The Political Economy of Food Security: Overcoming Institutional Constraints in Indonesia

Abstract

Indonesia’s persistent food security challenges extend beyond agricultural output to institutional inefficiencies and political dynamics that obstruct policy effectiveness. This study explores the political economy of food security by investigating how institutional fragmentation, bureaucratic misalignment, and political incentives shape food governance outcomes. Employing a qualitative methodology rooted in institutional theory and political economy, the research draws on document analysis and thematic interpretation of policy documents, academic literature, and official reports. The findings show that decentralization has contributed to disjointed mandates and weak inter-agency coordination, while populist pressures and elite interests distort resource allocation and policy priorities. Nevertheless, policy opportunities exist through institutional harmonization, digital governance, local innovation, and stakeholder inclusion. The study contributes a nuanced understanding of food security governance in Indonesia and proposes systemic reforms to enhance institutional coherence, transparency, and responsiveness. These findings have implications for both theory and practice in designing more equitable and sustainable food systems.