walisanga's efforts in Islamising the archipelago, but they differ in opinion about their da'wa character. For example, NU argues that Walisanga's success is due to his ability to harmonise Islamic religious norms and existing local cultural values. As long as the interrelationship of religion and culture does not violate the Shari'a, the traditional practice is maintained (Faizin, 2019; Multazam, 2015). On the other hand, Muhammadiyah and other puritan groups, for example, despite admitting that Walisanga's success is part of history (Zuhri, 2013), see the urgency of purification (from *tachayul*, *bid'ah*, *churafat* [TBC] - unacceptable innovation in Islamic teachings) is another effort yet to be done.

In other cases, the views of Muhammadiyah and NU are also frequent. For example, using the *beduk* (big drum) as a signal for the prayer times, practicing the double *adhan* (prayer calling) in the Friday prayer, reading the *qunut* prayer in the Fajr prayer, and the *ziarah* (a pilgrimage to the graves).

In the context of a broader and contemporary discourse, differences of opinion between these groups found an exciting theme in the notion of Islam Nusantara as offered by NU to portray the characteristics of moderate Islam in Nusantara. As widely known, the term Islam Nusantara is used by NU as a theme at the 33rd Congress (*Muktamar*) in Jombang, East Java, August 1-5, 2015, that is “Strengthening Islam Nusantara for the Indonesian and Global Civilization”. The bid by NU to promote moderate Islamic values (Arifianto, 2016) has triggered many responses, both from proponents and opponents. The polemic shows that differences in religious views among Indonesian Muslims are inevitable. They are even constructed in the ethnic sectarianisation that arises from socio-political dynamics (Arifianto & Saleem, 2021; Hashemi & Postel, 2017; Lim, 2017).

Whereas the *Muktamar* in 2015 became a vital momentum, it must be understood that, through the *Muktamar*, NU structurally consolidates and disseminates the ideas of Islam Nusantara, as expressed by the congress committee and some NU elites (Rohmatulloh, 2019b). Following the *Muktamar*, NU also held an International Summit of Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISOMIL) in Jakarta, on May 9–11, 2016. The summit, attended by around 400 participants from Sudan, Libya, Algeria, India, Russia, Morocco, Thailand, England, Senegal, Lithuania, Spain, Greece, South Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, resulted in the “*Nahdlatul Ulama Declaration*” that is also known as the “*Manifesto of Nusantara Islam*” (Ahmad, 2021). In line with the summit theme “*Islam Nusantara: Inspiration for World's Cultures*,” NU again offered the idea of Islam Nusantara further to the summit participants, which was far broader in the sense of globality than the participants in the *Muktamar* momentum. The initiative, even though noticed by some as a message to the Arab Middle East (Eliraz, 2016) or as a reactive movement to the emergence of extremism (Kato, 2021), aims to invite the global audience toward instilling the inclusive, tolerant, and moderate characteristics of religiosity.

Although Islam Nusantara is not solely the exclusive domain of NU, NU’s activism in promoting this idea has made people delimit Islam Nusantara as NU’s official campaign. Following the NU elite representing supports for the Islam Nusantara discourse, on the other hand, the *Muktamar* also became a momentum that sparked heated debates among previously polarised Indonesian Muslim groups. The issues on Islam Nusantara took place within broader society, such as being diplomatic means of international relationship (Afridah, 2017; Arifianto, 2016; Saiman, 2019), as also portrayed in the press, popular culture, or social media (Benny, Syahputra, Tarigan, & Siregar, 2019; Fahmi, 2017; Schmidt, 2021). The issue is also extensively mentioned in the digital media thanks to the current era where technology is an essential tool in human life, including religious matters (Lim, 2003; Slama, 2018; Solahudin & Fakhruroji, 2019). In digital media, debates on religious themes do find their place because of the democratic character of the media that allows this to happen (Bunt, 2000, 2018; Hjarvard, 2016). Ahyar (2017) calls the phenomenon of Islamic activism through internet media *clicktivism*. On the other hand, the weakness or even the awkwardness of traditionalist Muslim groups in responding to technological developments has increasingly opened up opportunities for other groups to contest religious authority in new media (Akmaliah, 2020; Pabbajah, Jubba, Widyanti, Pabbajah, & Iribaram, 2020; Rohmatulloh, 2019a).

For example, related to Islam Nusantara, Nadirsyah Hosen, one of the NU elites, posted a tweet on his Twitter social media account, @na_dirs, in 2018 to explain how Islam Nusantara juxtaposed the teachings of Islam with Nusantara cultural values.



Figure 1 Screenshot of @na_dirs tweet, taken on June 12, 2021

In Figure 1, Hosen uses the analogy of Islam Nusantara, like when the fast-food company KFC enters the Indonesian market, where Indonesians who are used to eating rice will almost certainly use KFC fried chicken as a side dish of rice.¹ Therefore, KFC also provides rice menus at its official outlets in Indonesia, a product that will never be found in its home country. However, KFC in Indonesia still has the same primary product as other KFC anywhere, namely fried chicken. On the other hand, KFC Indonesia will never innovate by providing *rendang*, *pecel*, or *gudeg* product variants on its menu, even though these three foods are top-rated traditional Indonesian foods. In line with the democratic nature of the media, where dialogue can run synchronously by removing barriers to debate as in traditional contexts, the analogy in this tweet was quickly responded to by another Twitter user, Akmal Sjafril @malakmalakmal. He criticised by linking the KFC analogy with a quote from the General Chairperson of National Board of NU, Kyai Said Aqil Siradj, about Indonesian and Arabic culture. In his tweet (Figure 2), he asked whether KFC Indonesia ever mocked KFC Australia since he argued that the NU Chairperson had offended Arabic culture.



Figure 2 Screenshot of @malakmalakmal's tweet, taken on June 12, 2021

The contestation of Islam Nusantara, in any social media, also confirms, as stated by Talbot (2007), that media discourse cannot be separated from social interactions that occur inside and outside the media itself. Also, against what Althusser (1976) stated that mass media, including social media, play

¹ In the Islam Nusantara discourse, the KFC analogy was first expressed by Akh Muzakki, Secretary of Provincial Board of NU in East Java, in a discussion in Jombang on August 2, 2015 where the author also attended.

a significant role in forming an ideology, in this case, Islam Nusantara. Since the Mukhtamar in 2015, the contest of Islam Nusantara has now entered its sixth year in 2021. The existence of social media further strengthens the debate. For instance, Ridwan (2019) discussed how Facebook enables its users to use the platform to engage in open debates, and Schmidt (2021) examines how the counter-narrative movement of the supporters of Islam Nusantara is made through films and social media against its opponents. The selection of the theme in this article, especially about how contestation on the Instagram social media platform, also departs from the study of Bhakti (2020), which found that Instagram has become the most used new media platform lately compared to its predecessors, Twitter and Facebook. Although the study was conducted in the local context of Aceh, global data also shows a significant trend of increasing users of this media, especially in Indonesia, which reached 82 million users in January 2021 (NapoleonCat.Com, 2021). Therefore, this article will focus on the contestation phenomenon of Islam Nusantara discourse, specifically on the social media platform Instagram.

This article used netnography as a research method because it has advantages in telling stories, understanding complex social phenomena, and assisting researchers in developing themes from the respondent's point of view (Rageh, Melewar, & Woodside, 2013). Following Kozinets (2010), netnography is designed to study online culture and communities or phenomena related to online communities. Compared to traditional ethnography, a netnographer performs computer-mediated communication (CMC) data retrieval. Online researchers can collect large amounts of data with or without making their presence visible to members of the under-studied culture.

Netnography can be applied to the social media platform Instagram. While this research does not explicitly conduct in-depth interviews with certain account users, the researchers do more about analysing the content written on the social media platform Instagram to understand the phenomenon of the contestation. Following the netnographic procedure according to Kozinets (2010) or Nasrullah (2017), this research has five stages. First, determine the problem and research topic; second, identify and select the community under study; third, collect data; fourth, analyse the data and confirm the study results; and fifth, write research results.

The first stage is to determine the problems and topics by presenting how the debate about the Islam Nusantara discourse occurring on Instagram social media using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and its variants. The second stage, namely identifying and selecting the community under study. In the first and second stages, the researcher used the help of the Instagram Analytic Tool at the *keywordtool.io* application. The use of netnography in the context of this research is quite relevant, not only because the research subjects are in cyberspace but also because they are a group that contests the #IslamNusantara hashtag. The contesting group will be seen in the distribution of posts on Instagram, both pros and cons. The third stage is data collection. The data obtained from the Instagram hashtag #IslamNusantara, with up to 344,000 posts, were analysed in the fourth stage. The fifth stage is writing the results presented by the researcher in the following sections.

2. Interest Pool of #IslamNusantara

Unlike the social media platform Twitter, which allows its users to write and publish short texts or sometimes in images and videos, Instagram permits people to mainly post pictures with the option of adding text as a description (caption). What Twitter, Instagram, and several other media platforms have in common is the hashtags (#) use. Using hashtags in a post allows users to identify the post as being in an interesting pool according to the marked word, phrase, or clause. Algorithmically, the feature on this new media platform can aggregate all posts that use the same hashtag in a kind of shared interest pool. As in the Islam Nusantara topic, the hashtag #IslamNusantara on Instagram is used in more than 344,000 posts in quotes and public figures' photos (Figure 3).




Figure 3 Screenshot of Instagram interest pool #IslamNusantara, taken on June 12, 2021

Two types of Instagram accounts dominate the spread of the hashtag #IslamNusantara. First, personal or individual accounts, either pseudonym users or recognised ones. The second is Instagram accounts on behalf of a group or organisation. Based on the researcher's observations, assisted by the Instagram Analytic Tool from the keywordtool.io application, the second type of Instagram account dominates the interest pool. The first type also attracts a sufficiently large level of engagement in the matter (Table 1). The main post format from supporting accounts of the Nusantara Islam discourse (*Pro*) uses posts in pictures or photos of figures and quotes from Nahdlatul Ulama. Meanwhile, most post formats from other accounts use quotes to criticise (*Op*) against the Islam Nusantara narrative on Instagram and propagate other narratives.

Table 1 Selected Instagram accounts using the hashtag #IslamNusantara

No.	Account Name	Followers	Category	Post format
1.	@nuonline_id	851.640	Verified group account – Pro	Posting posts in pictures or photos of figures and quotes from Nahdlatul Ulama, on average, using the hashtag #IslamNusantara, #ahlussunnahwaljamaah, and #islamcintadamai.
2.	@hijratime	734.730	Group account - Op	Posting the hashtag #IslamNusantara and spreading other narratives in the form of an invitation to <i>hijrah</i> and other urban movements, such as #indonesiatanpapacaran.
3.	@manhajsalafus.shalih	290.931	Group account - Op	Posting quotes against the Islam Nusantara narrative on Instagram, for example, by questioning why Islam Nusantara should be prohibited, using the hashtag #IslamNusantara.
4.	@nu.channels	400.925	Verified group account – Pro	Posting posts in the form of pictures/photos of figures and quotes from Nahdlatul Ulama, on average using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and #islamnusantararahmatanlilalamin
5.	@dawuhguru	397.279	Group account - Pro	Posting posts in the form of pictures/photos of figures and quotes from Nahdlatul Ulama, on average using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and #ulamanusantara
6.	@hijrahku_tulisanku	186.896	Group account – Op	Posting hashtag #IslamNusantara and propagating various contrasting narratives, mostly about <i>hijrah</i>
7.	@mediaaswajanusantara	41,750	Group account - Pro	Posting posts in the form of pictures/photos/videos of figures and quotes from Nahdlatul Ulama, on

No.	Account Name	Followers	Category	Post format
				average using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and #aswaja.
8.	@ldnu1926	24.253	Group account - Pro	Posting posts in the form of pictures/photos of figures and quotes from Nahdlatul Ulama, on average using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and #dakwahnusantara.
9.	@ulamaqurany	22.159	Group account - Pro	A sub-account of @dawuhguru, posting quotes of Nusantara ulama to support the Islam Nusantara narrative on Instagram, mostly using the hashtags #IslamNusantara and #ulamanusantara.
10.	@kajiansunnahmanhajsalaf	1.054	Group account - Op	Posting quotes and videos against the Islam Nusantara idea and narrative on Instagram while propagating other narratives using the hashtags #IslamNusantara and #manhajsalaf.
11.	@mata.muslim	994	Personal account - Op	Posting quotes and videos against the Islam Nusantara narrative on Instagram and propagating other narratives, using the hashtag #IslamNusantara
12.	@wahyuuni93	636	Personal account - Op	Posting videos against the Islam Nusantara narrative on Instagram to propagate contrasting narratives by using the hashtag #IslamNusantaraSesat.
13.	@alfaheem_	293	Personal account - Op	Posting meme pictures and quotes against the Islam Nusantara narrative on Instagram and propagating other narratives using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and #IslamNusantaraSesat.
14.	@pelajar_nu_karangpucung	231	Group account - Pro	Posting posts in pictures or photos and quotes, mostly using the hashtag #IslamNusantara.
15.	@sonisan99	185	Personal account - Op	Posting a meme picture to define the Islam Nusantara narrative using the hashtag #IslamNusantara and #ngajisunnah.



Figure 4 Screenshot of @sonisan99’s post and the hashtag #IslamNusantaraSesat, taken on June 12, 2021

From the interest pool(s), found that substantial debates with the hashtag Islam Nusantara mostly occurred in the 2015 to 2018 period, when the momentum of Muktamar 2015 was still happening. From the cons or opponents of Islam Nusantara, one can observe, among others, efforts to resonate with the argument of Rizieq Shihab (Eramuslim, 2015) that Islam Nusantara is heretical, anti-Islam, anti-Arab, and so forth. For example, as posted by the @sonisan99 account (Figure 4). The use of the hashtag Islam Nusantara among its opponents shows that the algorithm logic of the hashtag in social media plays an important role. Even if users disagree with such an issue in a particular hashtag, they can still use it as a hashtag in the caption so that their posts will participate and be accessible in the intended interest pool. Apart from using the hashtag #IslamNusantara, several other improvised variants, such as #IslamNusantaraSesat are also used.

The main interest pool within hashtag #IslamNusantara counted more than 344,000 posts on Instagram. The analysis of the Instagram Analytic Tool (Keywordtool.io, 2021) found that this interesting pool triggered no less than 49 variant hashtags (Table 2). This finding reaffirms the logic of social media (van Dijck & Poell, 2013) and its democratic nature that users might retain their agency (Turel, 2021) to employ the uses of hashtags within and beyond the trending topics engaged with (Bruns, Moon, Paul, & Münch, 2016). The platform Instagram even facilitates extending the fluidity of certain issues by making the hashtag feature more pertinent (Popper, 2017). The extensive role of hashtags on Instagram and other social media pave a fundamental way to become an interesting pool, where users of any vested interests might freely engage with and participate in the shared pool.

Table 2 The improvised variant hashtag of #IslamNusantara found on Instagram using Keywordtool.io

#islamnusantarasesat	#islamnusantaramusyrik
#islamnusantaracenter	#islamnusantaramanhajdakwahislamawajadi nusantara
#islamnusantarauntukperadabandunia	#islamnusantaramurah
#islamnusantaraa	#islamnusantaranudia_hasan
#islamnusantaraahmadbaso	#islamnusantaranyeleneh
#islamnusantaracentern	#islamnusantaraoo
#islamnusantaracintadamai	#islamnusantarap
#islamnusantaradariushulfikihhinggapahamkeba ngsaan	#islamnusantaraperspektifgusdur
#islamnusantaraewie	#islamnusantaraperusakislam
#eislamnusantara	#islamnusantararahmatanlilalamin
#islamnusantarafansclub	#islamnusantararahmatanlilalamiin
#islamnusantarafelixsiau	#islamnusantararail
#islamnusantaragoestoeurope	#islamnusantaras
#islamnusantaragayeng	#islamnusantarategalsari
#islamnusantaragantipresidetn	#islamnusantarau
#islamnusantaraideberbahaya	#islamnusantaraviews
#iislamnusantarashari	#islamnusantarayangmendunia
#islamnusantarajalanpanjangmoderasiberagamad iindonesia	#islamnusantarayangberkamajuan
#islamnusantarajilidsatu	#islamnusantarayo
#islamnusantarajilid1	#islamnusantara003
#islamnusantaraku	#islamnusantara001
#islamnusantarakaryajil	#islamnusantara1
#islamnusantarakoplax	#islamnusantara5
#islamnusantarakafir	#islamnusantara7
#lislamnusantarasemangatnegrikhayal	

3. Contestation of #IslamNusantara: Motives and Attitudes

From this pool of interest, whether in the hashtags #IslamNusantara, #IslamNusantaraSesat (of course only used by opponents), or other hashtags, there are many criticisms as well as presumptions (*offensive*) against the discourse of Islam Nusantara. Among the most popular is the *pocong* (dead body covered by clothes) meme picture using a batik shroud instead of the plain white cloth commonly used (Figure 5). In addition, several other posts show how opponents view and/or criticise this idea, including the @mata.muslim account quoting Ustadz Adi Hidayat or @wahyuuni93 referring to Gus Najih Maimoen. Both quoted are young *ustadz* (scholars) widely known for their statements in refusing the idea of Islam Nusantara promoted by NU (Figure 5).




Figure 5 Screenshot of the opposing group's post

Meanwhile, most of the supporting narratives are accounts affiliated with NU, showing *defensive* attitudes (towards criticisms and presumptions), while others show *neutral* attitudes. The attitudes are more or less in line with what Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (2021a, 2021b) views (and regrets) on the public sentiment of the Islam Nusantara proponents, which tends to highlight agency in the enforcement of local identities but while sneering at other identities. The defensive attitude triggered by criticisms can also be seen in the tweet war between @na_dirs and @malakmalakmal, as mentioned earlier. On the one hand, there is a neutral attitude to explain or clarify Islam Nusantara, but on the other hand, there is a trap with a defensive attitude in responding to the criticisms.



Figure 6 Screenshot of the support group post, taken on June 12, 2021

While the opposing group is busy criticising or even making false and misleading (*offensive*) perceptions and assumptions, the supporting groups are also busy making clarifications or responses (both *defensive* and *offensive* at the same time). However, it is undeniable that some other supporters are busy carrying out *neutral* attitudes, such as @nu.channels and @pelajar_nu_karangpucung, who posted positive quotes about the characteristics of Islam Nusantara (Figure 6). Furthermore, after six years of the momentum of the Muktamar, which triggered the contestation of Islam Nusantara, the trend and its continuity remains an interesting issue.

4. Trend and Continuity of #IslamNusantara Discourse in Social Media

Although not as boiled as in the early years of the Islam Nusantara contest, what can be witnessed today is that the debate is yet to be finished soon. Both contesting actors keep their positionalities toward the discourse. Figure 7 shows posts published in March-April 2021 about the Nisfu Sya'ban and Halal Bihalal traditions carried out by traditionalist Muslim groups, most of whom are supporters of the idea of Islam Nusantara. Regarding the tradition of which the puritan Salafist group could not accept, considering it was contrary to the Sunnah of the Prophet. Hence, through the @kajiansunnahmanhajsalaf account, they made a post that refutes the tradition. To ensure that the message reaches the targeted audiences, the hashtag #IslamNusantara is embedded to be found in the interest pool.

In the next post, the supporting account of Islam Nusantara @mediaaswajanusantara posted about the Halal Bihalal tradition usually carried out in Indonesia in the month of Sawal. Using the hashtag #IslamNusantara, this account also includes a quote from Kyai Said Aqil Siradj stating that "Halal Bi Halal is a genuine Indonesian culture, nowhere in Arab!" This statement can be considered as *neutral* and *offensive* narratives at the same time because it states the uniqueness of Islam Nusantara against Arab culture.



Figure 7 Screenshot of the latest post with the theme of tradition, taken on June 12, 2021

Apart from traditions that are part of daily practices, the current trend in the Islam Nusantara contest is also related to politics, especially regarding the terrorism and radicalism issues identified by some groups supporting Islam Nusantara as the impact of Salafism and Wahhabism. As shown in Figure 8, the @ldnu1926 account sent a post (*offensive*) from the interview with Kyai Said Aqil Siradj, entitled, "Said the entrance to terrorism, what are Wahhabism and Salafism?" Meanwhile, on the other hand, the @kajiansunnahmanhajsalaf account posted a video clip of Shahih TV showing a person in a police uniform. Using the hashtag #IslamNusantara, this post aims to portray (*offensive*) police officers who are Salafis and defend that "Salafis are not terrorists".



Figure 8 Screenshot of the latest post with the theme of politics (terrorism), taken on June 12, 2021

Considering the trend, we will see that the future of this contest remains intriguing. Let alone along with the increasing variety of platforms and new media features that can be used by the contesting groups involved. In addition, the current trend is that groups that had been seen as traditional and backward in using media technology have recently become more active in using new

media in promoting religious ideas. It is proven by the increasing number of new accounts joining the interest pool and actively using the hashtag #IslamNusantara, such as @srikandihwmi, @mediaansorbababan, and @dawuhguru. The emergence of new accounts is more or less in line with the invitation call from the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas (2021), to religious leaders to be actively involved in strengthening moderate religious content on social media.

Furthermore, Setyawan (2020) even suggests that such clicktivism should be driven by the *jihād* or holy struggle values (the *jihād* of social media). Quoting Jannah, the Arus Informasi Santri Nusantara community activist, Syahputra (2020), stated that harmful content must be eliminated along with the increasing number of positive content on social media. In this sense, what they meant by positive content is the content produced by *santri* or groups supporting Islam Nusantara. Hence, it is almost certain that this group will post more and more such content in the future.

5. Conclusion

The contest of Islam Nusantara cannot be separated from historical contestations in the context of Muslims in Indonesia. Its presence in new social media, Instagram, is merely an extension of the platform for contests that have traditionally existed before the internet. On Instagram, the contestation of the hashtag #IslamNusantara and its variants, such as #IslamNusantaraSesat, has become a shared pool of common interest. Not only between those who support and oppose the idea but also those who sympathise and provide critical opinions. General motives or attitudes that appear in the posts of the interest pool, namely presumption (*offensive*), clarification (*defensive* and *offensive*), and information (*neutral*). In terms of trends and continuity, it should be anticipated that this contestation will continue thanks to the growing passion for clicktivism and the future development of new media technologies.

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