

Administrative Dysfunction in Non-Quota Hajj Management: An Analysis of the 2025 Furoda Hajj Case in Indonesia

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Abstract

This study discusses the failure of public services in the implementation of non-quota Hajj (Furoda Hajj) in 2025 in Indonesia using an administrative analysis approach. The case of Haji Furoda 2025 reflects the dysfunction of the service, ranging from weak verification, lack of supervision by PIHK, to unclear rules in handling violations. This research uses a qualitative descriptive approach to provide an in-depth overview of the studied phenomenon. The Data Collection Technique through In-Depth Interviews was carried out in a semi-structured manner, including the affected Furoda Hajj pilgrims, PIHK Leaders, DPD Chairmen, and literature in the public policy and state administration. Data Analysis Technique: The data obtained is analyzed using the Miles and Huberman model interactive analysis technique. The results of the study show that the failure in the case of Haji Furoda stemmed from the failure of public services not only due to technical errors, but also due to institutions that were unable to manage, coordinate, and adapt. The implementation of non-quota hajj faces various administrative problems that are not accountable and unresponsive. Institutional failure can be seen in the inability to ensure accountability and successful outcomes. The data discrepancy between PIHK and the Hajj authorities shows weak public information management. In addition, poor inter-agency coordination and low administrative resilience make the bureaucracy fail to anticipate emergencies. Regulatory ambiguity and weak law enforcement further worsen the situation, opening up space for abuse of authority. This study recommends the need for governance reform of the implementation of non-quota hajj through clearer regulations, strict audit mechanisms, cross-agency data integration, empowerment of frontline workers, and service design oriented to the needs of pilgrims. This effort is important so that non-quota hajj services in the future are more transparent, accountable, and able to provide stronger protection for pilgrims.

Keywords: Public Service Dysfunction, maladministration, Non-Quota Hajj, Haji Furoda 2025, Administrative Governance.

INTRODUCTION

Quality public service is one of the important indicators in governance. Government apparatus plays a key role in providing responsive and adequate services to the community (Widanti, 2022). However, obstacles are often found in human resource management (HR) that hinder the optimization of services (Kholik & Yusri, 2025). Public services provided by Special Hajj supervisors reflect the quality of government at the national level. Good and responsive service will increase public trust in the government (Mohammed & Yaqub, 2024). The quality of public services still needs to be improved; some problems often encountered include slow response times, less friendly service, and ineffective handling of public complaints (Berman et al., 2021). This condition shows that the government apparatus needs to increase its capacity in managing public services.

Implementing the Hajj pilgrimage is one way for the state to simultaneously provide religious services that include spiritual, social, and administrative aspects (Alzeer & Abuzinadah, 2024). As the enthusiasm of the Indonesian people to perform the Hajj pilgrimage increases, the Furoda Hajj scheme involving sending via mujamalah visa (an invitation from the Saudi Arabian government outside the official quota) has become an attractive option because it promises departure without a long waiting time. However, in the 2025 Hajj year, this system faces major challenges. It was reported that more than a thousand prospective Furoda pilgrims could not depart because Saudi authorities did not issue or confirm their visas (Tempo, 2025).

This issue not only shows the technical and administrative shortcomings of the organizers, but also underscores the weak regulation, coordination between institutions, and the lack of protection for pilgrims who are not included in the quota. Law Number 8 of 2019 concerning the Implementation of Hajj and Umrah (PIHU) emphasizes that the government is responsible for the implementation of hajj within official quotas; for the mujamalah visa route (non-quota), the law regulates prohibitions/exemptions and requires PIHK reporting, but does not explicitly state the same protection guarantee as for quota pilgrims. Many prospective pilgrims have paid in full at a fairly high cost, but have to face the reality of not departing without certainty about rescheduling or a clear refund. This condition raises serious questions about the resilience of the non-quota Hajj administration system, the ability to learn from previous failures, and the responsibility of

the organizers, both the private sector and the government. It also emphasizes the need for revisions in the legal framework and supervision for alternative Hajj schemes, such as Furoda, to realize the principles of justice and protection for pilgrims.

In its implementation, Furoda Hajj, held outside the Indonesian government's official quota, requires very strict supervision and administration (Rasyid, 2025). According to existing regulations, only Special Hajj Organizers (PIHK) with permission from the Ministry of Religious Affairs can send Furoda Hajj pilgrims. However, in the last five years, there has been a significant increase in non-quota pilgrims who have become victims of fraud or administrative problems, including their failure to depart at the last minute. The peak occurred in 2025 when hundreds of prospective Furoda Hajj pilgrims could not depart because their mujamalah visas were not officially registered in the Saudi Arabian government system.

In 2025, there was a significant case related to the failure of thousands of prospective hajj pilgrims to depart via the Furoda route because visas from the Saudi Arabian authorities were not issued. This case attracted public attention because it caused material and psychological losses for prospective pilgrims and showed weaknesses in the supervision and accountability system in managing alternative hajj services. This failure affected public trust in the organizing institutions. It raised serious questions about how effective the state's role was in supervising and ensuring public service standards, especially in the sensitive religious sector.

The Furoda Hajj, as an official non-quota route, can only be organized by a PIHK licensed by the Ministry of Religion and requires strict supervision. However, in the last five years, the number of pilgrims falling victim to fraud and administrative problems has continued to rise, culminating in 2025 when hundreds of prospective pilgrims failed to depart due to unregistered mujamalah visas in Saudi Arabia's system. This case caused material and psychological losses, weakened public trust in the organizers, and highlighted the weak state supervision and accountability in non-quota hajj services.

Kettl (2016) emphasized that administrative analysis focuses on the effectiveness of governance, accountability, and inter-agency coordination in implementing public services. In Hajj Furoda 2025, administrative failure can be understood as failure when the state cannot provide a responsive, transparent, and integrated system. In recent

research highlight the importance of public service governance in the religious area, which must prioritize the principle of administrative prudence, especially when involving private agencies. If regulations are only theoretical and not accompanied by adequate supervision, the possibility of failure in public services will increase, especially in implementing international-scale worship such as the Hajj.

Hajj management studies in Indonesia have highlighted the implementation of regular Hajj, especially related to fund transparency, bureaucratic efficiency, and service improvement within the framework of official regulations. Meanwhile, non-quota hajj routes such as Hajj Furoda still rarely receive academic attention, even though these routes have high complexity because they involve cross-border regulations and the dominance of private roles. The gap can be seen in the lack of research linking Haji Furoda's administrative failures to public service theory, bureaucratic accountability, and cross-institutional governance. The failure of the departure of thousands of pilgrims in 2025 confirms the weakness of verification, coordination, and information transparency. Based on the above background, the formulation of the problem in this article is: (1) What is the form of failure of public services in the implementation of non-quota Hajj, especially in the case of Hajj Furoda 2025?; (2) What administrative factors cause ineffective governance of non-quota Hajj implementation?; (3) How do the weaknesses of regulation, coordination, and supervision of related institutions contribute to the failure of the implementation of Hajj Furoda 2025?; (4) What efforts can be made to improve governance and provide better protection for non-quota Hajj pilgrims in the future?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Pamungkas & Munawir (2025) see administrative analysis as an evaluation of the implementation of the code of ethics, integrity, and responsibility of the bureaucracy. They use equality, fairness, loyalty, and professionalism indicators in public services. Aminuddin et al.'s study (2024) emphasizes that administrative analysis also includes evaluating employee performance indicators, such as work quality, punctuality, communication, and initiative, which are important in driving public service innovation (Karampotsis et al., 2024). According to Kettl (2016), administrative analysis is a systematic study of how public organizations (bureaucracies) are designed and

managed; how administrative processes are carried out; and how the interaction between politics and management affects the effectiveness of public policy. Administrative Analysis Indicators, according to Kettl (2025), namely:

Institutional Effectiveness

Focus not only on procedures, but also on the ability of institutions to produce real public services (Rosenbloom et al., 2022). Dimensions Analyzed: institutions can adapt to community needs, organizational structures support the achievement of policy objectives, and policy outcomes reflect institutional capacity

Inter-agency Coordination

Administrative failures often stem from weak synergy between government institutions, especially cross-sector policies (Wu et al., 2024). Dimensions Analyzed: formal and informal coordination systems that are running, overlapping, or have gaps between institutional authorities, and how the conflict resolution mechanism between institutions

Managerial Capability

The analysis must include an evaluation of the bureaucracy's managerial capacity, including the ability of public leaders to manage crises and policy conflicts (Kapucu & Ustun, 2018). Dimensions Analyzed: The ability of public managers in planning, coordination, and evaluation; competence in handling crises and policy conflicts; and Participative and accountable leadership.

Accountability for results

Kettl (2016) emphasized the importance of outcome-based accountability, showing that procedures are followed and policies have a direct impact on the public. Dimensions Analyzed: Policy outcomes are measured and published, institutions are accountable for results, not just processes, and sanctions or rewards are based on the achievement of impact.

Administrative Resilience

In dealing with emergencies such as pandemics or disasters, administrative analysis must test how resilient the bureaucracy is to adapt (Boin & Lodge, 2016). Dimensions Analyzed: System readiness: contingency plans, emergency protocols, and SOPs for crises, Regulatory flexibility: the bureaucracy can adjust rules without ignoring the principle of accountability, Human resource and technology resilience: employees and digital infrastructure can continue to carry out basic service functions, and Ability to learn from crises: Does the government conduct post-crisis evaluations and strengthen system weaknesses?

Public service Widanti (2022) is a series of activities of bureaucratic institutions to meet the needs of citizens, often combined with the principles of efficiency, speed, and quality of service. According to Heinrich & Malatesta (2022), the failure of public services is not only about unachieved results, but also about inefficient processes, non-adaptive structures, lack of fair access, weak accountability, and the failure of institutions to coordinate and learn from mistakes.

The Public Service Failure Indicators used are, according to Heinrich & Malatesta (2022), namely:

Outcome Failure (Result Failure)

Failure occurs when public services do not produce the promised impact or outcome, even though procedures have been followed (Van de Walle, 2016). Common causes are that policy design does not match the root of the problem, there are no clear and measurable outcome indicators, and the Evaluation focuses on implementation, not the result.

Performance Data Misalignment

A service evaluation system that focuses too much on input and output rather than real results creates the illusion of success and masks real failures (Nababan et al., 2023). Common causes are a lack of meaningful evaluation indicators, manipulative or misleading reporting systems, and a Lack of integration between service data and impacts.

Disempowerment of Frontline Workers

When service employees cannot innovate or adapt to citizen needs, services become rigid and ineffective (Jenhaug, 2020). Common causes: Overly hierarchical organizational structures, Fear of mistakes or sanctions if they act outside of procedures, and Lack of training or support for innovation.

Lack of User-Centered Design

Services designed without involving users (citizens/users) often fail to meet community expectations and create poor experiences (Batley & Wales, 2022). Common causes: No mechanism for community participation in service design, Bureaucratic assumptions about what is "best" for the community, and Lack of user surveys or feedback.

Failure to Learn and Adapt

Public service organizations that do not learn from data, complaints, or previous experiences will repeat failures systematically (Milanović, 2019). Common causes: Lack of data-based evaluation, no organizational learning documentation system, and an Organizational culture that is anti-criticism and defensive.

This framework shows that the failure of the 2025 Furoda Hajj pilgrims' departure not only reflects technical administrative problems but also violates the regulatory provisions stipulated in Law No. 8 of 2019 and PMA No. 13 of 2021. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of PIHK supervision, the non-quota visa system, and the pilgrim protection mechanism is needed. The failure of the Furoda Hajj pilgrims' departure is not only caused by technical visa problems. Still, it results from a series of administrative and institutional failures that violate the principles of hajj governance (Farida, 2019). These four indicators reflect the need for comprehensive improvements in the system, supervision, and transparency of non-quota hajj services.

The five indicators from Heinrich & Malatesta (2022) can be a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding the causes and impacts of public service failures in the 2025 Furoda Hajj case. Each indicator shows that Administrative failure is not only

due to procedural errors, but also service design systems, data management, HR empowerment, and the inability to adapt.

Kettl's five indicators emphasize that the failure of public services in the case of Hajj Furoda 2025 is not only a technical failure, but a systemic failure in bureaucracy and service management. Each indicator is interrelated and shows that the public administration system cannot function responsively, accountably, and adaptively to market-based service phenomena such as Hajj Furoda.

The concept of failure of results, as explained by Heinrich (2021), is relevant in the case of non-quota hajj because the organizing institution not only fails procedurally, but also is unable to ensure the fulfillment of outcomes in the form of the departure of pilgrims safely and according to expectations. Meanwhile, the data inconsistency described in the perspective of Kettl (2016) is clearly seen from the difference between the PIHK data and the hajj authority data, which results in administrative errors and lowers public trust. In addition, the coordination problem that is the main concern in Kett's public administration theory is reflected in the weak integration between related institutions. Hence, the service mechanism for non-quota pilgrims is ineffective. Thus, Heinrich and Kett's theories provide a strong analytical framework for understanding the complexity of administrative failures in implementing non-quota hajj in Indonesia (figure 1).




Figure 1. The Thinking Framework

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses a qualitative descriptive approach to provide an in-depth description of the studied phenomenon, without manipulating the existing variables. This approach was chosen because it is appropriate for studying social reality and understanding the meaning of an event or policy based on the actors' perspectives, with

an emphasis on administrative analysis related to the failure of public services in the implementation of non-quota Hajj (Furoda Hajj) in 2025. This approach was chosen to gain in-depth insight into the processes, individuals, regulations, and institutional factors that contributed to the failure of the service. Type and Method of Research: This study is included in the type of case research that seeks to carefully and comprehensively analyze the case of the failure of Furoda Hajj pilgrims in 2025. Case research was chosen because it can provide a contextual understanding of complex phenomena involving many individuals and regulations in implementing public services in the religious field.

The research was conducted at Smart BBS Bandung which was selected purposively because it was relevant to the focus of the study. Because this institution has a direct connection with the implementation of the Furoda Hajj program. The research implementation time was carried out for two weeks from June 11, 2025 to June 25, 2025, the data collection stage to analysis. The informants in this study were selected purposively, namely individuals who were considered to know and were directly involved in the phenomenon being studied. The informant criteria include: PIHK officials, special hajj guides, community leaders, affected prospective pilgrims, and other related parties. The number of informants was not determined with certainty from the start, but was determined based on the principle of data saturation, namely when the information obtained was repeated and there was no significant new data.

Data Collection Techniques through In-depth Interviews were carried out in a semi-structured manner including affected Furoda Hajj pilgrims, PIHK Leaders, DPD Chairs, and literature in the field of public policy and state administration. to explore more flexible and in-depth information. The researcher used non-participatory observation by observing activities related to the focus of the research without being directly involved, as well as documentation studies on regulations (Law No. 8 of 2019, PMA No. 13 of 2021), circulars, official reports of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, reports from the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, and news from trusted media. Observations also include community and institutional responses through social media, press releases, and online public discussions, along with a review of documents, archives, official reports, and supporting secondary data.

The analysis technique used was content analysis with an emphasis on promoting key themes related to failure of results, data misalignment, weak coordination, and regulatory ambiguity. Data Analysis Techniques according to the Miles and Huberman model (1994) which consists of three main stages: Data reduction of the process of selection, concentration, simplification, and transformation of raw data from the field, Presentation of information organization data in the form of narratives, matrices, or tables that facilitate the drawing of conclusions and Drawing conclusions and verifications - done by interpreting the meaning of the data and connecting it to theory, and double-check the data to ensure its validity.

Data Validity Test is tested through triangulation techniques, namely comparing and reviewing data from various sources (informants), methods (interviews, observations, documents), and different times to ensure data consistency and validity (Kaman & Othman, 2016). To maintain the validity of the data, this study applied source triangulation by comparing information from government reports, statements from relevant institutions, and media coverage. Validity is also strengthened by tracing the consistency between sources, so that the resulting interpretation can comprehensively and credibly describe the administrative condition. Data Analysis Method The data obtained was analyzed through content analysis methods. The Data Analysis Method obtained was analyzed through the content analysis method. This study uses content analysis by using the administrative framework of Donald F. Kettl (1993) as an analytical lens. This approach helps interpret research findings related to administrative failures in the management of Hajj Furoda 2025.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

RESULT

The following are the results and discussions that link the indicators of public service failure according to Heinrich & Malatesta (2022) with the dimensions of administrative services (Kettl, 2016). This approach is relevant to analyze public service performance comprehensively regarding results and institutional capacity. Linking Heinrich's (2021) Public Service Failure Indicators with the Dimensions of Administrative Services according to Kettl (2016) :

Outcome Failure

Heinrich highlights the failure of services in achieving meaningful outcomes, not just output. This is directly related to: Institutional Effectiveness, Outcome failure reflects the failure of PIHK institutions to ensure that policies have a real impact. If an institution is unable to manage a program so that it has an impact on the community, for example, not going on the Furoda Hajj pilgrimage, then the institution is considered ineffective. Accountability for results, Outcome failure also shows weak accountability. PIHK institutions only focus on administrative procedures, without being accountable for the real results.

What is the most serious form of failure in the departure of Furoda Hajj this year?

PIHK Operational Director "Our pilgrims have paid in full, their luggage has been sent, and their visas have been approved administratively. But they still failed to enter Saudi Arabia. Forty-six pilgrims canceled their pilgrimage without a full refund. This is a huge loss both morally and financially." DPD Chairman: "This failure was due to the Saudi system, which had already closed access to Overseas Community Visas (VMN) before our input came in. The impact was that hundreds of pilgrims failed to depart. Many did not get visas, or were stuck in transit hotels, and some had even arrived in Saudi Arabia but did not get permission to stand in Arafah.

What caused this systemic failure that could not be prevented from the start?

Ministry of Religious Affairs Technical Official: "Many PIHKs did not report to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Because Furoda is a non-quota scheme, many bureaus felt they were not required to input data into the system. In fact, if it had been integrated from the start, we could have helped with quick intervention." Representative of the Indonesian Consulate in Jeddah, "We only found out about many cases after the pilgrims complained. We could not help because we had no manifest or visa data. We do not know who is legal, who is not." Member of the DPR Supervisory Team. "Institutions such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, PIHK, Consulates, and airlines are running their ways. There is no fixed coordination protocol, even when the hajj season is approaching.

Performance Data Misalignment

Heinrich emphasized the importance of matching data and performance reality. Data misalignment indicates PIHK organizational management's weak ability to manage information and decision-making. PIHK organization's public managers cannot read data correctly, or the data collected is irrelevant to the service objectives. Coordination between Institutions, User-based service design often requires synergy between institutions, both BPIH and PIHK. If there is no coordination, then a user-friendly design is difficult to realize.

What is the concrete form of data mismatch that causes Furoda pilgrims to fail to depart? PIHK Operations Director "We have submitted the visa data via a provider in Saudi Arabia, but when verified by the airline and Saudi authorities, the names of our pilgrims were not read as active visa holders. It is suspected that the input was tight and the server was overloaded." Ministry of Religious Affairs Staff "The problem is not only the delay in input, but the identity mismatch between PIHK's internal data, the visa provider (syarikah), and SISKOHAT. For example, the name uses a different spelling, the date of birth is a typo, the result: the visa failed to sync." The impact: Furoda visas were rejected during the departure process. Pilgrims were not recorded in the system, even though they had paid and had proof of reservation. The appeal or re-input process is impossible because the Saudi Arabian system has been automatically closed.

What to do when pilgrims cannot depart?

Representative of the Indonesian Consulate in Jeddah, "We cannot help because we do not know the names of the pilgrims. There is no official report or notification from PIHK or Kemenag regarding the Furoda list." Member of the DPR, Hajj Supervisory Team. "This is proof of a failure of coordination. No cross-agency dashboard can see in real time who is departing, who has visa problems. Kemenag, PIHK, Consulate, all should be connected." Head of Umrah-Hajj Daker, "We only have regular pilgrim data. If PIHK does not input it into the official system, then Furoda pilgrims are like 'ghosts' who cannot be tracked or be helped."

Disempowerment of Frontline Workers

Frontline workers are crucial in policy implementation (Hinterleitner & Wittwer, 2023). Failure to empower PIHK workers indicates weak managerial capacity in human resource development, training, and delegation of authority if they are not empowered. Managerial Capability Public managers who lead PIHK and do not evaluate and update strategies will maintain repeated failures.

What is the role of field officers in the Furoda Hajj departure process?

Head of PIH Field Team: "We were only given a briefing 2 days before departure. When a sudden visa problem arose, we were not provided with a handling protocol. Even contacting the Saudi provider had to go through the head office." Document Officer at Soetta Airport "Congregants panicked because some had invalid visas. We couldn't make any decisions in the field. We had to wait for confirmation from our superiors in Jakarta. Even though time was very limited." Problems Experienced by Field Workers: Not involved in simulations or crisis scenarios. Not having the authority to resolve critical issues (visas, transportation, hotels). Lack of two-way communication: information was hampered, and responses were late.

How is PIHK's managerial ability in responding to emergencies?

PIHK Operations Manager: "Our management is strong in planning (schedule, logistics) but weak in contingency. There is no written SOP if the congregation's visa fails or the manifest is blocked." Furoda Hajj Coordination Staff - Ministry of Religious Affairs "Many PIHK do not have a crisis unit or emergency team. When a visa rejection occurs, they panic, not ready to face the pressure of the congregation." Indicators of Weak Managerial Capability: No internal emergency reporting system, Reactive rather than proactive performance, only moving after a crisis occurs, and field human resources are not trained to make quick decisions.

Lack of User-Centered Design

Heinrich emphasized that services should focus on users, not just on procedures. Institutional Effectiveness PIHK institutions fail to achieve effectiveness if they do not understand their service users and their service needs. Accountability.

Towards results, if the data does not reflect actual performance, then the form of accountability from PIHK institutions becomes invalid.

To what extent does the Furoda organization pay attention to the specific needs of pilgrims?

PIHK Product Director "Most of our packages are designed from top to bottom: hotels, meals, schedules, all packaged by the Sharia in Saudi Arabia. There is no pre-departure survey of pilgrims regarding special needs or personal preferences. PIHK Association Representative "We often assume that all Furoda pilgrims are the same: empowered, experienced, and independent. In reality, many are elderly, do not understand the procedures, and expect full assistance. "There is no mapping of the congregation's profile, there is no service simulation before departure, and the facilities (food, accommodation, transportation) do not meet the expectations of most of the congregation.

When a failure occurs (such as a failed visa, a stranded congregation), who is officially responsible?

PIHK Operations Manager: "In theory, we are responsible. But in practice, many decisions are determined by Saudi partners. We can't do much if the visa is not issued because the system is jammed or the quota is full." Ministry of Religious Affairs Staff: "PIHK should have an internal accountability system. But what is happening now, the report of the results is just a formality. There is no follow-up if the congregation fails to depart." DPR Supervisory Team: "Many PIHK do not have post-Hajj evaluation documents. In fact, organizers who failed to send the congregation can still operate the following season."

Failure to Learn and Adapt

This is a very important indicator in a dynamic era like today. Failure to learn from mistakes and adapt to the context indicates low administrative resilience (Duit, 2016). The public system used by PIHK, which is not flexible, will fail to handle new challenges. Administrative Resilience. In a complex crisis, PIHK field workers who are not empowered will cause the administrative system to be vulnerable and unable to adapt. The public managerial capability that leads PIHK does not evaluate and update strategies, resulting in repeated failures.

How quickly does PIHK learn from the failures of previous years?

PIHK Operational Director “Every season, there is definitely an evaluation report, but the improvement method is not systematic enough. The two main problems of rejected visa data and immigration queues still appear even though they were evaluated last year.” *Member of the DP Supervisory Team*. We have provided recommendations for system audits, IT training, and crisis SOPs since 2023. However, improvements are only at the level. The data re-input process is still manual to date.” *Impact: Visa rejection cases still occur despite an SOP. PIHK has not implemented pilot testing or simulations before the Hajj season, and has relied on ad hoc solutions, rather than long-term system changes.*

How prepared is PIHK and the Ministry of Religious Affairs administration when obstacles occur?

Ministry of Religious Affairs Technical Official: “Administratively, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has a checklist and guidelines. However, there is no fallback mechanism if an error occurs, for example, the Saudi server is down. There is no SOP that regulates extreme scenarios.” *PIHK Manager*, we have an IT team, but their capacity is only to react, not to be proactive. When an error occurs, they have to check one by one the passport data, visas, and names, which ideally should be handled automatically.” *Weakness indicators: No backup mechanism (manual registration, verification box), no administrative crisis unit ready, and the System is only resilient to normal scenarios, not disruptions.*



Figure 2. Indicators of public service failure according to Heinrich (2021)

Source: Donald F Kettl's theory in 1993 and Heinrich (2021)




Figure 3. Indicators of public service failure according to Heinrich 2021

Source: Research Results 2025

Figure 2 and figure 3 show The 2025 Furoda Hajj case illustrates the failure of public services in the administrative dimension. When viewed from the perspective of administrative analysis, according to Kettl (2016), this failure occurred due to failure in the institutional system (institutional failure) and administrative processes that were not accountable and unresponsive to the needs of citizens.

Failure in Institutional Effectiveness

The institution implementing non-quota hajj could not guarantee accountability and successful outcomes. This shows that public services have failed not only in terms of procedure but also in guaranteeing results.

1. Data and Information Inconsistencies

The inconsistency between PIHK data and Hajj Authority data reflects weaknesses in public information management. Invalid data results in erroneous administrative decisions and creates public distrust.

2. Weak coordination

Weak coordination between institutions is clear evidence of systemic failure. The absence of policy actors' integration causes public services to run poorly.

3. Low Administrative Resilience

In emergencies (failure to depart thousands of pilgrims), the bureaucracy does not have adequate mitigation mechanisms. In fact, administrative resilience is crucial to ensure that services continue to run in abnormal conditions.

4. Ambiguous Regulation and Law Enforcement

The unclear rules of the game regarding non-quota hajj open up room for free interpretation by PIHK. Loose and non-standardized regulations reflect the weak role of the government in setting clear legal boundaries.

The following is a data simulation to support the Results and Discussion section in the article/journal entitled "Failure of Public Service in Organizing Non-Quota Hajj: Administrative Analysis of the 2025 Furoda Hajj Case".

Table 1. Recapitulation of Data for Prospective Furoda Hajj Pilgrims in 2025

No	Province of Origin	Province Origin	Dispatched	Failed Depart	Information
1	DKI Jakarta	320	190	130	There are three problematic PIHKs
2	West Java	450	270	180	Data not synced with Visa
3	Banten	180	120	60	Visa unilaterally cancelled

4	Central Java	200	150	50	There has been no confirmation from PIHK
5	North Sumatra	160	90	70	Fraud by the organizer
6	South Kalimantan	120	85	35	Fake visa
	Total	.430	905	525	

Source: Research Results 2025

Table 1 shows that out of 1,430 non-quota hajj registrants, only 905 pilgrims managed to depart, while 525 failed due to various administrative and institutional problems. According to Kettl (2016), administrative analysis has three important aspects: inter-agency coordination, data integration, and performance accountability. First, the case in West Java with data that is not in sync with the visa illustrates the weakness of public information management, in accordance with Kettl's attention to the importance of data accuracy in administrative decision-making. Second, the problems in DKI Jakarta (three problematic PIHKs) and North Sumatra (fraud by the organizers) show a failure of institutional accountability, because the supervision mechanism for PIHK is not running effectively. Third, the unilateral cancellation of visas in Banten and the use of fake visas in South Kalimantan confirm the weak coordination between policy actors between Indonesian authorities, Saudi Arabian authorities, and domestic institutions. Overall, this data shows that the implementation of non-quota hajj is still experiencing administrative dysfunction in line with the Kettl framework, namely coordination failures, data misalignment, and weak accountability. This condition emphasizes the importance of non-quota hajj governance reform to be more transparent, integrated, and able to ensure the protection of pilgrims.

Table 2. Level of Conformity of PIHK and Ministry of Religion (Ministry of Religious Affairs)

No	PIHK	Pilgrim Data According to PIHK	Congregation Data According to the Ministry of Religion	Data Difference	Sync Status
1	PT Amanah Haji Utama	280	210	70	Not Synced
2	PT Barokah Mulia Haji	150	140	10	Sync
3	PT Safar Furoda	400	260	140	Not Synced
4	PT Nurul Ikhlas	220	190	30	Qualitative findings of the interview
	Total	1.050	800	250	

Source: Research Results 2025

Table 2 shows a difference of 250 pilgrims between the PIHK report (1,050) and the Ministry of Religion's data (800). This significant difference shows weaknesses in the governance of non-quota hajj administration. According to Donald F. Kettl (1993), there are three main dimensions in administrative analysis: inter-institutional coordination, data integration, and institutional accountability. The cases of PT Amanah Haji Utama (a difference of 70) and PT Safar Furoda (a difference of 140) show weak data integration, because the PIHK data is not in line with the data of the Ministry of Religion. PT Nurul Ikhlas, with a difference of 30 based on qualitative findings, indicates a coordination problem, because information is not managed transparently between the organizer and the government. When linked to the indicators of public service failure according to Heinrich & Malatesta (2022), this difference in data reflects outcome failure because it can potentially cause pilgrims to fail to depart. In addition, data inaccuracy is a form of procedural failure that damages the administration's legitimacy. The data

misynchronization also triggers public distrust of PIHK and the Ministry of Religion, exacerbating service dysfunction. Thus, the combination of Kettl and Heinrich's theories shows that the main problems are not only in the technical aspects of administration, but also in the weak integration of institutions, coordination of information, and guarantees of accountability. Reform of the integrated data system between PIHK and the Ministry of Religion is urgently needed to restore credibility and increase protection for non-quota pilgrims.

Table 3. Qualitative Interview Findings

No	Findings Categories	Description of Findings
1	Outcome Failure	Many pilgrims were not sent off, even though they had paid in full
2	Data Mismatch	The pilgrims' names do not appear in Saudi Arabia's visa system
3	Weak Coordination	PIHK blames Kemenag, Kemenag blames PIHK, no public clarification
4	Weak Coordination	PIHK blames Kemenag, Kemenag blames PIHK, no public clarification
5	Unclear Regulations	Mujamalah Visa is not controlled nationally, and there is no audit mechanism.

Source: Research Results 2025

Table 3 show data simulation, it can be seen that there is a gap between the number of registrants and the pilgrims who actually departed. Almost 37% of the total pilgrims experienced service failure. The main problem lies in the unsynchronized data between PIHK and Kemenag and the weak administrative supervision of the non-quota hajj route (table 4).

Table 4. Qualitative Findings Interview Results

No	Findings categories	Interview results
1	Outcome Failure	"I had paid IDR 300 million, but canceled my departure for no apparent reason."

2	Performance Data Misalignment	"My name was not found when checked into the Saudi Arabian visa system."
3	Weak Inter-Agency Coordination	"PIHK said that Kemenag was slow, Kemenag said that PIHK was not officially registered."
4	Weak Administrative Resilience	"We waited for clarification for days, but there was no official response."
5	Unclear Regulations	"The mechanism for the Mujamalah Visa is unclear, and it is also unknown who controls it."

Source: Research Results 2025

Discussion

The failure to hold the Furoda Hajj 2025 reflects technical weaknesses and fundamental administrative failures. Heinrich's (2021) and Kettl's (2016) perspectives show that weak accountability for results, coordination, institutional capacity, and inability to adapt are the root of the problem that needs to be corrected through more transparent, integrated, and responsive governance. First, Outcome Failure is clearly seen when hundreds of Furoda Hajj 2025 pilgrims fail to depart despite having paid in full, sent suitcases, and obtained visa administrative approval. This aligns with Heinrich, who emphasized the importance of tangible achievements, not just procedural outputs. Interviews with PIHK's Operational Director and members of the House of Representatives showed the great losses suffered by the pilgrims. At the same time, the weak coordination across institutions indicates the low effectiveness and accountability, as explained by Kettl.

Second, Performance Data Misalignment reflects weak information management. The data between PIHK, Sharia in Saudi Arabia, and SSKOHAT is not synchronized, so many visas are refused. Kettl emphasized the importance of bureaucratic coordination. However, the interview results showed that the absence of a cross-agency dashboard made Furoda pilgrims feel like "ghost data" that neither the Ministry of Religion nor the Consulate could help with. Third, the Disempowerment of Frontline Workers shows the

weakness of PIHK's managerial capacity. Field officers are not given crisis training or decision-making authority, even though they are the spearhead of the service. This aligns with Kett's findings on the importance of strengthening administrative capacity, because bureaucracies that are only strong in planning without contingency readiness are prone to fail to deal with emergencies.

Fourth, the Lack of User-Centered Design shows that PIHK does not understand the real needs of pilgrims, especially older people. Service packages are made uniformly without a needs survey, so public service accountability is not achieved (Common et al., 2016). As revealed by the DPR, many PIHKs do not have post-hajj evaluations, but are still given operational permits. This emphasizes the weak accountability system of results. Fifth, Failure to Learn and adapt marks low administrative resilience. Although similar problems have occurred in previous years, the evaluation of the PIHK is only a formality and does not result in systemic changes. Kettl emphasized the importance of an adaptive bureaucracy, but interviews show that the fallback mechanism or crisis scenario has never been prepared by either PIHK or the Ministry of Religion.

The results of interviews with non-quota pilgrims show that there are five categories of public service failures. First, the statement "I have paid IDR 300 million, but canceled my departure without a clear reason" reflects outcome failure (Heinrich, 2021), which is the failure of the institution to ensure the final results residents expect. This aligns with Kettl (2016), who emphasized the importance of institutional accountability in public administration. Second, "my name was not found when checked against the Saudi Arabian visa system" describes performance data misalignment, which is the misalignment between PIHK and official authorities. In Kettl's perspective, this shows the weakness of information management that is the foundation of administrative decision-making. Third, the statement "PIHK says the Ministry of Religion is slow, the Ministry of Religion says PIHK is not officially listed" shows weak inter-agency coordination, a classic issue in Kett's theory of interconnectedness between policy actors.

Meier et al. (2019) view of governance failure is also relevant, that traditional bureaucracies tend to get caught up in blaming each other instead of collaboration. Fourth, "we are waiting for clarification for days, no official response" reflects low administrative resilience, where the bureaucracy fails to provide mitigation mechanisms

in emergencies. This emphasizes that public services are not enough to rely only on procedural routines, but also require organizational resilience. Fifth, "The Mujamalah Visa is unclear, the mechanism, who is in control, also does not know," highlights ambiguous regulations. Kettl (2016) emphasizes that accountability will be weakened without a clear regulatory framework. This view is in line with the theory of policy Wagenaar (2017), where the lack of clarity of rules opens up space for free interpretation, so that policy implementation becomes inconsistent. According to Heinrich, the field findings confirm Kettl's theoretical framework on the importance of coordination, data integration, and accountability, while strengthening the indicators of public service failure. Coupled with the concept of governance failure, the case of the 2025 non-quota hajj confirms the need for administrative reform that is more adaptive, transparent, and oriented to the interests of citizens.

It should be noted that the practice of non-quota hajj, or known as hajj furoda, does not only occur in Indonesia. Several other countries, such as Malaysia and Turkey, have similar schemes to accommodate people who want to perform the hajj outside the government's official quota. This shows that non-quota hajj is a global issue that requires strong institutional governance to run legally, transparently, and protect the rights of the clock. Malaysia has a Furada Hajj scheme is strictly regulated through official institutions and in collaboration with accredited travel operators (Muneeza & Mustapha, 2021). This aims to ensure that pilgrims get certainty of visa legality, legal protection, and adequate service guarantees. Meanwhile, Turkey implements a more transparent system in distributing non-quota visas, with direct supervision from the country's religious institutions with strong legitimacy (Akbulut & Ekin, 2018). This comparison shows that Indonesia still faces serious weaknesses in institutional governance, especially in the aspects of supervision and regulation, which have implications for the vulnerability of pilgrims to fraudulent practices and maladministration.

This cross-country comparative analysis indicates that there is a gap between ideal public governance norms and the reality of Indonesian bureaucracy in managing the issue of non-quota hajj. On the one hand, there is a high demand from the public to obtain alternative access to go on hajj amid limited official quotas. However, on the other hand, the weak mechanisms of supervision, transparency, and law enforcement have led

to rampant practices of fraud, abuse of permits, and failure to depart pilgrims. This confirms the existence of institutional failure rooted in the lack of inter-institutional integration, as well as the dominance of the economic interests of non-state actors in the administrative process.

This issue can also be positioned within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework, especially SDG 16 on Peace, Justice, and Resilient Institutions (Hope Sr, 2020). The management of non-quota hajj should reflect how the state is present in providing fair, accountable, and free public services from corrupt practices. The administrative failure in the case of Haji Furoda 2025 shows that public institutions are not fully able to fulfill these principles, so that public trust in the state is eroded. Thus, governance reform, regulatory transparency, and collaboration with international actors must be strengthened so that implementing the hajj pilgrimage—official and non-quota—aligns with fair and sustainable governance values. From this analysis, it can be emphasized that improving the governance of non-quota hajj in Indonesia is not only an administrative technical issue, but also part of a strategic effort to strengthen the country's legitimacy in the eyes of the public. By emulating good practices from other countries, Indonesia can develop more effective monitoring mechanisms, build a public accountability system, and ultimately realize the goals of SDG 16 in the context of religious services.

Based on the results of data analysis and discussion, the researcher recommends the following policies:

1. Strengthening Non-Quota Hajj Regulations Policy

Revise and harmonize regulations related to the implementation of Hajj Mujamalah (non-quota) by clarifying responsibilities, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and limits of authority between PIHK and the government. The goal is to avoid legal ambiguity and increase legal certainty for pilgrims and organizers. So that there were no 532 pilgrims who failed to depart.

2. Integrated Data Verification and Synchronization.

Data shows that 36.7 percent of pilgrims failed to depart due to data synchronization issues between PIHK, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Saudi authorities. Therefore, building an integrated digital system between PIHK, the Ministry

of Religion, and the Saudi Arabian visa system is necessary to ensure the accuracy and real-time tracking of pilgrim data. The goal is to overcome performance data misalignment, which is the root of many administrative failures.

3. Stricter Supervision and Certification of PIHK

The number of PIHKs indicated to be unprofessional or not financially feasible contributes to rampant fraud and failure of departures—stricter PIHK Supervision and Certification. The government needs to implement a regular accreditation and audit system for PIHKs, including evaluation of track record and financial feasibility. The goal is to prevent violations, fraud, and unprofessional administration.

4. Increasing the Capacity of Bureaucratic Response (Administrative Resilience)

Increasing Bureaucratic Response Capacity (Administrative Resilience). The slow response of the Ministry of Religion in handling thousands of pilgrims who failed to depart shows the low resilience of the bureaucracy in the face of the crisis. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and related agencies must prepare a rapid response unit to handle public service crises such as failure to depart or mass fraud. The goal is to improve the government's ability to respond to emergencies and maintain public trust.

5. Transparency and Public Education About Non-Quota Hajj

The lack of official information makes pilgrims vulnerable to misleading information spread by irresponsible parties. Create official and educational information channels (website, hotline, direct socialization) about procedures, risks, and legality of non-quota hajj. The goal is to protect pilgrims from misleading information and increase public legal awareness.

6. Complaints and Loss Recovery Mechanism

Failure to depart that causes financial losses for pilgrims shows the weakness of the state's compensation and accountability system. The government is obliged to provide an effective and fast public complaint mechanism and a compensation or refund scheme for aggrieved pilgrims. The goal is to provide administrative justice and strengthen service accountability.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the study, the failure to hold the Furoda Hajj 2025 is mainly reflected in the outcome failure, where hundreds of pilgrims fail to depart despite fulfilling all administrative and financial obligations. The main factors that trigger failures include data mismatches between systems, weak empowerment of frontline workers, and the absence of service designs centered on the needs of pilgrims. Weaknesses in regulation, coordination, and supervision further exacerbate the situation, plus the failure of relevant institutions to learn and adapt from previous experiences. Therefore, future improvements must be focused on clear regulations, cross-agency data integration, field human resource empowerment, user-based service design, and adaptive evaluation mechanisms so that similar failures do not repeat. And there is a need for reform in the management of the implementation of non-quota hajj through strengthening regulations, increasing technology-based supervision capacity, and enforcing administrative sanctions to PIHK that violates the provisions. The state must not ignore the administrative aspect of worship services, because that is where the responsibility and legitimacy of the state are tested in front of the public. Heinrich's (2021) approach is very suitable for identifying modern public service failures in terms of outcomes, organizational structure, service design, and adaptability. If it is associated with the Kettl (1993) approach, it can be concluded that: Public service failures are not only due to technical errors, but also due to institutions that are unable to manage, coordinate, and adapt.

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