Wittgenstein's Challenge: The Impossibility of a Private Language

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15575/jaqfi.v8i2.17417

Keywords:

External worl, Private language argument, Philosophy of language, Wittgeinstein

Abstract

The feasibility of a private language, a concept previously entertained by philosophers like Locke and Russell, is rigorously disputed by Wittgenstein in his later works. This article critically examines Wittgenstein’s standpoint on the notion of a private language, with a specific focus on its plausibility. It meticulously investigates the five arguments proffered by Wittgenstein against the concept of a private language and evaluates the counterarguments presented by his critics. These arguments encompass the future use argument, the interpretation argument, the stage-setting argument, the use argument, and the practice argument. Through a comprehensive analysis of these arguments, Wittgenstein substantiates the intrinsic unattainability of a private language. A privately defined word lacks the fundamental attributes of language, notably an established meaning, usability, prospective applicability, practical implications, interpretability, and a coherent framework governing the roles of its constituent elements. Ultimately, it is asserted that a private language cannot exist autonomously, separate from a public language.

Author Biography

Zainal Pikri, UIN Antasari Banjarmasin

Zainal Pikri obtained his PhD in Philosophy from Universiti Utara Malaysia in 2013 and MA in Philosophy from the University of Nottingham, UK, in 2004.  Currently, he is a lecturer at the Faculty of Dakwah and Communication Science, State Islamic University of Antasari Banjarmasin.  His research areas include philosophy of science, philosophy of law, religious studies and Islamic thought.

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Published

2023-11-09