

Political Dynasties in the Government System in Indonesia

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Abstract

There are many phenomena where politicians try to perpetuate their power through political dynasties, especially in local government. This is worrying, considering that the abuse of power will be easier with the political elite consisting of their own families. This research will then look at how political dynasties can occur in the Indonesian government system. This research will be carried out using a descriptive qualitative approach. The data used in this research was obtained through the literature study method. The results of this research then found that several factors cause political dynasties to occur in Indonesia. The first factor is Indonesian society which is plural, so individual political behavior is strongly influenced by social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. Another factor is that candidates who have charisma and popularity will provide great opportunities and make it easier for other family members to run for office in society.

Keywords: Political Dynasty, Government System, Indonesia.

Introduction

A political dynasty is understood as a form of control of power in government at the local level. Political dynasties in the traditional political sense are those in which the ruler tries to place his family, relatives, and relatives in strategic positions to build a political empire within the government. These efforts are carried out with their goals (national and local). This effort was made with the aim that those who are members of a political dynasty will look after each other so that they remain in power (executive, legislative, and judicial) (Meng et al., 2023). Placing family or relatives in strategic positions will make it easier for the ruler to control and manage all the things the ruler needs. One of the channels for politicians to contribute to control is at the legislative level, such as the people's representative institutions in the constitutional system in Indonesia, namely the DPR RI (people's representative council), provincial, city, and district DPRD, and DPD (regional representative council) (Gómezescobar et al., 2020). As a people's representative institution, it is legitimately elected by the people through general elections. Representation of the issues to be fought for in parliament has always been a weapon for politicians to get votes from their supporters. In every period of the democratic party, it is not uncommon for the same politicians to nominate and even bring their families along to nominate (Ncube, 2019).

In post-New Order Indonesia, decentralization and regional autonomy have been implemented. Big bang decentralization where central and regional political elites fight for regional-level authority. It turns out that decentralization is not the end of democracy, the weakness of the nation in mobilizing elites, and fragmentation of administration (Diprose et al., 2019). Decentralization itself has side effects such as patrimonial networks and regional corruption, controversies against the masses, and backing them with strongmen to protest against the local government. Three groups emerged, namely: first, formed from families originating from aristocrats who survived until decentralization, second, party bosses from the pillars of the new order, and third, newcomers to form new provinces (Olver, 2021).

According to Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is a government where the people have the freedom and opportunity to accept or reject the governing politicians. Schumpeter stated that the essence of democracy is the existence of a competitive mechanism for choosing leaders

through contestation to get the people's votes. This is consistent with the phenomenon of political actors fighting at the local level to get massive public votes and even perpetuate political dynasties to maintain their power (Hager et al., 2022). According to Schumpeter, democracy is a mechanism for general elections. Elections are an arena to win the people's voice and control actors who can carry out the function of representation. In this case, democracy is realized through the mechanism of general elections, even though the democratic party is for the sake of creating the election of people's representatives according to the will of the people (Pereira & Roder Figueira, 2021). According to Beetham, democracy is not just general elections but public control over government. Beetham explained that democracy is a form of accountability and transparency in government that leads to the creation of an equal social and political order. Every human being has equal rights in politics and has the responsibility to exercise control over the system that is already running (de Sousa et al., 2023).

In the realm of the national level political dynasties have also been found following efforts to build political dynasties in Indonesia starting from the national level. At the national level and throughout Indonesia, the practice of political dynasties has occurred at the local level (HS & Kristian, 2021). For example, in the election in the Riau Islands Province, several husband, and wife couples nominated themselves as legislative candidates. Empirical facts show that political dynasties are still occurring in the Indonesian government. In general, a political dynasty is indicated by the existence of political positions held by the family in government circles (Niner et al., 2023; Kristian, 2019).

Political dynasties in Indonesia have occurred since the New Order with the strong hegemony of the government, Golkar, in the political system in Indonesia making the people's representative institutions which are supposed to carry out a system of supervision over the government almost completely barren. People's representatives should supervise and voice the aspirations and interests of the people. Soeharto's resignation gave rise to new enthusiasm in the Indonesian political system. Not much has changed, observers say that legislative members are more likely to prioritize the personal interests of their relatives rather than fighting for the aspirations of the people (Udin et al., 2023; Kristian, 2020).

Unrestricted periodization will have the potential to lead to abuse of power and potential corruption. Power must be limited to prevent abuse of office, including limiting the periodization of legislative institutions. Quoted from Lord Acton's statement, namely, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely." The discourse on the unlimited periodization of the powers of the president, vice president, and regional heads will violate the constitution, but what about political actors who build political dynasties at the local level? (Nwozor et al., 2021; Kristian, 2022). Through the brief explanation above, this research then wants to examine how political dynasties become a form of power control in government in Indonesia.

Literature Review

Political Dynasty

A political dynasty can be compared or identified with a kingdom, where political power is exercised by family groups that are still related or related by blood. In this case, power is passed down from generation to generation to its descendants. According to Ari Dwipayana, kinship politics is a symptom of neopatrimonialism. The seeds have been around for a long time since tradition. Previously the heir to power was appointed directly, whereas now it is through procedural political channels (Duindam, 2021).

According to Nurmansyah, a dynasty is a primitive power with a reproductive system because it only inherits and relies on the blood of its descendants. The definition of political dynasty is the process of directing to regenerate power for the benefit of certain groups to gain power in a country (Xu et al., 2020).

Dynastic politics is a phenomenon that occurs in politics marked by the emergence of political candidates from the governmental family or regional heads who are still in power. In simple language, political dynasties can be interpreted as regimes that rule over politics and are run for generations in rotation by several family members. Political dynasties are very rarely discussed in Indonesia, even though in reality the practice of political dynasties in Indonesia has long been a seed in politics, consciously or unconsciously, since the independence era (Fatimatuzzahra & Dewi, 2021).

In behavioral theory, political behavior can be seen from a psychological, sociological, and rational point of view. In this case, the form and character of political dynasties can be seen from the sociological and psychological aspects. In political psychology, dynasty politics can be used as a system and a strategic tool used by political elites in carrying out their political activities. This is done to perpetuate or perpetuate power by involving family members. From a physiological perspective, dynastic political culture or familial political culture is something that cannot be avoided (Vuong et al., 2023).

There are three forms of political dynasty, as follows:

1. The form of a Regeneration political dynasty, namely a model like a family gathering, in this case, there is leadership without interruption, namely where in one area it is led by the same family without any interruption in leadership by other people (Annahar et al., 2023).
2. The form or model of cross-chamber political dynasties, often called branches of power, for example, brothers and sisters occupy executive and legislative seats. In a situation like this, there is potential for loss of check and balance control (Apaydın & Müftüler-Baç, 2022).
3. The third type or form of political dynasty is cross-regional. In this case, a family member is positioned to control strategic positions in various regions in Indonesia (Riyansyah et al., 2021).

Political dynasty is a political culture inherited from the royal era which is still ingrained in the flesh. The roots of political dynasties can be drawn from the past. Sri Margana said that political dynasties are not a phenomenon but are also a tradition, originating from a culture of feudalism in the archipelago which also adheres to a culture of patrimonism (Kuusela, 2023). In this case, the political culture prioritizes the lineage of the father's family. Almost all kingdoms in Indonesia implemented traditions like this, including during the Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic eras. There is a gap between the democratic politics chosen by the Indonesian people in modern times and the culture brought by the people who carry it out. In this case, this culture is very difficult to eliminate in Indonesia (Hernawan et al., 2021).

Genealogy is also very important. There are two lineages of the ruler, namely the mangiwo and manengen breeds. According to the term middle breed, it is a genealogy for the name of an unknown prophet, while Mangiwo is a genealogy that is ordered down to the wayang characters. Margana said that in this case there was no change in the concept of power, from Hinduism to Buddhism to Islam, the political culture remained the same (Sudarman & Hidayaturrahman, 2020). A person in becoming a king must have royal blood, including people who in him seep blood from the royal sultans, priests or scholars, and people who receive revelations from the creator or God, then he is said to be legitimate. To this day, this culture is

still maintained by the community in seeing or choosing a leader, if not from a circle close to the nobility and elite, at least someone from an intellectual circle or a cleric (Reid, 2020).

Government System

John Locke stated that power in the State is divided into 3 (three), namely legislative power, executive power, and federative power. Legislative power is the power to make laws, executive power is the power to implement laws, and federative power is the power relating to war and peace, forming unions and alliances, as well as all actions with all people and bodies abroad. The existence of federative power regarding relations with other countries was based on the existence of the British State at that time, as a country that had many colonial territories (Hudhaibi, 2023).

Inspired by John Locke with his theory as stated above, Montesquieu argued that in state government there are 3 (three) types of power, namely legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is the power to make laws. Executive power is the power to enforce laws. Judicial power is the power to try violations of the law. According to Montesquieu, federative power is not an independent power but is part of executive power (Akyuwen et al., 2021).

According to Montesquieu, when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body, there will no longer be freedom because there is a danger that the same king or legislative body will enact tyrannical laws and implement them in a tyrannical way. Montesquieu also stated that the three powers are separate from each other, both regarding their functions and the institutions that carry them out. The practice of separation of powers as intended by Montesquieu is difficult to implement (Nedzel, 2023).

According to Van Vollenhoven, in carrying out state duties there are 4 (four) functions, namely *regeling* (making regulations), *bestuur* (government in the narrow sense), *rechtspraak* (judging), *politie* (police). In a modern state, the government's duties include those of the state in carrying out the public interest, except for maintaining the law in a preventive manner (preventive *rechtszorg*), adjudicating, and making regulations (*regeling*). The government's task is not just to implement laws in the context of implementing the public interest. In urgent conditions, the government must be able to take quick action to resolve problems that arise without having to wait for statutory orders (Rao et al., 2023).

According to Logemann, the function of state power can be divided into 5 (five) areas, namely the statutory function (function to make laws); implementation function (function to implement the law); government function (in a special sense); police function (function to maintain order, conduct inquiries and investigations); and the judicial function (the function of adjudicating violations of the law) (Haruni, 2022).

Then according to Sunarto in his article regarding the principle of checks and balances. This principle is a constitutional principle that requires that legislative power, executive power, and judicial power be equal and mutually control one another. State power can be regulated, limited, or even controlled as well as possible so that the abuse of power by state administrators or individuals who are occupying positions in state institutions can be prevented and overcome (Muslimin & Putri, 2021).

Indonesia is a country with a presidential government system. This is based on the agreement of the nation's founding fathers at the meetings of the Investigation Agency for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPK) on 29 May-1 June and 10-17 July 1945. The presidential system of government has unique characteristics as adopted in the United States. First, the system is based on the principle of separation of powers. An American political

science expert stated that it is based on the separation of power principle. Second, there is no joint accountability between the President as executive leader and his members. The members called ministers are fully responsible to the President. Third, the President cannot dissolve the DPR, and fourth, the President is elected by the Electoral College (Siburian, 2022).

Method

This research will be carried out using a descriptive qualitative approach. The data used in this research was obtained through a literature study. This research data comes from various research results and previous studies which are still relevant to the content of the research. In this context, the research will review the phenomenon of politicians who seek to extend their power through political dynasties, especially in local government. This raises concerns because of the possibility of abuse of power by the political elite consisting of their family members. This research will discuss how political dynasties can develop in the Indonesian government system. This research will use a descriptive qualitative approach and collect data through a literature study. The results of this research identify several factors that enable the emergence of political dynasties in Indonesia. One of them is the diversity of Indonesian society which influences individual political behavior through social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. In addition, candidates who have charisma and popularity tend to provide great opportunities for their family members to run for office in society, facilitating the development of political dynasties in the country.

Result and Discussion

The dynamics of political actors, especially at the local level, reflect that deepening democracy through general elections does not necessarily eliminate the politics of patronage or clientelism. This politics is used to stretch the power of politicians at the local level by building the seeds of a political dynasty in the local level government on a massive scale.

Dynamics of Public Trust in the Legislature

The concept of democracy presented by Beetham confronts broader mechanisms of public control. Public mechanisms include controls in the system of people's representative government in Indonesia which stipulates that the term of office is only five years and is not regulated in the law limiting the periodization of legislative bodies. As a result, many "senior" candidates from every democratic party also become legislative candidates even though they have been elected several times in previous years.

This is different from the law which stipulates that the president and vice president serve for five years and can only serve two terms. Since the end of the New Order, political actors have returned to the regions to gain power. It turns out that decentralization is not the end of democracy, the weakness of the nation in mobilizing elites and fragmentation. Decentralized administration itself has side effects such as patrimonial networks and regional corruption, controverting the masses until three group classifications emerge, namely first, formed from families originating from aristocrats who survived until decentralization, second, party bosses, pillars of the new order, and third, newcomers to the formation of new provinces.

According to the results of the Indonesian Survey (LSI) Danny JA revealed that public trust in the People's Representative Council (DPR) is still the lowest among other countries, including that the DPR has the lowest level of trust compared to other institutions.

The level of trust in the DPR institution is very low compared to several other institutions. The low level of trust in the legislative institution shows that the legislature as a representation of the people should receive higher levels of trust in legitimacy, far from expectations. In the arena of people's democracy agents of public control initiate general elections to make choices. Democratization which gives power to the people as agents of control is being negated by political actors carrying out increasingly growing politics of patronage and clientelism at the local level. The reciprocal relationship between senior politicians and the people is often through populism and government programs to gain support. A study of patronage politics in the 2014 Indonesian election stated that various welfare schemes were often developed primarily to gain electoral support and were managed by maintaining clientelist ties. Patronage is defined as the exchange of benefits to gain political support. Group goods (Club goods) as a patronage practice that is given social group benefits rather than individual benefits. The existence of pork barrels, namely activities aimed at the public and funded with public funds with the hope that the public will provide political support to certain candidates. Not only that, regional autonomy provides a large space for the rise of local powers to become major players. The problems that arise are that local people only become spectators in democratization and regional autonomy in their regions. So that whatever is done by politicians does not bring any change with campaign promises that cannot be fulfilled. From the survey results above, it can be concluded that the DPR does not receive full legitimacy of power from the people at the local and national levels.

In a democratic system like the one currently implemented in Indonesia, representative democracy, the relationship pattern as a representative agent, does not work well. The absence of clarity on the role and position of political parties, and constituents threatens democracy to become pseudo. Parliament and political parties appear to be busy carrying out their agendas and are often slow to respond to the needs and problems that develop in society. The threat of a crisis of representative democracy is where citizens begin to not believe that the representation agents who represent them can work well and fight for the problems they or their constituents face. Prolonged periods of power gained popularity for including families in politics to the point of becoming political dynasties at the local level.

The Phenomenon of Political Dynasties

Familism as a political culture is defined as too much dependence on family ties, which gives rise to the habit of placing family and kinship ties in a higher position than other social obligations. Familism is also understood as a new social order, namely a psychological encouragement for someone to be able to have a career in two domains, namely the public as a bureaucrat and the private as a corporate-private sector. Familism, namely political dynasty based purely on direct blood relations within the family (consanguinity) and marriage relations (marriage) with other clans.

By using an equality perspective, political dynasties have closed equal opportunities for every citizen. The continuous practice of building political dynasties will gradually rot the country's economy and politics. As stated by Lord Acton, power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. And, absolute power was born and implemented by political dynasties. The existence of political dynasties in the body of people's representative institutions is also an important issue. The phenomenon of political dynasties in the local realm emerged along with the implementation of direct elections at the local level. As this process progresses as a form of democratization at the local level, various elites emerge in the regions to co-opt this process.

According to Weber, Asians are incapable and immature in holding the (political and economic) responsibilities of the state, so quite a few of them regard the political administration

entrusted to them as a personal right that is considered part of personal property that can be exploited. As a result of this weakness, they are unable to differentiate between the rights of the general public related to issues of responsibility and accountability and personal rights. As a result, political corruption is considered normal and not too problematic. Key values commonly associated with the middle class in the West such as independence, competence, and individualism. This is different from Indonesia's values which emphasize harmony and "mutual assistance", especially through the family.

The emergence of elites in local democracy is commonly known as the reorganization of power. This reorganization is interpreted as the return of the influence of local elite political power into the era of democracy. The populism-based familial political dynasty that was highlighted in the government succession was an effort to "secure" the previous legislative candidacy program. This is related to the reproduction of the heroism and populism discourse of the previous government's program which was used as campaign material. Relationship patterns are used to maintain power through patronage and clientelism. A study of patronage politics in the 2014 Indonesian election stated that various welfare schemes were often developed primarily to gain electoral support and were managed by maintaining clientelist ties. Patronage is defined as the exchange of benefits for political support. Apart from these reasons, several reasons why they continue to be elected even though they have served several terms are also because first, political behavior is an interaction between government and society, between government institutions, and between groups and individuals in society in the context of the process of creating, implementing and enforcement of political decisions is political behavior. In the context of a pluralistic society like Indonesia, individual political behavior will be greatly influenced by the production of social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. The cultural similarities encourage people to continue to choose those who are under the psychological bonds built by the candidates. Second, the absence of periodization restrictions means that candidates who are charismatic and popular in society continue to run as a great opportunity for families to participate in electoral politics at the local level.

Referring to the problem above, the role of the state and government in socializing individuals looks weak when compared to the family. This reveals the influence between families contributing to the socialization of the behavior of family members. Political leaders and bureaucrats who are considered family leaders will be able to increase positive socialization between the government and the people who are governed. Political dynasties and ongoing practices of corruption and nepotism are the result of previous socialization of customs. This is supported by Huntington's study. Huntington argues that traditional rules in most societies do not provide strict rewards to personal, familial actors. As a result, the public and private spheres become blurred, responsibilities to the state and responsibilities to the family become unclear. This is what triggers a society that is blind to its negative behavior, whether it is nepotism, corruption, or otherwise.

Resource Base for Achieving Power

Material resources in the form of wealth, and property (economy) become one of the sources of power to gain influence to gain power. The existence of an unequal distribution of power, where only a certain person/group of people has more power than others, is influenced by the number of sources, the distribution of sources, the momentum of using the source, and the result of using the source of power. Political actors who have potential sources of wealth have a great opportunity to gain power. Resources for gaining power can also be obtained through non-material resources such as popularity, charisma, and influential networks in political coalitions. Meanwhile, cultural capital in the form of information capital, education, and skills are supporting resources to gain power.

The culture of building political dynasties can also be seen when many actors continue to nominate themselves as "representatives of the people" every period. The existing nomination mechanism still has weaknesses. The impression arises that there is no serious effort to discuss the quality of legislative candidates in each period of election implementation. The nomination mechanism, which still relies on selection by political parties, has not made much difference.

Scientist Robert Mitchel conducted a study that found the emergence of an oligarchy managing government in the hands of a few people is a necessity. Sooner or later, every democratic organization will be trapped in an oligarchy. Organizations such as political parties are built on democratic procedures, the inevitability of oligarchy is only a matter of time, which is then called the iron law of oligarchy. Indonesia shows that the democratic process and democratic rights only take place in a thin layer of the middle class and therefore are only enjoyed by a handful of educated inhalers and their descendants.

Limiting the periodization of members of people's representative institutions is necessary due to the current situation in Indonesia. The absence of progress in the development and welfare of the community, one of which also comes from members of the people's representative institutions who do not have innovation and improvement of the work system. The absence of periodization restrictions causes an imbalance between people who have just nominated themselves as members of the people's representative institutions and incumbent candidates. Incumbent candidates have more adequate access and facilities to carry out outreach and campaigns. Group goods (Club goods) are a patronage practice that provides social group benefits rather than individual benefits. The existence of pork barrels, namely activities aimed at the public and funded with public funds in the hope that the public will provide political support to certain candidates. Lord Acton quoted a statement, namely, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely".

The political capacity of actors, especially democratic movement actors, in improving the quality of representation and advancing democracy such as the DPR, DPRD, DPD, general election organizing bodies, as well as improving electoral procedures and systems. The review of aspects of the capacity of actors in democracy is not just a picture of the condition of democracy in current situations. Understanding the dynamics of the process makes democracy not only seen as a goal but also a means (means). This is done through principled institutions such as equality of citizens, rule of law, the principle of equality before the law, transparency, anti-corruption (good governance), civil supremacy, freedom of parties, continuity of free and fair general elections, including press freedom and academic freedom, guarantees for citizen participation, and others.

Democracy is a condition that must be fulfilled by countries that have the essence of democracy, a mechanism for electing leaders through contestation to obtain the people's votes so that the elected leader can make political decisions in a country. Of course, general elections are a means of rotating power, getting people's representatives who can present the people in a democratic, free, and non-violent manner as well as providing broad political education to the community. The resource base is used as the basis for gaining power, giving rise to the potential for political dynasties to continue to occur. The author offers an initial solution to restore the essence of healthy democracy by limiting periodization as an initial solution so that the government system runs following the nation's goals and ideals. Providing political education to young intellectuals as a pioneer in socializing the community to become intelligent voters and encouraging parties to carry out political filters.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of efforts to build a political dynasty between a husband and wife and even a father-son family becoming legislative candidates is a normalization of the symptoms of patronage at the local level. The culture of building a political dynasty can be seen by continuing to nominate himself as a "people's representative". There are several reasons why they continue to be elected and build political dynasty efforts even though they have served several periods, namely first: Political behavior is the interaction between government and society, between government institutions, and between groups and individuals in society in the process of making, implementing, and decision enforcement, politics is political behavior. In the context of a pluralistic society like Indonesia, individual political behavior will be greatly influenced by the production of social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. Second, the absence of periodization restrictions means that candidates who are charismatic and popular in society continue to run as a great opportunity for families to participate in electoral politics at the local level. The resource base for gaining power is an important aspect. General elections with high political costs require material resources to be an important basis for gaining political support. The abilities and charisma of politicians in society are non-material resources that need to be taken into account so that the circle of popularity is used to build a political dynasty.

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