Hukum dan Politik: Studi Ambang Batas Presiden dalam Pemilu 2019 Law and Politics: Study of the Presidential Threshold in the 2019 General Election of Indonesia

1Islamic State University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cireundeu, Kec. Ciputat Tim., Kota Tangerang Selatan, Banten 15419 2 Islamic State University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, Pisangan Barat, Cireundeu, Kec. Ciputat Tim., Kota Tangerang Selatan, Banten 15419 3Djuanda University Bogor, Jalan Tol Ciawi No 1 Kotak Pos 35 Ciawi Bogor 16730 *corresponding author E-mail: wildan.munawar@unida.ac.id


INTRODUCTION
General elections must be held periodically, this is due to several reasons, namely, first, people's opinions on election policies always change according to the demands of the time. This is because socio-cultural developments always demand changes in the latest circumstances. Second, some aspects affect internally and externally. Externally this is influenced by changes in the international world and internally is changed in political will and conditions within the country itself. Third, it is influenced by demographic factors or the increasing number of adult residents who already have constitutional political rights (Asshiddiqie, 2008).
The implementation of the general election was originally intended to elect legislative members namely (DPR, DPD, and DPRD). After the 4th partially about democracy as well as a logical consequence of the democratic state itself (Oetama, 2001).
The practice of holding presidential and vice-presidential elections which began in 2004 until 2014 is conducted periodically or in the time after the legislative elections. There may be a grace period created to make the results of legislative elections (parliamentary threshold) become a reference/ticket to nominate a presidential candidate with a predetermined threshold.
Normatively, this can be seen in the provisions of Article 222 of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning election which states that a candidate pair is proposed by a political party or a combination of political parties participating in the General Election that meets the requirement of obtaining seats in the DPR at least 20% or obtaining a valid national vote as much as 25% in legislative elections. With this periodic mechanism, it can guarantee a balanced supporting axis between incumbent and opposition, so that when the government runs, it will not be one of the more dominant institutions and negate the system of checks and balances (Wisnewski, 2014).
In addition to the periodic elections to stabilize stable political conditions, a threshold mechanism for presidential nominations or presidential thresholds that has been used in the 2014 elections has also been created. However, it becomes a problem if the periodic elections become simultaneous and use high thresholds in presidential nominations. This will have an impact on the political intensity and the tug of war in the election will occur, even it will have an impact on the decline in the quality of democracy in the election. This provision can be seen in the decision of the Constitutional Hence, some problems come: first, the simultaneous holding of elections using the concept of the high presidential threshold will cause uncertainty. That is from which percentage of presidential threshold to nominate presidential candidates will be taken. If the determination of the nomination threshold is based on the previous year's legislative elections it will credit the possibility of new parties or parties that were not previously included to be able to enter parliament.
Second, the problem that will arise if a high threshold is applied by simultaneous elections is the possibility of a dominant coalition against parties whose presidential candidates win the presidential election. In the sense of the loss of opposition as a counterweight to the power, because if the elections are simultaneous, parties will automatically vote in coalition with the winning party. Third, this concept will have the effect of dividing the supporters who are divided into only two camps. This is because with the high threshold mutatis mutandis will create only 2 presidential candidates in the election contestation (Budiardjo, 2003). Furthermore, the intensity or pressure on supporting fanaticism is not broken down and is focused on just two presidential candidates. Thus, in turn, it will decrease; the important role of law as a tool to translate the political situation and interests into good ideas for democratic development.
There were several studies related to this research. Lytha Dayanara (2017)

Content analysis of legal drafts in the series of deliberations in the
People Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) will be done. This discussion is the main reference in deciding legal products that may have certain characteristics. Conceptually the process of debating a draft will determine characteristics of legal products. For this reason, the discussion will focus and conclude the underlying legal politics of the presidential threshold.
The using of Political Interests Theory is inevitable in this research.
Political interests are interests created by humans in regulating relationships between one another (Budiardjo, 2007). In the interaction between one another, political interests are contained in a political system. Interest in any system can be described as input and output. The input itself represents the demands and aspirations of the community as well as support from the community, these inputs are then processed into policies and regulations.
Gabriel A. Almond emphasized that political interests have a strong relationship with the political process which begins with the inclusion of demands that are articulated and aggregated by political parties, so that these special interests become a more general policy proposal, and are subsequently 138 incorporated into the policy-making process that is carried out by the legislative and executive bodies (Yana, 2016). Thus, political interests are closely related to political infrastructure activities such as pressure groups and political parties as well as the political superstructure such as the executive and legislative branches. According to Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, the study of the political process focuses on the activities of parties and interest groups, internal organizations, the nature of political decision-making, and the roles and backgrounds of politicians (Oman, 2016). The Interest groups are represented by the political parties which involve in the debate of the Bill.

Legal Politics in Forming Legal Products
Political law is the process of policy formation that occurs within a state institution authorized to form policies and regulations, to achieve the expected and desired goals of the state. The formation process will later produces a product of policies and regulations aimed at public interest (Soedarto 1983).
Sunaryati Hartono holds a view regarding legal politics and is outlined in her book entitled Political Law Towards a National Legal System. In the book, legal politics is seen as a tool or a way to realize the ideals of the nation which are conveyed and outlined in the formation of national law through the government (Hartono, 1991). Abdul Hakim G Nusantara focuses legal politics into national legal politics. According to him, national legal politics is the effort of the government of a country that wants to implement nationally a legal policy (Thohari and Syaukani, 2006).
National legal politics has several characteristics including consistency in the implementation of existing law, revitalization of laws that aim to replace laws that are considered obsolete with laws that adjust the times, reinforce the function of legal institutions as well as coaching members, and emphasize the views of policymakers into legal awareness in society (Thohari and Syaukani 2006 1. A law that provides justice and prosperity, meaning that the law must be used as a tool or a means of renewal for the benefit of the people's welfare.
Therefore, the formation of law must be harmonious and adapt to the concept of the welfare state, because the law is for humans.
2. The creation of a strong democracy because of the law is formed here to strengthen democracy and must be based on a concept that emphasizes the sustainability of democracy and has the mindset of grounding democratic idealism in political life, therefore a legal foundation is needed that holds fast to democratic goals with the support of strong moral content.
3. Laws that guarantee the basic rights of citizens. The point is that the law created must prioritize human rights.
4. The law aims to guide the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. In the formation of law, the creation of an increasingly strong NKRI is the basic foundation that must be present in the drafting of legislation.
5. Single diverse law; in the formation of law, one must pay attention to various kinds of differences, such as socio-cultural diversity and the many groups that exist, by sticking to the basis of the state and the priority of national unity.
6. Laws were created to protect the nation and spill the blood of Indonesia.
These foundations become the main axis in forming a legal product. The formation of legal products cannot be separated from nuances that are full of interests. In another view, the formation of law that has the interests of lawmakers can be dissected through political configurations. In Raison D'atre, the political configuration can be interpreted as the political will that exists and influences decisions on regulation-making. The formation of this regulation is in the realm of legislative institutions whose existence is the characteristics of legal products. (Marpaung, 2012). Factually, each legal norm is a transformation of a particular political configuration, so that its characteristics will affect the quality of a legal product (MD, 1993). For this reason, the making of regulations must be aimed at the ideal law and by the mandate of the constitution.
The political configuration exists as a representative of a structure, political views and political system whose existence is evidence that the country adheres to a political-democratic or authoritarian system (MD, 2006).
A country that adheres to a democratic political system can be seen from the application of the rule of law, freedom of opinion, and people's participation.
This will have logical consequences that the law will be responsive (Mayo, 1960). Whereas a state that has an authoritarian political system will have an impact on political structures that are fascist-conservative, meaning that political attitudes that are always taken are top to down so that it will limit people's freedom of opinion or in the sense of a political structure built to be conservative and orthodox (Dahrendorf, 1986). Both schemes are not absolute because democratic political systems can produce orthodox legal character both formally and materially (Anggoro, 2019).
To achieve the true essence of the law and achieve the welfare of the people, the formulation of rules through legislation systems is mandatory (Courtney and Smith 2010). For this reason, the practice of governing the government must create the quality of national law in achieving legal objectives, namely certainty, justice, and expediency. These goals are the responsibility of members of the DPR, DPD, DPRD, and the Government.

Issues of Election and the Determination of Presidential Threshold
The debate is the first round of a political process that revolves on every crucial issue, in which decisions on these crucial issues become an important  for their victory (Halim 2015). This can be categorized as a breakthrough, in which this system has never been practiced during the General Elections in Indonesia. Second, related to parliamentary threshold. According to the government in the Special Committee meeting, one of the objectives of the application of this rule is to create a simple multiparty system. The debate that arises related to the logic of government is not the number of political parties participating in the General Election which must be limited but rather the ideal number of political party forces, which needs to be empowered and streamlined in the DPR.  Committee. Finally, the Special Committee agreed on the decision on the 5 packages of issues of the Election system to be brought to the DPR's plenary session. By looking at the political map of the votes of these factions, the winner will likely be Package A, with the following counts table 2: From the data that has been presented in the   After a long process of voting finally, the victory was aimed at supporters of package A which was initially headed by the PDIP faction. in the existence of political support in a presidential system, because political support is not permanent, but rather the calculation of interests.
The discussion on the presidential threshold which was applied to the General Election was the discussion that drew the most attention of all factions in the DPR. Because until the deadline the DPR held a plenary session to agree on the Election Implementation Bill, discussions about the Presidential Threshold had failed several times to reach a decision.

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The cause of the failure to reach the decision was the many tug-of-war interests, all factions still did not agree on the amount of the Presidential Threshold number that would later be used in the 2019 Presidential Election.
If it is examined more fundamentally and deeper, the decision is not reached because each faction has different interests.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 from the facts and data presented by the researcher in those tables, it may be related to the theory of political interest as stated above: political interest is behind the legal policy (Shidarta, 2012). Because basically in the making and ratification of the Election Bill, there is political intrigue that prioritizes the interests of the party elite rather than the interests of the community, the data that has been presented prove that there is a policy behind the legal policy in the discussion of the Election Implementation Bill, especially in discussions related to percentages. presidential threshold of 20%.
This happens considering how important it is to fight for seats at the executive level.  With the many representatives of members from various factions in the Election Bill meeting, the determination related to the presidential threshold became a discussion that was colored by a lot of debate, it arose because of differences in interests of each faction. The interests of each faction in determining the presidential threshold can be classified into 3 groups, namely the threshold percentage of 20-30 percent, 0% or no threshold and the group taking the middle path is 10-15 percent.
The first classification that requires a high threshold with a range of 20-

Law and Authoritarianism in the Presidential Threshold Regulation
The discussion on the presidential threshold in a special committee meeting on the Election Implementation Bill has an element of interest from each faction. The determination of the presidential threshold is dominated by factions who want a high percentage of nomination limits. It was proven in the minutes of the meeting that 6 factions agreed with the government's proposal of 25% and some even reached the 30% limit. The remaining 3 factions want no limit in presidential nominations or 0% and one faction wants a 10% threshold.
Contextually, the agreement can be seen in several debates that took place at the 6th Working Meeting on Friday, February 17, 2017. At the debate there was one important point that must be considered, from the representatives of the factions. The majority of the factions voiced the same votes related to the percentage of presidential threshold. The majority of the factions gave the same decision regarding this matter, namely approving Taufiqulhadi, M.Sc.), giving an agreed view with the government, which is 25% without giving a logical argument or argument that can be justified. "If Nasdem agrees with the government, then we think that at least twenty percent of the total number of seats in the DPR or get twenty-five percent of the national legitimate votes. Like the government that is the attitude of Nasdem ('Risalah Rapat Pansus RUU Penyelenggaraan Pemilu, 2017). The same attitude without POLITICON : Jurnal Ilmu Politik Vol.3 No.1 ; argumentation was also carried out by F-PDIP (Arif Wibowo) and F-Hanura (Rufinus Hotmaulana Hutahuruk) to directly agree with the provisions set by the government, which is 25%.
Based on the attitudes and arguments of the factions, the overall agreement was agreed upon by the government. Agreements by some of the actors forming these regulations conceptually can be categorized as political forming of regulations. Before there were written rules, there was a political intention to achieve a goal. More clearly about the agreement before the formation of rules can be seen in the opinion of Spencer A. Overton regarding political law, namely: "Some problems involve the structure of institutions that regulate political activities such as allocating responsibility among federal, state, and local officials and between different branches and agencies within each level of government; varying standards (or a lack of standards) stemming from decentralization (for example, different localities resolving similar disputes or multiple federal agencies investigating the same set of allegations); delegating discretion to private actors such as political parties (for example, by allowing them to challenge voters at the polls); capture agency; and review of agency decisions. Other challenges stem from rulemaking and adjudication, such as the adequacy of notice and process, the clarity and administration of legal directives, and the balance between consistency and flexibility in decision making " (Overton, 2013). In his view, Overton stated universally that there are factors that determine a legal policy. This factor can be seen from the cultural conditions of a region or the will of political parties that have their respective interests.
These factors will form regulatory standards that vary according to the interests behind the formation of the policy (Overton, 2013 3. Either an empirical or normative relationship can be the basis for an analytic relationship so that the concept of a legal system logically depends on an effective or moral political order. The first factor empirically allows for the relationship between law and politics through political orders (political orders) (Bayles, 1982). These political orders are carried out by individuals or groups who assume that effectiveness is necessary for the existence of the legal system. The second factor assumes that legal orders are normatively dependent on political orders, meaning that formally the rules that are formed are following the morals desired by the political orders of legislators. The third factor, both the effectiveness and morale can be the basis for determining policy formation (Thompson, 2000).
In discussing the determination of the presidential threshold at the limited meeting in 2017, it is clear that the dominance of parties that want a percentage of 20% has a relation in terms of strengthening the position of one of the presidential candidates, both effectively and morally (Thompson, 2000).
The agreement to determine the presidential threshold by the 6 factions is systematically the same goal, namely to create overpower candidates in the presidential election (Mainwaring et al., 1997). There is almost no substantial debate on the determination of the presidential threshold. This is because in general the dominant factions choosing a high percentage want to strengthen presidential system and a small political party cannot necessarily be able to carry a pair of presidential candidates. According to the factions that agreed 20%, the presidential threshold wanted high filtering (high standard) (Fogg, 2002) in elections, even though these standards have political interests for incumbent candidates.
This is in Bruce Cain's opinion "A narrow focus on election law prompts us to overlook non-selection governance issues, such as pay-to-play rules,  (Cain, 2012). This means that in matters of election policy the riskiest thing to happen is the existence of supply and demand between the authorities and the stakeholders.
If we look at the objectives of election based on the process and its results, according to Perhimpunan Pemilu dan Demokrasi (PERLUDEM), the objectives of the election are (i) making it easier for voters to vote, (ii) simplifying the implementation schedule, (iii) saving state funds, and (iv) balancing the burden of the organizer. Whereas in terms of results, the objectives of the election are (i) increasing voter participation and control of elected candidates, (ii) creating an effective presidential government system, (iii) simplifying the party system in the DPR and DPRD, and (iv) strengthening and democratizing political parties. These objectives must be written down in an explanation of the law, so that they are read as electoral designs that will facilitate the formulation of articles and paragraphs (Perludem, 2020).
While normatively, the objectives of the election regulation can be seen in article 4 of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections, namely: The Election Arrangement aims to: a. strengthen the democratic state system; b. realize fair and integrity elections; c. ensure consistency in the regulation of the electoral system; d. provide legal certainty and prevent duplication in directing elections, and e. realize effective and efficient elections.
Based on the above points of objectives of the election, in determining the presidential threshold, it seems do not describe the essence of the objectives of the election regulations. This causes intrigue and problems in a structured and massive way: starting from the initial stage of the disproportionate candidacy, because the simultaneous election model that uses a split ticket cannot provide a leader candidate who should be able to appear more. In terms of effectiveness, it was not created because after the Furthermore, at the level of the presidential government system, what is desired is a balance between parliament and the executive. Whereas essentially a presidential system in Indonesia requires a balanced and controlled government (checks and balances) (Aritonang, 2010). Factually, the application of the presidential threshold creates an unbalance government because the executive position is more dominant in running the government.
The condition in the parliament which should be the people's watch tool has become one direction with the president's policy and even seems not to look at the people as their constituents (Soetjipto, 2014). This is also caused by simultaneous elections which provide very short pauses to form coalitions in government. So that the parties will automatically join the bearer party that has a high parliamentary threshold and incumbent candidates who have above average electability.
Based on this answer a pattern of legal political relations that emerged in the formation of the presidential threshold percentage applied to the holding of simultaneous elections. The high percentage of presidential threshold becomes a benchmark that the rules have original intensities which are contrary to responsive legal rules, which is rooted in four basic steps such as ideological footing, normative footing, constitutional footing and moral footing (Tanya, 2011). Instead, it is more inclined to the political intrigue that prioritizes the interests of the government elite rather than the interests of society which should be the main value in the formation of responsive laws.
Based on the perspective of legal politics, the non-fulfillment of the values contained in the formation of responsive law shows that the formation of the law is conservative or orthodox, it is related to other variables, namely the authoritarian political system.

CONCLUSION
The presidential threshold legal politics have the characteristics of 157 authoritarian law. This is because in the discussions at the Special Committee on the Election Implementation Draft Bill related to the formation of the presidential threshold tend to be led by the domination of incumbent government, instead of to strengthen democracy or strengthen the presidential system. In the discussion of the special committee meeting, there were also political interests of the authorities to maintain the power of the ruling party and incumbent government. The political politics of determining the presidential threshold also contradicts the principle of effective and proportional election objectives, because the presence of a presidential threshold with a high percentage of up to 20% creates a gap in political rights or democratic rights between parties with majority votes and minority parties.
The authoritarian legal characteristics of the presidential threshold discussion have hurt the electoral system and democracy in Indonesia. This can be described based on several things: first, the number of digits of presidential threshold which has been determined before the holding of the Special Committee on Election Implementation Bill on the presidential threshold. Secondly, the magnitude of the presidential threshold percentage up to 20% results is in high political intensity. This arises as a result of the small number of candidates who can participate in the Presidential Election contestation. Third, there is an inconsistency of political willingness in the Special Committee on Election Implementation Bill related to the determination of the presidential percentage threshold.