

## Sociology of Religious Extremism in the Malay World: A Preliminary Analysis

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### Suggested Citation:

Qoumas, Yaqut Cholil; Rahim, Rahimin Affandi Abdul; Rahman, Mohammad Taufiq; Sakhok, Jazilus. (2023). Sociology of Religious Extremism in the Malay World: A Preliminary Analysis. *Temali: Jurnal Pembangunan Sosial*. Volume 6, Number 1: 55-64. <http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/jt.v6i1.24001>.

### Article's History:

Received March 2023; Revised May 2023; Accepted May 2023.  
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### Abstract

The Malay World is known as an area inhabited by gentle and peace-loving people. This happens because this area has a history of interacting with foreign nations and major world religions. However, this image of peace changed when extremist movements appeared in the name of *salafi jihad*. The main objective of this study is to analyze the Islam-based sociology of extremism based on literature sources. It consists of primary and secondary sources produced by extremists and religious authorities. The data from these two sources are analyzed critically and use a historical perspective to identify the details of this religious extremism's teachings. This study found that the religious extremism detected in the Malay world stems from the understanding of the concepts of *takfir* and *jihad* that deviate from the teachings of Islam. These two concepts have been brought to life by the neo-Khawarij (Salafi Jihad) movement that uses ICT, especially modern social media. This causes this religious extremism movement to be welcomed by some community members.

**Keywords:** excommunication; extremism; Malay nature; Salafi jihad; takfir

### INTRODUCTION

Syeikh Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain bin Mustafa Al-Fatani narrated the position of Malay World and its people through the book *Tashilul Amani fi Syarah Awamil al-Jurjani*. This book was completed on 12 Rabiul Awal 1300H/January 21, 1883 AD (Mohd & Abdullah, 2004). The Malay region is *Negeri Di Bawah Angin* [The Land

Under the Wind] on the world map with a specific community character (Laffan, 2003). Malays are said to be sincere, forgiving, not begging, beautiful and refined in their art, and have extraordinary knowledge:

is a group of residents of the Malay Islands; Malay (pronounced) 'mim' with the bottom line, or 'mim' with the top line and 'ya' read with the front line. They are a group of people who have glory among humans, their country is the most fertile in the world, it is located between the Indian countries and China, it has many protected areas (during navigation). Geographers call half of their country Hindi and China and half of Hijaz (Makkah and Medina) name the other, that is, most of the population is called Java. They are in a large group, they respect a language that is lighter than the language of the people of the area. For this reason, many people use it among Hijaz members due to the interaction of the people involved who are made up of various languages. The Malay population is a race that always has sincere intentions, and is far from greedy and has a forgiving nature. Special to any party who has never seen their country and others among them have never begged despite being in dire poverty. They have elegance in daily affairs, the fineness of handicraft art, have the power of creativity to make the results easy to export. Having knowledge and scientific knowledge but being seized and colonized causes stunted development. Their countries were oppressed and colonized by the infidels. May the Islamic countries be protected from Allah's wrath. Amen.

This means the Malays have unique characteristics that distinguish them from other races. Therefore, the presence of external influences can be identified quickly and immediately. These external influences can reshape the specific attributes of the Malays.

The Malay world does have a history of interacting with various foreign nations. Among them are Arabs, Persians, Chinese, and Europeans. It also includes the world's major religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity (Lopez, 2001). Therefore, from external relations and exposure, Malay world society is very dynamic, a meeting place of various cultures and great civilizations worldwide. This process takes place somewhat and reciprocally. It is motivated by the nature of Malay world society, which is open to external influences.

It is informed that thoughts can come from other cultures and places that influence the community of other locations. Although this process may differ, the basic idea remains the same. Edward Said confirms this with his theory of the journey of ideas by asserting, "Like people and schools of criticism, ideas, and theories travel from person to person, from situation to situation, and from one period to another" (Said, 1983, p. 226). Coinciding with this view, the Malay world region often accepts various Islamic thoughts. It starts from traditionalism, reformation, neo-sufism, and liberalism. All these understandings can generate healthy exclusive ideas to empower Islamic thinking. But this reality began to be scratched by the spread of Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi Malay world ideology. It is interesting to analyze the details of the Salafi Jihad ideology that forms the basis of the current religious extremism movement.

It turns out that the index of Islamic extremist activity in Southeast Asia is increasing every year. The United Nations and the terrorism research center in Singapore issued this index. It found that this ideology of extremism stems from the doctrine of Salafi Jihad (Iviarquardt & Heffelfinger, 2014). Proven despite various efforts, Southeast Asian governments have done Counterterrorism, the activities of gaining support, sympathy, and recruiting new members have increased. It is made through social media channels and science and technology in the country involved. It was done covertly without the government being aware of it.

This phenomenon has changed the construction of Malay world society, which was previously known as a peaceful area with its people loving peace compared to other sites (Zakaria, 2003). Even more frightening, the United States has categorized this region of Southeast Asia as a hotspot or hotbed of Islamic terrorist movements. It started with al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyyah and Daesh. They aimed to intervene in this area "supposedly" to help eradicate Islamic extremism (Mizan, 2016).

The Salafi movement is divided into three types: Salafi Dakwah, Salafi Politics, and Salafi Jihad. The two early Salafis (preaching and politics) invited the community to stick to what was practiced by generations of the *salaf* and hostile acts of extremism. While Salafi Jihad uses a revolutionary-violent approach to achieve its goals. On that basis, Salafi Jihad is considered a new form of "neo *khawarij*" that arose after the death of Sayyid Qutb (Wiktorowicz, 2005). They fight to establish an Islamic state that enforces Islamic law through revolution. They do not tolerate deviant elements such as *bid'ah* in society and will try to eliminate them through violence (Bin Ali, 2012).

Kate Ferguson, a terrorism researcher, thinks that the influence of Salafi Jihad is like a fire in a husk, proliferating without being noticed, and is gaining young people's support in Malaysia. The Internet is the primary media for spreading this understanding, which is done quite effectively (Ferguson, 2016). This is because these young people are more exposed to the Internet, which is more open, interactive, and global.

The reality of the Internet's influence in spreading the ideology of terrorism is evident by understanding this statement. Abu Hassan Hasbullah (2008) said that society depends on the Internet. Thus, outside influences today sneak in through this technology (Hasbullah, 2008):

The Internet had become a kind of "new religion" for the 21st century and for centuries to come, taking over the same faith that was once given to television as soon as the GE Octagon machine was invented in 1928 and throughout the 20th century when the culture of human existence was formed from the effects of the influence that radiated through this glass screen. Although the role of television seems to be still strong, its position as the most influential and powerful media, which is trusted by the human community as a great source of information, has experienced quite a drop in the value of trust when the Internet with its entire network of sci-tech (science-techno) gravitas such as Search Engines Engine, for example Yahoo, Google), Browsers such as Windows Explorer, Safari, Netscape, AOL, Looksmart, Lycos, Flock, Opera, Mozilla Firefox and others; Sites (Websites), Portals, of course the fastest to take over the role of traditional media practices are E-Mail, and Weblogs and their networks such as Chat/Messenger, Guestbook, Comments, ShoutBox/ShoutMix, which are included with organizational or community applications through the system of Groups, Forums, for example Yahoo Groups, Dotmac Groups, Google Groups have developed a brand new and extraordinary way of managing a living with the ability to generate and mechanize the formation and dissemination of information more openly, widely, and widely without having any boundaries.

The power and influence of the Internet are further strengthened by the abilities and strengths of alternative media that are established from the roles of traditional media, namely printing (newspapers, magazines, books) and electronics (radio, television, and film) through cyber machinery such as MySpace, Friendster, Facebook, which is a community in nature; Twitter, del.ici.ous, Magnolia, which is a newsletter network; Flickr, YouTube, WebTV, iTunes, Daily Motion, Metacafe, Vimeo, OurMedia, and others that are of a personal broadcasting nature that can distribute copies of images or graphics, films, radio, and television repeatedly without having any further obstacles in terms of time, places, targets including ideologies and policies that are characteristic in and the responsibility of traditional media movements (Bartha et al., 2020).

Admittedly, current technological developments have a lot of influence on users, especially among teenagers, who make social media the primary information search agent. Results from a survey of TNS' Connected Life released that more than three-fifths or 62 percent of internet users in Malaysia access social media networks every day compared to 42 percent worldwide. 52 percent of internet users in Malaysia use short messaging services daily, 35 percent reach for their mobile phones before getting out of bed, and 34 percent use their phones before bed (Fadzil & Long, 2015).

This can explain why some internet users are easily influenced by what is channeled or found online. A study by Mohd Mizan Aslam (Mizan, 2016) and Azazuddin Mohd Sani (2016) found an increase in Malaysian students inside and outside the state influenced by Daesh propaganda. Malaysian students are also said to be influenced by social media sites belonging to Daesh (A. S. A. Hassan & Sauffiyah, 2016).

## METHOD

This qualitative research uses library research as the data source (Silverman, 2013). Library research on the sociology of extremism in Malay lands involves identifying related topics or themes, conducting a comprehensive search for relevant information and resources, evaluating each source carefully, and synthesizing data to draw conclusions and develop research findings (Miles & Huberman, 2013; Spohr, 2017). This research is described by analyzing a network of texts that promote extremism within the Islamic tradition, which references contemporary Islamic-based extremism. Thus, this research can show the logic of contemporary extremism that can influence the discourse of extremism in the Malay world.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Salafi teachings of *Jihad* include several main points. The following are the details of the Salafi teachings and their discussion.

### Application of the loose concept of takfir

The Salafi Jihad movement adheres to and loosely applies the takfir concept to the enemy. This action resembles a Khawarij approach. The Khawarij group, as the earliest religious extremists, has several central beliefs (Green, 2009):

1. Understanding Islam in the Quran and Sunnah must be taken literally and wholly practiced.
2. Only their views are correct, and anyone who disagrees with them will be declared a kafir, and his blood is halal. Even worse, all family members of groups who disagree with them are halal for their blood, including women and children.
3. The area where they live will be considered Dar Islam, while other Islamic areas are *Dar al-Kufr* which must be fought. The entire population of this Dar al-Kufr district is of the same rank as polytheism, regardless of whether it is an adult or a child.
4. Anyone who commits major or minor sins continuously will become an absolute *kafir*, and if he dies, he will remain in hell.

Similarities between Salafi Jihad idealism and Khawarij can be seen in the Salafi Jihad belief that divides the Muslim community according to their beliefs. For them, society in modern times is divided into four types (Hafez, 2010):

1. Government *taghut* (misguided and tyrannical) among Muslims who do not practice and refuse to adopt the Islamic Sharia system. They no longer belong to the category of Muslims, and their main crime is opposing and persecuting Muslims who want to implement Islamic Shariah in the country's life.
2. Apostates who oppose principles *Al Wala Wal Bara* (obey Islam and free oneself from the Kafir group). They cooperated with external pagan powers. It consists of security personnel, government employees, police, and all parties who want to maintain the government *taghut* directly or indirectly.
3. Heretics and polytheists who violate the principle of monotheism brought by orthodox Sunni scholars. Most importantly, it is against what the Salafi and Wahhabi groups bring. This label is given to Shiites and Baha'is in Iran, Ahmadis in Pakistan, and Sufis in most Muslim countries.
4. True Muslims who support the efforts of extremists. They also do not support the government *taghut* and avoid being influenced by Western cultural activities. This group refers to the Sunni community in most of the Islamic world.

For Salafi Jihad, the best method to deal with the first group is to fight them per Quranic verse 5:44, which means "*Whoever does not punish with what Allah has revealed because of disbelief, then they are the disbelievers*" as their main argument. They need to be instructed to repent from the mistake and change the country's policy; failure to do so the status of *kafir* will be imposed. As a result, this first group will be executed without mercy. It is the responsibility of religion to declare their infidelity. Failure to do so becomes a grave sin.

For the second and third groups, there are three main views. First, it is necessary to avoid disbelieving these two groups even if they are seen as tending to support the *taghut* group. A careful investigation needs to be done before the takfir process is done. Second, it is allowed to disbelieve them in general for supporting the government *taghut* and infidel power. Even their status is considered the same as *taghut* power involved. Even more extreme, it asserts that anyone who supports power *taghut* and foreign powers is considered an infidel and allowed to kill them. The essential victims are the Shiites, who are not entitled to the protection given to the Sunnis.

Modern scholars assert that the ideology of al-Qaeda and ISIL is a *Jihad-Salafi* trend. They all stick to *Takfir, Hakimiyah, Hijrah, Jihad, and Dar Harb Dar Islam*. It has become the main essence of the al-Qaeda movement. They are increasingly spreading this ideology of takfir which describes how the image of Islam is negative to non-Muslim opponents and fellow Muslims themselves (Marsella, 2004).

Indeed, there is a connection between the concept of takfir of the Salafi Jihad movement and the idealism of early scholars. The modern Salafi Jihad movement has added to the thoughts of Ibn Taimiyyah, Muhammad Abdul Wahab, and Sayyid Qutb (Moussalli & Mawṣilī, 1992). Efforts to compare the takfir ideology of past

scholars with al-Qaeda's beliefs have been made by Aaron Y. Zelin (Zelin, 2010), Michael Doran, and Quintan Viktorovich. They found that there was indeed a similarity between the two. This can be seen in several forms.

Among the similarities that can be mentioned is the first action of Ibn Taimiyyah, labeling the Mongol rulers as enemies of Islam because al-Qaeda copied the damage done to Islamic civilization to all Islamic rulers who adopted the Western system (Doran, 2002). Similarly, al-Qaeda also claimed that Christians could be killed because they help the enemy of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

When Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farrag declared the rulers of Egypt to be infidels, it asserted that they had apostatized because of their collaboration with the former (infidel) colonial powers. They remain infidel, even though they pray fast and consider themselves Muslims (Farrag, 2000). This argument is equivalent to what Ibn Taimiyyah said. It states that the Mongol rulers still adhere to the Yasa legal system despite recognizing themselves as Muslims. On that basis, they still cannot be considered as Muslims. In this matter, Ibn Taimiyyah has strengthened his argument by giving Quranic verse 8:39, which means, "*And fight them until there is no more slander, and (until) the religion becomes entirely (free) for God alone*".

Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farrag based his view by quoting the words of Ibn Taimiyyah in his work *Majmu' al-Fatawa*. As a result, he thinks that anyone who does not implement Allah's *shari'a* has *shirk* and *jihad* must be done to bring them down. Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farrag (Farrag, 2000, p. 26) states:

Indeed scholars of the Muslims were agreed that when the rebellious group abstains from some *mutawatir* (clear-cut) obligations of Islam, fighting them becomes compulsory. If they say the *shahadah* (declaration of faith) but refuse to pray, pay zakat, fast in the month of Ramadan, perform Hajj, judge between themselves by the Qur'an and sunnah, or refuse to prohibit evil deeds (such as) (consuming) alcohol, marrying those who are prohibited to marry, legalizing killing and stealing wealth with no cause, dealing in usury, gambling, or (failing) to fight against the disbelievers or imposing jizyah on people of the scripture or other things from the Islamic *shari'ah*, they must be fought until all of the religion is for Allah.

Action Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farrag, who too quickly disbelieves his opponent, resembles the Khawarij approach. On that basis, his group, *Takfir wa'l Hijrah*, is seen to be causing many problems in Egyptian society. In this question, Steven Brook explains the tactics Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farrag coincided with the tactics previously used by Ibn Taimiyyah (Brooke, 2008, p. 206):

Farrag also borrows one of Ibn Taimiyyah's rhetorical devices to ensure that the obligation for revolution is clear. When Ibn Taimiyyah had to persuade Muslims to attack the Mongols, he portrayed them as Kharijites, an early deviant sect of Islam. There was wide justification among early Muslims to fight the Kharijites. Farrag improves on the device when he explains that the leaders of Egypt are "more rebellious against the laws of Islam than . . . the Kharijites."

Second, the *takfir* approach Muhammad Abdul Wahab which is too easy to disbelieve the enemy is entirely imitated by al-Qaeda (Brooke, 2008). The concept of modern ignorance brought by Sayyid Qutb (Rahman, 2014) is imitated by al-Qaeda, which believes that Islamic rulers who do not practice Islamic Sharia must be eliminated through violent methods. In this matter, Nicholas Bellerose (Bellerose, 2015, p. 47) affirmed:

They expands on the theory of takfir to the point where almost everyone is considered kufr. He based his version on the Prophet words: "When a man calls his brother an infidel, we can be sure that one of them is indeed an infidel". Following these words, those who support Dr. Fadl views believe they have 'a divine right to kill those who disagree with their warped view of what constitutes a Muslim. The "Compendium" gave Al Qaeda and its allies a warrant to murder all who stood in their way.' As such, many supporters classify as apostates those who are engaging or supporting the War on Terror on Muslim lands such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to justify the killing of people, groups like AQ are adding the Quranic verse 2:194 to these references: 'So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you. And fear Allah and know that Allah is with those who fear Him'. The verses are binding to 'punishments for infidels, for the licentious Muslims, and for oppressors'. This narrative is borrowed to the extreme by Al-Takfir wa'l Hijra, which considers a kafir anyone who refuses to be part of this group as an enemy of God.

He added again;

almost every Islamic radical group has a clear target that they identify as *kufir*, the rulers in the Middle East, the Jews, the Christians and the Americans. Zawahiri defines the 'governments ruling over Muslim lands to be illegitimate and apostate [...] and any persons collaborating or engaging with those entities'. In his publication *The Basis of Loyalty and Separation in Islam*, he goes further and bans imitating with the unbelievers because their place is in hell. On the other hand, bin Laden perceived the takfir concept very broadly with a special attention placed on the crusader-Zionist alliance. Involved in this coalition are pagans that need to be fought 'until there is no more tumult or oppression, and justice and faith in God prevail'. As for AQI leader Zarqawi, he was trained and educated by takfiri in a warfare environment. He saw politicians, the Shiites Muslims, police, military and anybody 'collaborating with the government security apparatuses and especially those working with U.S. forces deemed traitors'. In the context of the Gulf War, the War on Terror and other Middle East internal conflicts, the concept gained in importance. Its original theological signification was not assessed extensively but Islamist radicals were able to take advantage of the situation. Many more young people joined jihadist groups in order to fight the *kufir* and recently, a similar discourse attracted them to ISIS.

Even worse, this ideology of *Takfir* is thoroughly copied by ISIS;

The system of takfir is a key component of ISIS strategy used to establish the ideological foundation of their Islamic State. It justifies their 'purification of the world from apostates by killing vast numbers of people'. Their version of these concepts pushed them to use violent and degrading practices such as slavery. It looks evident that ISIS methods are more extreme than other jihadist groups, but their narrative and their interpretation of this Islamic concept is very similar (Bellerose, 2015, pp. 48–49).

It includes policies that disbelieve all Muslims who refuse to accept the authority of ISIS has become a central theme of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi during his declaration as Caliph of ISIS.

In his first public appearance of June 2014, the new Caliph referred to several points made by other thinkers with regards to the impurities of the West and their negative consequences for Muslims living with infidels. A good believer is pulled 'away from his religion, disbelieves in Allah, and disgracefully submits to the manmade *shirk* (polytheistic) laws of the east and west, living despicably and disgracefully as a follower'. During his speech of May 2015, al-Baghdadi repeats this rhetoric and includes the apostates to be the near and far enemies: 'O Muslims, the apostate tyrannical rulers who rule your lands in the lands of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Mecca and Medina), Yemen, Shām (the Levant), Iraq, Egypt, North Africa, Khorasan, the Caucasus, the Indian Subcontinent, Africa, and elsewhere, are the allies of the Jews and Crusaders' (Bellerose, 2015, pp. 48–49).

### War and Terrorists as the Only Recognized Struggle Method

Khalid Abu Fadl has confirmed the group *Salafi Jihad* only considers the method of war as the only one that can be used to bring about change. It is in harmony with the crude mentality of the Saudi community in the Middle East, which saw the expansion of Wahhabism in the Middle East through this method. Similarly, the effort to purify the Wahhabi faith is more directed towards the purity of oneself and denying it to other parties. Wahabis only practice meaning, true monotheism as opposed to polytheism. In contrast, opponents practice *shirk* and heresy (el-Fadl, 2007).

These two concepts were combined according to the suitability of the struggle of the radical movement by Abdus Salam Faraj. It also adheres to the concept *al wala' wal bara'* based on the words *la ilaha illa Allah* by giving a pledge of loyalty to Allah SWT and avoiding anything against His Sharia. They also believe that through this concept, they can help them identify who is hostile to Islam, whether Muslims themselves or the infidels and enable them to carry out *qital jihad* and abolish all other teachings of *jihad* in Islam.

In debating this *qital jihad*, they have introduced the terminology of global *jihad*, which is *jihad* against a distant enemy, the United States, or offensive *jihad* (Haron & Hussin, 2013). It means *jihad* against infidels who are hostile to Muslims. This Jihad is based on evidence from Surah At Taubah: 123, which means, "O you who believe! Fight the polytheists who are close to you; and let them feel the violent attitude that you have; and know, indeed, Allah is with the pious" who invites to fight the polytheist infidels. In addition, there is also a defensive

jihad which is a jihad to defend the rights and dignity of the Islamic country which is based on Surah Al-Mumtahanah: 8, which means "Allah does not forbid you from doing good and being fair to those who did not fight you because of your religion and did not expel you from your hometown" which allows people to act justly and well towards infidels who do not fight Islam. All these jihad terms are made to destroy the group *taghut* and establish the state or *Islamic State* and this ideology has placed the law of this *qital jihad* is *farḍu ain* (obligatory acts) as based on Surah At Taubah verse 5 and 36, which means "So when the respected months are over, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, and capture them, and bind them, and spy on them in every place they spy on." And "And fight the polytheist disbelievers as a whole as they fight you as a whole; and know that Allah is with the pious" which is known as *Ayatus So'if* and referred to eliminating more than 120 jihad verses other than war jihad (Wardani, 2010).

### Rejection of Scientific Culture

The activities of the al-Qaeda movement are more focused on war. This causes them to be stuck in the problem of ignorance and confusion of knowledge. It happens due to not being educated in the world of knowledge. On the other hand, they spend more time-fighting *jihad* without a sufficient supply of Islamic knowledge. This can be seen in al-Qaeda figures such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and Djamel Zitouni; who all received minimal Islamic education (Drennan, 2008).

We can see the reality of neglecting this knowledge-seeking program in practical activities and through several statements by al-Qaeda leaders. David Aaron has collected a collection of al-Qaeda leaders' speeches that directly show the phenomenon of *jihad* is more important than the science program. At the same time, the foundation of a movement should be focused on the process of seeking knowledge. What is clear is that although the foundation of the al-Qaeda movement is said to be based on the Salafi belief that emphasizes the effort to do *ijtihad* and oppose sectarian imitation, this is indeed ignored by al-Qaeda. Knowledge programs that can only be done through scientific research (*ijtihad*) are not emphasized. On the other hand, they are involved in blind imitation when each member must adhere to the indoctrination program set by al-Qaeda.

Among the examples of the collection of al-Qaeda leaders' speeches compiled by David Aaron (Aaron, 2008) are:

1. "How can someone who specializes in religious studies (Islam) and who knows about minor and major sins not realize the importance of *jihad*, and the punishment for delaying or neglecting it" (Aaron, 2008, p. 188).
2. "The wall of oppression and humiliation cannot be destroyed except in a rain of bullets" (Laden, 2007).
3. "We must understand the nature of battle and conflict. Our enemies will not give us our rights without Jihad" (Al-Zarqawi, 2005).

### Highlighting Sadistic Images of Islam

This belief in *takfir*, which was opposed entirely by scholars in the past, proved to be true. It is judged from the character of *Jihad Salafis*, who are challenging, confident, proud, and without remorse for the consequences of their actions. This is because they do not appreciate the nature of compassion towards fellow human beings, especially non-Muslims, who are considered the eternal enemies of Muslims.

Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan asserts that (M. H. Hassan, 2017) according to ISIS, the status of infidelity occurs when;

1. A Muslim who commits a grave sin.
2. Leaders and people who do not practice Sharia.
3. Any group that is not a member of ISIS.
4. the group that refuses to label the enemies of ISIS as infidels.
5. Muslims who live in *Dar Harb* and refuse to migrate to *Dar Islam* under the rule of ISIS. Christians and Jews are considered infidels rather than People of the Book because of their ties to the powers of Western colonialism and Zionism. They are considered close partners in a Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world.
6. They create a binary understanding (there are opposing enemies, *Dar Harb* and *Dar Islam*). *Dar Harb* is the absolute enemy of Islam. They are hostile to all new things that come from the West. The West is considered a battlefield that must be fought, and violence is carried out that sacrifices the lives of

residents and community assets. They strongly encourage their followers to antagonize and fight against all elements associated with the West.

7. The young generation of Muslims is encouraged to get involved in fighting the infidels as an antithesis to the Muslims, who are said to be attaining the status of martyrs if they are willing to sacrifice themselves in suicide bombings.

Based on three primary references of the ISIS movement made online: *Aqidah Wa Manhaj Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Fi Al-Takfir, Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid Li Al-Mu`askaratand Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna*, The group of disbelievers consists of (M. H. Hassan, 2017):

1. Adherents of the Shia sect and those who refuse to disbelieve them.
2. Political parties based on the concepts of Nationalism, Communism, and Democracy and all involved.
3. Governments that do not practice Sharia include all members of its administration.
4. Civilians and groups involved in the administration of Western-made civil law.

In Malaysia, the approach of takfir accompanied by the nature of no mercy is also detected. On June 23, 2016, a video titled *Thogut*, a Daesh member from Malaysia known as Mohd Rafi gave a shocking statement. It is specifically aimed at the Muslim community in Malaysia; *kill them wherever you find them. If you have a car, hit them. Use weapons and knives to stab them directly in the chest". It also warned the Malaysian police; to those of you in Bukit Aman, you are no longer safe. We are ready to slaughter you. When we come, our friends in this country will also hunt you down"* (Jani, 2017).

The most significant danger of this concept of takfir is that it makes a person an extreme fanatic. If a person is convinced that his belief is based on the Quran and Sunnah, it is considered absolute truth. Coupled with the ignorance of understanding the text literally, it denies the right to truth to others (Green, 2009).

Ironically, this concept of *takfir* is not accompanied by good morals. It usually happens because there is no deep understanding of Sufism. Most importantly, it is driven by a lack of understanding and a desire to reasonably understand the opposing party's arguments. Even if an opponent's argument is evaluated, it will be used world-view Alone.

The best example to show this fanaticism can be seen in the various forms of cruelty committed by ISIS against prisoners of war (Mударis, 2017). As reported by Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2013), ISIS has done:

1. Random war-resistant killing. It is a form of revenge for the death of ISIS members in a war.
2. Killing of prisoners without a fair trial. There are cases where prisoners are forced to confess their guilt before being killed; *Amnesty International reported that captured members of insurgents who fought against ISIS were put to trial before being executed. However, these trials lasted less than a minute and did not give a fair opportunity for the captive to respond to the allegations* (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 13). It includes self-incarceration made based on the confession of one party only. This happened in the case of Sayyed Al-Hadrami, the leader of Jabhat Nusra, an ISIS ally, only because of the confession of his opponent, who accused Sayyed Al-Hadrami of apostasy of supporting the enemy (The Syrian Observer, 2014). In its actions, ISIS claimed to adhere to the views of the old scholar Ibn Nuhas, who allowed prisoners of war to be killed at the discretion of the leader of the Islamic movement (Bhatt, 2014). However, all these cases did not go through a fair trial process as prescribed by Islamic Sharia. Even ISIS is known as an extremist movement that likes to take the easy way out by killing all prisoners of war to save costs and time.
3. Extreme torture of prisoners of war. It involved beatings, pulling out the skin and nails, using electric torture, crucifixion, and confinement in a room without food or drink (Human Rights Council, 2014).

## CONCLUSION

The spread of Salafi Jihad ideology to the Malay World has scratched the peaceful image of Islam that was previously synonymous with the Malay community. Due to the development of ICT, especially social media, some community members have recently welcomed the ISIS movement. It is a mutation from the *Salafi Jihad* movement, which is more characteristic of the neo-Khawarij movement. It is much more violent that must be opposed by all walks of life.



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