Moral and Institutional Foundations of Preferences in Conventional and Islamic Economics

Abstract

This article presents a comparative analysis of preference structures in conventional and Islamic economics, with particular emphasis on their ethical, ontological, and behavioral foundations. In conventional economics, preferences are typically modeled as stable, self-interested, and value-neutral constructs. These assumptions underpin rational choice theory and the broader utility maximization framework, reflecting an individualistic orientation toward economic behavior. Islamic economics, by contrast, treats preferences as ethically guided and spiritually dynamic, shaped by maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (objectives of Islamic law), communal values, and moral consciousness. Preferences are thus viewed not merely as personal choices but as expressions of moral duty and social responsibility. Employing a qualitative methodology based on interpretive thematic analysis, the study synthesizes insights from classical and contemporary literature, institutional analysis, and behavioral perspectives. The findings reveal that while conventional models tend to overlook normative influences, Islamic economics embeds ethics within its core theoretical structure. Institutions such as zakāt, waqf, and ḥisbah play a pivotal role in aligning preferences with ethical and communal goals. This research contributes to the refinement of economic theory by proposing a pluralistic model that incorporates moral dimensions into preference analysis. It also offers practical implications for policy design in culturally diverse societies, advocating for frameworks that integrate ethical considerations into economic decision-making.