

Hizb Ut-Tahrir's Tabanni Concept: the Problem of Internal Unity and External Weakness

Heriansyah^{1*}, M. Syaroni Rofii²

^{1,2}Universitas Indonesia, Depok Jawa Barat, Indonesia

*Corresponding author E-mail: heriansyah@ui.ac.id

Received: January 5, 2023; Revised: March 11, 2023; Approved: March 29, 2023

ABSTRACT

This article explains the tabanni (adoption) concept adopted by Hizbut Tahrir and its relationship with the level of public acceptance of Hizbut Tahrir's ideas, thoughts and ideals. Using a qualitative method through a content analysis approach to the comments of Muslim figures from mainstream organizations, observation and literature study, reinforced by data on the level of public support for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia (HTI) from several survey institutions, the author finds that HTI activists failed to socialize their ideas, thoughts and ideals because they lost the test in the public sphere in Habermas' perspective. This is evidenced by public support to the government for the revocation of HTI's legal entity. This failure was caused by the concept of tabanni that they adopted in order to maintain internal unity which had a negative impact on the interaction of HTI activists with external parties. The concept of institutionalized tabanni is pseudo, unable to prevent the internal conflict and frictions that often occur as a result of the party organizational model with single leadership pattern which is semi-military in nature.

Keywords: Ideology, tabanni, power-knowledge, khilafah, cognitive interests.

INTRODUCTION

It has been five years since the legality of the Hizbut Tahrir organization in Indonesia (HTI) was revoked by the Minister of Law and Human Rights on Wednesday, (19/08/2017). The revocation of HTI's status as legal entity is based on a government regulation in lieu of law (*Perppu*) No. 2 of 2017 article 80A. (Humas Kemenko Polhukam, 2017). Nevertheless, the activities of ex-HTI activists are still running despite all the shortcomings and limitations. Occasionally they hold rallies using pseudonyms in several places. This can be understood because the ideological impulse that is raging within them, demands that they continue to move until the *khilafah* (an Islamic caliphate) is established. (an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin, 2001a, 2001b, 2016).

In line with the definition of their organization made by its founder, Hizbut Tahrir (HT/HTI) is a political organization that adopts Islamic ideology in the form of a party and all its activities are political. They aim to repeat and resume Islamic-style life through the establishment of a Caliphate that enforces Islamic law and spreads the mission of Islam throughout the world. (Hizbut Tahrir, 1989). They call their organization Hizbut Tahrir, which means party, to emphasize that Hizbut Tahrir is not a pesantren (Islamic boarding school), not a madrasa (Islamic seminary), not a social organization, not a tariqah that emphasizes the spiritual aspects of Islam, not an academic and scientific institution, and not a monastic organization that is far from the reality of society. Delivering dawah with guidance and advice is one of Hizbut Tahrir's political activities. (Zallum Abdul Qadim, 1985).

HTI in Indonesia (HTI) performs all the functions of a political party (recruitment, regeneration, education, articulation, aggregation, communication) except the legislative function because HTI does not have a faction and representatives in parliament. (Hawari Muhammad, 2010; Maurice, 2014; Ikhsan, 2018). The collection of ideas (concepts, laws, analysis and opinions) adopted (*tabanni*) officially and formally by Hizbut Tahrir, must be *tabanni* by every member. All members are obliged to take them and make them their own. Hizbut Tahrir's ideas are its members' ideas, regardless of whether the ideas *tabanni* by Hizbut Tahrir are right or wrong, comprehensive or detailed, strong or weak and many or few, because a member's attachment to Hizbut Tahrir lies in the *tabanni* of ideas. (an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin, 2001b; Hizbut Tahrir, n.d.-b, n.d.-a, 2001). While for prospective members (*daris*), supporters and sympathizers and the general public; Directed, encouraged and conditioned to participate *tabanni*.

Tabanni is one of the requirements that a prospective member must fulfill in order to be accepted as a member (*hizbiyin*). For this reason, before becoming a member, a candidate is asked to take an oath (*qassam*), one of the

contents of which reads: *mutabaniyan ara a Hizbut Tahririt Tahrir hadza qaula wa 'amalan, wa afkarahu wa dusturahu* (to *tabanni* the opinions of this Hizbut Tahrir with words and deeds, its ideas and its constitution). (Hizbut Tahrir, n.d.-a, 1995; Za'rur, 2016).

The ideas adopted by Hizbut Tahrir are contained in 1) The books of guidance that are the subject matter of the *halaqah* organized by Hizbut Tahrir for members, supporters, sympathizers and the general public. 2) Leaflets (*nasyrah*) containing political thoughts, analyses and opinions, *fiqh* laws, and administrative rules (*idari*) that bear the Hizbut Tahrir seal. 3) Question and answer leaflets (*Nasyrah Soal Jawab*) issued by the Amir of Hizbut Tahrir. (Hizbut Tahrir, 1995, 2001).

In essence, Hizbut Tahrir strives to realize the ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws that they *tabanni*. Hizbut Tahrir has done everything in its power to strive among the people to preserve the *aqeedah* and *sharia* according to what they *tabanni*. Hizbut Tahrir hopes that people will know and understand it in detail, then adopt it, practice it and fight for it together. Eventually, secular society will be transformed into an Islamic society through the *khilafah*, which will also preach Islam to the countries of the world. (an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin, 2001a; Hawari Muhammad, 2010; Hizbut Tahrir, 1989).

According to Hizbut Tahrir, a new state must be born from a new ideology on which it is based, which will change the governmental power to follow the new ideology. An ideology formed from systematic and systemic ideas will become an understanding that drives change after being practiced by its practitioners. The behaviour of people and rulers changes when the view of nature and life changes (world view). Because, with this view, people and rulers organize their affairs of benefit. In the end, people will give power to people who have the same world view and ideology. (an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin, 2001a, 2001b, 2016, 28).

Previous research that examined this topic was first conducted by

Muhammad Muhsin Rodhi from the Islamic University of Baghdad (2007). In his research, Rodhi explains what is meant by *tabanni* in the books and official leaflets of Hizb ut Tahrir. According to him, *tabanni* is a certain opinion taken by a Muslim in a disputed matter, which then becomes his opinion, binding to be practiced, taught to others, and preached when calling for Islamic law and thought. (Radhi Muhsin, 2012, 39). Rodhi simply presents Hizbut Tahrir's concept of *tabanni* as it is, without analysis and criticism and its relevance for Hizbut Tahrir activists' relationship with society. This is understandable, as he was a member of Hizbut Tahrir in Iraq. Meanwhile, Agustina Setianingrum from the University of Indonesia, describes the internal divisions of Hizbut Tahrir at the world and Indonesian levels during the leadership of the second Amir of Hizbut Tahrir, Abdul Qadim Zallum. (Setyaningrum Agustina, 2011). This research does not touch the aspect of *tabanni* as a method of maintaining internal unity, which is actually considered a solution for Hizbut Tahrir in minimizing the potential for conflict and internal divisions. Only in Arif Gunawan Santoso's research from the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, *tabanni* is specifically discussed. (Santoso, 2015). However, the discussion is still one-way from the perspective of HTI activists, without seeing the influence of *tabanni* on outsiders. Relatively new research was conducted by Siti Mafrukhah and Irfan Afandi from UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya. They both researched a collection of Ayik Heriansyah's articles criticizing the ideas, thoughts and laws of syara' *tabanni* by Hizbut Tahrir. (Afandi Irfan, 2022; Mafrukhah Siti, 2021). However, the research does not specifically discuss the concept of *tabanni* Hizbut Tahrir, but rather discusses examples of cases *tabanni* Hizbut Tahrir published on several websites and in the book "Getting to Know HTI Through the Sense of Heart and Is It a Sin to Be an Indonesian. (Ayik Heriansyah, 2020a, 2020b).

This article covers the shortcomings of previous researchers, namely from the aspect that there is actually a problem or dilemma experienced by

Hizbut Tahrir with the concept of *tabanni*. On the one hand, the concept will maintain internal unity through the uniformity of opinions, ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws, but on the other hand, the concept of *tabanni* makes it difficult for Hizbut Tahrir activists to be accepted by the community, because of the plurality of ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws adopted by the community. In addition, the culture of uniformity within Hizbut Tahrir makes their activists unfamiliar with external differences. Hizbut Tahrir activists are not trained to communicate ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* opinions in a scientific manner, which is rational, open, based on facts and data, and ready to be tested. This makes them tend to shy away from scientific dialogue and discussion, which makes them slow to adapt to the changing social environment. In fact, the success of Hizbut Tahrir's struggle to establish their version of *khilafah* depends on the support of the community.

RESEARCH METHOD

The author uses several data extraction techniques from qualitative methods to obtain valid and reliable data. The author collects primary data by interviewing sources, making observations to HTI *halaqah* groups. Then equipped with a literature study, digging up secondary data in the form of archives, documents, social media content and online media affiliated with HTI as well as literature and scientific publications from experts and researchers about HTI. Data were taken from 2017 to 2021, then processed, analysed and criticized for interpretation so as to obtain a valid and reliable description of the object of research.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Like most political parties, Hizbut Tahrir aims for governmental power. For Hizbut Tahrir, power is the standard method (*thariqah*) of upholding an ideology (*mabda'*). Power is a practical goal, in order to realize the normative

goal of continuing Islamic life (*li isti'fi hayatil islamiyah*). In simple terms, Hizbut Tahrir defines Islamic life by the rule of Muslims, which in this case is represented by the rule of Hizbut Tahrir. It is as if there is no Islamic life without the rule of Hizbut Tahrir. (Ayik Heriansyah, 2020b). Therefore, power is not for the sake of power alone. Thus, Hizbut Tahrir does not stop at the issue of seizing power by overthrowing the status quo rulers, but also seeks to have Hizbut Tahrir's version of Islamic ideology dominate society. Hizbut Tahrir wants the status quo rulers to fall by the grip of society. (an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin, 2016, 27).

Hizbut Tahrir plunges into society (*dukhul mujtama'*) in order to carry out its functions as a political party, including the educational function, in the form of socializing ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws that they *tabanni*. These ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws are final and closed, not to be discussed anymore. People just have to choose, whether to accept or reject. (Abdurrahman Hafidz, 2017; an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin, 2001b; Hizbut Tahrir, 2001). Because, when presenting it to the public, Hizbut Tahrir is not in the context of scientifically testing ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws, right or wrong? However, in order to frame the society's thinking to participate in adopting what is being adopted by Hizbut Tahrir, as it is, like a member of Hizbut Tahrir. Through the ideas, thoughts and *fiqh* laws that are *tabanni* (*adoption*) by Hizbut Tahrir, before gaining power Hizbut Tahrir acts as a temporary ruler (pseudo-quasy) who becomes a source of knowledge for the community. Once in power, this knowledge will be applied and taught through the instruments of the state. (Hizbut Tahrir, 1989).

This reality is closely related to Michael Foucault's Power-Knowledge Theory, which states that power is the source, method and purpose of knowledge. Knowledge is created by the ruler. Therefore, power is knowledge. From power comes knowledge. It is the rulers who produce knowledge, not scientists. (Hardiman F Budi, 2009; J. Kiersey Nicholas and Doug Stokes, 2014;

Yusuf Akhyar dan Irawan, 2016).

Knowledge-power theory intersects with ideology and propaganda, explaining how an ideology is instilled through propaganda. A.G. Santoso from the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in his research entitled *Tabanni as the Direction of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Movement* (2015) said the study of the phenomenon of social movements, especially Islamic fundamentalism that aggressively makes narratives, ideas and opinions, is closely related to framing theory (framing process). With framing theory, the aggressiveness of Islamic fundamentalist groups in narrating is studied as an attempt to change people's thoughts, feelings and habits to suit their agenda. (Rohlinger, 2009, 343). The transformation of society becomes the object of this theory with a cultural perspective of a social movement. (Wiktorowicz, 2004, 1). From the frame process point of view, the culture of society becomes an arena for framing by social movements, in this case Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. (Santoso, 2015).

Meanwhile, from the perspective of critical theory put forward by Habermas; three things are interrelated and intertwined, namely ideology, science, and knowledge are always intertwined with the practical aspects of society. Ideology is considered a standardized and frozen form of science (Wissenschaft) and knowledge (Erkenntnis). Science is systematic, methodical and reflective knowledge. Ideology provides false consciousness that is considered scientific, thus leading society to false happiness. (Hardiman F Budi, 2009, 210).

There are several definitions of ideology inventoried by Geuss based on critical theory, namely awareness of the belief system of inner space, which influences motivations and preferences and is "false" which epistemologically claims to be the only valid form of knowledge that functions to maintain, stabilize and or recognize the dominance of the interests of a power. (Geuss,

1981: 12-21 in Hardiman F Budi, 2009). Behind ideologization there are cognitive interests. According to Habermas, it is a form of domination that creates and regulates science and knowledge in society, namely empirical analysis, historical hermeneutic and critical-emancipatory interests. (Miller, 2002: 66 in Tjahyadi Sindung, 2003, 184).

Ideologization and the process of framing people's thoughts are efforts to impose claims of truth, rightness, authenticity, sincerity and comprehensibility. Communication activities aim to recognize the truth, in fact different, but still related and intertwined, complementing each other. (Habermas, 1948 in Poespowardojo Soerjanto dan Alexander Seran, 2016).

To be accepted, based on the theory of discourse ethics, it must fulfill several communication requirements, namely: 1) Everyone is allowed to speak in a common forum as long as they are able and have the right to accept or reject the content of the conversation. 2) Everyone is allowed to have an opinion on anything in a common forum and is welcome to express their attitudes, and express what they want and what they need. 3) Everyone should not be prohibited from expressing opinions related to the rights in the two conditions above, with either pressure in any form inside and outside the forum. (Habermas, 1979 in Poespowardojo Soerjanto dan Alexander Seran, 2016a).

Tabanni is very important to maintain the unity of thought, feeling and movement of Hizbut Tahrir activists. As concluded by A.G. Santoso's research (2015), through the concept of *tabanni*, HTI can maintain internal solidarity and solidity. The soul of the HTI activists is always maintained. The soul of the HTI activists is always maintained. In accordance with the doctrine of *kullun fikriyun syu'uriyun* (all one thought and feeling) adopted by HTI. The concept of *tabanni* also shows that Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia is an integral part of HT international, because, Amir Hizb international is the holder of authority that determines what *tabanni* by Hizbut Tahrir. The HTI acts as the executor or

executor of what is determined by Amir Hizb in the form of anything *tabanni* by Hizbut Tahrir.

The attachment of HTI members to the *tabanninized* ideas is caused by three factors:

1. HTI adopts the concept of *tabanni*.
2. *Tabanni* is a binding rope between HTI members and HTI;
3. An HTI member takes an oath (*qassam*) to *tabanni* the ideas *tabanni* by Hizbut Tahrir.

The ideas, opinions and laws (*fiqh*) *tabanni* HTI has been systematized in the books of *halaqah* that must be studied by HTI members at weekly *halaqah* (*usbu'iyah*) and monthly *halaqah* (*shahriyyah*). The rules of the *halaqahs* are as follows (Hizbut Tahrir, 2001):

1. *Halaqahs* are formed by HTI territorial leaders (*mas'ul mahaliyah*).
2. Mas'ul mahaliyah appoints and appoints a senior member, mastering the contents of the *halaqah* book, loyal and disciplined to be the mentor (*musyrif*) of the *halaqah*.
3. *Halaqah* participants are members or prospective members of HTI.
4. One *halqah* group contains 2 - 5 participants.
5. *Halaqah* lasts for 2 hours, once a week.
6. Participants are not allowed to be late from the set time.
7. Each participant must bring the book being *halaqah*.
8. Participants who do not bring the book are prohibited from participating in the *halaqah* at that time.
9. Participants are asked to read the chapter/page being discussed per paragraph out loud.
10. The *musyrif* explains the paragraph that has been read so that the participants understand and *tabanni*.

11. Participants may ask questions if they do not understand. However, it is forbidden to ask about the truth, validity and accuracy of the contents of the book.
12. Participants who question the correctness, validity and accuracy of the contents of the book will be separated from the *halaqah* or expelled.

The process of *halaqah* meeting is one-way, from *musyrif* to participants. *Halaqah* participants are required to understand the content of the book, but are prohibited from criticizing it. This rule is not in accordance with the requirements of communication in the theory of discourse ethics formulated by Habermas. It can be understood because HTI is a political party where *halaqah* is part of political activities, not scientific activities. *Musyrif* acts as a ruler, wanting to shape knowledge to *halaqah* participants following the cognitive interests of HTI. This fact brings together Foucault's Power-Knowledge theory with Habermas' Cognitive Interests theory.

The patterns of ideologization carried out by HTI to its members and prospective members as happened in the *halaqahs* are difficult if done in a democratic and informative society. A democratic and informative society will accept and adopt (*tabanni*) something if the truth, accuracy and validity are clear. The framing process of people's thoughts will be successful if the communication requirements in Habermas' discourse ethics theory are met. However, this is very difficult for HTI to fulfill because of HTI's position as an ideological political party, not as a scientific institution.

On the other hand, ideologization causes thoughts, political analysis and legal opinions that are *tabanni* by HTI to become sacred dogma. HTI refuses to test and examine the truth of thoughts, political analysis and legal opinions that are *tabanni* with the alibi that HTI is a political party, not a scientific institution. so that thoughts, political analysis and legal opinions that are adopted, just apply, not to be discussed.

This dogmatization has an impact on the formation of mental blocks among HTI activists. They close themselves off to other opinions, opinions and thoughts that do not come from Hizbut Tahrir. They avoid scientific dialog and discussion related to this matter. There is no interaction, let alone confrontation of ideas between HTI activists and the public in the public sphere. What happens is a monologue in HTI's public spaces. Although they present speakers outside HTI activists, it is certain that these speakers do not reject and oppose the thoughts, political analysis and legal opinions that are adopted by HTI. Usually they are unfamiliar with HTI, but have a passionate position against the government.

All of this boils down to the exclusive attitude of HTI, both as an organization and individual activists. HTI's involvement with other components of the ummah is represented by a spokesperson. Meanwhile, other HTI activists act as influencers to influence public opinion to support the activities of the HTI spokesperson.

CONCLUSION

On the one hand, the concept of tabanni is expected to maintain internal unity through the uniformity of ideas, opinions and fiqh laws, but on the other hand, this concept makes it difficult for Hizbut Tahrir activists to interact with the community which results in problems of socialization and communication and public acceptance, due to the plurality of ideas, opinions and fiqh laws that exist in the midst of society.

In addition, the culture of uniformity within Hizbut Tahrir makes Hizbut Tahrir activists unfamiliar with external differences. Hizbut Tahrir activists are not trained to communicate ideas, opinions and fiqh opinions in a scientific manner, which is rational, open, based on facts and data, and ready to be tested for truth and reliability. This makes Hizbut Tahrir activists tend to shy away from scientific dialog and discussion, which makes them slow to adapt to the changing social environment. In fact, the success of Hizbut Tahrir's

struggle to establish their version of *khilafah* depends on the support of the community.

In other words, Hizbut Tahrir cannot fulfill the ethical requirements of discourse proposed by Habermas in the context of deliberative democracy in the public sphere. On the one hand, the concept of *tabanni* is a factor of internal unity, although in reality divisions still occur. The institutionalized *tabanni* is a formality without the critical awareness of its activists. Such *tabanni* is actually 'fake', easily shaken when faced with clashes of ideas in society.

On the other hand, the concept of *tabanni* becomes an inhibiting factor for a democratic and informed society to accept Hizbut Tahrir's ideas, opinions and fiqh laws, because Hizbut Tahrir closes itself off from critical dialogue/discussion to test the truth, validity and accuracy of their ideas, opinions and fiqh laws. This has implications for the closed doors of the community when they want to go into the community to garner sympathy and support in order to realize the ideals of establishing the *khilafah*.

The framing process can be applied effectively within Hizbut Tahrir, but it is very difficult to apply to a democratic, communicative and informative society. Although internally, Hizbut Tahrir appears to be solid, externally, public support is very weak. All this is a result of the concept of *tabanni* that they adopted and institutionalized.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdurrahman Hafidz. (2017). *Mafahim Islamiyah Pokok-pokok Pemikiran Islam* (Iwan Januar (ed.); 4th ed.). Al-Azhar Press.

Afandi Irfan. (2022). *Analisis kritik Ayik Heriansyah tentang doktrin khilafah pasca pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: perspektif teori tindakan komunikatif Jurgen Habermas*. Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel.

an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin. (2001a). *At-Takattul Hizbi (Pembentukan Partai Politik)* (4th ed.). HTI Press.

an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin. (2001b). *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (6th ed.). HTI Press.

- an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin. (2016). *Dukhul Mujtama* (3rd ed.). Pustaka Thariqul Izzah.
- Ayik Heriansyah. (2020a). *Dosakah Menjadi Indonesia* (Al-A'mal (ed.); 1st ed.). Sang Khalifah.
- Ayik Heriansyah. (2020b). *Mengenal HTI Melalui Rasa Hati* (1st ed.). Pustaka Hركاتuna.
- Hardiman F Budi. (2009). *Kritik Ideologi Menyingkap Pertautan Pengetahuan dan Kepentingan Bersama Jurgen Habermas* (Sitorus Fitzerald K (ed.); 1st ed.). Kanisius.
- Hawari Muhammad. (2010). *Politik Partai Strategi Baru Perjuangan Partai Politik Islam* (Arif B Iskandar (ed.); 1st ed.). Al-Azhar Fresh Zone Publishing.
- Hizbut Tahrir. (n.d.-a). *Qassam*. Hizbut Tahrir.
- Hizbut Tahrir. (n.d.-b). *Tabanni*. Hizbut Tahrir.
- Hizbut Tahrir. (1989). *Manhaj Hizbut Tahrir fi Taghyir* (Beirut). Hizbut Tahrir.
- Hizbut Tahrir. (1995). *Qanun Idari*. Hizbut Tahrir.
- Hizbut Tahrir. (2001). *Milaf Idari*. Maktab HTI.
- Humas Kemenko Polhukam. (2017). *Pemerintah Bubarkan Ormas Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*. Kemenko Pohukam. <https://polkam.go.id/pemerintah-bubarkan-ormas-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia/>
- Ikhsan, D. (2018). *Sistem Politik Indonesia* (Susanti (ed.); 2nd ed.). Penerbit Universitas Terbuka.
- J. Kiersey Nicholas dan Doug Stokes. (2014). *Michel Foucault* (Noorhayati Siti Mahmudah (ed.); 1st ed.). Pustaka Pelajar.
- Mafrukhah Siti. (2021). *Analisis diskursus kritik Ayik Heriansyah terhadap propaganda Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia pasca pembubaran perspektif Norman Fairclough*. Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel.
- Maurice, D. (2014). *Sosiologi Politik* (Alfian (ed.)). Rajafindo Persada dan Yayasan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial.

- Poespowardojo Soerjanto dan Alexander Seran. (2016a). *Diskursus Teori-teori Kritis. Kritik atas Kapitalisme Klasik, Modern dan Kontemporer* (1st ed.). Kompas.
- Poespowardojo Soerjanto dan Alexander Seran. (2016b). *Diskursus Teori-teori Kritis* (Parera Frans M (ed.); 1st ed.). Kompas.
- Radhi Muhsin. (2012). *Tsaqofah dan Metode Hizbut Tahrir Dalam Mendirikan Khilafah Islamiyah* (Abdurrahman Hafidz (ed.); 1st ed.). Al-Azhar Fresh Zone Publishing.
- Rohlinger, D. A. dan J. Q. (2009). Framing Faith: Explaining Cooperation And Conflic in the US Conservative Christian Political Movement. *Social Movement Studies*, 8(4).
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14742830903234239>
- Santoso, A. G. (2015). Tabanni Sebagai Haluan Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. *Harmoni*, 14(1), 106–119.
- Setyaningrum Agustina. (2011). *Perkembangan Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*. Universitas Indonesia.
- Tjahyadi Sindung. (2003). Teori Kritis Jurgen Habermas: Asumsi-asumsi Dasar Menuju Metodologi Kritik Sosial. *Jurnal Filsafat UGM*, 34(2), 180–197.
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Q. Wiktorowicz (ed.)). Indiana University Press.
- Yusuf Akhyar dan Irawan. (2016). *Filsafat Sosial* (O. Boedhi (ed.); 6th ed.). Penerbit Universitas Terbuka.
- Za'rur, A. (2016). *Seputar Gerakan Islam* (Arif B Iskandar (ed.); 5th ed.). Al-Azhar Press.
- Zallum Abdul Qadim. (1985). *Ta'rif Hizbut Tahrir*. Hizbut Tahrir.